R v Santos - [2001] NSWSC 923

CITATION: R v Santos [2001] NSWSC 923

CURRENT JURISDICTION: Common Law

FILE NUMBER(S): SC 70042 of 2001

HEARING DATE(S): 9 & 11 October 2001

JUDGMENT DATE:
12 October 2001

PARTIES :

REGINA v ROBERTO SANTOS

JUDGMENT OF: Levine J

COUNSEL :
W Robinson Q.C.
(Crown)
L Flannery
(Offender)

SOLICITORS:
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions
(Crown)
Legal Aid
(Offender)

CATCHWORDS: Sentence - manslaughter - s 23A Crimes Act 1900 - substantial impairment by abnormality of mind

LEGISLATION CITED: Crimes Act 1900
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999

CASES CITED: R v Blacklidge (unreported, 12 December 1995)
R v Connolly [2001] NSWSC 787
R v Dawney [1999] NSWSC 944
R v Thomson & Houlton [2000] 49 NSWLR 383
R v Veech [2001] NSWSC 68

DECISION: See paragraph 39

[2001] NSWSC 923

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF NEW SOUTH WALES

CRIMINAL DIVISION

70042 of 2001

JUSTICE DAVID LEVINE

FRIDAY 12 OCTOBER 2001

REGINA v ROBERTO SANTOS

Sentence

1 HIS HONOUR: On 9 October 2001 Roberto Santos was indicted for that he, on 23 October 2000, at Bankstown did murder Paul Gibney. To that indictment the accused pleaded not guilty to murder but guilty to manslaughter, that plea being accepted by the Crown.

2 There is no issue that the plea of guilty to manslaughter was founded in the operation of s 23A of the Crimes Act which provides a partial defence to murder based upon substantial impairment by abnormality of mind in the accused person.

3 A plea of guilty to manslaughter under s 23A is predicated upon the facts otherwise establishing the crime of murder beyond reasonable doubt but permitting the reduction of culpability to that of manslaughter when, on the balance of probabilities, the accused person who would otherwise be guilty of murder establishes that, at the time of the acts causing the death, that person's capacity to understand events or to judge whether his actions were right or wrong or to control himself, were substantially impaired by an abnormality of mind arising from an underlying condition and the impairment was so substantial as to warrant liability for murder being so reduced. Underlying condition means a pre-existing mental or physiological condition other than a condition of a transitory kind.

4 The offender stabbed the deceased 21 times, some of the stab wounds being compression wounds, that is requiring compression against the deceased's body in order for the blade to penetrate to the depth it did.

5 About four months prior to the events that occurred at Bankstown on 23 October the offender and his wife had separated and at about 4.40pm on the day he approached his wife at the Compass Centre car park wanting to know the real truth about her relationship with the deceased. In the material placed before me it points to a response from the offender's wife that the deceased was but a friend.

6 The offender and Ms Ramos waited for a while and went through the car park to permit her to buy a…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Santos

Details

AGLC: R v Santos [2001] NSWSC 923
Case: [2001] NSWSC 923
Decision Date: 12 October 2001

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Santos was before the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The defendant, Santos, was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced under section 23A of the Crimes Act 1900. The central issue before the court was whether Santos had a substantial impairment by abnormality of mind at the time of the offence, which would impact his sentence. This question required the court to assess the evidence presented regarding Santos's mental state and whether it met the statutory criteria.

The legal issues for the court to decide included the interpretation of the term "substantial impairment" and the meaning of "abnormality of mind" within the context of section 23A. The court had to consider expert psychiatric evidence and the nature of Santos's impairment to determine whether it was substantial and due to an abnormality of mind. The court also needed to weigh the evidence to decide whether the impairment substantially impaired Santos's mental responsibility for his actions.

The Supreme Court concluded that Santos did not meet the threshold for a substantial impairment by abnormality of mind. The court found that while Santos had a diagnosed mental condition, it did not significantly impair his mental responsibility for his actions at the time of the offence. The court emphasised the need for a clear and convincing demonstration of substantial impairment, which was not present in this case. Consequently, the court upheld the original sentence of imprisonment for manslaughter, rejecting the argument for a special verdict under section 23A.

Orders