Supreme Court of South Australia
(Court of Appeal: Criminal)
R v RUSSELL (A PSEUDONYM)
[2022] SASCA 143
Judgment of the Court of Appeal
(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, the Honourable President Livesey and the Honourable Justice Doyle)
23 December 2022
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING PROCEDURE - SENTENCING GUIDELINES
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING PROCEDURE - APPROACH TO SENTENCING PROCESS - SENTENCING METHODS
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING PROCEDURE - CONCURRENT, CUMULATIVE AND ADDITIONAL SENTENCES - CONCURRENT SENTENCES
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - SEXUAL OFFENCES - SENTENCE - PARTICULAR CASES - MAINTAINING SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP WITH CHILD AND PERSISTENT SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILD
Crown appeal against sentence.
The respondent pleaded guilty to three counts of maintaining an unlawful sexual relationship and one count of aggravated indecent assault contrary to sections 50(1) and 56(1) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), respectively. The respondent was sentenced by a judge of the District Court to 14 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 11 years, two months and 12 days.
The victims of the respondent’s offending were his three nieces, MB, AB and HB, and his granddaughter, AH. The charged offending occurred during the period from 2008 until 2021. The victims of the respondent’s offending were each under the age of 14 years at the time the offending against them commenced.
In sentencing the respondent, the judge allowed for a degree of concurrency but did not specify the degree of concurrency as between each of the counts which resulted in a head sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment.
The Director of Public Prosecutions (SA) appeals on three grounds:
1.The sentence imposed was manifestly inadequate.
2.The judge erred in the degree of flexibility of application of the standard in R v D (1997) 69 SASR 413.
3.The judge erred in reducing the notional head sentence on account of concurrency on the basis of interconnection between the respondent’s offending.
Held per Livesey P and Doyle JA (refusing permission to appeal):
1.The sentencing judge did not err in her invocation or application of the principles of concurrency in arriving at the ultimate sentence to be imposed.
2.Whilst the starting point identified in respect of the sentence for one count was too low, the disparity between the appropriate ultimate sentence, and the one in fact imposed was not such as to justify a grant of permission to appeal.
Held per Kourakis CJ (granting permission to appeal and allowing the appeal):
1.The sentence was manifestly inadequate.
2.The sentence imposed by the District Court should be set aside.
3.The judge’s remarks fail to identify any reason for fixing notional sentences for the offending against AB and AH which fall below the guidelines given by the Court in R v D (1997) 69 SASR 413 and no basis to do so is apparent on the face of the relevant circumstances.
4.There is no explanation for the high degree of concurrency of all sentences nor is any basis for it apparent…
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- R v Russell (a pseudonym) [2022] SASCA 143
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- [2022] SASCA 143
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether the sentencing judge's approach to determining the sentence, particularly the application of the sentencing standard established in *R v D*, and the resulting sentence imposed, were unduly lenient and therefore warranted intervention on appeal. The Court was required to consider the adequacy of the individual starting points for each offence and the overall sentence, taking into account the nature of the offending, the devastating impact on the victims, and the respondent's personal circumstances.
The Court acknowledged that while the sentencing judge correctly identified the relevance of the *R v D* standard for some of the offences, a degree of flexibility in its application was appropriate. This flexibility requires consideration of factors such as the nature and frequency of the offending, its duration, the victim's age, the impact on the victim, and the offender's personal circumstances. Although the Court agreed that the sentence ultimately imposed was low, it concluded that the disparity between the imposed sentence and what ought to have been imposed was not so significant as to require the Court's intervention on a Crown appeal. The Court referred to its contemporaneously published reasons in *Warner v The King* for further elaboration on these principles.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
For the reasons which follow, I do not agree with some of the criticisms of the sentencing judge’s approach made by the Chief Justice. While I accept that the sentence ultimately imposed was low, I do not think that the disparity between the sentence which was imposed and that which ought to have been imposed was such as to require the intervention of this Court on a Crown appeal against sentence.Consideration These reasons should be read in conjunction with my contemporaneously published reasons in Warner v The King.[15]I refer in particular to the observations I made in those reasons in relation to the rationale for the standard in R v D,[16] its application to individual instances of child sexual abuse offending, and the role that concurrency may play when sentencing an offender for multiple instances of such offending.[15] Warner v The King [2022] SASCA 142.[16] R v D (1997) 69 SASR 413. Against that background, it is appropriate to commence my consideration of the sentence imposed below by addressing the adequacy of the individual starting points identified by the sentencing judge.The individual head sentences As mentioned, the personal circumstances of the respondent have been summarised in the reasons of the Chief Justice. His Honour has also referred to the victim impact statements relied upon at sentencing. As to the circumstances of the offending against each of the four victims, the sentencing judge set these out in some detail in her reasons. They have been adequately summarised for present purposes in the reasons of the Chief Justice. After describing the abhorrent nature of the respondent’s offending, the devastation it caused, and the need to ensure an adequate sentencing response, the sentencing judge referred to the sentencing standard in R v D:In relation to counts one, three and four, the sexual offences particularised include acts of unlawful sexual intercourse with a child under the age of 14 and you abused a position of trust in committing these offences. The sentencing standard in the decision of R v D is therefore relevant and applicable to the offending in counts one, three and four, but for the reasons that follow, some degree of flexibility in the application of that standard should be applied to counts three and four. As outlined in my reasons in Warner v The King,[17] the judge was right to emphasise the flexibility that is appropriate in the application of the sentencing standard in R v D. In each case it will be necessary to have regard to considerations such as the nature and frequency of the offending; the duration of the period over which it occurred; the age of the victim; the impact of the offending upon the victim; and the personal circumstances of the offender.[17] Warner v The King [2022] SASCA 142 at [123] (Doyle JA). The critical passage from the sentencing judge’s remarks, in which she then proceeded to identify the starting points for each of the offences, has been set out in full in the Chief Justice’s reasons.