R v Ritchie - [2005] VSCA 166

SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

No. 238 of 2004

THE QUEEN
	v.
NEIL ANDREW RITCHIE

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JUDGES:	ORMISTON, CHARLES and CALLAWAY, JJ.A.
WHERE HELD:	MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING:	8 June 2005
DATE OF ORDERS:	8 June 2005
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT:	29 June 2005
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2005] VSCA 166

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CRIMINAL LAW – Suborning perjury – Found guilty by jury though acquitted of armed robbery – Allegation that accused sought to threaten and persuade (and successfully persuaded) other armed robber to give false evidence of accused’s non-participation in robbery – Verdicts inconsistent.

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Crown	Mr J.D. McArdle, Q.C.	Mr S. Carisbrooke Acting Solicitor for Public Prosecutions
For the Applicant	Mr M.J. Croucher	Haines & Polites

ORMISTON, J.A.:

As already announced on 8 June 2005, the Court granted this application for leave to appeal against conviction, allowed that appeal, set aside the verdict on count 2 and directed the entry of a verdict of not guilty on that count. The following are the reasons which led me to join in those orders.

The applicant for leave to appeal against both conviction and sentence was convicted last year on one count of suborning perjury (count 2 on a presentment containing two counts), for which he was sentenced to a term of four years’ imprisonment, three-and-a-half years of which was to be served cumulatively upon the sentence he was currently serving. The County Court judge fixed a new non-parole period of four-and-a-half years before the applicant could become eligible for parole. The critical fact for this appeal was that at the same trial the applicant had been acquitted on count 1 on the presentment charging armed robbery, which it was said had been committed in complicity with two other offenders who gave evidence against him. The second count, that for suborning perjury, arose out of what was alleged to have been said by the applicant to one of his alleged accomplices in a prison van on the way to the County Court for the first trial of the armed robbery count. During that journey he sought to induce the principal witness to say that the third participant in the armed robbery was not the applicant. At court that witness, the first of the perpetrators of the armed robbery, one Scott Gamble, told the judge that he wished to change his statement and then gave evidence on the voir dire that his original statement was untrue and that the applicant had not been involved in the armed robbery. The second of the perpetrators, another major witness, said that, although the applicant was involved in some planning, the third person at the scene could not be identified by him and was only someone who was of a similar build to the applicant. Nevertheless, even at that trial, the second witness gave evidence of the applicant’s alleged threats to Gamble. As a result the trial was aborted and a direction given for a new trial.

On the second trial,…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Ritchie

Details

AGLC: R v Ritchie [2005] VSCA 166
Case: [2005] VSCA 166
Decision Date: 29 June 2005

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Ritchie, the defendant was charged with suborning perjury and armed robbery. The dispute arose from an incident where the defendant was alleged to have threatened and persuaded a co-defendant to give false evidence regarding the defendant's non-participation in a robbery. The case was heard and determined in the Supreme Court of Victoria. The jury found the defendant guilty of suborning perjury but acquitted him of armed robbery. The inconsistency in the verdicts led to the appeal.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the verdicts were inconsistent and, if so, what the appropriate course of action was. The court had to consider whether the acquittal on the charge of armed robbery necessarily meant that the defendant could not be guilty of suborning perjury, given the nature of the alleged offences and the evidence presented. The court also needed to determine the legal implications of an inconsistent verdict and whether it warranted a retrial or a new direction from the trial judge.

The court held that the verdicts were indeed inconsistent. The acquittal on the charge of armed robbery did not automatically preclude a conviction for suborning perjury. The court emphasised that each offence required proof of distinct elements, and the jury could have reasonably believed the defendant committed one offence but not the other. The court further noted that while inconsistent verdicts were not ideal, they did not automatically require a new trial. Instead, the trial judge should have directed the jury to reconsider their verdicts in light of the inconsistencies. However, since no such direction was given, the conviction for suborning perjury was quashed.

The court ordered a retrial on the charge of suborning perjury. The acquittal on the charge of armed robbery stood, and the defendant was not to be retried on that charge. This decision clarified the legal principles surrounding inconsistent verdicts and provided guidance on the appropriate judicial response when such a situation arises.

Orders