R v Sales

Case

[2020] NSWSC 1183

02 September 2020

No judgment structure available for this case.

Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Sales [2020] NSWSC 1183
Hearing dates: 24 July 2020
Date of orders: 02 September 2020
Decision date: 02 September 2020
Jurisdiction:Common Law - Criminal
Before: Garling J
Decision:

See [95]

Catchwords:

SENTENCING – Cumulative and Concurrent Sentences – where the Offender is already serving a lengthy sentence for a number of convictions – pleaded guilty to solicit to murder and murder involving two separate victims – assessment of the totality of the criminality involved over all the offending – assessment of the degree of concurrency these sentences should have with existing sentences

Legislation Cited:

Crimes Act 1900

Crime (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006

Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999

Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990

Cases Cited:

Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; (2013) 249 CLR 571

Green v R [2018] NSWCCA 146

Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; (2005) 228 CLR 357

Mill v The Queen [1988] HCA 70; (1988) 166 CLR 59;

Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA39; (2011) 244 CLR 120

Texts Cited:

Not Applicable

Category:Principal judgment
Parties: The Crown
Graham Thomas Sales (Offender)
Representation:

Counsel:
B Hatfield (Crown)
T.D. Anderson (Offender)

Solicitors:
Crown Solicitors Office
Director of Public Prosecutions
File Number(s): 2020/92022
Publication restriction: Not Applicable

Judgment

  1. Between 23 October 1995 and 28 October 1995, almost 25 years ago, Graham Sales (“the Offender”) murdered Ronald Penn (“the deceased”) in an area just north of North Entrance, NSW.

  2. He did so by tricking the deceased into accompanying him to that area; he tricked him into digging his own grave; he then struck him with a baseball bat and choked him to death.

  3. The deceased’s body, although buried in that grave, has never been found. The Offender confessed to this murder on 14 March 2018.

  4. Between about 23 October 1995 and 22 November 1995, immediately after the offence to which I have just referred, the Offender was charged with breaching an Interim Apprehended Violence Order (“Interim AVO”) with respect to a female victim, to whom I will refer as “JF”. That matter was listed for hearing on 21 November 1995 at Gosford Local Court.

  5. The Offender told his brother, Ross Sales, to kill JF, otherwise he, the Offender, would kill him. The Offender’s brother attempted to do so by firing a shortened gun at JF in the foyer of the Wyong Court House. JF was not killed, but she was seriously injured. The Offender accepts that he solicited his brother to murder JF.

  6. On 1 May 2020, the Crown commenced the present proceedings against the Offender by way of ex officio Indictment. After an initial adjournment to obtain legal advice, the Offender pleaded guilty to both counts upon his arraignment in this Court on 15 May 2020.

  7. It is now time for the Offender to be sentenced for his crimes.

  8. At the relevant time, the Crimes Act 1900 provided for a maximum term of life imprisonment for the offence of murder, and a maximum term of 25 years imprisonment for the offence of solicit to murder. At that time, there were no applicable standard non-parole periods.

  9. The maximum terms of imprisonment are guideposts to which a Court must have regard when imposing sentence[1] .

    1. Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39; (2011) 244 CLR 120 at [27]

The Statutory Regime

  1. The Parliament of New South Wales has fixed[2] the purposes for which a court may impose a sentence on an offender. Those purposes are: to ensure adequate punishment of an offender; to prevent crime by deterring an offender and others from committing similar offences; to protect the community from an offender; to promote an offender’s rehabilitation; to make an offender accountable for their actions; to recognise the harm done to the victims of the crime and the community; and to denounce publicly the conduct of an offender.

    2. Section 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999

  2. These purposes obviously overlap and are often in tension [3] . The purposes of ensuring adequate punishment of an offender and promoting an offender’s rehabilitation, for example, are not always compatible. None of the purposes of sentencing can be considered in isolation.

    3. Muldrock at [20]

  3. The legislation also requires the Court to take into account, where relevant, a number of aggravating and mitigating factors in determining an appropriate sentence. The legislation does not require the Court to increase or decrease a sentence because of the presence or absence of these factors[4] .

    4. Section 21A(5) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999

Common Law Principles

  1. Over time, the courts have developed legal principles to guide the exercise of the sentencing discretion by judges. These common law principles are to be found in decided cases.

  2. In summary, the common law principles include proportionality, namely, that the sentence should be proportionate to the gravity of the offence; parity, namely that the imposition of sentences on co-offenders must not give rise to a justifiable sense of grievance on the part of one co-offender; totality, that is that the Court when considering a number of offences must impose a sentence which appropriately reflects the totality of the criminal behaviour; and avoidance of double punishment, that is that a person should not be punished twice for the same conduct.

  3. These common law principles have continuing relevance because the legislation preserves the entire body of judicially developed sentencing principles [5] . As well, factors established by the common law as being relevant to sentence, such as whether incarceration may be particularly burdensome, are also to be taken into account [6] .

    5. Muldrock at [18]

    6. Muldrock at [19]

  4. What the sentencing task requires of a judge is that they have regard to the relevant legislation, including the purposes of sentencing, the statutory guidepost of the maximum penalty and the aggravating and mitigating factors, as well as the principles of the common law. Against that legal framework, the sentencing Judge has to identify, and consider the significance of, all the relevant factual circumstances of the offending and the Offender. The sentencing judge is then in a position to undertake an “instinctive synthesis”, whereby the judge “makes a value judgment as to what is the appropriate sentence given all the factors of the case”[7] . As the “instinctive synthesis” approach to sentencing embodies a value judgment, there is no such thing as a single correct sentence.

    7. Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; (2005) 228 CLR 357 at [51]; Muldrock at [26]

  5. I will bear in mind the legislation by which I am bound and the common law principles developed by the Courts when proceeding on the task of sentencing the Offender.

The Facts

  1. The Offender is to be sentenced for both offences on the basis of a Statement of Agreed Facts. Here is a summary of those facts.

Murder

  1. In the period between 24 and 27 October 1995, the deceased, who was then 54 years old and in receipt of a Disability Support Pension because he had been injured and was unable to work in the building industry, was staying with the Offender.

  2. The Offender was not licensed to drive a motor vehicle, and occasionally paid the deceased to drive him around from time to time.

  3. During the period in late October 1995, the Offender, when the deceased was staying with him, contrived a story to get the deceased away from his house. He pretended that there was some money buried in a local bush area. He told the deceased that if he was to dig it up for him, he could have some part of it. The Offender, his brother and the deceased entered the deceased’s van and drove to an area of bush near a beach north of North Entrance.

  4. The three men left the car and walked along a track for a short time, through scrub, and came to a small clearing with sandy soil. The Offender told the deceased that the money was buried there and to start digging a hole. The Offender encouraged the deceased to keep digging deeper and deeper. The Offender’s brother assisted with the digging, which continued for several hours. Whilst the hole was being dug, the Offender left the scene and returned with a baseball bat.

  5. After a deep hole had been dug and whilst the deceased was standing with his back to the Offender, the Offender struck the deceased twice with the baseball bat with all his might - he hit the deceased’s leg below the knee, causing the bat to break. The deceased screamed and fell to the ground.

  6. The Offender, who at this time weighed over 100kg, then held a broken piece of the baseball bat across the deceased’s neck, pushing it into his throat with all of his strength. The deceased struggled to get free but was unable to. After some time, the deceased was unable to hold the piece of wood back any longer and he eventually stopped moving.

  7. There is a conflict in the versions given by the Offender and his brother as to whether both acted jointly to choke the deceased, or whether the Offender alone choked the deceased. I am unable to determine which version is correct. But to my mind it is irrelevant. The fact is that either alone, or together with his brother, the Offender choked the deceased to death.

  8. The deceased’s clothing was stripped from him and he was then placed in the hole which was filled in. The clothing and the broken bat were disposed of in a skip bin and the deceased’s vehicle was then parked by the Offender’s brother in the carpark of a local licensed club. When it was not stolen from there (as had been hoped) or from the next carpark that it was moved to, the van was taken to AN industrial area near Berkeley Vale and set alight.

Solicit to Murder

  1. The Offender had previously been in a relationship with JF, which had commenced in about 1991 and continued until about 1995. The relationship ended on 10 September 1995, when JF ran away from an event where she was with the Offender. She then reported significant abuse in her relationship with him to the police. JF was placed in a women’s refuge in Gosford. The Offender discovered where she was and as a consequence JF was moved to a second refuge.

  2. On 22 September 1995, police took out an Interim AVO against the Offender on behalf of JF. The substantive matter was listed for hearing at the Gosford Local Court on 21 November 1995. In the meantime, JF had moved to a third refuge in the Newcastle area.

  3. On Thursday 12 October 1995, the Offender, his brother and the deceased were driving in the deceased’s car in the Charlestown area of Newcastle and identified JF, who was driving her car. They followed her for some distance until JF entered a shop and contacted police to report that she was being followed. This event gave rise to a charge against the Offender of breaching the Interim AVO.

  4. On the night of the deceased’s murder, after the deceased was killed, the Offender and his brother were driving towards Bateau Bay. During that drive, the Offender told his brother that he had to kill JF. He threatened his brother that if he did not do so, he would kill him.

  5. On Wednesday 8 November 1995, the Offender was charged in relation to the breaching of the Interim AVO when he followed JF in the Charlestown area. That matter was also listed for hearing on 21 November 1995 at Gosford Local Court.

  6. The Offender told his brother that he was to shoot JF and when arrested by police, he was to tell them that he was mentally unwell. Preparations were put in place to lay the ground work for such conduct.

  7. The brother attended an Aboriginal Health Centre and told staff there that he had homicidal thoughts about a female. A gun was obtained and the brother shortened the stock and barrel of the gun.

  8. On the day the matter was listed for hearing, the Offender and his brother, together with some members of his family, attended the Gosford Local Court together. The Offender’s brother was carrying a large bag which contained the shortened gun and ammunition. The matter was transferred to the Wyong Local Court to be heard there.

  9. Upon arrival at Wyong Local Court, the Offender’s brother entered the foyer and went to an alcove with a vending machine in it, where he removed the shortened gun from the bag. He placed four rounds into the gun, three in the magazine and one in the chamber. One was a solid bullet and the others were pellets.

  10. As JF was being escorted through the foyer to the courtroom by a Domestic Violence Court Support worker, the Offender’s brother approached JF as she entered the empty courtroom. He called her name out. As she turned to face him, he fired the shortened gun once, hitting JF’s left hand and wrist, chest, right shoulder and face. Emergency services were called. JF was taken to hospital where she was admitted to Intensive Care and required several operations to remove pellets from her body.

  11. The Offender’s brother was arrested in the courtroom immediately after the shooting. When he was interviewed by the police, he admitted shooting JF, but said that he had been seeking assistance for his mental health issues for some weeks, but had not received any. The Offender’s brother was subsequently assessed by two psychiatrists. He pretended that he was mentally ill and that he was hearing voices and having delusions during his psychiatric assessments.

  12. On 18 December 1996, at Gosford District Court, the Offender’s brother was found not guilty of shooting JF with intent to murder by reason of mental illness under s 38 of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990. He was subsequently detained as a forensic patient.

Investigation

  1. In the course of 2013 and 2014, police interviewed the Offender’s brother on three separate occasions. In these interviews he gave an account of the murder of the deceased and the events surrounding the shooting of JF.

  2. On 23 May 2013, the Offender met with detectives investigating the death of the deceased. He declined to make a statement on legal advice. He again met with investigators in January and February 2014, and gave them information that indicated that his brother might have been involved in the murder of the deceased.

  3. On 14 March 2018, at a time when the Offender was in custody in relation to a series of other offences which were entirely unrelated to the two offences the subject of these sentence proceedings, the Offender informed police that he wanted to participate in another interview. In the course of that interview, he admitted that he had murdered the deceased, and identified the evening when it occurred.

  4. In 2019, the Offender participated in a walk through in the beach area where the murder had occurred. He identified various areas which were then extensively excavated, however none of the sites yielded any evidence of the deceased’s remains. The deceased’s body has never been recovered. I note that the area has significantly changed since the murder had occurred.

Objective Seriousness

Murder

  1. The Crown did not submit that the objective seriousness of the offence of murder was such as to warrant the maximum penalty of life imprisonment. The Crown did however submit that the seriousness of both offences was such as to require the imposition of a lengthy custodial sentence.

  2. In assessing the objective seriousness of the murder offence, it is clear that it is a serious matter. The offence involved a degree of planning. It was obviously premeditated: the Offender took the deceased to a place with which he must have been familiar, together with the necessary tools to enable him to dig his own grave, at a time when the deceased was doing so under the misapprehension that he would be obtaining financial reward.

  3. The killing itself was callous and took place in circumstances where the Offender clearly had an intention to kill the deceased without any particular or obvious precipitating event. As well, the killing of the deceased involved the Offender continuing for an extended period of time the action of choking (either by himself or with his brother) the deceased as he struggled. The deceased’s body was then concealed by being disposed of in the grave which the deceased had dug, which meant that it was unlikely to be discovered.

  4. The offence was committed by the Offender in the company of his brother. It is unnecessary to determine the extent of involvement of the brother but, clearly, to one extent or another, he was also involved in the commission of the offence. I am satisfied that the offence involved gratuitous cruelty, not only because of all the circumstances (including the deception of the deceased), but particularly because of the length of time during which the deceased was choked to death. I have also had regard to the fact that the planning was a part of the objective seriousness of the crime.

  5. I regard this offence as a very serious example of the crime of murder.

Solicit to Murder

  1. The offence of soliciting to murder was, I am satisfied, an offence of domestic violence. There was in place an Interim AVO against the Offender, naming JF (the victim) as a person who needed protection from the Offender at the very time when he was soliciting his brother to kill her.

  2. I am satisfied the purpose in the Offender’s mind when he initiated the plan was to prevent JF giving evidence against him in the proceedings relating to the Interim AVO. In eliminating the only substantive Crown witness, the Offender intended to ensure that the Interim AVO proceedings did not succeed.

  3. There was no element of voluntariness on the part of the Offender’s brother concerning the solicitation by the Offender of his brother. Putting it differently, the brother was not, for example, offered money to participate in the murder of JF. Rather, the Offender threatened to kill his brother himself unless he murdered JF. This was a credible threat because the Offender’s brother had just witnessed the murder of the deceased, Mr Penn.

  4. This offence was accompanied by significant planning, involving the creation of a false story of mental illness in order to enable the Offender’s brother to escape the full consequences of what he had done.

  5. Because the shooting was intended to be carried out in the foyer of a public building, it was done without any regard for public safety.

  6. Finally, the offence occurred as the victim entered a court room in order to be ready to give evidence once the proceedings had commenced.

  7. In my view, the objective seriousness of this offence is also very high, and approaching the upper end of that range of objective seriousness.

Victim Impact Statements

  1. Two separate Victim Impact Statements were tendered to the Court by the Crown. I acknowledge their receipt. The contents of these statements will be given the consideration which the law allows as an aspect of harm done to the community.

Subjective and Mitigating Circumstances

  1. In a letter dated 15 July 2020, written to the Court by the Offender, he informed the Court that he accepts full responsibility for his actions in murdering the deceased and soliciting his brother to murder JF, and that he accepts any punishment which will be imposed. The letter states that it is not an attempt to obtain “leniency or lesser punishment”. Nevertheless, I will have regard to its contents as a mitigating factor, because I accept that it shows some remorse on the part of the Offender for both of these offences.

  2. However, having regard to the Offender’s history of previous offending, I am unable to find that he is unlikely to reoffend nor that he has good prospects of rehabilitation. No doubt, as he ages, the Offender might be expected to embark upon efforts to rehabilitate himself. However, I am unable to presently form any view as to what his prospects of ultimate rehabilitation may be.

  3. It is necessary to consider the Offender’s background and upbringing, particularly as an upbringing characterised by abuse and violence:

“… may mitigate the sentence because the offender’s moral culpability is likely to be less than the culpability of an offender whose formative years have not been marred in that way.”[8]

8. Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; (2013) 249 CLR 57 at [40]

  1. The Offender’s upbringing was in a house where his parents’ relationship was marred by domestic violence, perpetrated by his father upon his mother. As well, whilst a child, he was physically and sexually abused by his father. He has also reported on a previous occasion that he saw his father involved in killing people when he was a child. There may be some doubt about the accuracy of this recall. The Offender, at least up until he was admitted into custody, had been a lifelong member of the Jehovah’s Witness faith.

  2. It will be necessary shortly to discuss the Offender’s previous criminal history, and the custodial sentences which he is presently serving.

  3. There is no suggestion that the Offender, at any time when these offences were committed, was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. He was not intoxicated at the time of any of these offences.

  4. These subjective circumstances apply to both of the offences upon which the Offender is to be sentenced.

Pleas of Guilty

  1. A plea of guilty, particularly at an early stage, is always a factor which the sentencing Court has to take into account[9] .

    9. Section 21A(3) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999

  2. The Offender was first charged with the solicit to murder offence on 26 May 2014. He was then charged with the offence of murdering the deceased on 26 May 2015. On 19 August 2016, both charges (which were still then before the Local Court) were withdrawn by the Crown. There is no evidence as to why that occurred.

  3. On 1 May 2020, the Crown commenced proceedings in relation to these two offences by way of the presentation of an ex officio Indictment in this Court. After an adjournment was granted to enable the Offender to obtain legal advice, on 15 May 2020, a plea of guilty was entered to both offences in the Supreme Court.

  4. The Crown accepts that this plea entitles the Offender to a 25% discount on any sentence which would otherwise be imposed for each offence.

Discount for Voluntary Disclosure

  1. The Offender submitted that with respect to the murder offence, in addition to a discount for his plea of guilty, he should receive a further discount because of his voluntary disclosure of a range of facts unknown to investigating police, and without which the murder would have remained unsolved.

  2. The legislation states that a Court may impose a lesser penalty for an offence than would otherwise have been imposed having regard to the degree to which the Offender has assisted law enforcement authorities in the detection or investigation of the proceedings relating to the offence[10] .

    10. Section 23 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999

  3. Any such discount requires an evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the Offender’s assistance, the truthfulness and reliability of any information provided, the timeliness of the assistance, and a number of other matters which are noted in the legislation.

  4. The police knowledge of the involvement of the Offender in the offence of murder first arose in the context of an interview given by his brother in 2014, which led to the Offender being charged. That charge was withdrawn in August 2016. As earlier indicated, no reason was provided by the Crown for this.

  5. The facts disclose that on 14 March 2018, the Offender voluntarily approached the police and confessed to the murder. It was at that point that he was arrested. He then participated in an electronically recorded interview in which he made full admissions about the murder.

  6. I am satisfied that, but for the Offender’s decision to approach the police in March 2018 (though he was in custody for other offences) and give them a full account of his involvement in the murder, the probabilities are that the murder would not have been further prosecuted.

  7. In considering the relevant discount, I need to keep in mind that the legislation provides that any lesser penalty which is imposed by reason of assistance provided in relation to an offence must not be unreasonably disproportionate to the nature and circumstances of the offence.

  8. Taking all of these matters into account, I am of the opinion that the total discount for the Offender’s plea of guilty and the assistance which he provided to the police in respect of the offence of murder should total 40% of any sentence which would otherwise be imposed. Any greater discount would in my view, lead to the imposition of a sentence which was unreasonably disproportionate to the criminality involved.

Previous Criminal Convictions and Current Sentences

  1. In assessing the appropriate sentence for the Offender on the current charges, I must give consideration to the other offences of which the Offender has been convicted and for which he is currently serving a custodial sentence. The ultimate sentence I impose must (either cumulatively or concurrently with those other sentences already imposed) reflect the totality of the Offender’s criminality for all of the offending. Put differently, the sentence I impose must, along with the sentences already imposed, reflect the aggregate sentence the Offender would likely have received if all his offending had been sentenced at the same time[11] .

    11. Mill v The Queen [1988] HCA 70; (1988) 166 CLR 59 at 66; Green v R [2018] NSWCCA 146

  2. In 2017, the Offender was charged, tried and ultimately found guilty by a jury of 21 offences committed against seven victims between 1988 and 2014 including a number of serious sexual offences and a number of serious violence offences. There were a further 23 related offences taken into account in sentencing relating to further violence committed by the Offender against six of the seven victims. Six of the victims were in a domestic relationship with the Offender at the time of the offending and one victim was the child of a person in a domestic relationship with the Offender.

  3. On 13 October 2017, Huggett DCJ in the District Court of NSW sentenced the Offender to 36 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 27 years commencing from the date of his arrest on 15 May 2014. She found that the Offender showed a prolonged, consistent cycle of serious violence, intimidation and control in his intimate relationships, and had little prospect of rehabilitation. The Offender will not be eligible for parole under this sentence until 14 May 2041. The Offender has not appealed the sentence imposed by her Honour.

  4. In 2018, the Offender was charged with, and pleaded guilty to, six counts and one further charge on a Form 1, in respect of three victims. Two of the victims, against whom the Offender committed a number of serious sexual offences, were underage girls at the time of the offending (12 and 13 years old respectively). The third victim was an underage boy at the time of the offending, which was constituted by a violent attack. There were two further Public Justice Offences also taken into account concerning the Offender’s conduct in his 2017 trial.

  5. On 19 October 2018, Wass SC DCJ in the District Court of NSW sentenced the Offender to 12 years imprisonment commencing 15 May 2039 with a non‑parole period of 6 years. The Offender is therefore not eligible for parole until 14 May 2045, and his overall sentence expires on 14 May 2051. The Offender has not appealed the sentence imposed by her Honour.

  6. Although her Honour found the existence of special circumstances and adjusted the statutory ratio to extend the parole period for the sentence she imposed, the resulting effective sentence for all of the offences dealt with in the District Court, meant that the ratio for the non-parole period was reduced so as to be a lesser proportion of the sentence (16%) than the statute provided (25%).

  7. By the time the Offender first becomes eligible for parole he will be 81 years old. His overall sentence will expire when he is 87 years old.

  8. In considering these existing convictions and sentences and having regard to the principles which I must apply, it is necessary for me to consider not just the appropriate sentence for each of these two offences for which the Offender stands to be sentenced by me, but also to consider how the two sentences which I am to impose should be served in relation to these other sentences. Put differently, I must consider how the sentences I impose should be accumulated on the existing sentences so as to reflect a total effective sentence which addresses the totality of the criminality of all of the offences and the criminal conduct engaged in by the Offender.

  9. In that way, the Court answers the question: “what would be likely to have been the effective head sentence imposed if the Offender, having committed all of these offences, had been sentenced at the one time”?

Discernment

  1. The Court, in imposing these sentences, is confronting the need to impose a sentence which reflects the high level of objective seriousness of each of the offences. There is also a need to take into account and reflect, in the case of the sentence for murder, the assistance and early plea of guilty which provides a substantial discount on the sentence which would otherwise have been imposed. The discount for the plea of guilty for the solicit to murder offence needs also to be considered.

  2. As well, the Court has to keep in mind imposing an ultimate effective head sentence which reflects the totality of all of the criminality for which the Offender has in the past been sentenced, and for which he will now be sentenced. This necessarily means that because of the existing sentence, those which I impose will be, in their effect, relatively modest when compared with the sentences imposed for like crimes in other cases.

Special Circumstances

  1. In respect of each of these offences, I will make a finding of special circumstances. This is to recognise that by the time these sentences have taken effect, the Offender will be of advanced years and, without an adjustment of his non-parole period below the statutory requirement, he would be confronted with an unacceptably long sentence.

  2. However, because of the ratio between the non-parole period and parole period which exists for the District Court sentences, my findings of special circumstances will not have any ultimate beneficial effect.

  3. Any sentence imposed for these offences, which occurred nearly 25 years ago, ought also reflect the sentences which were being imposed at that time.

Sentence

  1. Taking all of those matters into account, I would propose to impose, prior to discount, a sentence of 25 years for the offence of murder. This must be discounted by 40% to reflect the early pleas of guilty and assistance. This results in a head sentence of 15 years with a non-parole period of 8 years and 6 months.

  2. For the offence of solicit to murder, I would impose a head sentence of 16 years which, after the application of a discount for the plea of guilty, would result in a head sentence of 12 years with a non-parole period of 7 years and 2 months.

  3. Necessarily, because these are two separate offences, and to recognise the different victims involved and the effect upon each of the different victims, these sentences will need to be accumulated. The appropriate method of doing that would be to commence the sentence for solicit to murder first and then to accumulate the sentence for murder on that sentence by a period of 3 years.

  4. It is next appropriate, in considering and determining the date for commencement of these sentences, to have regard to the principle of totality.

  5. Had I been sentencing the Offender for all of the offences dealt with by Huggett DCJ, Wass SC DCJ, and for the current offences, I would have imposed a head sentence of 45 years to represent the totality of the criminality in which the Offender engaged. The sentence which I impose will, as near as is possible, reflect this approach.

  6. I recognise that the length of such an overall effective sentence means that, in practical terms, there is a significant prospect that the Offender may die in jail. However, any lesser sentence would not sufficiently address the purposes of sentencing, including denunciation, punishment and protection of the community.

Sentence

  1. Graham Sales, I sentence you as follows:

  1. For the offences of murder, a non-parole period of 8 years and 6 months, with an additional term of 6 years and 6 months. The sentence is to commence on 14 May 2044.

  2. For the offence of solicit to murder, a term of imprisonment comprising a non-parole period of 7 years and 2 months with an additional term of 4 years and 10 months. This sentence is to commence on 14 May 2041.

The effect of these sentences is that your head sentence is increased by 8 years, and your existing non-parole period is increased by 7 years and 6 months. You will first be eligible to be released on parole on 13 November 2052.

  1. I inform you, as I am required to, of the existence of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006, and that you may be subject to an order under that Act at the time of, or after the completion of, these sentences.

**********

Endnotes

Decision last updated: 02 September 2020

Actions
Download as PDF Download as Word Document


Cases Citing This Decision

1

Cases Cited

7

Statutory Material Cited

4

Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37
Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37