R v Rokomaqisa (No 5)

Case •

[2025] NSWSC 914

•

13 August 2025

No judgment structure available for this case.

Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Rokomaqisa (No 5) [2025] NSWSC 914
Hearing dates: 12 August 2025
Date of orders: 12 August 2025
Decision date: 13 August 2025
Jurisdiction:Common Law - Criminal
Before: R A Hulme AJ
Decision:

Application for blanket non-publication and take down orders refused.

Catchwords:

CRIME – Murder – Non-publication orders – Takedown orders – Present trial concerning member of Alameddine OCN charged with offences arising out of feud with opposing OCN – Where accused in future trials belonged to OCN and alleged to have committed different offences but in the context of the same feud – Where prejudice asserted arising from similarities in evidence – Principle of open justice prevails.

Legislation Cited:

Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), s 128

Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW), ss 7, 8

Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 98(1)(a)

Cases Cited:

Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Maitland-Newcastle v AA [2025] NSWCA 72

Fairfax Digital Australia and New Zealand Pty Ltd v Ibrahim (2012) 83 NSWLR 52; [2012] NSWCCA 125

Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Quami (2016) 93 NSWLR 384; [2016] NSWCCA 97

Munshizada v R [2021] NSWCCA 307

R v Chalabian (No 2) [2022] NSWSC 63

R v Adam Cranston [2023] NSWSC 1004

Category:Procedural rulings
Parties: Rex (Crown)
Samuel John Rokomaqisa (Accused)
Masood Zakaria (Applicant in the Notice of Motion)
News Life Pty Ltd, Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd, Australian Broadcasting Corporation News (ABC News) (Respondent to the Notice of Motion)
Representation: Counsel:
K Ratcliffe with J Sfinas (Crown)
G Thomas with R Deppeler (Accused)
C Parkin (Applicant in the Notice of Motion)
M J Lewis SC (Respondent to the Notice of Motion)
File Number(s): 22/280742
Publication restriction: Publication restricted until the conclusion of proceedings concerning the applicant involving a jury.

JUDGMENT

  1. The accused, Samuel John Rokomaqisa, is being tried for the alleged murder of Bilal Hamze on 17 June 2021, conspiracy to murder Ibrahem Hamze between 23 July and 15 August 2021, and aggravated carjacking on 14 August 2021. A jury was empanelled and the trial commenced on 4 August 2025. The present estimate is that the Crown case will conclude on or about 29 August 2025.

  2. The Crown alleges the accused was associated with the Alameddine Organised Criminal Network (OCN) and that the alleged offences arose from a public feud between the Alameddine and Hamze OCNs. This allegation is not in dispute. The Alameddine and Hamze OCNs have become notorious through media reporting in recent years; to deny that is to ignore what is patently obvious. It is understandable as a result that the trial has received some degree of media interest.

  3. There presently exists separate but factually related proceedings concerning murder, conspiracy to murder and other charges against Masood Zakaria, a person who is alleged by the Crown to be a member of the Alameddine OCN. Zakaria’s trial for the alleged murder of Toufic Hamze and Salim Hamze on 20 October 2021 is scheduled to commence in this Court on 29 September 2025 and has a current estimate of six-weeks. An alleged offence of conspiracy to murder Ibrahem Hamze is scheduled to commence in the District Court on 17 November 2025.

  4. In relation to the conspiracy to murder, I was told by the Crown Prosecutor in this case that the proposal that Ibrahem Hamze be murdered had its origins in the retaliatory non-fatal shooting of Assad Alahmad, an associate of the Alameddine OCN by someone connected to the Hamze OCN on 7 June 2021. The overt acts directed to the murder of Ibrahem Hamze alleged to have been committed by the present accused are alleged to have occurred between 23 July and 15 August 2021. Zakaria and his co-accused, Adam Achrafi, are alleged to have carried out overt acts in pursuit of Ibrahem Hamze’s murder in October and November 2021. The present accused was arrested and refused bail on 7 September 2021. [1]

    1. Tcpt, 6 August 2025, p 141.

  5. Counsel for Zakaria, Mr Parkin, informed me the Crown proposes to adduce evidence of the conspiracy to murder Ibrahem Hamze in Zakaria’s murder trial. An application to bring that charge into this Court and add it to the indictment pursuant to s 128 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) has been refused by the Chief Justice. Other charges, such as participating in a criminal group, are pending in the District Court and are expected to receive a trial date sometime in 2026.

Non-publication and takedown orders

  1. By notice of motion, informally notified to my chambers on Saturday 9 August 2025 and formally filed in court with leave on 11 August 2025, Zakaria seeks orders that there be no further publication of any evidence, or information about evidence, in this trial until the conclusion of all his trials and that any media publications concerning this trial to-date be taken down. These orders have the effect of providing a blanket prohibition against the publication of the entire trial of Samuel Rokomaqisa and for all publications, such as those concerning the evidence relating to his connections with the Alameddine OCN and its organisational structure, be taken down ex post facto.

  2. It is proposed that the orders have effect throughout the Commonwealth of Australia and remain in force until 1 January 2027.

  3. The orders are sought on the basis that all the proceedings involve interrelated facts. Both accused are alleged to be members of the Alameddine OCN and were a part of either the same conspiracy or a different conspiracy but with the same object to kill Ibrahem Hamze. Zakaria submitted the evidence already adduced in this trial, and further evidence intended to be adduced, may be misused by a jury in his trial and the orders sought are necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, that being his right to a fair trial. He contended that this would arise even at a pre-trial stage with the jury panel being irreparably “tainted” by such pre-trial publicity.

  4. In circumstances where I heard the application on the morning of Tuesday 12 August 2025 while the jury were waiting patiently for the trial to resume, I announced that the application was refused and indicated the reasons would follow. These are those reasons.

Principles

  1. The power to make orders of the kind sought is governed by the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW). Section 7 authorises the making of suppression and non-publication orders. Section 8 provides that an order may be made on any of the grounds set out therein, relevantly including:

“(a) the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice,

…

(e) it is otherwise necessary in the public interest for the order to be made and that public interest significantly outweighs the public interest in open justice.”

  1. The threshold is that the order is necessary to achieve one of the purposes identified in s 8. The word “necessary” is a strong word and indicates a legislative intention that orders should only be made for compelling reason and despite the primary objective of the administration of justice being to safeguard the public interest in open justice (s 6). A non-publication order needs to be effective to achieve its end. It is not enough that it appears to the Court to be convenient, reasonable or sensible, or to serve some notion of the public interest: Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Maitland-Newcastle v AA [2025] NSWCA 72 at [42].

  2. The concept of “publication”, in the case of a website, is a continuing act whereby access is provided to the public for so long as the material is available on the world-wide web: Fairfax Digital Australia and New Zealand Pty Ltd v Ibrahim (2012) 83 NSWLR 52; [2012] NSWCCA 125 at [43] (Basten JA).

  3. Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Quami (2016) 93 NSWLR 384; [2016] NSWCCA 97 involved an appeal against non-publication and takedown orders made where the same accused were to face back-to-back trials each involving allegations of the same type of offending, namely murder committed in the context of an inter-gang feud. The Court (Bathurst CJ, Beazley P and Hoeben CJ at CL) considered (at [35]) the difficulty caused by media publicity to arise “most acutely where back-to-back trials had been directed” and found (at [75]) this was “… an exceptional case in which it is necessary to make an order prohibiting publication…”.

  4. In Munshizada v R [2021] NSWCCA 307 the Court unanimously dismissed an appeal against a decision of Fagan J refusing to extend non-publication orders earlier made in seven interconnected trials which resulted in convictions related to inter-gang murders. The appeal concerned the refusal of an extension of the non-publication orders while the seven stood further charged with participation in criminal group-related offences subsequently fixed for trial in the District Court. The Court (at [55]) found:

“Although there is an important difference between the extent to which a jury learns of events in the controlled environment of the courtroom and subject to the rules of evidence, as opposed to uncontrolled revelation by the media, the significant possibility that many of the matters the subject of the proposed non-publication order will become known to the jury in any event enhances the prospect that potential prejudice can be dealt with effectively by carefully formulated directions.”

  1. The Court had observed (at [48]) that the trial judge had been correct to make non-publication orders to preserve the integrity of the seven interconnected murder trials involving the same accused. I can readily accept that jurors in a murder trial might find it difficult to put out of their minds the publicity of the same accused having previously been tried in respect of the murder(s) of another or others.

  2. Johnson J in R v Chalabian (No 2) [2022] NSWSC 63 granted a temporary blanket non-publication order over the entirety of a proceeds of crime trial because of a future related trial of other persons who were alleged to have committed the actual crime, the details of which may be gleaned from R v Adam Cranston [2023] NSWSC 1004. His Honour identified (at [9]–[10]) a “factual overlap between the two trials”, and described the prejudice as arising in circumstances “where evidence (which refers to the accused persons in the second trial) is to be adduced by the Crown in the trial of Mr Chalabian, but which will not be adduced in the second trial” (emphasis added). In short, the evidence in the first trial would largely be about, and have as its foundation, the commission of the crime in the subsequent trial of others.

Discussion

  1. In support of his application, Zakaria referred to and relied upon each of these authorities, amongst others. He pointed to the following evidence which has been the subject of publication as contributing to the prejudice he anticipated he may face:

  1. A conversation on 8 June 2021 between Zakaria and other members of the Alameddine OCN in which one of them said, "Ibby needs to go". The Crown alleges this was the genesis of the conspiracy to murder Ibrahem Hamze.

  2. Evidence of Zakaria’s association with the Alameddine OCN which included:

  1. A document setting out members of the Alameddine OCN which includes reference to Zakaria as a senior member.

  2. Various admissions allegedly made by Rokomaqisa. (Yet to be adduced).

  3. Witness A’s evidence of admissions made by Rokomaqisa about his associations with the Alameddine family. (Yet to be adduced).

  1. A message sent by the accused that he was owed $70,000 for "the other thing" which the Crown contends is related to the conspiracy to murder Ibrahem Hamze. (Yet to be adduced.)

  1. There is some crossover of the facts underlying the alleged offending in respect of the accused in the present case and Zakaria in the pending proceedings. So much is unlikely to be a surprising revelation in separate trials of persons who are alleged to belong to the same OCN and who are alleged to have been part of the same or substantially the same conspiracy to murder. The question is whether the publication of material concerning this crossover (in respect of the takedown order), and any future crossover (in respect of the non-publication order) would give rise to prejudice to Zakaria (and his co-accused) which cannot be overcome by appropriate jury directions and would thus impact upon their right to a fair trial.

  2. A takedown order with the effect that all current publications be unpublished when sought at the stage of a trial which has been proceeding for just over a week is, to some extent, inutile. Particularly in circumstances where the advent of the internet makes distribution of materials and publication or republication seemingly automatic. This is not to diminish the effect that these types of orders may have, but is to say something about the importance of early intervention, particularly when it can be anticipated from pre-trial disclosure what will occur in a trial concerning an evidential crossover with various proceedings involving alleged participants in the same or similar crimes.

  3. It may be assumed that each accused must have been appraised of the case against one another, particularly given the circumstantial nature of the trial and Crown reliance on coincidence evidence for which notice pursuant to s 98(1)(a) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) was given relatively early on. In pre-trial proceedings in the present case, reference was made at least as early as 14 July 2025 to Rokamaqisa’s legal representatives having been in communication with the legal representatives of Zakaria regarding their shared interests in the various proceedings. [2]

    2. Tcpt, 14 July 2025, p 5.

  4. The prejudice arising in the three cases referred to above militating in favour of granting an order for non-publication (and in Quami, a takedown order as well) was of a kind far greater than what is asserted may arise here. Just as the jury in this trial is not bound to accept the asserted fact of the accused’s OCN membership (although it is not disputed) as evidence in support of the charged offences, the jury in Zakaria’s trial is not bound to accept the assertion either. This asserted fact is not an element of the charged offences. It is not the case, contrary to Zakaria’s submission, that membership of the Alameddine OCN is “fundamental” to the crown case. Rather the fact is contextual, and while a jury may have regard to this evidence, it would be erroneous to reason to conviction or acquittal based upon whether this aspect is established. To say otherwise is to suggest a jury would reason to guilt by association.

  5. Mr Parkin submitted the fact that the accused’s admissions and related evidence in this trial is inadmissible in Zakaria’s trial would cause or contribute to the prejudice asserted. The difficulty with that is that none of the accused’s admissions include a direct assertion adverse to Zakaria. At its highest, it was put that a representation made by Rokomaqisa that he was owed money, by inference by the Alameddine OCN, would be prejudicial to him because it will be contended that he was a part of that OCN and was a senior member.

  6. The asserted prejudice in the present matter is unlike that which was found to require blanket non-publication orders in the three cases mentioned above. In Quami and in Munshizada the prejudice arose in there being back-to-back murder trials of the same genre. In Chalabian the prejudice arose from the trial involving, effectively, a pre-determination of the issue that would be at the very heart of the subsequent trial of other persons.

  7. In the present case there is similarity in allegations of the accused and Zakaria being asserted members of the Alameddine OCN. But a juror in a subsequent trial should be well capable of avoiding being influenced by having heard that it was alleged that Rokomaqisa was a member when deciding whether Zakaria, or his co-accused, were members. As mentioned, this issue will concern an intermediate issue and not be a core finding that will need to be made in Zakaria’s trials.

  8. In relation to the covertly recorded conversation on 8 June 2021 (“Ibby needs to go”), Mr Parkin indicated that there would be an objection to its admissibility but submitted there would be prejudice to Zakaria whether or not the objection was upheld. On the one hand, having regard to the indistinct nature of portions of the recording, if the evidence were to go before the jury, the jurors might not comply with the usual instruction from the judge that the recording is the primary evidence and they must act upon what they can hear rather than simply accepting the correctness of the transcript. It was suggested that jurors might simply act upon what they recalled having previously been published in the media. This submission cannot be accepted. More faith should be had in jurors complying with relatively straightforward instructions.

  9. I also bear in mind that the parties will no doubt be making suggestions to the jury as to what can and cannot be heard. It will not be as if they would have no starting point for what can be discerned except for what might have been recalled from a news story.

  10. If the evidence were to be ruled inadmissible, the prejudice was said to be that the jury would take it into account nonetheless because jurors had heard or read about it in media stories. This is to assume, or even just to suspect, that jurors would flagrantly disobey directions given by the trial judge at both the pre and post empanelment phases of the trial. This is not accepted.

  11. Overall, I have had regard to the fact that the trial judges in Zakaria’s trials will give directions to the jury panel prior to empanelment, and subsequently to the jury, about the need to have an open mind and to avoid prejudice or influence by anything they may have seen or heard in the media. It can be expected that jurors-in-waiting and empanelled jurors will abide by such directions. It can also be expected that trial judges will readily excuse any juror-in-waiting who reports having seen or heard media publicity that they might not be able to put aside in their minds.

Summary

  1. The prospect of prejudice to Zakaria (and his co-accused) in future trials is not anywhere near the extent of that which was considered in the three cases mentioned above which rendered them sufficiently exceptional to warrant the extreme step of imposing a blanket prohibition upon publication of entire trials. It is also of a different style.

  2. The orders sought are not “necessary” as such prospect of prejudice as exists can be addressed by appropriate jury directions. The public interest in open justice prevails given the available protection of Zakaria’s right to a fair trial.

  3. It is for these reasons that the application was refused.

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Endnotes

Decision last updated: 28 October 2025

Cases Citing This Decision

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