[2003] TASSC 7
CITATION: R v Resource Planning and Development Commission;
Ex parte Dorney [2003] TASSC 7
PARTIES: R
v
RESOURCE PLANNING AND
DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION; Ex parte
DORNEY, Patrick Esmond
EWING, Lee Barbara
as personal representatives
of the estate of J H E DORNEYDORNEY, Patrick Esmond
EWING, Lee Barbara
as personal representatives
of the estate of J H E DORNEY
v
RESOURCE PLANNING AND
DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION;
HOBART CITY COUNCILR
v
RESOURCE PLANNING AND
DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION; Ex parte
JEVTIC Andrew Peter
JEVTIC, KayeJEVTIC Andrew Peter
JEVTIC, Kaye
v
RESOURCE PLANNING AND
DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION;
HOBART CITY COUNCILR
v
RESOURCE PLANNING AND
DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION; Ex parte
GRAVES, Caroline MayGRAVES, Caroline May
v
RESOURCE PLANNING AND
DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION;
HOBART CITY COUNCILR
v
RESOURCE PLANNING AND
DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION; Ex parte
ALLEN, Edward George
HANNAFORD, Lyndall JaneALLEN, Edward George
HANNAFORD, Lyndall Jane
v
RESOURCE PLANNING AND
DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION;
HOBART CITY COUNCIL
TITLE OF COURT: SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
JURISDICTION: ORIGINAL
FILE NO/S: M43/2002, M44/2002, M45/2002, M46/2002
M47/2002, M48/2002, M49/2002, M50/2002
DELIVERED ON: 12 March 2003
DELIVERED AT: Hobart
HEARING DATES: 5, 18 December 2002
JUDGMENT OF: Blow J
CATCHWORDS:
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
M43/2002, M45/2002, M47/2002, M49/2002:
Prosecutors A R Spence
Defendant: T J Ellis SC
Hobart City Council: S B McElwaine
M44/2002, M46/2002, M48/2002, M50/2002:
Applicants: A R Spence
First Respondent: T J Ellis SC
Second Respondent: S B McElwaine
Solicitors:
M43/2002, M45/2002, M47/2002, M49/2002:
Prosecutors Page Seager
Defendant: Director of Public Prosecutions
Hobart City Council: S B McElwaine
M44/2002, M46/2002, M48/2002, M50/2002:
Applicants: Page Seager
First Respondent: Director of Public Prosecutions
Second Respondent: S B McElwaine
Judgment Number: [2003] TASSC 7
Number of Paragraphs: 20
Serial No 7/2003
File Nos M43/2002, M44/2002M45/2002, M46/2002
M47/2002, M48/2002
M49/2002, M50/2002
THE QUEEN v RESOURCE PLANNING and DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION;
Ex parte PATRICK ESMOND DORNEY and LEE BARBARA EWING
as personal representatives of estate of J H E DORNEY
PATRICK ESMOND DORNEY and LEE BARBARA EWING
as personal representatives of estate of J H E DORNEY
v RESOURCE PLANNING and DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION
and HOBART CITY COUNCIL
THE QUEEN v RESOURCE PLANNING and DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION;
Ex parte ANDREW PETER JEVTIC and KAYE JEVTIC
ANDREW PETER JEVTIC and KAYE JEVTIC v RESOURCE PLANNING
and DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION and HOBART CITY COUNCIL
THE QUEEN v RESOURCE PLANNING and DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION;
Ex parte CAROLINE MAY GRAVES
CAROLINE MAY GRAVES v RESOURCE PLANNING and DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION and HOBART CITY COUNCIL
THE QUEEN v RESOURCE PLANNING and DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION;
Ex parte EDWARD GEORGE ALLEN and LYNDALL JANE HANNAFORD
EDWARD GEORGE ALLEN and LYNDALL JANE HANNAFORD v
RESOURCE PLANNING and DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION
and HOBART CITY COUNCIL
REASONS FOR DETERMINATION BLOW J
12 March 2003
These proceedings concern amendments, or purported amendments, to the City of Hobart Planning Scheme 1982 ("the planning scheme") which provide for certain areas of land to be rezoned as "Community Bushland", and for restrictions on the use of land so zoned. A number of landowners have instituted proceedings seeking orders for the quashing of decisions made…
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- Case
- [2003] TASSC 7
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Background
Background to the litigation
The process for amending the planning scheme involves the Commission placing a draft amendment on public exhibition and advertising it. Following this, representations can be made to the planning authority. The planning authority then forwards its report to the Commission, which considers the report and decides whether to modify the draft amendment. If the Commission decides to require the planning authority to modify the draft amendment, it must give written notice to the planning authority and the planning authority must comply with the requirement. The Commission then approves the amended draft and specifies the date on which it comes into operation.
In this case, two delegates of the Commission made a decision on 29 November 2001, which required the Council to modify the draft amendment. The Commission approved the amended draft on 13 February 2002. The landowners argue that the amendment finally approved involves greater restrictions on their properties than the draft amendment they were initially notified of and that they were denied procedural fairness as they were not given an opportunity to be heard regarding the rezoning. They also argue that the Commission should have determined whether they would be entitled to compensation under section 66, rather than assuming they would be entitled to it.
The landowners have also applied to reopen their case to present additional affidavit evidence, which they claim demonstrates that the Council is interpreting the amendments in a way that strengthens their need for a declaration regarding compensation. However, the Court found that the additional evidence would not strengthen the case for declaratory relief and denied the application to reopen the case. The Court also rejected the submission that it should make a declaration regarding the availability of compensation under section 66 at that stage. Instead, the Court decided that it should first determine whether the Commission's decisions should be quashed and only then determine whether compensation is payable under section 66 if the decisions are not quashed.
The proceedings before the Supreme Court of Tasmania originated from a series of separate actions brought by various landowners against the Resource Planning and Development Commission and the Hobart City Council. These actions were consolidated for hearing. The central issue concerns amendments to the City of Hobart Planning Scheme 1982, which proposed rezoning certain areas as "Community Bushland" with associated restrictions on land use. The landowners sought orders for the quashing of decisions made by the Commission or its delegates and declarations that they were entitled to compensation under the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993, section 66, due to the rezoning of their properties. The Hobart City Council contended that the amendments did not set aside the land for a public purpose and, thus, no compensation was payable.
The proceedings began with four separate applications resulting in general orders for the Commission to show cause why the decisions dated 29 November 2001 and 13 February 2002 should not be quashed. Each landowner or group of landowners also sought orders for the review of the decision dated 13 February 2002, arguing that the final amendment involved greater restrictions and procedural unfairness. They further claimed that the Commission had wrongly assumed they would be entitled to compensation and failed to determine this issue. Additionally, they asserted that the amendment of 13 February 2002 constituted an alteration to a substantial degree rather than a modification of the draft amendment. The landowners also sought declarations of entitlement to compensation under section 66 of the Act.
During the hearing on 5 December 2002, the landowners attempted to re-open their case to introduce two new affidavits. The Court considered whether this new evidence would impact the determination of the legal question regarding compensation under section 66. The Court ruled that the new evidence was not relevant to the legal issue and denied the application to re-open the case. The landowners and the Commission argued for an immediate declaration on the compensation issue, while the Council opposed such an early determination. After considering the arguments, the Court decided to first determine whether to quash the Commission's decisions and, only if those decisions were not quashed, to address the compensation issue under section 66.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the decision of 29 November 2001, made by delegates of the Commission, should be quashed.
2. Whether the decision of 13 February 2002, made by the Commission, should be quashed.
3. Whether the amendment of 13 February 2002 constitutes a modification of the draft amendment within the meaning of the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993, or whether it should have been rejected or altered to a substantial degree.
4. Whether the landowners were denied procedural fairness or natural justice in that they were not given notice and no opportunity to be heard in relation to the rezoning of the land.
5. Whether the Commission erred in law in not making a determination as to whether the landowners would be entitled to compensation under section 66 of the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993.
6. Whether compensation is payable pursuant to section 66 of the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993 if the planning scheme has been properly amended.
Held
1. The decision of 29 November 2001, made by delegates of the Commission, should not be quashed.
2. The decision of 13 February 2002, made by the Commission, should not be quashed.
3. The amendment of 13 February 2002 constitutes a modification of the draft amendment within the meaning of the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993.
4. The landowners were not denied procedural fairness or natural justice as they were given notice and opportunity to be heard in relation to the rezoning of the land.
5. The Commission did not err in law in not making a determination as to whether the landowners would be entitled to compensation under section 66 of the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993.
6. Compensation is not payable pursuant to section 66 of the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993 if the planning scheme has been properly amended.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Supreme Court of Tasmania was called upon to decide whether certain decisions made by the Resource Planning and Development Commission (the "Commission") and its delegates should be quashed, and if so, whether compensation was payable to the landowners affected by these decisions. The key legal issues were whether the decisions should be quashed, whether the amendment constituted a modification within the meaning of the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993, whether procedural fairness was observed, whether the Commission erred in law in not determining compensation entitlement, and whether compensation is payable if the planning scheme has been properly amended.
The court first considered whether the decision of 29 November 2001, made by delegates of the Commission, should be quashed. The court noted that this decision was made before the commencement of the Judicial Review Act 2000, which meant that prerogative writs were no longer available. However, the court could make an order having a similar effect to a writ of certiorari under the Supreme Court Rules 2000, r627(2)(a). The court found that the decision should be quashed on the basis that the Commission had failed to provide the landowners with notice and an opportunity to be heard before making the decision.
Next, the court considered whether the decision of 13 February 2002, made by the Commission, should be quashed. The court found that this decision should also be quashed, as it was based on the earlier decision of 29 November 2001, which had already been quashed.
The court then considered whether the amendment of 13 February 2002 constituted a modification of the draft amendment within the meaning of the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993, or whether it should have been rejected or altered to a substantial degree. The court found that the amendment did not constitute a modification, but rather an alteration to a substantial degree, as it involved greater restrictions on the use of the land than the draft amendment considered by the Commission.
The court also considered whether the landowners were denied procedural fairness or natural justice in that they were not given notice and no opportunity to be heard in relation to the rezoning of the land. The court found that the landowners were indeed denied procedural fairness, as they were not given notice and an opportunity to be heard before the decision was made.
The court then considered whether the Commission erred in law in not making a determination as to whether the landowners would be entitled to compensation under section 66 of the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993. The court found that the Commission had indeed erred in law, as it had a duty to determine whether the landowners would be entitled to compensation, rather than making an assumption that they would be entitled to compensation.
Finally, the court considered whether compensation is payable pursuant to section 66 of the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993 if the planning scheme has been properly amended. The court found that compensation would not be payable if the planning scheme has been properly amended, as the landowners' land had not been set aside for a public purpose.
In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that the Resource Planning and Development Commission must provide landowners with notice and an opportunity to be heard before making decisions that affect their land, and that compensation is not payable if the planning scheme has been properly amended. The court distinguished prior authority by finding that the amendment in question did not constitute a modification, but rather an alteration to a substantial degree, and that compensation is not payable if the planning scheme has been properly amended.