R v Sheridan (No.2)

[2022] NSWSC 1634

Supreme Court

New South Wales

• Amendment notes

Medium Neutral Citation:

R v Sheridan (No.2) [2022] NSWSC 1634

Hearing dates:

18 November 2022

Date of orders:

09 December 2022

Decision date:

09 December 2022

Jurisdiction:

Common Law - Criminal

Before:

Garling J

Decision:

(1)   For the offence of the murder of Hamish Dunn, I impose a sentence of imprisonment comprising a non-parole period of 17 years with a balance of term of 8 years to commence on 16 March 2021.

(2)   The first date upon which the Offender will be eligible to be released on parole is 15 March 2038.

Catchwords:

CRIME — Murder — Sentence after trial —Deceased child killed in his bedroom — Finding of intention to kill — Objective seriousness of the offence fell just below the mid-range — History of mental illness and drug abuse and addiction — Offence occurred in the context of acute intoxication — Finding of remorse — Offender’s conduct prior to and at trial facilitated the administration of justice

Legislation Cited:

Crimes Act 1900 ss 19A(1), 23A

Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006

Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 Pt 4, Div 1A, ss 3A, 21A, 22, 22A, 30E(3), 44(2)

Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act 2020 ss 4, 28

Cases Cited:

Cheung v The Queen (2001) 209 CLR 1; [2001] HCA 67

Madden v R [2011] NSWCCA 254

Markarian v R (2005) 228 CLR 357; [2005] HCA 25

Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39

R v Gagalowicz [2005] NSWCCA 452

R v Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346; [1999] NSWCCA 111

R v Isaacs (1997) 41 NSWLR 374

The Queen v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270; [1999] HCA 54

Texts Cited:

Not applicable

Category:

Sentence

Parties:

The Crown
Chadley Sheridan (Offender)

Representation:

Counsel:
P Hogan (Crown)
B Robinson (Offender)

Solicitors:
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown)
Ramsland Laidler Solicitors (Offender)

File Number(s):

2021/74828

Publication restriction:

The name of the child victim must not be published or broadcast in a way that connects them with these proceedings: s 15A of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987

Judgment

1. On 15 March 2021, Hamish Dunn (“the Deceased”) was killed by strangulation by Chadley Sheridan (“the Offender”) whilst in his bedroom at home at Charlestown in the Newcastle area.

2. The Offender was arrested in the early hours of the following morning, 16 March 2021, and charged with the murder of the Deceased.

3. On 15 September 2022, after a trial which lasted seven days, a jury found the Offender guilty of the murder of the Deceased.

4. It is now time for the Offender to be sentenced for his crime.

5. The maximum penalty for the offence of murder is life imprisonment: s 19A(1) of the Crimes Act 1900. A standard non-parole period of 25 years applies: Pt 4, Div 1A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (“the Sentencing Procedure Act”). The maximum term of imprisonment and the standard non‑parole period are guideposts to which a court must have regard when imposing a sentence: Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39 (“Muldrock”) at [27]. The standard non-parole period is not the starting point of a sentence for an offence falling in the mid-range of objective seriousness: Madden v R [2011] NSWCCA 254 at [35].

The Statutory Regime

6. The Parliament of NSW has fixed in s 3A of the Sentencing Procedure Act the purposes for which a court may impose a sentence on an offender. Those purposes are: to ensure adequate punishment of an offender; to prevent crime by deterring others and the offender from committing similar offences; to protect the community from an offender; to promote an offender’s rehabilitation; to make an offender accountable for his or her actions; to recognise the harm done to the victims of the crime and the community; and to denounce publicly the conduct of an offender.

7. These purposes obviously overlap and are often in tension: Muldrock at [20]. The purposes of ensuring adequate punishment of an offender and promoting an offender’s rehabilitation, for example, are not always compatible. None of the purposes of sentencing can be considered in isolation.

8. Section 21A of the Sentencing Procedure Act also requires the Court to take into account, where relevant, a number of aggravating and mitigating factors in determining an appropriate sentence. The legislation does not require a court to increase or decrease a sentence because of the presence or absence of these factors: s 21A(5).

Common Law Principles

9. Over time, the Courts have developed legal principles to guide the exercise of the sentencing discretion by Judges. These common law principles are to be found in decided cases.

10. The common law principles have continuing relevance because s 21A(1) of the Sentencing Procedure Act preserves the entire body of judicially developed sentencing principles: Muldrock at [18]. As well, factors established by the common law as being relevant to sentence, such as whether incarceration may be particularly burdensome, are also to be taken into account: Muldrock at [19].

11. What the sentencing task requires of a Judge is that they have regard to the relevant legislation, including the purposes of sentencing, the statutory guideposts of the maximum penalty and the standard non-parole period, the aggravating and mitigating factors and the principles of the common law. Against that legal framework, the sentencing Judge has to identify the significance of all the relevant factual circumstances of the offending and the offender. The sentencing Judge is then able to undertake an “instinctive synthesis” whereby he or she “makes a value judgment as to what is the appropriate sentence given all the factors of the case”: Markarian v R (2005) 228 CLR 357; [2005] HCA 25 at [51]; Muldrock at [26].

12. As the instinctive synthesis approach to sentencing embodies a value judgment, there is no such thing as a single correct sentence. I will bear in mind the legislation by which I am bound, and the common law principles developed by the Courts, when proceeding on the task of sentencing this Offender.

The Facts

13. Although this matter proceeded by way of a trial before a jury, very few matters were in dispute between the parties. Exhibit A in the trial was an agreed statement of facts which included, among other things, biographical details for the Offender and the Deceased. It also included a statement that the Offender agreed that, between 10pm and 11pm on 15 March 2021, he killed the Deceased in his bedroom by strangling him.

14. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, consistently with the verdict of the jury, that at the time he killed the Deceased:

1. the Offender was criminally responsible for the death of the Deceased;

2. the Offender was not substantially impaired by any abnormality of mind; and

3. the Offender was affected by the drug or drugs which he had himself taken in the period prior to the offence ("self-induced intoxication”).

15. In addition to these matters, the essential issue in the trial was whether, at the time he killed the Deceased, the Offender intended to kill or else to cause grievous bodily harm to the Deceased.

16. In the course of the trial, it became clear that the Crown did not contest that, at the time he killed the Deceased, the Offender was impaired such that he did not know that his act was wrong. As later expanded upon, the medical evidence made clear, and I am satisfied, that the Offender was suffering from a drug‑induced psychosis which had that disabling effect at the relevant time. That drug-induced psychosis was the result of self-induced intoxication.

17. It is now necessary, in addition to these matters, to set out the relevant findings of fact which are made for the purpose of sentencing.

18. I am not entitled to make a finding of fact against the Offender unless I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of that fact, whereas any finding in favour of the Offender needs only to be established on the balance of probabilities: The Queen v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270; [1999] HCA 54 at [27].

19. Also, I note that it is well established that a Judge’s findings of fact on sentence must be consistent with the verdict as to an offender’s guilt: Cheung v The Queen (2001) 209 CLR 1; [2001] HCA 67 at [14] citing R v Isaacs (1997) 41 NSWLR 374 at 377-378. I have already set out that verdict and the necessary factual findings which I have made which flowed from it.

20. In January 2021, the Offender moved from the Northern Rivers to Newcastle to live with his sister and her son at Mayfield. His sister, by way of condition of him living at her house, required that the Offender not use drugs. He commenced working in garden maintenance and was regarded by his employer as a good employee.

21. Prior to this move, the Offender had for some years used drugs including cannabis and methamphetamine (more commonly known as “ice”). Although it will be necessary at a later stage to detail the medical treatment which the Offender has received, it is sufficient to note that before 2021, the Offender had presented to medical centres, in 2018 and 2020, with symptoms consistent with psychosis such as hallucinations and delusional beliefs, temporally connected with his use of drugs, especially ice. I am satisfied that the Offender was well aware of a causal connection between his taking of drugs, particularly ice, and suffering psychotic episodes.

22. When the Offender moved to Newcastle, he started spending time with his half‑brother, Lydon Sheridan, and another person he met in Newcastle, Amy Badger.

23. On Friday, 12 March 2021, whilst he was with Lydon, the Offender smoked a small quantity – a few points – of ice. He also smoked some cannabis.

24. The following day, Saturday, 13 March 2021, the Offender’s sister told him he would need to move out of her house. He did so, in the company of Lydon, on Sunday, 14 March 2021.

25. At this point in time, the Deceased was living with his father, Jason Dunn, in an apartment at Charlestown. The Deceased was 16 years old, was attending Swansea High School and had been diagnosed with autism. He also had a mild intellectual disability.

26. On Sunday, 14 March 2021, Lydon contacted Mr Dunn who was his uncle, and arranged for him to collect the Offender and Lydon from Mayfield. They drove to Mr Dunn’s apartment at Charlestown.

27. When they first arrived at Mr Dunn’s apartment, on the Sunday afternoon, the Offender took ice intravenously. It is not clear what quantity of the drug he took. Mr Dunn, Lydon and the Offender spent the remainder of that afternoon drinking. The Offender drank two cans of pre-mixed bourbon and cola. During the course of the evening, Lydon left the apartment.

28. At some time before midnight, the Offender told Mr Dunn that he had been sexually abused by his father when he was younger. This was an entirely delusional belief because it is clear that the Offender had not in fact been sexually abused. Mr Dunn observed the Offender to be upset and crying, and as a result he telephoned Lydon and told him that the Offender was acting in a peculiar manner.

29. After midnight, on Monday, 15 March 2021, Lydon returned to Charlestown and met the Offender who was outside Mr Dunn’s apartment. They were then picked up by Ms Badger, who drove them around for another seven hours or so. During this period, Lydon observed the Offender to be “completely off” and “out of character”. Ms Badger described him as being “really upset” and unlike himself. She said he was childish and illogical and that he could not speak coherently. Lydon described the Offender to be distraught and “not present” and, at one point, angry.

30. Lydon observed the Offender’s demeanour to normalise about an hour before they returned to Mr Dunn’s apartment. They slept there during Monday. Lydon left the apartment in the late afternoon. That afternoon the Offender’s sister telephoned him. She observed that he seemed to be “scared” and “like a little child”. He was stuttering and could not express himself properly.

31. In the course of that afternoon, the Deceased arrived home at the apartment after school. During the early evening, he went to a nearby shopping centre with the Offender. After his return, the Deceased followed a regular routine. He took his medication and went to bed at around 9:30pm. Around that time, Mr Dunn’s friend, Mark Pierpoint, arrived at the apartment. He said hello to the Deceased while he was in bed and observed the Deceased to be unhurt.

32. At some point during the evening of Monday, 15 March 2021, the Offender took ice intravenously. It is not clear what quantity of the drug he took. I am also satisfied that, on either, or both, of Sunday and Monday nights, the Offender consumed methadone which was put into his drink by Mr Dunn. He also took benzodiazepine (Valium), which he had been lawfully prescribed, and 3,4‑methylenedioxymethamphetamine (commonly known as MDMA or Ecstasy), although it is not clear when or how much of these drugs he took.

33. Just before 10pm, Messrs Dunn and Pierpoint left the apartment. The Offender was alone with the Deceased in the apartment from then until about 11pm, when Messrs Dunn and Pierpoint returned. During that time period, the Offender entered the Deceased’s bedroom and killed the Deceased by strangling him.

34. Shortly after Messrs Dunn and Pierpoint returned to the apartment block, the Offender was observed whilst standing outside the apartment to be upset and distressed. Mr Dunn comforted him and the three of them went inside the apartment. The Offender was unsettled.

35. Shortly before 12:35am, Mr Dunn went into the Deceased’s bedroom to check on him. He discovered the Deceased on the floor at the foot of his bed. He commenced cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Mr Pierpoint telephoned 000, and an ambulance arrived at 12:42am. Ambulance officers attempted various emergency treatments on the Deceased which were unsuccessful, and he was pronounced dead at 1:11am.

36. Shortly after Mr Dunn discovered the Deceased in his bedroom, the Offender took Mr Dunn’s car and fled from the apartment block. He telephoned Lydon who was at Ashtonfield at that time. Lydon observed the Deceased to be “completely and utterly distraught”. Lydon said he “could barely understand what [the Offender] was saying”.

37. Lydon arranged for his friend to meet the Offender at a service station at Thornton, some 27km away from Charlestown. Having been informed of the meeting, police travelled to the service station at Thornton where they arrested the Offender at around 2:10am.

38. The autopsy of the Deceased confirmed that he had died by asphyxiation. The autopsy revealed that the Deceased had suffered injuries consistent with the Offender using three different methods to kill him, namely: smothering, manual strangulation of the neck with bare hands, and strangulation of the neck with a cord. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Offender did in fact carry out each of these three methods whilst killing the Deceased. The cord which the Offender used was an electrical cord attached to a pedestal fan located in the Deceased’s bedroom.

39. At the trial, the Crown called Dr Kerri Eagle and the Offender called Dr Olav Nielssen. Both are expert psychiatrists. On the basis of their evidence, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Offender was suffering from a drug-induced psychosis at the time he killed the Deceased. He was experiencing command hallucinations, in the form of voices directing him to act in a certain way or else he would suffer certain consequences. I am satisfied that he was impaired in the sense that he did not know that strangling the Deceased or killing him was morally wrong.

40. However, the Offender’s impairment was caused solely by the temporary effect of ingesting a substance, most importantly in the circumstances of this case, ice, which he had voluntarily injected on the night of Monday, 15 March 2021, and which he had voluntarily injected and smoked on previous days.

41. Although I am satisfied the Offender did not know that strangling the Deceased was morally wrong, I am also satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that, at the time he killed the Deceased, the Offender intended to kill him. The evidence clearly establishes that the Offender was capable of forming purposeful intentions and engaging in goal-directed behaviour around the time he killed the Deceased. Examples of such behaviour include that when Mr Dunn discovered the Deceased, the Offender fled the apartment. He was able to operate his mobile telephone to call Lydon for help. He was able to drive a vehicle at least 27km to Thornton in order to meet up with a friend who could give him comfort or assistance.

42. As I have explained, the Offender used three methods to kill the Deceased. Clearly, he did not relent in undertaking his attack after attempting one or two methods. In my view, in the circumstances of this case, persisting in those three distinct methods of assaulting the Deceased are consistent only with an intention to kill the Deceased, and are inconsistent with an intention to merely cause the Deceased grievous bodily harm.

Objective Seriousness

43. The nature of the murder of the Deceased was objectively serious. It was a violent assault by the Offender, upon an adolescent in his own bedroom, which involved the use of three methods of attempting to kill the Deceased with the intention of so doing.

44. The offence involved the actual use of violence which is an aggravating factor referred to in s 21A(2)(b) of the Sentencing Procedure Act. However, as the use of violence related directly to the way in which the Deceased was killed, the statutory aggravating factor does not contribute further to the assessment of the objective seriousness of the offence.

45. The offence involves a number of factors determined to be aggravating factors by the Sentencing Procedure Act. They include that the Offender used a weapon namely the pedestal fan cord: s 21A(2)(c); the offence was committed by the Offender while he was on conditional liberty: s 21A(2)(j); and that it was committed in the bedroom of the Deceased, where he was entitled to feel safe and secure: s 21A(2)(eb).

46. Another aggravating factor was that the Deceased was vulnerable: s 21A(2)(l). The Deceased was vulnerable because he was young, he had autism and an intellectual disability, and he was alone in his apartment, in his bedroom, either asleep or going to sleep. The autopsy of the Deceased revealed only one minor defensive injury, namely a bruised left second finger. He was attacked unawares, without warning or reason, and he was simply unable to defend himself in any meaningful way.

47. The Offender accepts, correctly in my opinion, that his moral culpability for the offence is not to be reduced on account of his psychotic state.

48. The Parliament has fixed a standard non-parole period of 25 years for offences of murder where the victim was a child under 18 years of age: Pt 4, Div 1A of the Sentencing Procedure Act. Although I have described the objective circumstances of this offence as including the fact that the Deceased was under 18 years of age at the time he was killed, I have been careful not to double count the aggravating effect of that matter when considering the guidepost provided by the standard non-parole period for this offence.

49. I note that the offence is mitigated because it was not planned or part of any organised criminal activity: s 21A(3)(b). I also acknowledge that the Offender had no motivation to kill the Deceased.

50. I accept the Crown’s submission that this offence falls just below the mid-range of objective seriousness for offences of murder. I reject the Offender’s submission that it is in the low range. I do so because of the extent of the violence used, the fact that the Offender intended to kill the Deceased, the place where the offence occurred and all of the surrounding circumstances. I note that the Offender’s self-induced intoxication does not mitigate the assessment of objective seriousness which I have made.

The Offender’s Subjective Circumstances

Personal History

51. The Offender was born on 8 February 1997 and was 24 years old at the time of the offence. He is now 25 years old.

52. The Offender’s personal history is recorded in medical reports which were tendered on sentence. He grew up in the Northern Rivers Region of New South Wales, where he attended school until year nine. He left to work for a water tank manufacturer, and at a later point enrolled in a trade course, although he withdrew from the course without completing it. He has worked in various roles since leaving school and estimates that he spent three of those years unemployed.

53. One of the roles in which the Offender worked was at a funeral home in Sydney. Dr Ash Takyar, a consultant psychiatrist, assessed the Offender shortly before he committed this offence, and opined that this employment was the main contributing factor to the Offender’s diagnosed mental condition of post‑traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and was also the cause of an aggravation of a major depressive disorder from which the Offender has suffered.

54. The Offender’s family life appears to be unremarkable. Many of his family members are gainfully employed, although his half-brother, Lydon, also has a history of using drugs. The Offender was previously in a relationship for two years, from which he has a son now aged four.

55. The Offender has a history of convictions for drug and driving-related offences. He also has convictions for common assault and affray, for which he was sentenced four months before committing this offence, to community correction orders continuing for 12 months. Although I do not regard his history of convictions as particularly serious, it is indicative of a propensity for abusing drugs and alcohol and engaging in violence. I am therefore unable to say that as a matter of mitigation the Offender does not have any significant record of previous convictions.

Psychiatric Evidence

56. I have made findings about the psychiatric state of the Offender as it relates directly to the circumstances of the offence. In determining the appropriate sentence for the offence, the self-induced intoxication for the Offender at the time the offence was committed is not to be taken into account as a mitigating factor: s 21A(5AA) of the Sentencing Procedure Act.

57. Having acknowledged those matters, it is necessary at this stage to set out the evidence of the subjective circumstances relating to the Offender’s mental illness.

58. The Offender has reported that he is not aware of any family history of psychiatric conditions. At the age of 13, he was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”), but thereafter refused to take medication prescribed for the condition. He engaged with school counsellors and psychologists during his adolescent years. During this period, he reported some self-harm, periods of severe depression and suicidal thoughts. He has since been prescribed medication for depression.

59. The Offender commenced drinking alcohol to excess as a young teenager. He commenced smoking cannabis at around the age of 12 and using ice at around the age of 15. Although he reported some periods of abstinence of up to 18 months, prior to his admission to custody, it is clear that the Offender has abused substances for much of his life.

60. On 30 August 2018, the Offender was referred by his general practitioner to the Lismore Community Mental Health Centre under a mental health plan. He reported using ice for the last five months on an increasingly frequent basis and most recently on an intravenous basis. He displayed some psychotic or delusional content, including that he tried to explain his belief that he was his own god and he had been given the gift of saving other people by helping them financially. On 5 September 2018, he was diagnosed with a first episode of psychosis which was probably drug related. His condition was observed to improve significantly after a day or so without using drugs. He received treatment at the Centre on a number of occasions in November 2018.

61. On 13 May 2020, the Offender presented again to the Lismore Community Mental Health Centre. He reported using ice more frequently and said he had been experiencing command hallucinations to harm himself, although they had ceased two days after he had last used ice. On 28 May 2020, he reported bizarre persecutory beliefs, including that his movements were being watched by the Chinese Government. He was prescribed antipsychotic medication.

62. On 4 June 2020, he was assessed by a psychiatrist to be presenting with negative symptoms associated with the prodromal stage of schizophrenia, which is recognised as a period which may last between one and five years during which a person’s mental well-being is suspected to decline as they develop the symptoms of schizophrenia. The Offender was treated on a number of other occasions between May 2020 and March 2021 for depression, anxiety, stress and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”).

63. As noted earlier, on 11 March 2021, a few days before the offence, the Offender was assessed by Dr Takyar for the purpose of preparing a report in the Offender’s workers compensation claim. The Offender was diagnosed with PTSD and a major depressive disorder. He was prescribed an antidepressant, mirtazapine, and anti-anxiety medication, benzodiazepine (Valium).

64. About a month after he entered custody, the Offender attempted to commit suicide and as a result was removed to an observation cell for 11 days. Since he has been in custody, observations of him have noted that he does not show or else describe features of any psychotic illness.

65. As I have said, the Offender experienced a drug-induced psychosis around the time of the offence, on 15 March 2021. I am satisfied, on the balance of probabilities and based on the evidence of Dr Nielssen and Dr Eagle, that the Offender is susceptible to suffering future episodes of psychosis if and when he uses drugs, especially ice.

66. Clearly, the Offender has a complicated history of drug use and mental illness. Although those matters are intertwined, I am satisfied that the Offender suffers from chronic mental illness including ADHD, PTSD, a major depressive disorder and a substance use disorder. He is at an increased risk of experiencing drug‑induced psychosis.

67. I accept that, as a result of his mental illness, his time in custody will be more onerous than it would otherwise be. I also accept that this chronic mental illness means that general deterrence will have a lesser role to play in the determination of the appropriate sentence. It is not entirely irrelevant.

68. I accept the Crown’s submission that the Offender was on notice that using ice could cause him to become psychotic. He had on several occasions presented himself for medical treatment with symptoms consistent with psychosis which were temporally connected with his use of drugs, especially ice. The medical records reveal that he was informed of the negative effects of taking drugs but he nevertheless chose to continue using them.

69. However, I also accept that the Offender was not on notice that using ice may cause him to act violently. Evidence of his past drug taking, from Lydon and from the medical professionals whom he consulted, supports this conclusion. I have taken these matters into account merely as circumstances of the offending, noting that the Crown does not submit that the Offender’s foresight of psychosis aggravates the offending.

Other Subjective Matters

70. From shortly after he was arrested, the Offender accepted that he had killed the Deceased and that he was responsible for all that occurred.

71. The Offender tendered a letter addressed to the Court. In it, he wrote he was sorry for what he had done and that he was full of remorse. The Offender did not give any evidence under oath or affirmation at the sentencing hearing. His statement of remorse was untested.

72. In my view, the Offender has on a number of occasions, and through his admissions at trial, expressed his regret and remorse for what has happened, which I take into account, as a mitigating factor of the kind contemplated by s 21A(3)(i) of the Sentencing Procedure Act.

73. In light of the role occupied in the offence of the use of illicit drugs by the Offender, it is difficult to make any finding about the likelihood of the Offender engaging in further criminal offending. Much will depend on the amelioration of the Offender’s drug addiction. Similarly, the Offender’s prospects of rehabilitation remain an open question because he needs to demonstrate that he has and will continue to live his life free from illicit drug use.

74. I am satisfied that the Offender’s present custodial circumstances and the restrictions imposed over the last two years or more to keep correctional centres free of COVID-19 have made the Offender’s imprisonment more harsh than usual.

Victim Impact Statements

75. The Court read a victim impact statement from the mother of the Deceased and heard a victim impact statement from the brother of the Deceased. Those statements made clear that the death of the Deceased has caused significant harm and distress.

76. Pursuant to s 30E(3) of the Sentencing Procedure Act, I consider that it is appropriate to take these statements into account. I do so on the basis that the harmful impact on the family of the Deceased is an aspect of the harm done to the community as a whole by the Offender.

Facilitation of the Administration of Justice

77. The Offender’s trial by a jury, which commenced on 5 September 2022, was originally scheduled to take three weeks of the Court’s time.

78. Ultimately, however, the trial proceeded very efficiently. It commenced on time without any pre-trial dispute. There was an agreed statement of facts which included an admission that the Offender killed the Deceased. The issues were confined to those matters described at [14]-[15] above. As a result, the oral evidence required to be called in the trial was greatly reduced and the evidence was concluded by the end of the fifth day.

79. The Crown acknowledges that the Offender has significantly facilitated the administration of justice by only taking issue with matters which were genuinely in dispute in the trial. In my view, that acknowledgement is made properly.

80. The Offender is not entitled to any discount which he would otherwise have received for pleading guilty to the offence: s 22 of the Sentencing Procedure Act. However, this Court may impose a lesser penalty than it would otherwise having regard to the degree to which the administration of justice has been facilitated by the defence: s 22A of the Sentencing Procedure Act.

81. Although, as is preferrable, I do not identify the discount for such assistance by numerical reference, I make clear that I have taken into account the Offender’s conduct at his trial, which I accept has facilitated the administration of justice, in mitigating the sentence which I will determine.

Sentencing

82. In considering the appropriate sentence to be imposed on the Offender, I commence with the reminder that the offence of murder involves the criminal taking of a human life. It is a violation of the sanctity of human life which is a concept at the heart of a civilised community. Any conviction for murder warrants a substantial sentence. In the Offender’s case, the purpose of punishment having regard to his moral culpability for the offence is significant but, because of his particular subjective circumstances, I place less weight on general deterrence. However, the circumstances of this offence of murder are such as to require careful attention being paid to the importance of denunciation of the Offender’s conduct in the circumstances. Ultimately, the sentence imposed must be one which reflects the gravity of the offence, and the moral culpability of the Offender.

83. I am satisfied that I should make a finding of special circumstances as the law permits: s 44(2) Sentencing Procedure Act. In my view, the usual period of parole will not be adequate to assist this relatively young Offender to reintegrate into the community on the completion of his non-parole period. He will need considerable assistance to do that and to avoid any dependence on illicit drugs when in the community. Accordingly, I will vary the statutory ratio.

84. I have now discussed all of the facts relevant for sentence, including the relevant subjective circumstances of the Offender, and it is necessary to make a value judgment as to the appropriate sentence to be imposed for the offence.

85. The Offender has committed a grave act of gratuitous violence against a young and vulnerable person in their own bedroom. I have concluded that the offence falls just below the mid-range of objective seriousness for offences of murder.

86. The Offender has struggled with mental health issues and drug addiction for many years. However, the Offender’s psychosis which led to the death of the Deceased was caused solely by the temporary effects of the voluntary ingestion of drugs by the Offender. He is criminally responsible for his actions and is to be sentenced on that basis.

87. I determine the appropriate sentence for the Offender to be a total of 25 years, of which 17 years is the period he will be required to serve before being eligible for parole. It is appropriate to commence the sentence on 16 March 2021 so as to reflect the period of time which the Offender has spent in custody prior to his conviction.

Offence of Serious Personal Violence

88. I am required to warn the Offender, which I now do, of the existence of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 and the fact that that Act applies to the offence of murder of which he has been convicted and for which he is about to be formally sentenced. At some future point in time, an application may be made that, notwithstanding the completion of his sentence, the Offender should continue to be detained or else be subject to an Extended Supervision Order impacting upon his liberty.

Sentence

89. Chadley Sheridan, I impose the following sentence upon you:

1. For the offence of the murder of Hamish Dunn, I impose a sentence of imprisonment comprising a non-parole period of 17 years with a balance of term of 8 years to commence on 16 March 2021.

2. The first date upon which the Offender will be eligible to be released on parole is 15 March 2038.

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Amendments

12 December 2022 - Correction to counsel appearing

12 December 2022 - Typographical error

Decision last updated: 12 December 2022