R v Rowan No. Sccrm-02-371, Sccrm-02-372

Link copied
Case Copied 17 min read

R v ROWAN
[2003] SASC 138

  1. Court of Criminal Appeal:  Doyle CJ, Perry and Nyland JJ

  2. DOYLE CJ: The appellant was convicted on the verdict of a jury of possessing cannabis for sale contrary to s 32(1)(e) of the Controlled Substances Act 1984 (SA) (“the Act”).

  3. The appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for three years with a non-parole period of 12 months.

  4. He appeals against his conviction and against the sentence imposed.

    Statutory Provisions

  5. Section 32(1)(e) of the Act prohibits the possession of a drug of dependence or prohibited substance “for the purpose of the sale, supply or administration of that drug or substance to another person”. Cannabis is a prohibited substance for the purposes of that provision.

  6. The appellant was charged with possessing cannabis for sale contrary to s 32(1)(e). The particulars alleged that the appellant was in possession of the cannabis for the purpose of sale. There was no suggestion that the Director is not permitted to particularise the charge in that way, that is, to allege possession for the purpose of sale rather than possession for the purpose of sale, supply or administration, if the Director so chooses.

  7. Section 32(3) of the Act provides:

    “(3)For the purposes of this section, a person who knowingly has in his or her possession more than a prescribed amount of a drug of dependence or a prohibited substance, being an amount that is prescribed for the purposes of this subsection, will, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be presumed to have that drug or substance in his or her possession for the purpose of the sale or supply of that drug or substance to another person.”

    It is to be noted that this provision creates a presumption that relates to the purpose of sale or supply, and does not include the purpose of administration to another person.

  8. Regulations made under the Act provide that the prescribed amount of cannabis for the purposes of s 32(3) is 100 grams.

    Facts

  9. On 10 August 2001 the police raided a house rented by the appellant.  They found a quantity of cannabis in the form of leaf, stem and 6.114 kilograms of female flowering head.  The sentencing Judge sentenced the appellant on the basis that the appellant had produced the cannabis.  He had grown it hydroponically.  When found by the police the flowering head was laid out to dry under lamps.  The weight of the flowering head would have been less at the time of sale, after it had been dried, than at the time it was seized by the police.

  10. It was common ground that a relatively small amount of the cannabis was intended for gratuitous supply to friends of the appellant on a casual basis.

  11. Allowing for the drying out of the flowering head and some gratuitous supply, the quantity of cannabis in the appellant’s possession was still well in excess of the prescribed amount of 100 grams necessary to activate the statutory presumption in s 32(3) of the Act. The…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read R v Rowan No. Sccrm-02-371, Sccrm-02-372 and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2003] SASC 138
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant was convicted and sentenced for possession of a quantity of cannabis exceeding the prescribed amount of 100 grams, triggering a statutory presumption of possession for the purpose of sale. The appeal against conviction and sentence raises the question of whether the statutory presumption of possession for sale, as provided in section 32(3) of the Act, is correctly applied when the possession of cannabis exceeds the prescribed amount. The court had to determine whether the statutory presumption of possession for sale is valid and if the judge correctly applied it in directing the jury.

The court examined the statutory presumption under section 32(3) of the Act and its application in this case. The appellant argued that there was no evidence indicating an intent to sell and that the presumption was incorrectly applied by the judge. The court found that the statutory presumption was correctly identified and applied by the judge, and the jury likely proceeded on that basis. The court also considered the sentencing issue, which hinged on whether the judge correctly applied the presumption of possession for sale in determining the sentence.

The court concluded that the statutory presumption of possession for sale is valid and appropriately applied in this case. The presumption was correctly identified and applied by the judge, and the jury likely proceeded on that basis. The court found no error in the application of the statutory presumption or in the sentencing decision. The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed, and the court agreed with the reasons expressed by the Chief Justice.

The court dismissed both the appeal against conviction and the appeal against sentence. The reasoning was that the statutory presumption of possession for sale, as provided in section 32(3) of the Act, was correctly identified and applied by the judge. The court agreed with the Chief Justice that the appeals against conviction and sentence should be dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Regulations made under the Act provide that the prescribed amount of cannabis for the purposes of s 32(3) is 100 grams.Facts On 10 August 2001 the police raided a house rented by the appellant. They found a quantity of cannabis in the form of leaf, stem and 6.114 kilograms of female flowering head. The sentencing Judge sentenced the appellant on the basis that the appellant had produced the cannabis. He had grown it hydroponically. When found by the police the flowering head was laid out to dry under lamps. The weight of the flowering head would have been less at the time of sale, after it had been dried, than at the time it was seized by the police. It was common ground that a relatively small amount of the cannabis was intended for gratuitous supply to friends of the appellant on a casual basis. Allowing for the drying out of the flowering head and some gratuitous supply, the quantity of cannabis in the appellant’s possession was still well in excess of the prescribed amount of 100 grams necessary to activate the statutory presumption in s 32(3) of the Act. The overall weight of the cannabis – that is, of the leaf, stem and head – was 8.0245 kilograms on 13 August 2001, and approximately 7.5 kilograms on 22 October 2001. The reduction in weight was explained by the escape of moisture from the bags in which the cannabis was stored. The market value of the cannabis was estimated to be between $22,000 and $44,000. In the course of giving evidence, the appellant conceded that the cannabis seized by the police was in his possession at the relevant time. His evidence was that the cannabis was for his own consumption and occasional gratuitous supply to friends, and that his purpose was not to sell it.Grounds of Appeal The sole ground on the appeal against conviction is that the Judge erred in directing the jury that where a person is in possession of more than 100 grams of cannabis, the law presumes that the possession was for the purpose of sale, unless the person proves on the balance of probabilities that the possession was not for the purpose of sale. The issue is whether s 32(3) of the Act gives rise to a presumption of possession for the purpose of sale when the Director proves possession of a prohibited substance, the amount is more than the prescribed amount, and alleges that the possession is for the purpose of sale. Mr Lang, counsel for the appellant, submitted that there was in this case no evidence indicating that the appellant’s purpose was sale, and that the Director relied solely on the presumption of possession for sale to prove possession for sale. It is not necessary to form a view on that because the Judge directed the jury that the presumption of possession for the purpose of sale arose, and the jury is likely to have proceeded on that basis. There are two grounds of appeal against sentence. The first ground is that the Judge erred in sentencing the appellant on the basis of an intention to sell the cannabis. This raises the issue already identified.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

PERRY J (dissent)
I would dismiss the appeal against sentence.Conclusion For those reasons I would dismiss the appeal against conviction and I would dismiss the appeal against sentence. I agree with the reasons published by the Chief Justice and that the appeals against conviction and sentence should be dismissed. NYLAND J: I agree that the appeals against conviction and sentence should be dismissed for the reasons expressed by the Chief Justice.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

Full text does not contain this section.