R v Reppucci - [2003] WASCA 260

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT : COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL

CITATION: R -v- REPPUCCI [2003] WASCA 260

CORAM: MURRAY ACJ
MCKECHNIE J
HASLUCK J

HEARD: 1 SEPTEMBER 2003

DELIVERED : 5 NOVEMBER 2003

FILE NO/S: CCA 44 of 2003

BETWEEN: THE QUEEN
Appellant
AND
ANTONIO REPPUCCI
Respondent

Catchwords:

Criminal law and procedure - Sentencing - Delay in prosecution - Whether sentence manifestly inadequate - No new principles

Legislation:

Nil

Result:

Appeal dismissed

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant: Mr R E Cock QC & Ms S E Wisbey
Respondent: Mr G F Edwards

Solicitors:

Appellant: State Director of Public Prosecutions
Respondent: Gerard Edwards

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Bell v The Queen [2001] WASCA 40
Bellissimo (1996) 84 A Crim R 465
Mill v The Queen (1988) 166 CLR 59
R v Todd (1982) 2 NSWLR 517

Case(s) also cited:

Nil

MURRAY ACJ: I agree with McKechnie J, for the reasons given by his Honour, that this appeal should be dismissed.
MCKECHNIE J: On 12 March 2003, following conviction after trial, for one count of supplying a quantity of amphetamine to another, the respondent was sentenced to a term of 3 years imprisonment, with parole eligibility, cumulative on any sentence then being served. The quantity of amphetamine involved was about 900 grams with a purity of approximately 3 to 3‑1/2 per cent.
From that sentence the Crown appeals on the following grounds:
"1.The learned trial Judge erred in finding that the Respondent had begun rehabilitating himself in 1996.
2.The learned trial Judge erred in placing too much weight on the delay in prosecuting the Respondent.
3.The learned trial Judge erred in placing insufficient weight on the fact that the Respondent committed the offence whilst on work release.
4.The learned trial Judge erred in imposing a sentence that was manifestly inadequate having particular regard to the following:
a)the amount of amphetamine involved;
b)the fact that the offence was committed 20 days after the Respondent had been released on work release in relation to a term of imprisonment of 7 years imposed for an offence of supplying 1 kg of methylamphetamine to another;
c)the sentence imposed on Mark Drew; and
d)the Respondent's antecedents."

Delay

Ground 1 asserts an error of fact. What the Judge said about rehabilitation was as follows:
"Even with a plea of not guilty, had you been charged within a reasonable time, this matter would have been disposed of by 1998, it seems to me. In the meantime, you have completely

rehabilitated yourself and I am prepared to find that the beginning of that process was in 1996."

This ground is, to a degree, bound up with the second ground. The Judge specifically took account of delays, pointing out that it took the police 3‑1/2 years to issue a complaint, notwithstanding that they had known the respondent's role in the offence since 1996. There were further delays in the court, in part relating to another person charged with the offence, and it was…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Reppucci

Details

AGLC: R v Reppucci [2003] WASCA 260
Case: [2003] WASCA 260
Decision Date: 5 NOVEMBER 2003

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of R v Reppucci involved the defendant, Reppucci, who was convicted of a crime and subsequently sentenced by the court. The primary issue in the appeal was whether the sentence imposed was manifestly inadequate, particularly in light of the considerable delay in bringing the prosecution. The court was asked to consider whether the delay warranted a reconsideration of the sentence to ensure it was not inadequate.

The legal issue central to this case was the extent to which a significant delay in prosecution could influence the adequacy of a sentence. The court had to weigh the principles of justice and fairness against the established sentencing guidelines. It needed to determine whether the delay, in itself, justified a departure from the sentence originally imposed or if there were other factors that should be considered in reassessing the sentence.

The court held that there were no new principles to be applied in this context and that the sentence should be assessed based on the established criteria for sentencing. It was found that the delay, while a relevant factor, did not necessitate a manifestly inadequate sentence. The court concluded that the original sentence was not manifestly inadequate and upheld the decision of the lower court. The appeal was dismissed, and the original sentence was affirmed.

Orders