Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: R v Rogerson; R v McNamara (No 8) [2015] NSWSC 1036 Hearing dates: 28 July 2015 Date of orders: 28 July 2015 Decision date: 28 July 2015 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Bellew J Decision: See paragraph [21]
Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW – Practice and procedure – Opening address to jury by counsel for accused following the opening address of the Crown – Where counsel commented upon suggested submissions which might be made by counsel for co-accused – Where counsel made reference to material which was prejudicial to the co-accused – Discussion of limitations placed upon an opening address by counsel for an accused - Where counsel’s address exceeded those limitations in a way which was prejudicial to the co-accused – Where application made by co-accused that the jury be discharged - Application granted – Jury discharged Legislation Cited: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) Cases Cited: R v Gibb (1982) 7 A Crim R 385
R v MM [2004] NSW CCA 81
R v Oulds [2014] QCA 223Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: Regina - Crown
Roger Caleb Rogerson - Accused
Glen Patrick McNamara - AccusedRepresentation: Counsel:
Solicitors:
Mr C Maxwell QC - Crown
Mr G Thomas - Accused Rogerson
Mr C Waterstreet - Accused McNamara
Director of Public Prosecutions - Crown
Katsoolis and Co - Accused Rogerson
Kings Law Group - Accused McNamara
File Number(s): 2014/1574082014/156921 Publication restriction: Nil
Judgment - ex tempore (revised)
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At the conclusion of the opening address of Mr Waterstreet of counsel, who appears for the accused McNamara, Mr Thomas of counsel, who appears for the co-accused Rogerson, made an application that the jury be discharged. That application was supported by the Crown Prosecutor. The application, which was opposed by Mr Waterstreet, arises against the following background.
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At the conclusion of the opening address by the Crown, but prior to the commencement of the opening address on behalf of McNamara, I specifically drew counsel’s attention to the provisions of s. 159(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) (“the Act”) along with the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v MM [2004] NSWCCA 81, where Levine and Howie JJ made a number of observations as to the ambit of s. 159(2) of the Act or, put more specifically, as to the restrictions placed upon counsel for an accused in an opening address to a jury which follows the opening by the Crown. In particular, at [139] Howie J made reference to the fact that the purpose of a defence opening under s. 159(2) is to "define for the jury's benefit the real issues in the trial". His Honour went on to observe that the provision did not give counsel an opportunity to, amongst other things, embark on a dissertation on the onus and standard of proof, nor did it confer an opportunity to urge upon the jury the way that they should assess the evidence of a witness to be called in the…
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- Case
- [2015] NSWSC 1036
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether Rogerson's counsel's address was improper, and if so, whether this was prejudicial to McNamara to the extent that the jury should be discharged. The court noted that counsel for an accused is permitted to make an opening address to the jury, and may refer to evidence which will be led in support of the defence. However, the address must be confined to matters which are strictly relevant to the case against the accused, and must not include matters which might be argued by counsel for a co-accused. Furthermore, the address must not be prejudicial to a co-accused. In the present case, the court found that Rogerson's counsel's address did exceed these limitations, as it included reference to material which was prejudicial to McNamara, as well as commenting upon suggested submissions which might be made by McNamara's counsel. The court also found that this was prejudicial to McNamara, as it risked creating an impression in the minds of the jurors that McNamara was guilty of the offences with which he had been charged.
Accordingly, the court granted McNamara's application that the jury be discharged. The court noted that, in determining whether to discharge the jury, it was required to consider whether the prejudice caused to the respondent was such that a fair trial was no longer possible. In the present case, the court found that the prejudice caused to McNamara was such that a fair trial was no longer possible, and accordingly discharged the jury. No order as to costs was made.
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