R v Rose (No 2) - [2025] NSWSC 88

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Amendment notes

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Rose (No 2) [2025] NSWSC 88
Hearing dates: 3, 17-18 February 2025
Date of orders: 21 February 2025
Decision date: 21 February 2025
Jurisdiction: Common Law - Criminal
Before: Weinstein J
Decision:
The offender is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 6 years and 4 months with a non-parole period of 3 years and 10 months.

Catchwords:
CRIME – sentencing – manslaughter – unlawful and dangerous act – where offender homeless and itinerant – where deceased not previously known to the offender – whether offender appreciated his actions posed a risk of serious injury – whether offender left the deceased in need of medical assistance – offer to plead guilty before committal – significant background of deprivation and disadvantage – effect of background on moral culpability – moral culpability and requirement for general and specific deterrence diminished – genuine remorse

Legislation Cited:
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)
Crimes (High Risk Offenders Act) 2006 (NSW)
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW)

Cases Cited:
Bugmy v The Queen (1990) 169 CLR 525; [1990] HCA 18
Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; [2013] HCA 37
DH v R [2022] NSWCCA 200
DPP (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194
Dulihanty v R [2013] NSWCCA 275
Luque v R [2017] NSWCCA 226
Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; [2005] HCA 25
Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39
Nasrallah v R [2021] NSWCCA 207
Perkins v R [2018] NSWCCA 62
R v Bouggas [2015] NSWSC 914
R v Edwards [2022] NSWDC 110
R v Erazo [2016] NSWCCA 139
R v Gavel (2014) 239 A Crim R 469; [2014] NSWCCA 56
R v Johnson (No 5) [2017] NSWSC 1169
R v Millwood [2012] NSWCCA 2
R v MJB [2014] NSWCCA 195
R v Staff [2024] NSWSC 1471
R v Syme [2015] NSWSC 1609
R v Tuala [2015] NSWCCA 8
R v White [2023] NSWSC 611
Tepania v R [2018] NSWCCA 247

Category: Sentence
Parties: Rex (Crown)
Rodney Stephen Rose (Offender)
Representation:
Counsel:
S Oliver (Crown)
J Watts (Offender)
Solicitors:
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown)
Universal Law (Offender)

File Number(s): 2022/45909
Publication restriction: Nil

JUDGMENT

The offender, Rodney Stephen Rose, is before the court for sentence for one count of manslaughter contrary to s 18(1)(b) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) (“Crimes Act”) for which the maximum penalty is 25 years imprisonment and for which there is no standard non-parole period.
Mr Rose was 50 years old at the time of the offending, which occurred in the home of Mr Steven Ponton (“the deceased”) in Ballina in the afternoon of 5 February 2022. Mr Rose pleaded guilty to this count on 3 February 2025, which was the first day of his trial.
I am grateful to Ms Oliver who appeared on behalf of the Crown and to Mr Watts who appeared on behalf of Mr Rose for the efficient manner in which they conducted the proceedings.

Agreed Facts

The agreed facts state the following.
Since 2012, the deceased had lived in a unit at Tamar Street in Ballina which was owned by his friend. The unit complex in which the deceased lived extended between Tamar Street at the front and Holden Lane at the rear.
In 2019 and 2020, the deceased had been in a relationship with Ms Michelle McLennan, during which time she occasionally lived at the deceased’s unit. In February 2022, the deceased was living at the unit alone. At that time, there was an enforceable Apprehended Domestic Violence Order preventing Ms McLennan from going within 100 metres of the deceased’s residence.
In February 2022, the offender was homeless in Ballina. He had come to the Ballina area from Queensland in December 2021. He initially stayed with a friend, but from mid-January 2022 when she was no longer able to accommodate him, he began sleeping in a swag near the river in Ballina.
The offender met Ms McLennan only days, perhaps one day, before the offence. Ms McLennan was also homeless, although she had temporary accommodation staying with a friend at another unit in Tamar Street in Ballina, which was not the deceased’s unit. The offender had not met the deceased before 5 February 2022.
At about 12.30pm on 5 February 2022, the offender was captured on CCTV in Woolworths River Street, Ballina, and then at a bottle shop in the same street where he bought a cask of wine.
Sometime thereafter, the offender and Ms McLennan attended the deceased’s unit to escape heavy rainfall. The three shared a meal of a BBQ chicken and salad. At about 4.00pm, a neighbour heard the raised voice of a female coming from inside the deceased’s unit. At about this time, another neighbour from the unit above the deceased’s unit heard a thud, followed by the deceased saying something like “bloody hell”.
At 4.55pm, local residents found the deceased lying bleeding on the road in Holden Lane. The deceased was holding a black shopping bag containing an unopened six pack of stubbies of Tooheys New beer, and there was an upright stubby with a small amount of beer standing near to where he lay.
When asked what his name was and what had happened, he replied, “I’m Steve, I fell over” and “I felt dizzy and I’ve fallen”.
A nearby resident called 000 and advised the operator that there was bleeding from the back of the deceased’s head and his chin. The operator advised her to stem the bleeding, but the resident stated that the bleeding from the “massive laceration” to his chin was “not stopping” and she believed that he would “bleed out”. Another resident present at the time described the bleeding from the chin as “gushing”.
The deceased remained conscious until the ambulance arrived. He said to one of the residents several times, “Just let me get up”, “My stomach’s hurting” and “Where’s my beers?”. He said that he lived in the units and that he had consumed ten beers that day. The resident said that the deceased was slurring his words and smelled of beer. The resident asked him whom he had been with, and he replied, “I’ve been with no one. I’ve just fallen over. Take my beers to number 11”.
Another bystander took the beer to number 11, where a friend of the deceased lived. That friend was alerted and she attended the laneway where she identified the deceased.
An ambulance arrived in Holden Lane at 5.12pm. The deceased was conveyed to Lismore Base Hospital in a critical condition. En route to the hospital, he suffered a cardiac arrest and had to be resuscitated, including by manual compression which broke his ribs.
The deceased presented to the Emergency Department with “serious trauma with unknown mechanism” with the following injuries documented:-

Deep 7cm laceration to the chin;

5cm laceration and large area of bruising to the back of the scalp;

Fractures to the nose and left facial features including the jaw, zygomatic arch and orbital floor;

Anterior factures of ribs 2-9 bilaterally in keeping with CPR, with bruising;

Healed fractures of ribs 7-9 on right laterally; and

A large bruise on the right upper arm and another on the right hip.

The deceased had significant blood loss from the scalp laceration. His haemoglobin was low upon his admission. He required ongoing blood transfusions and was haemodynamically unstable. He died the next day at 1.00pm, with the cause of death recorded as “Significant injuries secondary to trauma of unknown mechanism in a patient with end-stage liver disease”. He was 54 years of age at the time of his death. His underlying known chronic medical diseases were recorded as including liver cirrhosis, hypertension, coagulopathy (the impaired ability of blood to coagulate, giving rise to a tendency to excessive bleeding), thrombocytopaenia (low platelet count), severe hypotension and hypoglycaemia, asthma and hepatitis C. Friends of the deceased reported that he had a tendency to fall and injure himself in recent years.
The offender and Ms McLennan were seen on CCTV in the vicinity of the unit shortly after 5.00pm on 5 February 2022. At 5.10pm, the offender returned to the bottle shop on River Street, Ballina, and purchased another cask of wine. Between 6.00pm and 9.00pm, the offender and Ms McLennan can be seen on CCTV around a local bar and an adjoining park where they continued to consume alcohol.
At the local bar and adjoining park, they met two men, Mr Smith and Mr Graham (pseudonyms), who knew Ms McLennan. The offender gave them $50 to buy cannabis for him, which they did, and they shared the cannabis between them. At 9.00pm, they witnessed an argument between the offender and Ms McLennan, and they heard the offender tell her that he loved her. Ms McLennan left the area, and the offender left shortly after.
At 9.30pm the offender went to two other venues. At the second venue, he bought a six pack of beer. Upon leaving the hotel, he encountered Mr Smith and Mr Graham, and they sat on the street together.
Mr Smith says that the offender told him that his hands and one of his feet were swollen. He says that the offender also said:-

“I fucked some bloke up in his house and shoved a fork in his head”;

“I did it for Michelle because he touched her up as well”;

“Some flat near a laneway”;

“I’ll probably go to gaol”; and

“I fucked this bloke up in his own house”.

Mr Smith says that Ms McLennan then walked past the three men and asked for a tobacco cigarette. He says that the offender said to her, “I did that for you. I bashed that cunt for you”. She apparently replied, “Fuck off get fucked”, and left. Mr Smith also recalled the offender talking about his bad childhood and saying that he was sexually assaulted when he was a child.
Mr Graham says that the offender pointed in the direction of the deceased’s unit and said:-

“I fucked up, I’m going to fucking gaol, I fucken bashed this cunt, kicked him and stabbed him with a fork”;

“A unit block it’s going to stink in a couple of days”; and

“Some Steve fella, I kicked him in the head with my right foot and stabbed him with a fork. He fucked over Michelle and her father, so I bashed him.”

Mr Graham says that the offender then stood up and urinated, but lost his balance and fell over. He said that Ms McLennan then walked up to them and asked for a cigarette. The offender said to her, “Michelle good on ya - You told em?”, to which Mr Graham said, “Nah, you just did. She never said anything.” Mr Graham described the offender as being “pretty drunk”.

Police Investigation

Police first attended the deceased’s unit at 5.25pm on Saturday 5 February 2022, to find an upturned armchair and heater, a broken glass ashtray and schooner glass, and a substantial amount of blood.
The following forensic evidence placed the offender in the deceased’s unit on the afternoon of 5 February 2022:-

His fingerprints were on the inside frame of a glass sliding door and on the underside of a dinner plate on the kitchen bench;

DNA matching his profile was on the handle of the packaging of a BBQ chicken which had been cooked at Woolworths that day;

DNA matching his profile was on a wine cask bladder; and

The offender’s bicycle lock was inside the unit.

On 8 February 2022, police arrested the offender for larceny of the BBQ chicken on 5 February 2022, which was found at the deceased’s unit. The offender was taken into custody at Ballina Police Station and participated in an Electronically Recorded Interview with Suspected Person (“ERISP”) during which he maintained that he had no recollection of what he did on 5 February 2022 because he had been heavily intoxicated. The police informed him of the evidence they had gathered which placed him at the deceased’s unit on 5 February 2022 and told him that the deceased had died from injuries he sustained that day. The offender became upset at the implication that he might be responsible for the fatal injuries sustained by the deceased.
On 9 February 2022, Mr Smith and Mr Graham made police statements, indicating the use of a fork in the assault. Later that day investigators returned to the unit and recovered a fork from a pool of blood on the loungeroom floor. The fork had three prongs and was consistent with other forks found in the cutlery drawer of the unit. Only the deceased’s DNA profile was located on the fork.
Between 9 and 14 February 2022, the offender stayed with a friend. That friend observed that when she saw him on 9 February 2022, he looked grief stricken and burst into tears. He told her that he had been locked up for stealing a cooked chicken and that “Some things have happened” but made no further admissions. He gave her the DVD of his ERISP with police on 8 February 2022 and told her “It’s a bit more than a cooked chook”, but she did not watch the DVD. She observed that Mr Rose cried frequently during the days he spent with her before she drove him to the bus stop to catch the bus and train to Cairns, a ticket she had booked for him. She said he was prone to crying in the days prior to the assault as well.
On 16 February 2022, an arrest warrant was issued for the offender for the murder of the deceased. On 18 February 2022, Mr Rose was arrested in Cairns, Queensland. He exercised his right to silence with arresting officers and with the NSW Police who attended to extradite him to NSW.
On 20 February 2022, the offender was extradited to NSW and charged.

Forensic Evidence

There were significant deposits of the deceased’s blood inside his unit:-

In the living room:-

In the doorway from the hallway to the living room, there was blood and hair on the lower hinge of the door jamb, blood and hair on the adjoining wall, and a large pool of blood on the floor. The bloodied fork lay within this pool of blood;

Blood deposits on the backrest of a three-seater lounge and on the wall behind, consistent with the deceased having sat there while bleeding from the back of the head; and

Blood drip stains on the living room floor consistent with the deceased moving around this room while dripping blood.

In the hallway:-

Blood drip stains up the hallway from the living room to the toilet, consistent with the deceased having walked this route while bleeding.

In the toilet:-

Drip stains on the floor of the toilet and the top of the cistern consistent with the deceased sitting on the toilet while bleeding.

In the bedroom:-

Drip stains on the floor including near a beer carton in the wardrobe, consistent with the deceased bleeding as he retrieved beer from the carton. A stain on the bed was consistent with the deceased having lain there for a period while bleeding.

An autopsy was conducted by Dr Lorraine du Toit-Prinsloo on 11 February 2022.
The “Direct Cause of Death” was said to be due to “Multiple Injuries”. The mechanism of death was blood loss which led to shock and bradycardia, cardiac arrest and organ failure. The injuries responsible for the fatal blood loss were the laceration to the back of the head (“Wound 1”) and the laceration under the chin (“Wound 22”). “End Stage Liver Disease (Liver Cirrhosis)” was listed as another significant condition contributing to death.
Wound 1 was an abrasion of 5cm x 3.5cm containing within it a Y-shaped laceration with irregular edges. The abrasion sat in a large confluent area of bruising measuring 13cm x 12cm present in the occipital region of the scalp.
Wound 22 was a deep horizontal wound, 7cm in length, under the chin with irregular margins. Both these wounds were caused by blunt force trauma. The forensic evidence cannot determine whether they were from inflicted blows or from falls against hard objects.
There were several bruises on the face and scalp, and contusions inside the mouth. There were fractures to the left facial features including nose, jaw and eye socket. There were bruises on the upper and lower limbs. The deceased was markedly jaundiced with features of hepatic encephalopathy present in the brain and emphysematous changes were present in the lungs.
There were three circular abrasions on the dorsal aspect of the deceased’s right hand consistent with three prongs of a fork (“Wound 12”), although the injuries did not penetrate through the skin and there was no underlying bruising. There were no wounds consistent with a stabbing with a fork. There was a linear laceration/abrasion in a vertical plane measuring 7cm x 0.2cm (“Injury 19”). Injury 19 was anterior to the left ear and was deeper in the superior aspect. The inferior aspect showed three superficial abrasions. It is possible that a fork caused this wound, but other instruments such as a comb, key or spoon could cause similar findings. This injury was not considered life threatening.
Toxicology findings included antemortem blood alcohol content of 0.162g/100mL and cannabis ingredients.

Liability

The offender assaulted the deceased by punching him to the head several times, causing facial fractures and bruising. As a result of the assault, the deceased fell to the floor where the offender kicked him to the head with his bare foot. At some stage the offender took a fork and ran it in a slicing motion down the left side of the deceased’s face, causing a laceration/abrasion in front of his left ear.
The mechanism by which the fatal wounds to the back of the head and chin were caused is unknown with certainty.
The agreed facts state that it is reasonably possible, if not probable, that the wound to the back of the head was caused by a fall against the doorway between the hallway and the living room. I find (to which see below at [111]) that such a fall is probable, but that it is not possible to know precisely when it occurred, although on the balance of probabilities it occurred after the offender and Ms McLennan left the deceased’s premises after the assault. The offender accepts that his assault of the deceased was likely to cause him to fall, given his intoxication and poor health and the injuries the offender had inflicted on him.
The agreed facts state that it is reasonably possible, if not probable, that the wound to the chin was caused by the deceased falling in the laneway. There was a minimal trail of blood drip stains between the unit and the laneway, whereas the wound on the chin was said to be “gushing” blood by witnesses who assisted the deceased in the laneway. I therefore conclude, on the balance of probabilities, that the wound to the chin occurred when the deceased fell in the laneway.
The offender caused the death of the deceased by the unlawful and dangerous act of assaulting the deceased, causing facial fractures and bruising which significantly contributed to his death by making him more prone to falling as he did inside and outside the unit. A reasonable person in the position of the offender would have appreciated that his act exposed the deceased to a risk of serious injury.

Exhibits

Before me are four exhibits. Exhibit 1 is a bundle of documents prepared by the Crown which was tendered without objection. The bundle includes the following nine items:-

The Indictment;

Agreed Facts (noted above);

Photographs and paragraphs [41]-[50], [53], [60]-[69] and [73] of the statement of Detective Senior Segreant Terrance Flippence;

The offender’s New South Wales (NSW) Criminal History;

The offender’s Queensland (Qld) Criminal History;

The offender’s Northern Territory (NT) Criminal History;

The offender’s South Australian (SA) Criminal History;

The offender’s Western Australian (WA) Criminal History; and

The offender’s New South Wales (NSW) custodial history.

Exhibit 2 contains two Victim Impact Statements. The first is of Mr Ian Ponton, the deceased’s father, and the second is from Ms Cassie Ponton, the deceased’s younger sister. The latter was read in court by Ms Ponton.
The offender’s material on sentence is contained in exhibit 3, which is a report of Ms Emma Hübner, forensic psychologist, dated 11 February 2025, and exhibit 4, which is a letter from Mr Jacob Weseley Little, co-founder of About Time for Justice (advocates for survivors of institutional abuse), dated 5 February 2025.

Evidence

I will now summarise the documents which have been placed before me.

Exhibit 1

The Crown bundle on sentence contains the criminal history of the offender in NSW, Qld, NT, SA and WA and the offender’s NSW custodial history.
The criminal histories detail a long background, over several decades, of criminal offending, generally of low seriousness, consisting mainly of property crime, drug possession and behavioural and public order offences. There is some limited history of violent offending (in 1991 and 2019). These histories are consistent with the offender’s lifelong experience with homelessness and his itinerant lifestyle. The more recent offence of wounding and assault occasioning actual bodily harm, committed in Western Australia in 2019 and which did not result in a custodial sentence, is somewhat relevant to specific deterrence, to which see below.
The offender’s NSW custodial history relates only to the offending for which he stands to be sentenced. No instances of misconduct are recorded. He is currently employed as a cleaner, which I accept is the same as a “sweeper”. He was previously employed in the metal shop. The history also records that the offender was previously homeless and that he has a “gait” condition.

Exhibit 2: Victim Impact Statements

Mr Ponton’s Victim Impact Statement discloses that times were often difficult when the deceased was a child, and that he struggled without his mother who left soon after he was born. Despite those difficulties and his son living a nomadic lifestyle, Mr Ponton described a positive relationship with him. Mr Ponton stated that his son was clever and industrious, and always took pride in what he did. Although the deceased had rheumatoid arthritis in his hands, he did beautiful work painting and renovating homes, and maintained his pride and joy, an old Ford Fairlane car.
The last time Mr Ponton saw his son, he was in good spirits. He had set goals and was working hard to achieve them despite having been through so much in his life, which Mr Ponton believes was a testament to his son’s will and determination.
Mr Ponton is understandably devastated by the brutal and senseless death of his son. Mr Ponton has significant health issues and he is now struggling to cope. He thinks about his son every day and he feels sick at the thought of what was done to him.
Ms Ponton read out her Victim Impact Statement in court. Her perspective of her brother was different to her father’s, as by the time she was born, her brother was in his early twenties and was struggling with his own demons. Her brother had a difficult life and faced many challenges. She spent limited time with him growing up, but she always knew that he was out there and cared about her.
As Ms Ponton grew up, she wanted to try to reconnect with her brother but she found it difficult to navigate the gap they had in their lives earlier on. She stated that her brother had been defined by his mistakes, but that he deserved kindness, compassion and family. At the time of his death, she was living in New Zealand with plans to return home and had been keeping up to date with his life. She looked forward to nurturing their relationship and finally having the big brother that she had aways thought about, and who she stated was kind, generous, thrifty and had a great sense of humour. She said that Mr Ponton had a good soul.
Ms Ponton said that she will never understand the senseless and grievous act that the offender committed upon a man that he did not even know. She believes that the offender could have at any time stopped and spared her brother; that he could have recognised his humanity and vulnerability and sought help for him. She thinks about what her brother would have gone through during the period of the assault and she is devastated. She thinks about her brother all of the time and how she will never have the opportunity to be with him and hear about his life, speak about what they have in common and laugh together. She feels a deep despair for her brother.
The Court expresses its gratitude to both Mr and Ms Ponton for courageously providing their statements which shed light on the deceased’s life, his qualities and his good nature. As a result of the offender’s senseless actions, Mr Ponton’s son pre-deceased him, which is a parent’s nightmare. Because of the offender’s senseless actions, Ms Ponton was robbed of the opportunity to reconnect with the brother she loved. The death of the deceased is a tragedy for his family and for his friends. It is also a tragedy for the community, which has lost one of its contributing members. We are less of a community because of the loss of the deceased. On behalf of the community, the Court acknowledges the pain and suffering of Mr Ponton and Ms Ponton and expresses its condolences to all who loved and have lost Steven Ponton.

Exhibit 3

Exhibit 3 is a report dated 11 February 2025 prepared for the purpose of the sentence hearing by Ms Emma Hübner, who is a forensic psychologist. She assessed the offender on 5 February 2025 via Audio Visual Link (“AVL”) for two and a half hours. Ms Hübner is the director of a private practice in forensic psychology and has a Bachelor of Psychology (Honours) and Master of Psychology (Forensic). I observe that Ms Hübner was not required for cross-examination by the Crown, who accepted both the history given to her by the offender and Ms Hübner’s conclusions and recommendations.
Ms Hübner conducted testing including a Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI) and Self-Appraisal Questionnaire (SAQ), the results of which are set out below.
Ms Hübner set out the extensive history provided by the offender in detail. She recorded that Mr Rose was born in 1971 on Kangaroo Island, SA. He has a younger sister, now aged 51 years old and he was raised primarily by his mother, who later revealed that the person whom he thought was his biological father was in fact his stepfather. There is ongoing uncertainty about the identity of his biological father.
Mr Rose told Ms Hübner that his mother was “outspoken” when she drank alcohol, but was described as otherwise having made efforts to be a good mother. His stepfather was frequently absent and drank alcohol daily. He enforced strict household rules which involved physical punishment, derogatory name-calling and threats of isolating the offender from his friends and social activities. Other children were forbidden from playing with him when he was five or six years old after their parents noticed cigarette burns on his arms, which he believes were inflicted by his stepfather. He reported instances of sexual abuse by a babysitter from ages two to four, a school headmaster at age 13 and a detention centre worker at age 14.
Ms Hübner noted that Mr Rose attended Kangaroo Island Public School from kindergarten until the eighth grade (clarified in his evidence to be until the end of the seventh grade). He was expelled for drinking alcohol at school. He attended another school (in Adelaide) for 6 months and then never returned home.
At age 13, Mr Rose began running away from home which led to frequent interactions with police and the law. He was detained in juvenile detention multiple times before he turned 18 years of age and was frequently homeless. Shortly after he turned 18, he was sentenced to three years in custody, which was suspended, for assaulting someone he believed was a paedophile. After his release from custody on that occasion, he experienced an itinerant lifestyle with significant periods of homelessness and reliance on temporary accommodation. He believed that his peripatetic lifestyle has contributed to persistent feelings of loneliness.
Ms Hübner recorded an extensive history of drug and alcohol abuse. Mr Rose reported that he started abusing cannabis at the age of 10 years. He then began abusing alcohol and experimenting with hallucinogens, including LSD and mushrooms, at age 13. From 15 years of age, he began using amphetamines and quickly developed a dependency on the drug. At age 30, he began using MDMA on weekends when he was out drinking and he reported methamphetamine abuse from age 40, including binge episodes. He reported cocaine use on a few occasions.
The offender reported that he struggled to form relationships with people and often pushed people away due to trust issues. He had short intimate relationships with four women, each of whom bore one child from the relationship. He has had little involvement with any of them and stated that he did not feel that he was ready to be a father.
Mr Rose reported self-destructive behaviours including running in front of motor vehicles and periods of heavy substance abuse during which he was indifferent as to whether he lived or died. In 2004 he required surgery to his right arm because its circulation was cut off during a long period of unconsciousness following a methadone overdose. This injury is addressed in more detail below. He spent approximately two weeks in a mental health unit at Cairns Hospital following that incident and he has received a Disability Support Pension since that time. He said that he made a conscious effort to reduce his drug use after that incident, but he has experienced cycles of relapse and recovery.
Mr Rose voluntarily admitted himself to a psychiatric ward in 2017 for about two weeks due to depressed mood and suicidal ideation, which he believes was linked to his substance abuse. After that admission, he reportedly briefly attended a rehabilitation facility and engaged with Alcoholics Anonymous. He told Ms Hübner that in 2021, he abstained from drug and alcohol use for 5-6 weeks before relocating to Ballina when he relapsed into methamphetamine use and daily alcohol abuse.
The offender reported a varied work history, primarily in manual labour and hospitality in a wide range of locations, but he was never employed for an extended period of time.
In custody, he reported that he has worked as a sweeper for the past year. He is prescribed Mirtazapine, a mood stabiliser aimed at alleviating his sleep disturbances, low mood and anxiety. He confirmed compliance with his medication regime and told Ms Hübner that it has assisted his overall mood. He denied symptoms of active psychosis.
Ms Hübner recorded that the offender had lodged an application with the National Redress Scheme with respect to the sexual abuse he experienced, and that he has the assistance of an organisation called “About Time for Justice”. Although he has never sought or engaged in psychotherapy, he reported that he was motivated to pursue that option now.
Mr Rose told Ms Hübner that he had met Ms McLennan shortly before the offence. On 5 February 2022, they sought shelter from heavy rain at Mr Ponton’s unit. In relation to the offending conduct, Ms Hübner reported a history that accorded with the agreed facts in all material respects. The offender told Ms Hübner that at the time of the offending, he had been drinking and smoking cannabis both the previous night and throughout the day. He stated that he, Ms McLennan and the deceased had shared a cask and a separate bottle of wine, as well as approximately six joints of cannabis in the 24 hours prior to the offending. He also stated that he was “coming down” from methamphetamines, and that he had not slept during the two preceding days.
Mr Rose told Ms Hübner that he intervened in a domestic argument between Ms McLennan and the deceased. He said that he was struck in the chin by a beer can held by the deceased, which he could not say was either intentional or accidental, but he believed that this triggered his anger which led to the assault. He recalled holding a fork during the altercation which he had been using to eat dinner when the argument escalated, but he was not fully aware of holding the fork at the time due to the limited sensation in his right arm. After the assault, he recalled the deceased lying on the floor, conscious but bleeding from the nose and mouth. He noted that Ms McLennan offered to help the deceased, but Mr Ponton declined the offer and told them to leave. Mr Rose reported that he did not believe that the deceased would die, as he was still conscious and speaking to them when they left. He denied knowledge of the deceased’s underlying medical conditions.
The offender conveyed feelings of regret to Ms Hübner, stating:-

“I’m devastated that someone lost their life… I liked Steve; things just escalated so quickly. … I never want to be like that again… because of my drug use and drinking, someone lost their life.”

The MCMI test is a psychometric personality test designed to identify entrenched behaviour patterns and reactive mood states that may arise in response to recent life events and circumstances. Ms Hübner believes that the offender provided an honest and accurate account based on his response pattern.
The MCMI test showed elevations on the following subscales: Self-Defeating, Schizoid, Depressive, Antisocial, Passive Aggressive and Avoidant. There were also elevations on the Severe Personality Pathology subscales: Schizotypal and Borderline. Whilst most of these subscales may be thought to be somewhat self-explanatory, Ms Hübner provides a detailed summary at [40]-[46] of her report which is important in the context of the offender’s subjective case:-

“Self-defeating tendencies suggest that Mr Rose may engage in behaviours that undermine his own success and happiness. He likely struggles with feelings of unworthiness, leading to self-sabotaging actions that prevent him from pursuing opportunities or achieving his goals. This pattern can create a cycle of disappointment and frustration, reinforcing negative self-perceptions.
The schizoid traits indicate a preference for solitude and emotional detachment. Mr Rose likely feels uncomfortable in social situations and withdraws from interactions with others. He might appear aloof or indifferent, which can make it difficult for him to form close relationships or connect with others on an emotional level.
Depressive characteristics suggest that Mr Rose experiences persistent feelings of sadness, low energy, and a generally negative outlook on life. He may struggle with motivation and find it challenging to engage in activities that once brought him joy. This pervasive sense of hopelessness can further isolate him from social connections and contribute to his emotional distress.
The presence of antisocial traits indicates a tendency to disregard social norms and the rights of others. Mr Rose may exhibit impulsivity and a lack of remorse for his actions, which can lead to conflicts in relationships and difficulties maintaining a stable social life. His behaviour may be characterised by a sense of entitlement or a willingness to manipulate situations to his advantage.
Passive-aggressive tendencies suggest that Mr Rose may express negative feelings indirectly rather than addressing them openly. He might exhibit behaviours that are resistant or obstructive, leading to frustration in his relationships. This indirect expression of anger can create misunderstandings and further complicate his interactions with others.
The elevations on the Severe Personality Pathology subscales, particularly in schizotypal and borderline traits, indicate additional layers of complexity. Schizotypal traits can manifest as eccentric behaviour, unusual beliefs, or perceptual experiences that might alienate him from others. Meanwhile, borderline traits suggest emotional instability, intense interpersonal relationships, and a fear of abandonment. Mr Rose may experience rapid mood swings and have difficulty managing his emotions, leading to tumultuous relationships and a sense of chaos in his life.”

On the Clinical Syndromes scales, which Ms Hübner indicates measure moods and behaviours in response to life events and circumstances, the offender had significant scores on Anxiety, Alcohol Dependence and Drug Dependence. These scores indicate the presence of anxiety, which Ms Hübner says would likely intensify and exacerbate his other symptoms and negative emotions. Furthermore, in her opinion, alcohol and drug dependence represent maladaptive coping strategies for the offender which may provide temporary relief but come with well-known negative consequences such as legal issues, health problems and the exacerbation of anxiety and depression which create a vicious cycle reinforcing distress and dysfunction.
The SAQ test measures both static and dynamic factors and was administered to gather information regarding the offender’s risk of recidivism. Mr Rose was found to be at high risk of reoffending, although Ms Hübner noted that if Mr Rose’s dynamic factors were addressed, his risk of re-offending would decline. Ms Hübner recommended that he engage in:-

individual counselling to explore the causes of his disturbed childhood behaviour and criminal involvement;

drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs, along with interventions that specifically address peer pressure; and

individual counselling to investigate and address the root causes of his anger, as well as participate in anger management programs to develop healthier coping strategies.

In Ms Hübner’s opinion, the offender presented with a complex psychosocial background marked by early childhood trauma, including exposure to substance abuse, domestic violence, physical and sexual abuse and emotional neglect. She believes that his experiences in childhood set the foundation for his tortured history including homelessness, incarceration, mental health struggles, substance and alcohol dependence and abuse. At [57] of her report, Ms Hübner observed that:-

“Given his extensive history of trauma and substance dependence, it is probable that his mental state at the time of the index offence was impaired by intoxication, emotional dysregulation, and long-standing personality vulnerabilities. His history of psychiatric admissions and past attempts at rehabilitation suggest that while he has struggled to maintain stability, he has demonstrated prior motivation for change.”

Based on the psychometric assessments and Mr Rose’s clinical presentation, Ms Hübner believes that the offender exhibits symptoms consistent with the following diagnoses:-

Severe Alcohol and Substance Use Disorder, marked by persistent and long-term abuse of alcohol, cannabis, amphetamines and other substances, which has led to multiple failed attempts at achieving abstinence and has severely impaired his social and occupational functioning;

Symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder including recurrent distressing memories, hypervigilance and avoidance behaviours rooted in childhood trauma;

Traits of Borderline Personality Disorder, characterised by emotional instability, impulsivity and intense, unstable interpersonal relationships, alongside self-defeating behaviours;

Traits associated with Antisocial Personality Disorder, such as impulsivity and a disregard for societal norms, coupled with a history of repeated legal offences; and

Symptoms of generalised anxiety and depression, which appear to be secondary to his personality pathology and chronic instability, further complicating his overall mental health.

Ms Hübner is of the view that the offender’s prognosis is guarded due to the entrenched nature of his personality pathology, long-standing substance dependence and repeated involvement with the law. However, she believed that there was potential for rehabilitation due to his history of intermittent efforts at substance abstinence and participation in psychiatric treatment which suggest a degree of insight and willingness to change.
Ms Hübner stated that the offender’s actions in assaulting the deceased were influenced by a convergence of acute psychological and situational factors. She observed that whilst Mr Rose’s behaviour was violent, it appears to have been reactive rather than premeditated, with no evidence of an intent to cause fatal harm. His statement of regret, noted above at [75], in Ms Hübner’s view suggests emerging insight into the consequences of his behaviour. Deeper therapeutic engagement is required to strengthen Mr Rose’s capacity for emotional regulation and to enhance his understanding of alternative coping mechanisms.

Ms Hübner recommended that Mr Rose engage in an intensive substance abuse rehabilitation program, trauma-focused therapies such as Cognitive Behavioural Therapy or Dialectical Behaviour Therapy and a structured anger management program. She is of the opinion that ongoing psychiatric monitoring and medication adherence are vital components of Mr Rose’s rehabilitation plan, alongside the continued use of mood stabilisers. She believes that a gradual community reintegration plan should be implemented with supervised transitional housing and employment support services which will reduce the likelihood of relapse into substance use and which will prevent homelessness. If these areas are addressed, in Ms Hübner’s view Mr Rose will be better positioned for successful rehabilitation and reintegration into society.

Exhibit 4

Exhibit 4 is a letter from Mr Jacob Weseley Little of “About Time For Justice” dated 5 February 2025. Mr Little was not required for cross-examination by the Crown.
Mr Little is a co-founder of About Time For Justice, which advocates for survivors of institutional abuse. He indicates that Mr Rose engaged their services in June 2022 (approximately 4 months after he was taken into custody for this matter) to seek help for the harm he suffered.
Mr Little says that the offender suffered institutional child sexual and physical abuse at the hands of workers at a state facility as a teenager and that he has opened up about his experience of abuse. The matter is ongoing. Mr Little indicates that the offender is a strong and self-reflective person, that he is dedicated and shows enthusiasm to grow and learn as a person to better himself for the future.

Mr Rose gave evidence

Mr Rose was called by Mr Watts to give evidence and was cross-examined by Ms Oliver.
Mr Rose presented as a contrite and honest witness who gave his evidence frankly, often against interest. I accept his evidence in all material respects.
Mr Rose confirmed that he had been honest and forthright with Ms Hübner when she interviewed him. He elaborated on his childhood experiences, about which he was not cross-examined. He gave details of the sexual assaults perpetrated on him at ages 4, 13 and 15. After he ran away from home at about age 13, after being sexually assaulted by the headmaster at his school, Mr Rose never returned home. He did not thereafter have any formal education, save for six months in Adelaide. He was thereafter largely homeless, save for the times spent in youth detention or in boys’ homes. He described significant alcoholism, neglect and personal violence in the family home.
The offender described an incident in about 2004 when he overdosed on methadone. He fell asleep on his right arm, being right hand dominant, which cut off circulation and required him to undergo surgery in an effort to save the arm. The muscle was cut so that he was left without feeling or real use of the arm. In 2006, he received a Disability Support Pension on account of the disabilities caused by that incident. He has lived an itinerant lifestyle most of his life, from the time that he left home at age 13.
Mr Rose said that his last recollection of the deceased was of him sitting on the couch, after Mr Rose had punched him on the face, when Mr Ponton asked him and Ms McLennan to leave. At that point, Mr Ponton was bleeding on the nose and mouth, but not in the back of the head.
Mr Rose apologised for his actions.
The offender told the court that he wished to engage in rehabilitation and various programs and very much wished to re-engage with his family, because he now understands that he has two grandchildren who live with their father in Cairns.
In cross-examination, Mr Rose said that he met Ms McLennan on the evening of 4 February 2022, before they went to Mr Ponton’s unit at her suggestion to get out of the rain. He stayed there overnight drinking with Ms McLennan and Mr Ponton. He believed that Ms McLennan slept for part of that time in the sole bedroom and that Mr Ponton may have had a nap. However, there was constant drinking throughout the night and into the morning. He could not recall anything unusual about Mr Ponton’s appearance or skin colour.
In the morning of 5 February 2022, after Mr Rose and Mr Ponton had been drinking all night, Ms McLennan awoke. The offender and Mr Ponton continued to drink. Later, at about noon, Mr Rose left the unit by himself to get more alcohol and some food which he brought back to the unit. At some point there was an argument between Ms McLennan and Mr Ponton and Mr Rose “almost got in the middle of it” when he was hit on the chin by Mr Ponton’s beer bottle. Mr Rose said that he hit Mr Ponton a couple of times, after which Mr Rose fell over. Mr Rose agreed that he had a fork in his hand at the time of the assault as he was eating.
Mr Ponton did not fight back. Mr Ponton fell down after which Mr Rose kicked him with his bare foot. Mr Rose accepted that his punches were hard punches which caused Mr Ponton to fall to the floor. After he fell to the floor, Mr Ponton sat on the couch and asked Mr Rose and Ms McLennan to leave. Ms McLennan asked Mr Ponton if he wanted her to call anyone (perhaps an ambulance or a friend) for him but he told them both to “fuck off”. Mr Rose did not believe that Mr Ponton looked like he needed medical help.
Mr Rose denied that later that day, when speaking to Mr Graham and Mr Smith, that he believed that he had committed a serious assault on Mr Ponton and that he was likely to go to gaol. He said that he believed that Mr Ponton was slightly injured when he left the unit. He said that he only saw blood falling from Mr Ponton onto his clothing and that he did not see blood anywhere else.
Mr Rose told Ms Oliver about the circumstances of his 2019 Western Australian conviction for wounding. He apparently had a drunken fight with someone who tried to stab him and he hit that person with a bottle.

Objective Seriousness

Manslaughter

As Beech-Jones, then CJ at CL said in R v White [2023] NSWSC 611 (“White”) at [25]-[27]:-

“It has long been accepted that, of all crimes, manslaughter is said to “throw up the greatest variety of circumstances affecting culpability” (R v Blacklidge, Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), 12 December 1995, unrep per Gleeson CJ). There are various forms of manslaughter, including gross negligence and a killing that is otherwise murder but occasioned by gross provocation. No category of manslaughter is inherently more serious than another.
The form of manslaughter to which the offender pleaded guilty is manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act. As the agreed facts state, the unlawful act was punching Dr Johnson. For an act to be “dangerous”, a reasonable person in the position of the offender must have appreciated that the act exposed another person to a risk of serious injury. In this case, the act was “dangerous”, at least in part, because of its proximity to the clifftop. The relevant state of mind required to be guilty of this form of manslaughter is an intention to commit the relevant act. It is not necessary for the offender to be subjectively aware that the relevant act was dangerous.
Even with manslaughters by unlawful and dangerous act, there are a variety of circumstances that can render one crime more serious than others. To that end, one of the fundamental aspects of sentencing is to assess the objective seriousness of the specific crime committed (see DS v R (2022) 109 NSWLR 82; [2022] NSWCCA 156; “DS”). However, it is not necessary to determine where the individual offence falls on some hypothetical range of offending. In the case of manslaughter, it is preferable to avoid such an assessment (Paterson v R [2021] NSWCCA 273 at [33]).”

Manslaughter carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment for 25 years, the greatest maximum penalty in the criminal law of New South Wales, other than life without the possibility of parole. There is no standard non-parole period prescribed. The offence will almost inevitably be objectively serious, as it concerns the criminal taking of human life: see R v Johnson (No 5) [2017] NSWSC 1169 per Button J at [25].
The parties agreed that the following features of the conduct leading up to and constituting the offence of this manslaughter are relevant to its objective seriousness:-

The offender and the deceased had only met on 5 February 2022 and appear to have been introduced by Michelle McLennan. The early interaction between them was cordial in that they shared a meal and consumed alcohol together.

The offender was heavily intoxicated and appears to have been motivated by the perception that the deceased and Ms McLennan were arguing about Ms McLennan being wronged on some earlier occasion. I observe that I do not take the offender’s intoxication into account as a factor mitigating the seriousness of the offending: s 21A(5AA) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (“the Sentencing Act”).

The offender assaulted the deceased by punching him in the face several times causing facial fractures and contusions and kicking him in the head with his bare foot after the deceased fell to the floor. The facial fractures included a fractured nose which could be expected to have bled. In evidence, the offender qualified the kick to the deceased by saying that “[I] more fell over him, rather than kicked him”.

The offender also caused a laceration/abrasion to the deceased’s face in front of his left ear with a fork. However the injury caused by the fork was not life threatening and not as serious as the injuries caused by the punches but could be expected to have bled. The fork came from the deceased’s unit and appears to have been used when the meal was consumed.

One of the fatal injuries was caused when the deceased fell inside the unit hitting the back of his head on the lower hinge of the door jamb in the hallway causing a laceration which bled profusely.

The offender’s assault of the deceased and the resulting injuries made the deceased more prone to fall as he did, given his intoxication (0.162 g/100mL) and poor health which had already given rise to a tendency to fall and injure himself.

After the fall which caused the laceration to the back of his head, the deceased got up and walked to the three seater lounge where he sat for a period leaving a blood stain on the wall behind the lounge. At some point after being assaulted and before or after the fall the deceased walked to the toilet where he appears to have stood and sat for a period. Further, the deceased walked into his bedroom where he appears to have sat or lay on his bed and retrieved a 6 pack of Tooheys New beer from a carton in the cupboard. Thereafter the deceased walked out of the unit and down to the lane behind his unit block where he fell a second time, occasioning the laceration under his chin.

The actions of the deceased in leaving the unit to continue drinking at his friend’s house are consistent with him not realising the extent of his injuries or that he was in need of medical treatment.

The deceased’s pre-existing health issues including end stage liver disease (cirrhosis) and coagulopathy (impaired ability of the blood to coagulate giving rise to a tendency to excessive bleeding) significantly contributed to his death.

The Crown asked the Court to add to that list two additional findings relevant to the seriousness of the offending: first, that there was no evidence that the deceased assaulted the offender or that there was any provocation which led to the assault and second, that the offence occurred in the deceased’s home. I accept the Crown’s submission and make those findings, noting that the latter is a statutory aggravating factor, which I find but do not double count: s 21A(2)(eb) of the Sentencing Act.
The Crown also submitted that there was an inference available that the offender knew that the deceased required medical assistance due to witnessing significant blood loss, but that he did not attempt to secure that assistance which would be aggravating. Ms Oliver referred to three decisions of this Court which, she submitted, supported the contention that leaving a person seriously injured (at one’s own hand) without assistance increases moral culpability and objective seriousness: R v Staff [2024] NSWSC 1471 per Lonergan J at [13], [33], [43]; White per Beech-Jones CJ at CL at [36]; Dulihanty v R [2013] NSWCCA 275 at [68] per Johnson J.
The Crown’s submission regarding the deceased requiring medical assistance at the time at which the offender left the premises, in the circumstances, depends upon a finding that the deceased had suffered the injury to the back of his head prior to the offender leaving which caused profuse bleeding. The Crown pointed to a number of factors which it was said allowed me to make this finding beyond reasonable doubt:-

The fork used in the assault was found laying in a large pool of blood which, the Crown submits, meant that the offender would have seen the pool of blood prior to leaving (because the fork was used in the assault and left in the pool of blood thereafter).

A blanket was located on the floor near the door jamb where the deceased hit the back of his head. The Crown submits that I would find that this was put there by someone else so that the deceased could lay his head down.

The offender says that the deceased sat down on the three-seater lounge before he left the premises. The Crown noted that there were blood deposits on the backrest and on the wall behind, which were agreed to be consistent with the deceased having sat there while bleeding from the back of the head. The Crown submits that the offender therefore must have been present when the deceased was bleeding from the back of the head.

After the offender left the premises, he told Mr Graham that the unit block was going to stink in a few days. The Crown submits that this could only mean that the offender was aware of a substantial amount of blood being deposited onto surfaces within the unit.

The offender also told Mr Smith and Mr Graham that he was probably going to go to gaol, which the Crown submits is evidence that he was aware that he had assaulted the deceased so severely that he believed he would receive a custodial sentence.

Mr Watts submitted that the evidence at the crime scene was not consistent with three people walking around the unit after the deceased had bled substantially in the unit. He emphasised that even the deceased did not appreciate that he required medical treatment after the offender and Ms McLennan departed. Mr Watts discounted the reliability of Mr Rose’s later admissions to Mr Smith and Mr Graham due to his extreme intoxication (having been awake for at least 36 hours) and submitted that he was likely exaggerating or “big-noting” about the assault in an unreliable way. Mr Rose’s assertions about the fork, for example, were demonstrably unreliable, a point conceded by the Crown. In Mr Watts’s submission, the Court would not find that the offender was aware of a laceration to the back of the deceased’s head.
The submissions made by the Crown have some force, made as they are in circumstances where many of the facts will never be known with certainty, but ultimately they are not findings that I am able to make beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence before the Court of what actually occurred on the evening of 5 February 2022 is very limited and significant reliance must be placed on the forensic evidence which is not complemented by any witness apart from the offender, whose evidence I accept. The forensic evidence demonstrates that the offender was able to walk around his unit, get up and sit down on the toilet, grab his beer and leave, all while bleeding profusely.
The first three of the Crown’s contentions with respect to the forensic evidence does not necessitate a conclusion that the offender must have seen the deceased after he sustained the injury to the back of his head. There are other reasonably possible conclusions. For example, the fork may have been laid where it was prior to the deceased falling and injuring the back of his head in the door jamb, and the deceased later sat in that spot. The folded blanket may have already been in the position where it lay (as there was evidence that the deceased and Ms McLennan had been sleeping in the deceased’s house), or the deceased may have put it there himself after he hit the back of his head after the offender left the unit. Further, the deceased may have sat down on the couch first before the offender left (when the offender says he saw him sitting there) and then again after the offender left and the deceased had hit his head. Therefore I cannot accept beyond reasonable doubt that the offender left the premises after the deceased had injured the back of his head (and bled profusely from that injury).
I accept Mr Watts’s submissions with respect to the offender’s representations to Mr Smith and Mr Graham. I am circumspect as to their accuracy given that they were made at a time when the offender had not slept for approximately 36 hours and had consumed a significant amount of alcohol over that period. I accept that they were more likely to be exaggerations, “big-noting” or otherwise unreliable. Taking into account the offender’s criminal history, I do not accept that saying “I’ll probably go to gaol” means that the offender appreciated that his actions had exposed the deceased to a risk of serious injury. In my view it is a substantial leap to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that either or both representations relied upon by the Crown, combined with other evidence, meant that the offender knew that the deceased required medical assistance before the offender left the unit.
The Crown conceded that her submission may fail because the offender gave evidence (which I accept) that the deceased told him and Ms McLennan to “fuck off” when she asked him if he needed her to call an ambulance or someone else. That concession was rightly made, because if the deceased in fact required medical assistance before the offender left, his refusal of medical assistance means that whilst the offender left in any event, it could not be said that he left him callously and cowardly alone in need of assistance. Further it is not in dispute that the deceased himself did not think he required medical assistance.
Perhaps more significantly, another difficulty the Crown faces in its argument is that the offender gave compelling evidence before me that when he left the unit, the deceased was only bleeding from the nose and mouth, and there was only blood on his clothes rather than any surface of the unit. He was cross-examined on this topic, but there is nothing arising out of his testimony or otherwise in the evidence to disbelieve him. On that basis, I find that the deceased’s injury to the back of the head which caused significant bleeding occurred after the offender left. The deceased was then able to walk around his unit, get his beer and leave with the intention of going to a friend’s house.
Dovetailing with her previous submission, the Crown also submitted that it may be inferred from the nature of the injuries and the offender’s admissions that the force used was not insignificant, and that it was open to find that the offender appreciated his actions had exposed the deceased to a risk of serious injury. I have already dealt with this in part in paragraph [109] above. The offender accepted that the force was not insignificant and that the injuries he caused directly could be “expected to have bled”, but he did not accept that he appreciated his actions had exposed the deceased to a risk of serious injury.
Mr Watts submitted that there was no evidence that the offender was aware of the deceased’s pre-existing health concerns or that he noticed that the deceased was jaundiced. He also submitted that the deceased was a regular drinker who might not necessarily have appeared drunk, particularly to the offender who was significantly intoxicated. The offender gave evidence that Ms McLennan did not tell him anything about the state of the deceased’s health, and that he did not recall the deceased appearing drunk or having yellow skin. I accept that evidence. Mr Watts further submitted that the presence of facial injuries caused during the assault of the deceased fall short of establishing that the offender knew that there was a risk of serious injury to the deceased. I accept that submission, noting that I have accepted the offender’s evidence that the deceased was only bleeding from the nose and mouth and that the blood had only fallen onto his shirt rather than surfaces in the unit.

The Crown acknowledged that, despite the attack on the deceased by the offender, there were other contributing factors to his death, including end stage liver disease, coagulopathy and the fall in the laneway.
Both the Crown and Mr Watts referred me to a number of comparable cases of manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act where the act was an assault and there was no provocation. The objective and subjective circumstances of each of those cases vary significantly, and they are of limited utility bearing in mind that I am concerned with individualised justice and the imposition of a proportionate sentence. Nonetheless, I am grateful to counsel for referring me to these decisions and I have had regard to them.
The Crown submitted that the objective seriousness of this offence was below the mid-range on a notional scale. Mr Watts submitted that it was significantly below the mid-range but not at the lowest end. I observe that there is no obligation on a court to indicate where on a notional scale of objective seriousness the offending lies.
In DH v R [2022] NSWCCA 200, Yehia J said at [60]:-

“[60] The assessment of objective seriousness of an offence is an essential element of the process of instinctive synthesis, a purpose of which is the imposition of a proportionate sentence: Zreika v R [2012] NSWCCA 44 at [46]; R v Dodd (1991) 57 A Crim R 349 at 354; Khoury v R [2011] NSWCCA 118. A sentencing judge is required to identify all the factors relevant to the objective seriousness of an offence but is not required to nominate a point on the scale of seriousness by reference to a notional mid-point. The use of descriptors such as “low end of the middle of the range”, “upper end of the middle of the range” or, “just below or above the midpoint” add nothing of value to the process of instinctive synthesis and the determination of a proportionate sentence.”

I have set out the factors which I consider to be relevant to the objective seriousness of the offending. It is an objectively serious example of the offence of manslaughter.

Statutory Aggravating and Mitigating factors

An aggravating factor to be taken into account is that the offence was committed in the deceased’s own home: see s 21A(2)(eb) of the Sentencing Act. Mr Watts submitted that this factor was tempered by the fact that the offender was not an intruder and was originally in the home with the consent of the deceased, consuming food and alcohol in a social setting. I accept that an objective feature of this case is that the offender was in the home of the deceased with his consent, but in my view that does not detract from the aggravating factor that I must take into account in determining an appropriate sentence.
The parties agree that the effect of the offender’s criminal history is such that it disentitles him to the leniency that could be afforded to a person of good character.
As to mitigating factors, it is conceded by the Crown that the offence was not part of a planned or organised criminal activity (s 21A(3)(b)), and that there was remorse shown by the offender such that he has accepted responsibility for his actions and he has acknowledged the injury and loss caused by his actions (s 21A(3)(i)). I take those mitigating factors into account in my determination of an appropriate sentence.

Subjective Circumstances

Plea of Guilty

When the offender was arraigned on the first day of his trial, the offender pleaded not guilty to murder but guilty to manslaughter, which was accepted by the Crown in full satisfaction of the indictment. The offender had offered to plead guilty to manslaughter in a written negotiations document before he was committed for trial, but the offer was rejected by the Crown. On the basis of that offer, it was agreed between the parties that the offender is entitled to a discount of 25% pursuant to s 25E(1) and (3)(a) of the Sentencing Act.

Self-induced intoxication

I have already observed that s 21A(5AA) of the Sentencing Act applies such that the offender’s self-induced intoxication cannot not be used as a mitigating factor. Mr Watts submitted, however, that the offender’s heavy consumption of alcohol in the days leading up to and day of the offending is relevant to his subjective case and in particular to the assessment of his prospects of rehabilitation and special circumstances. On that issue the Court was referred to R v Bouggas [2015] NSWSC 914 per McCallum J, as her Honour then was, at [14], [19]-[23] and R v Syme [2015] NSWSC 1609 at [12]-[14] per Adams J. The Crown did not disagree with Mr Watts’s submission and I accept that it may be relevant in those respects.

Mental Health and Deprived Background

There are a number of interrelated factors in the offender’s background that have defined his life and amount to profound deprivation which has not diminished with time, and which must be given full weight in the determination of the appropriate sentence: see Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; [2013] HCA 37 at [44] (“Bugmy”). The Crown does not disagree with this proposition. I do not repeat [62]-[72] above which summarise the relevant parts of Ms Hübner’s report, but it is necessary for me to set out the indicia of Mr Rose’s disadvantage in some detail to demonstrate the connection between them, the severity of their effect, and how they have influenced the offending.

Domestic Violence and the Offender’s Childhood Home

The offender experienced domestic violence from a young age. The offender’s stepfather was frequently absent and drank alcohol daily. When giving evidence before me, Mr Rose recalled being afraid of his stepfather returning home. His stepfather verbally and physically abused the offender as a very young child. He called him derogatory names and burned cigarettes on his arms. He threatened to isolate the offender from his friends and social activities. Other children were not allowed to play with him because of the cigarette burns, which isolated him from his peers.
As Fullerton J said in Perkins v R [2018] NSWCCA 62 at [99]:-

“The insidious effects of exposure to family and domestic violence on children in their formative years, and the potential for that exposure to play out in unforeseen ways as a young child develops from adolescence into adulthood, are well researched and documented.”

In the instant case, the abuse was perpetrated by someone not only in a position of trust and authority over the offender, but also by someone from whom he ought to have been able to expect love, care and affection. Such was the family and domestic violence to which the offender was exposed, that he ran away from the family home at 13 years of age, never to return and which caused him to be homeless and to interact with the criminal justice system.
The offender’s treatment in his home no doubt affected the offender’s emotional development and his ability to form meaningful relationships, not least due to the fact that the abuse he experienced was carried out by someone he ought to have been able to trust. I do not doubt that his childhood exposure to violence and neglect have had a long-lasting negative emotional and psychological impact, and so much is clear from the report of Ms Hübner.

Childhood Sexual Abuse

The Courts have long recognised that emotional and psychological damage to children from sexual abuse can be assumed: R v Tuala [2015] NSWCCA 8 at [56]; R v Gavel [2014] NSWCCA 56; (2014) 239 A Crim R 469 at [110]; R v MJB [2014] NSWCCA 195 at [49]; R v Erazo [2016] NSWCCA 139 at [44]. Mr Watts cited Hamill J in Nasrallah v R [2021] NSWCCA 207 at [99]-[102], the content of which I respectfully adopt as apposite to the present proceedings:-

“The impact of violence and sexual offences on victims is well understood and documented. In R v MJB, Adamson J observed that “[t]he damage done to children who are the victims of sexual assault by adults is well known and can be assumed.” The pervasive effects of child sexual abuse were again acknowledged in R v Gavel:
“[110] … [C]hild sex offences have profound and deleterious effects upon victims for many years, if not the whole of their lives: R v CMB [2014] NSWCCA 5 at [92]. Sexual abuse of children will inevitably give rise to psychological damage: SW v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 255 at [52]. In R v G [2009] 1 AC 92, Baroness Hale of Richmond (at [49]) referred to the ‘long term and serious harm, both physical and psychological, which premature sexual activity can do’. The absolute prohibition on sexual activity with a child is intended to protect children from the physical and psychological harm taken to be caused by premature sexual activity: Clarkson v The Queen (2011) 32 VR 361; 212 A Crim R 72 at [3], [26]-[39].”

In Stanton v R, Johnson J (Adamson and Campbell JJ agreeing) noted:
“[67] …
‘… the Court is entitled to have regard to the well-known fact that the victims of child sexual assault very frequently suffer long-term, and serious, psychological consequences.
Moreover, those consequences are not limited to the obviously, at face value, more serious offences.’”

The Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse (RCIRCSA) also contributed to the understanding of the impacts of child sexual abuse with the release of its final report and recommendations in 2017. The Commission’s conclusions, based on a body of academic research and the experiences of witnesses called in the course of the lengthy hearings and private sessions, analysed the adverse and multifaceted effects of child sexual abuse on “survivors”. The impacts on participants in the RCIRCSA were summarised as follows:
“After mental health, relationship difficulties were the impacts most frequently raised by survivors in private sessions, including difficulties with trust and intimacy, lack of confidence with parenting, and relationship problems. Education and economic impacts were also frequently raised.
For many people, these diverse impacts are interconnected in complex ways, making it difficult to isolate the specific impacts of child sexual abuse. These interconnected impacts can be experienced at the same time or consecutively, as a cascade of effects over a lifetime. For instance, we heard from many survivors that they developed addictions after using alcohol or other drugs to manage the psychological trauma of abuse, which in turn affected their physical and mental health, sometimes leading to criminal behaviour and relationship difficulties.”

This court has echoed RCIRCSA conclusions that “what was previously regarded as low level sexual abuse can have catastrophic effects on children” in several decisions: BT v R [2019] NSWCCA 147 at [11] and see, for example, O’Sullivan v R [2019] NSWCCA 261 at [14], R v Cattell (2019) 280 A Crim R 502; [2019] NSWCCA 297 at [111].”

The offender reported several instances of sexual abuse throughout his childhood. It is not clear whether these were ongoing sequences or isolated incidents. It is noteworthy that each of the relationships between the offender and his sexual abusers were such that each was in a position of power, trust and authority over him.
The offender was not only verbally and physically abused by his stepfather when he was in his care. He was sexually abused when left in the care of a babysitter at home, his headmaster at school and by a youth worker in juvenile detention. The offender left home after being abused at school at age 13, no doubt causing him to be homeless and to interact with the criminal justice system, exposing him to drugs and alcohol and leaving him without parental guidance at a tender age. I do not doubt that he developed issues of trust and anger, set out in the report of Ms Hübner as a result. In addition I feel confident that the mental health issues which now affect him can be traced, at least, to the sexual abuse he suffered as a child. These issues are unresolved and have influenced the trajectory of his life, including the instant offending.

Early Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse

Ms Hübner set out the offender’s alcohol and drug abuse, which commenced in his childhood at about the age of 10 years old. The extent of the offender’s drug use at early adolescence is set out above at [66] and cannot be described as anything but extreme. Indeed, by the time he was expelled for drinking alcohol at his first school in the seventh grade, he had been abusing cannabis for approximately three years and he was also experimenting with hallucinogens, including LSD and psychedelic mushrooms. Putting the effect of the alcohol and drug abuse on his schooling to one side, the deleterious effect of drug and alcohol abuse on a developing brain is well researched and documented. In my opinion, it undoubtedly affected the offender’s emotional and intellectual development.
The root cause of Mr Rose’s alcohol and drug abuse is a matter of conjecture, but in my view it is almost certainly co-related to the violence and neglect in his childhood household and the early sexual abuse he suffered. I also do not doubt that the abuse of alcohol by his parents contributed to his own abuse of alcohol and drugs.
Ms Hübner’s view is that the offender’s long-term alcohol and drug abuse (rather than his self-induced intoxication at the time) is but one of the many factors which contributed to his mental state at the time of the offending, and I accept that this is the case.

Interrupted Schooling

The offender left school at the end of the seventh grade in response to the sexual abuse by his headmaster. It is not surprising that he never returned to formal education thereafter given that experience and his running away to Adelaide where he became homeless. Despite leaving school, the offender is literate and he reports still being able to read and write. Nonetheless, he was deprived of a secondary education, which is a gateway to further education and the general development of skills and routines which assist in both maintaining employment (skilled or unskilled), and the participation in everyday activities which the community takes for granted.
I observe that being deprived of an education also has social consequences. It is likely that the absence of supervision in the offender’s formative years led to antisocial behaviour (seen in the offender’s criminal history), an inability to appropriately interact with other children, and exposure to antisocial behaviours.
I find that the offender’s interrupted schooling is yet another interrelated factor (which cannot be disentangled from the others) which contributed to and influenced his marginalisation as an adult in the community.

Homelessness

Throughout the offender’s lifetime, from a tender age, he has experienced significant periods of homelessness.
I have written elsewhere that in my view homelessness sits at the apex of disadvantage: see R v Edwards [2022] NSWDC 110 at [97]. Without a home, one cannot have visitors. It is not possible to receive mail without a fixed home address. One cannot enter a home address on an application for a driver’s licence or other identification, or for government support. Without a home, there is no access to electricity, gas or water. It is not possible to store food, clothing and other possessions safely and securely. There is no Wi-Fi, which we take for granted, and no access to the internet on which we all depend. Where does one wash? Where does one cook? How does one stay warm or dry? How does one stay safe? In the context of this case, how will those who will supervise, be able to locate him?
Mr Rose’s homelessness is directly related to his childhood deprivation. In the future, it will be necessary for him to have a home in order to have the best chance of rehabilitation. If he has no fixed home address, it will be extremely difficult for him to access treatment from service providers, including Community Corrections and case management services. It will be difficult for him to maintain meaningful relationships, which is clear from the offender’s history to date. Ms Hübner noted that the offender’s high risk of reoffending would decline if his dynamic factors were addressed. Perhaps the easiest dynamic factor to remedy is to find him stable accommodation. In my opinion, it is of utmost importance to ensure that the offender has a home, which I believe will materially reduce the risk of his reoffending.

Mental Health Problems

Ms Hübner diagnosed the offender with Severe Alcohol and Substance Use Disorder and indicated that he had symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, generalised anxiety and depression, in addition to traits of Borderline Personality Disorder and Antisocial Personality Disorder.
Mr Watts submitted that Ms Hübner’s report makes it clear that Mr Rose’s mental health conditions are closely related to his background of significant trauma, deprivation and disadvantage. The offender was sexually abused at home, at school and in juvenile detention. He was physically abused by his stepfather which affected his social relationships with other children. He abused alcohol and drugs from a very young age. He left school and ran away from home at age 13. Since then, he has continued to experience homelessness. I agree that it is not possible to disentangle this severely deprived background from his mental health issues.
Mr Watts submitted that the offender’s mental health conditions have significantly contributed to his offending and this alone reduces his moral culpability and the significance of general deterrence in accordance with the principles in DPP (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194. In that well known decision, McClellan CJ at CL summarised the principles to be applied in sentencing an offender who was suffering from a mental condition at the time of committing the offence, to the following effect (leaving to one side an offender who was more dangerous because of a mental condition):-

It might reduce his moral culpability (and consequently the need to denounce the crime);

It might render him a less appropriate vehicle for general deterrence resulting in a reduction in the sentence which would otherwise have been imposed;

It might mean that a custodial sentence weighs more heavily upon him; and

It might reduce the significance of specific deterrence.

In Luque v R [2017] NSWCCA 226, Hamill J said at [114]:-

“…a sentencing Judge dealing with evidence of an offender’s mental condition or intellectual impairment ought not to approach the task in an unduly technical or restrictive way. The issue to be determined is not the same as deciding the issue of causation in a civil case. The issue is whether the fact of the disorder mitigates the punishment that ought to be visited upon the offender. In one respect, this involves an assessment of whether the moral culpability of an offender is reduced because their mental condition contributed directly or indirectly to the commission of the offence. In other respects, the impact of an offender’s mental condition is not conditional upon any link (causative or otherwise) between the condition and the offending. For example, the condition may mean that the offender is not an appropriate vehicle for a sentence containing a large component of general (or specific) deterrence. Further, incarceration may be more onerous as a result of an offender’s difficulties. Those matters do not require the judge to find any link or connection between the condition and the commission of the crimes.”

Although it is not necessary for me to find a link or connection, in my opinion, there is a clear association, or a bright line between, or a co-relationship with or a nexus, or some influence, between the offender’s significant mental health issues and his background of deprivation and the instant offending, that for all intents and purposes amounts to causation in the sense that they are intertwined and not capable of disentanglement. In my view, all the factors I have addressed above have precipitated the offending behaviour.

Conclusion

Mr Watts relied on the principles enunciated in Bugmy and R v Millwood [2012] NSWCCA 2 at [69] to submit that Mr Rose’s childhood of significant trauma and deprivation and his mental health issues significantly reduce the offender’s moral culpability and moderates the weight to be given to specific and general deterrence. The Crown accepted that the offender’s background of deprivation reduces the offender’s moral culpability.
I note the oft cited quote of Simpson J (as her Honour then was) in R v Millwood [2012] NSWCCA 2 at [69]:-

“I am not prepared to accept that an offender who has the start in life that the respondent had bears equal moral responsibility with one who has had what might be termed a “normal” or “advantaged” upbringing. Common sense and common humanity dictate that such a person will have fewer emotional resources to guide his (or her) behavioural decisions.”

This is such a case. Taking into account the offender’s deprived background as I have set out, and the trauma he has experienced, I find that he had fewer emotional resources to guide his decisions and was unable to make choices in the same way as an average person at the time of the offending. As a result, the offender’s moral culpability is significantly reduced, and I give full weight to his background of deprivation in the sentencing exercise: Bugmy at [44]. That finding does not extinguish his moral culpability. The offender bears responsibility for the unlawful killing of the deceased. My finding is that his moral culpability is diminished, and it is a matter I will take into account in the process of synthesis on sentence.

Prospects of rehabilitation and risk of reoffending

It was agreed between the parties that it is not currently possible to conclude that there are good prospects of rehabilitation of the offender. I note the results of the testing set out in Ms Hübner’s report and her assessment of the offender as at a high risk of recidivism, and my earlier comments with respect to his ability to address dynamic factors to reduce risk.
Mr Watts submitted that the offender now has a diagnosis and professional recommendations in relation to his mental health issues provided by Ms Hübner. He has expressed a desire to pursue those recommendations. The offender also relied upon the objective facts that he has contacted About Time For Justice in relation to his sexual abuse, has been maintaining contact with that organisation, and that he has an untarnished custodial history and has been employed in trusted positions for about three years. Counsel also submitted that the offender’s long-term mental health conditions arising out of trauma often cumulatively create difficulties with anger management problems, impulsiveness and difficulty accepting authority and responsibility (and there is some evidence of that in Ms Hübner’s report), and that this would allow me to attribute greater weight to his custodial history in his favour. I accept that submission. Counsel emphasised that the offender has maintained his good behaviour in custody without support from family or visitors. Mr Watts’s submission was that Mr Rose’s prospects were guarded, noting that ultimately they depend on his ability to manage his dynamic risk factors.
The Crown conceded that there were objective features that were cause for some optimism, such as the offender’s positive custodial history and an expressed desire to go to counselling, but she also noted the fact that the positive custodial history is in the context of forced sobriety and that the offender has limited substantive plans in relation to his life after being released from prison. I accept the Crown’s submission in that regard.
I observe that in addition, Ms Hübner says that the offender has some evolving insight into his behaviour and his background. This is in my view a positive sign. Furthermore, he has been compliant with a medication regime for some time, which has improved his mood.
Taking all the circumstances into account, including objective and subjective features, I find that the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation and his risk of re-offending are guarded. Given Mr Rose’s stated commitment to addressing his historical problems with mental health and drug and alcohol abuse, if the offender receives appropriate treatment, as set out in the report of Ms Hübner, and if he receives support in his transition back into the community, including assistance with housing and employment, then I anticipate that his prospects of rehabilitation will improve and that there will be real hope for his eventual rehabilitation and reintegration in the community.

General and specific deterrence

I note the offender’s submission that the requirement for general and specific deterrence is diminished by reason of his mental health and deprived background, and the causal connection between that background and the offending conduct. Mr Watts submitted that, in the circumstances of this case, the causal connection as alluded to by Ms Hübner, was not pressed as something that would diminish the objective seriousness of the offending as something personal to the offender: see Tepania v R [2018] NSWCCA 247 per Johnson J at [112]. As I have mentioned, the Crown accepted that the offender’s moral culpability is diminished, but she maintained that general deterrence still had a role to play, as the crime needed to be denounced, and that bearing in mind that the offender had wounded someone with a bottle some three years prior to the instant offending, specific deterrence too had a role to play.
In my opinion, because of the offender’s background of disadvantage and his mental health issues, both general and specific deterrence have less of a role to play in this particular sentencing exercise than they would in a sentence where those factors do not loom large. Notwithstanding that comment, in my view both general and specific deterrence have some limited role in this sentencing exercise.

Time in custody

The offender has been in custody referrable to this offending for 3 years, ie since 18 February 2022. The parties agree that the sentence should be backdated accordingly.

Special circumstances

Mr Watts submitted that the Court would find special circumstances pursuant to s 44 of the Sentencing Act, on the basis that the offender will require and would benefit from an extended period of supervision and assistance to properly reintegrate into the community, abstain from alcohol and illicit drug consumption and continue to seek treatment for his trauma-related mental conditions. The Crown agreed that a finding of special circumstances could be made on that basis. It was acknowledged by the offender that he will require assistance to leave the custodial environment because he does not have an address to which he is currently able to return. He will require some significant long-term assistance with finding, securing and maintaining accommodation.
I indicate that my reasons for deviating from the standard non-parole period are the special circumstances that I find, that is the reduction in the offender’s moral culpability, the offender’s significant psychiatric needs and the need for extended supervision with respect to the management of his likely accommodation and mental health requirements over his lifetime. I have deviated to a ratio of approximately 61% because of special circumstances.
To the extent that it may be observed that I should avoid overweighing or double counting when dealing with special circumstances, factors may be – and in this case are – relevant to both the total sentence and the length of the non-parole period. In Bugmy v The Queen (1990) 169 CLR 525; [1990] HCA 18 at 531, Mason CJ and McHugh J said:-

“Once this is accepted, it follows that the considerations which the sentencing judge must take into account when fixing a minimum term will be the same as those applicable to the setting of the head sentence. Obviously, the weight to be attached to these factors and the way in which they are relevant will differ due to the different purposes behind each function.”

I find special circumstances for the reasons stated.

Threshold

Having considered all the possible alternatives, I am satisfied that the s 5 threshold of the Sentencing Act has been met. Due to the seriousness of the offending, I find that no penalty other than imprisonment is appropriate.

Sentence

I have taken into account the various purposes of sentencing under s 3A of the Sentencing Act. They include ensuring an offender is punished for his or her conduct, deterring crime, protecting the community, promoting an offender’s rehabilitation, making an offender accountable for his or her actions, denouncing an offender’s conduct and recognising the harm done to victims of an offence in the community. As always, the facts and circumstances of the present offence and this offender highlight how the various purposes of sentencing pull in competing directions – especially given, in my opinion, the offender’s need for psychiatric review and rehabilitation.
As the High Court said of s 3A in Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120 at [20]:-

“The purposes there stated (in s3A) are the familiar, overlapping and, at times, conflicting, purposes of criminal punishment under the common law (Veen v The Queen (No 2) at [476-477]). There is no attempt to rank them in order of priority and nothing in the Sentencing Act to indicate that the court is to depart from the principles explained in Veen v The Queen (No 2) [at 476] in applying them.”

The instinctive process of sentencing requires consideration of the relevant facts and circumstances as they are known to the Court, including the facts surrounding the commission of the offence, matters affecting relative seriousness, the offender’s subjective circumstances and other aspects which bear upon the question of sentence, including the guidepost of the maximum penalty and the factors referred to in s 21A of the Sentencing Act. The sentencing court is required to identify the factors relevant to the sentencing discretion and then to make a value judgment as to the appropriate sentence in all the circumstances: Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; (2005) 215 ALR 213; [2005] HCA 25.
I intend to sentence the offender to a term of full-time imprisonment. Taking all matters into account, as I am satisfied that no alternative other than a sentence of imprisonment is appropriate, the next step is to determine the appropriate sentence in the quantitative sense. Having considered all of the matters I have referred to in this sentence judgment, I impose a sentence of imprisonment of 6 years and 4 months (rounded down) after a discount of 25% for the early plea of guilty. Without the discount, the sentence would have been 8 years and 6 months. I impose a non-parole period of 3 years and 10 months.

Orders

Mr Rose, I have convicted you of the offence of manslaughter contrary to s 18(1)(b) of the Crimes Act.
I impose a sentence of imprisonment of 6 years and 4 months with a non-parole period of 3 years and 10 months. Without the 25% discount for your plea of guilty, your head sentence would have been 8 years and 6 months.
Your sentence has been backdated to commence from 18 February 2022. The head sentence will expire on 17 June 2028. You will be eligible for release to parole on 17 December 2025.
Pursuant to s 25C of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), you are advised of the existence of that Act and of its application to the offence of manslaughter for which you have been convicted. Your legal representatives are directed to advise you of the implications of those matters to you.

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Amendments

21 February 2025 - Insert medium neutral citation.

01 May 2025 - Unredacted catchwords upon publication.

Decision last updated: 01 May 2025

Medium Neutral Citation:	R v Rose (No 2) [2025] NSWSC 88
Hearing dates:	3, 17-18 February 2025
Date of orders:	21 February 2025
Decision date:	21 February 2025
Jurisdiction:	Common Law - Criminal
Before:	Weinstein J
Decision:	The offender is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 6 years and 4 months with a non-parole period of 3 years and 10 months.
Catchwords:	CRIME – sentencing – manslaughter – unlawful and dangerous act – where offender homeless and itinerant – where deceased not previously known to the offender – whether offender appreciated his actions posed a risk of serious injury – whether offender left the deceased in need of medical assistance – offer to plead guilty before committal – significant background of deprivation and disadvantage – effect of background on moral culpability – moral culpability and requirement for general and specific deterrence diminished – genuine remorse
Legislation Cited:	Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) Crimes (High Risk Offenders Act) 2006 (NSW) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW)
Cases Cited:	Bugmy v The Queen (1990) 169 CLR 525; [1990] HCA 18 Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; [2013] HCA 37 DH v R [2022] NSWCCA 200 DPP (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194 Dulihanty v R [2013] NSWCCA 275 Luque v R [2017] NSWCCA 226 Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; [2005] HCA 25 Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39 Nasrallah v R [2021] NSWCCA 207 Perkins v R [2018] NSWCCA 62 R v Bouggas [2015] NSWSC 914 R v Edwards [2022] NSWDC 110 R v Erazo [2016] NSWCCA 139 R v Gavel (2014) 239 A Crim R 469; [2014] NSWCCA 56 R v Johnson (No 5) [2017] NSWSC 1169 R v Millwood [2012] NSWCCA 2 R v MJB [2014] NSWCCA 195 R v Staff [2024] NSWSC 1471 R v Syme [2015] NSWSC 1609 R v Tuala [2015] NSWCCA 8 R v White [2023] NSWSC 611 Tepania v R [2018] NSWCCA 247
Category:	Sentence
Parties:	Rex (Crown) Rodney Stephen Rose (Offender)
Representation:	Counsel: S Oliver (Crown) J Watts (Offender) Solicitors: Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown) Universal Law (Offender)
File Number(s):	2022/45909
Publication restriction:	Nil