R v Rik

Case [2004] NSWCCA 282


NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL

CITATION:    R. v. RIK [2004]  NSWCCA 282 revised - 06/09/2004

FILE NUMBER(S):
60185/04

HEARING DATE(S):             11 August 2004

JUDGMENT DATE:               19/08/2004

PARTIES:
Regina - respondent/Crown
RIK - appellant

JUDGMENT OF:      Hodgson JA Hulme J Smart AJ   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:             Supreme Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):        SC 70042/03

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:   Kirby J

COUNSEL:
Mr. R. Hulme SC for appellant
Mr R. Cogswell SC with Dr. J.A. Quilter for the respondent/Crown

SOLICITORS:
S. O'Connor for appellant
S. Kavanagh for respondent/Crown

CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW - Appeal - Manslaughter - Whether evidence sufficient - Whether verdict unreasonable - Whether conduct of appellant dangerous - Whether response of deceased reasonable or proportionate

LEGISLATION CITED:

DECISION:
Appeal dismissed.

JUDGMENT:

IN THE COURT OF

CRIMINAL APPEAL

CCA 60185/04
SC    70042/03

HODGSON JA
HULME J
SMART AJ

Thursday 19 August 2004

REGINA  V.  RIK

Judgment

  1. HODGSON JA:  On 27 October 2003, the appellant was arraigned before Kirby J in the Supreme Court on three charges concerning events that occurred on 27 October 2002 at Redfern, namely that he:

    (1)did cause the death of William Christopher Harris in circumstances amounting to manslaughter;

    (2)did threaten unlawful violence towards William Christopher Harris and his conduct was such that a person of reasonable firmness at the scene would have feared for his or her safety;

    (3)did unlawfully endanger the safety of William Christopher Harris who was on a railway.

    The three counts (which can respectively be called manslaughter, affray, and endanger safety of person on railway) were presented as alternatives.  The appellant pleaded not guilty to all counts, and a nine-day trial ensued before Kirby J and a jury.

  2. On 6 November 2003, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the manslaughter count, making it unnecessary for it to return a verdict on the other two counts.

  3. On 24 February 2004, the appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for three years to commence on 24 February 2004, with a non-parole period of twelve months to expire on 23 February 2005, the sentence to be served in a Juvenile Detention Centre.

  4. The appellant appeals from his conviction on two grounds:

    1.The learned trial judge erred in holding there was a case to go to the jury on manslaughter.

    2.The verdict of guilty of manslaughter is unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.

    CIRCUMSTANCES

  5. The Crown case was that the appellant acted unlawfully and dangerously, and thereby significantly and substantially contributed to the death of Mr. Harris.  The basic facts were largely undisputed, and the critical issues were whether the appellant’s acts caused the death of Mr. Harris and whether the appellant acted dangerously. 

  6. The basic facts were summarised as follows by the trial judge in his remarks on sentence:

    Mr Christopher Harris was in the habit of using the train. On the morning of 27 October 2002 he caught the train at Kings Cross Station. He intended to travel to Newtown. It was necessary for him to change trains at…

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AGLC
R v Rik [2004] NSWCCA 282
Case
[2004] NSWCCA 282
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal was heard by the court, involving the appellant who was convicted of manslaughter. The deceased's response to the appellant's threatening actions was central to the dispute. The court was tasked with determining whether the appellant's actions were dangerous and if the deceased's response was reasonable or proportionate under the circumstances.

The key legal issues before the court were whether the appellant's conduct posed a significant risk of serious injury to the deceased, and if the deceased's response was reasonable or proportionate. The court had to consider whether the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence and whether any reasonable jury, properly directed, could have found beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant's actions were dangerous and the deceased's response was reasonable.

The court examined the evidence and the options available to the deceased at the time of the incident. The deceased had limited time to react and considered moving south towards the end of the platform, north towards the building, towards the train, or towards the tracks. The court concluded that moving north towards the building or the train would have placed the deceased closer to the appellant, and moving south would have led to a dead end with the possibility of being pursued onto the tracks. Therefore, the deceased's decision to remain seated was seen as the most reasonable option to avoid the appellant and prevent pursuit.

The court ultimately found that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. The court held that it was appropriate to exercise caution before concluding that no reasonable jury could have found the appellant's actions dangerous and the deceased's response reasonable. The appeal was dismissed, and the original conviction for manslaughter was upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Mr. Hulme accepted that the deceased had little time to pause and reflect upon his options. However, he submitted, reasonable or proportionate responses might have ranged from ignoring the appellant or orally engaging him in an attempt to placate him, at one end of the spectrum, through to getting up and running away at the other. As to the latter, there was the option of moving in a southerly direction towards the end of the platform, where there was a fence he could put between himself and, if pursued, his assailant. There was also the option of moving in a northerly direction towards the building in the middle of the platform. This was not a case where the deceased had commenced to move away, and the appellant had continued to pursue him. DECISION In my opinion, the two questions on which the Court has been addressed on behalf of the appellant, namely (1) whether a reasonable person in the position of the appellant would have realised that his acts were exposing another to a significant risk of serious injury and (2) whether the response of the deceased was reasonable or proportionate in the circumstances, were quintessentially questions appropriate for determination by a jury, being questions concerning what amounts to reasonable human belief and behaviour. Those questions were fairly put to the jury by the trial judge; and there is no complaint about the way those questions were left to the jury. In those circumstances, in my opinion it is appropriate for this Court to exercise considerable care before coming to the view that no reasonable jury, properly directed, could find beyond reasonable doubt in favour of the Crown on these questions. In considering whether there was evidence capable of supporting such a finding, it is necessary to consider what options were available to the deceased when the appellant approached him in a threatening manner. If he wished to get away from the appellant, he had the alternatives of moving south towards the end of the platform, moving north towards the building on the platform, moving towards the train from which the appellant had alighted, or moving towards the tracks on the other side of the platform. Moving north towards the building would have taken him closer to the appellant; and even if he had moved from his seat towards the edge of the platform opposite the train from which the appellant had alighted, he would have been in a position where he could have been blocked by the appellant if he attempted to move north. If he had moved towards the train from which the appellant had alighted, again he would have been coming closer to the appellant. If he had moved south towards the end of the platform, he would have been moving to a place from which there was no exit except on to railways tracks, with the possibility that the appellant would have pursued him to the end of the platform. There was no-one on the platform between where the deceased was and the end of the platform. In those circumstances, the deceased could well have seen the option that he took as the one giving most assurance of avoiding the appellant and avoiding pursuit by the appellant.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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