R v Ross - [1996] QCA 411

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL	[1996] QCA 411
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

C.A. No. 347 of 1996

Brisbane

[R. v. Ross]

T H E Q U E E N

ANNE MAREE ROSS

(Applicant)
Moynihan J. Mackenzie J. Cullinane J.

Judgment delivered 25/10/1996

Judgment of the Court

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE REFUSED

CATCHWORDS:SENTENCE - manslaughter - unlawful killing of a child - 21 year old mother suffocated seven week old son - whether sentence manifestly excessive

Counsel:	M. Irwin for the applicant T. Martin for the respondent
Solicitors:	Legal Aid Office for the applicant Qld Director of Public Prosecutions for the respondent

Hearing date : 3 October 1996

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - THE COURT

Judgment delivered 25 October 1996

This is an application for leave to appeal against a sentence of six years' imprisonment, with a recommendation of eligibility to be considered for parole after 18 months, in respect of an offence of manslaughter. The sentence is said to be manifestly excessive. The applicant had originally been charged with murder, a plea of guilty to manslaughter was accepted on the basis that there was no intent to cause death or grievous bodily harm.

The applicant was a young woman, 21 years of age, at the time of the commission of the offence. On 22 November 1994 she suffocated her son who had been born on 3 October 1994. The pregnancy was the unintended result of a casual act of sex after a meeting at a nightclub. The applicant and the father had no further involvement, she in fact paid her brother to be present at the birth.

The applicant had an unfortunate childhood which had not equipped her for parenthood; apart from anything else the state of relations between her parents, and their conduct meant the applicant had no parenting model on which to base her dealing with the child. She left home at 17. Notwithstanding the difficulties referred to, her father and disabled sister moved in with her after the birth and her father provided assistance in caring for the child although it may be doubted that this would have lasted. It seems that he had become concerned about her shows of temper and frustration directed at the child.

It is clear that the applicant had increasing difficulty in being the mother of a young child particularly in dealing with the child's persistent crying. She increasingly resented in the interference the need to care for the child imposed on the lifestyle she had been leading prior to her pregnancy. This apparently largely revolved around nightclubs. On the other hand, the child was well-nourished and bore no signs of prolonged ill-treatment. The applicant initially denied killing the child but after speaking to her father she made a full disclosure.

On the night of 21/22 November 1995 the applicant could not get the child to sleep. After what appeared to have been extended endeavours to settle him down the applicant wrapped the child tightly in a bunny rug…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Ross

Details

AGLC: R v Ross [1996] QCA 411
Case: [1996] QCA 411
Decision Date: 25/10/1996

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Court of Appeal of Queensland, the case of R v Ross involved the applicant, Anne Maree Ross, who had been convicted of manslaughter for the unlawful killing of her seven-week-old son. The applicant had originally been charged with murder, but a plea of guilty to manslaughter was accepted due to the absence of intent to cause death or grievous bodily harm. The legal issue before the court was whether the sentence of six years' imprisonment, with a recommendation of eligibility to be considered for parole after 18 months, was manifestly excessive. The applicant argued that the sentence was too harsh considering her difficult circumstances and the mitigating factors present in the case.

The court considered the various factors that the trial judge had taken into account in sentencing the applicant, including her difficult upbringing, her lack of parenting skills, and her adjustment disorder that led to excessive anger and frustration. The court also noted the psychiatric reports that supported the applicant's diminished responsibility due to her mental state at the time of the offence. However, the court emphasised that while these factors did diminish the applicant's responsibility to a substantial degree, they did not provide total justification for her actions. The court also highlighted the seriousness of the offence, which involved the unlawful killing of a defenceless child.

The court concluded that it was difficult to conceive of a more favourable sentencing outcome than in similar cases, such as Leef, where a young woman had shaken to death her month-old child after becoming angry and frustrated. The court acknowledged the difficulty in identifying a sentencing pattern for manslaughter due to the variety of circumstances in which the offence is committed. However, the court was not persuaded that the sentence in this case was outside the sound exercise of the sentencing discretion and therefore refused leave to appeal against the sentence.

In summary, the court held that the sentence imposed on the applicant for manslaughter was not manifestly excessive and refused leave to appeal against it. The court emphasised the importance of not interfering with a trial judge's exercise of the sentencing discretion unless it was plainly warranted. The court acknowledged the difficult circumstances faced by the applicant but also noted the seriousness of the offence and the need to protect children from harm.

Orders