SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Court of Criminal Appeal)
R v SHATKU
[2018] SASCFC 77
Judgment of The Court of Criminal Appeal
(The Honourable Justice Kelly, The Honourable Justice Blue and The Honourable Justice Bampton)
9 August 2018
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE - GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE - JUDGE ACTED ON WRONG PRINCIPLE
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - DRUG OFFENCES - SENTENCE - IMPORT-EXPORT OFFENCES
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - RELEVANT FACTORS - RESPONSE TO CHARGES - CONTRITION
The appellant and his co-offender were found guilty by jury verdict of one count of importing a material quantity of a border controlled precursor, namely pseudoephedrine – the appellant was sentenced to three years and six months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years – the appellant appeals on the ground that the sentencing Judge erred in tempering the significance of his rehabilitation by having regard to the fact that he showed no contrition for the offending, pleading not guilty and going to trial.
HELD: Appeal dismissed – the Judge did not err in finding that the appellant’s lack of acceptance of the criminal wrongdoing and lack of contrition tempered the appellant’s claim to have rehabilitated himself.
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2)(f); Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 307.12(1), referred to.
The Queen v Shannon (1979) 21 SASR 442; Vartzokas v Zanker (1989) 51 SASR 277, considered.
R v SHATKU
[2018] SASCFC 77Court of Criminal Appeal: Kelly, Blue and Bampton JJ
KELLY J: I agree that the appeal should be dismissed for the reasons given by Bampton J.
BLUE J: I agree with Bampton J that this appeal should be dismissed for the reasons given by her Honour. I add the following observations.
It is common ground on appeal that, if the Judge had increased the sentence that would otherwise have been imposed because the appellant pleaded not guilty and went to trial, thereby treating the plea of not guilty as an aggravating factor, that would have constituted error. However, the appellant does not contend that the Judge so acted.
The appellant contends that the Judge treated his plea of not guilty as tempering a mitigating factor, namely rehabilitation. The appellant accepts that a sentencing judge is entitled to take into account contrition or a lack of contrition in assessing rehabilitation and that no error would have been made if the Judge had not included the words “pleading not guilty and going to trial”. He contends that the Judge treated his plea of not guilty not merely as a manifestation of lack of contrition but as an independent or additional reason tempering the mitigatory effect of his rehabilitation. He contends that this offends the principle that a defendant is not to be penalised by reason of pleading not guilty.
The relevant passage from the Judge’s sentencing remarks is as follows:
I have read the references handed up by your counsel. Clearly, you are well-regarded by the authors of those references but…
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- R v Shatku [2018] SASCFC 77
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- [2018] SASCFC 77
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Full Court was whether the sentencing judge had erred in law by taking into account the appellant's lack of contrition, demonstrated by his refusal to plead guilty and his decision to contest the charges at trial, when assessing the weight to be given to his claimed rehabilitation. The appellant contended that this consideration improperly tempered the significance of his subsequent offence-free period.
The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the sentencing judge did not err. The court reasoned that a lack of contrition, including a refusal to accept responsibility by pleading not guilty and proceeding to trial, is a relevant factor for a sentencing judge to consider when assessing the leniency that might be afforded to an offender, particularly in relation to claims of rehabilitation. The judge's remarks were interpreted as explaining why the appellant's failure to acknowledge guilt tempered the leniency that could be attributed to his rehabilitation, rather than increasing the sentence due to his decision to go to trial. The court noted that the judge had properly considered various mitigating factors, including the appellant's background, employment history, prior convictions, the time elapsed since the offence, and his compliance with bail conditions. The court concluded that the sentencing judge had correctly balanced the appellant's prospects of rehabilitation against his lack of contrition.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background to the litigation
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Director submits that Mr Shatku was not punished for going to trial; it just meant he could not expect to receive the leniency he may otherwise have been entitled to had he pleaded guilty or in some other way shown remorse. It is submitted that a lack of contrition or remorse is evidenced, amongst other things, by refusal to take responsibility and a manifestation of that is refusing to plead and going to trial. A lack of contrition, typically, will reduce the leniency that might be afforded to a defendant, rather than increasing the sentence that would otherwise be appropriate on account of a lack of contrition.Consideration I accept the Director’s argument that the reference to pleading not guilty and going to trial was made in order to explain why the Judge came to the conclusion that Mr Shatku had a lack of contrition. The Judge was explaining why Mr Shatku’s failure to acknowledge guilt and the harm the offending may have caused the community tempered the leniency that could be attributed to rehabilitation. This is reinforced by the Judge’s remarks that immediately follow the statement complained of regarding the lack of contrition tempering the claim to rehabilitation: “You have shown no recognition of the harm your offending might have caused the community”. As submitted by the Director, there is nothing in the remarks to indicate that the sentence was increased on account of Mr Shatku pleading not guilty and contesting the matter at trial. Further, when the words complained of are read in the context of the paragraph in which they appear, it is clear that the Judge was balancing Mr Shatku’s prospects of rehabilitation against his lack of contrition in an attempt to assess the leniency that could be extended to him on account of what was said to be good prospects of rehabilitation. As King CJ said in The Queen v Shannon,[2] “An offender’s remorse, contrition or repentance has always been regarded as a matter making for leniency”.[2] (1979) 21 SASR 442 at 443. The remarks complained of should also be seen in the context of the Judge’s remarks addressed to Mr Kasumovic, where he said:Like Mr Shatku, you have shown no contrition or remorse for your offending. This does not suggest that you have rehabilitated yourself since 2013. Again, there has been no recognition of the harm your offending might have caused had your attempt at importation succeeded.In my view, it is clear that the remarks complained of are confined to the issue of contrition or the lack thereof. Contrition is a matter that a sentencing Judge is entitled to take into account in determining the leniency that might be afforded in arriving at a sentence. The Judge took into account matters that may mitigate a sentence, namely Mr Shatku’s background, his education, his working history, his prior convictions, the time that had lapsed since he had offended, and his good compliance with bail.Conclusion Mr Shatku played an essential role in serious drug importation and, following the jury verdict, has not expressed contrition for, insight into, or renunciation of his wrongdoing.[3][3] Vartzokas v Zanker (1989) 51 SASR 277 at 279 (King CJ).