R v Renaud

[2025] NSWDC 386

District Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

R v Renaud [2025] NSWDC 386

Hearing dates:

3/6/25-17/6/25, 15/8/25, 21/8/25

Date of orders:

21 August 2025

Decision date:

21 August 2025

Jurisdiction:

Criminal

Before:

Bourke SC DCJ

Decision:

Convicted and sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 10 years 6 months with a NPP of 6 years (17/6/25—16/6/31).

I find special circumstances.

Indicative sentences:

Count 1 – 1 year 3 months

Count 2 – 8 months

Count 7 – 9 years 6 months.

Catchwords:

Crime – Sentence – Indecent Assault – Commit act of indecency towards a person under 16 years – Maintain unlawful sexual relationship with a child

Legislation Cited:

Crimes Act 1900

Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999

Cases Cited:

Baldwin-Davies v R [2024] NSWCCA 220

Clarkson v R [2011] VSCA 157

Dipangkear v R [2010] NSWCCA 156

R v CMB [2014] NSWCCA 5

R v Edwards [1996] 90 A Crim R 510

R v Gavel [2014] NSWCCA 56

R v Holyoak [1995] 82 A Crim R 502

RA v R [2024] NSWCCA 149

Category:

Sentence

Parties:

NSW DPP – Crown
Andre Renaud - Offender

Representation:

Mr A Lynch for Crown
Mr T Edwards for Accused

File Number(s):

2023/74155

Publication restriction:

Statutory non-publication order in relation to the identities of the victims.

remarks on sentence

1. The offender, Mr Andre Renaud, stood trial in June 2025 on an indictment with nine counts, although counts 8 and 9 were expressed as alternatives to count 7. On 16 June 2025, a directed verdict of not guilty was returned on count 3. However, on 17 June, the jury found the offender guilty of counts 1, 2 and 7, but not guilty of counts 4, 5 and 6. I note that counts 4, 5 and 6 relate to DU. I note further that counts 1 and 2, and former count 3, relate to RU, and counts 7, and alternatives 8 and 9, relate to BI, now known as BI. The offender must therefore be sentenced in relation to counts 1, 2 and 7.

2. The maximum penalty for count 1, which is an offence of indecent assault under s 61E(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 is four years' imprisonment.

3. The maximum penalty for count 2, which is an offence of committing an act of indecency towards a person under the age of 16 years, that being an offence under s 61E(2), is two years' imprisonment.

4. The maximum penalty for count 7, which is an offence of maintaining an unlawful sexual relationship with a child under the age of 16 years is life imprisonment.

5. The maximum penalties are, of course, important guideposts in the sentencing exercise, to which I have had appropriate regard.

FACTS

6. It is for me to determine the facts for the purposes of sentence. Matters in aggravation must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Matters in mitigation need only be proved on the balance of probabilities. The facts that I find must, however, be consistent with the verdicts of the jury.

7. The Crown provided a document entitled "Facts consistent with jury verdicts of guilty", which it says represents the evidence relevant to the three offences for sentence. While the offender maintains his innocence of the offences, his counsel accepted that in relation to counts 1 and 2, the Court would likely accept the factual scenario set out in the Crown's summary. Based on this document and my own review of the evidence, I find the following facts in relation to those two offences.

8. Firstly, with count 1. This offence occurred when the victim, RU, was aged nine or ten, and was accompanying the offender on a tractor while the offender was ploughing a paddock. The victim was sitting on the offender's lap. The offender used his hand to rub the victim's genital area through his pants for a period of a few minutes while they were riding on the tractor. The victim did not say anything in response to the offender while this was going on.

9. Count 2 was an offence that occurred on the same occasion as count 1, but shortly afterwards. The offender drove the tractor to the fence line where they both alighted and walked down to the creek bank. The offender then removed his penis from his pants and commenced to masturbate while the nine to ten year old victim stood next to or near him and masturbated his own penis after being encouraged to do so by the offender. The offender eventually ejaculated, and he and the victim then continued with the ploughing.

10. The Crown submitted that the Court should find that the offences in counts 1 and 2 were not the only occasions when the offender committed sexual acts either on or in the presence of the victim. The victim gave evidence that there were other times where the offender touched him on his genitals through his clothes while riding on the tractor, and other occasions when they each masturbated down at the creek. The victim said this happed "a few times", or "a handful of times". He said that subsequently the nature of the activity changed such that he would masturbate the offender, although the victim did not give any real detail about these instances.

11. It was submitted by the offender that I would not be satisfied that there were any occasions other than those the subject of counts 1 and 2 where sexual acts took place, and that I would treat counts 1 and 2 as being the totality of any criminality towards this victim.

12. In my view, the victim was an honest and essentially reliable witness, a conclusion which is consistent with the jury's assessment of him in finding the offender guilty of counts 1 and 2. Given that the victim was not asked to elaborate on occasions where he said that he masturbated the offender's penis, I put this evidence aside. However, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, based on the victim's evidence, that the events in counts 1 and 2 were not the only times where sexual acts were done to the victim or occurred in the presence of the victim. I am satisfied that there were at least two other occasions where the offender touched the victim on the genitals through his clothes while riding on the tractor, and where the offender subsequently masturbated in the victim's presence while the victim did likewise.

13. Turning then to count 7. In the Crown's suggested facts document it pointed to evidence given by the victim, Ms BI, to the effect that she was sexually abused by the offender on numerous occasions. Counsel for the offender, however, disputed the factual findings for which the Crown contends.

14. The Crown pointed to the evidence of Ms BI to the following effect. That as the offender was their next-door neighbour, and as she was friends with his daughter, she would go to the offender's house, and at times she would be driven there either on the offender's tractor or in his twin cab vehicle. She said that on these occasions she would sit on the offender's lap and steer the vehicle, and that he would take the opportunity to place his hand inside her pants and touch the outside of her vagina and insert a finger or fingers into her vagina.

15. She said this would happen "any time I was getting a lift" down to the see the offender's daughter. She said that it was "very opportunistic", and that she was not able to put a figure on it, but that it was just "par for the course, pretty much, any time that I was in a vehicle with him by ourselves, so, like, fortnightly, monthly, like...it was just what happened". When asked when this started, the victim said, "I don't have a childhood memory where I don't, like, not remember being an abused child by him". When asked whether there were other places where similar sexual contact occurred, the victim said that when she had sleepovers at the offender's house, she would share a bed with the offender's daughter, and the offender would come into the bedroom and insert his finger or fingers into her vagina while telling her to "shush" and that this would go on for a couple of minutes before the offender left. She said that this would happen "every time I was on a sleepover". She said she felt that the sleepovers were about once a month, and that they started from when she was possibly about four until she was aged about ten.

16. The victim gave evidence also that there was an occasion when she was aged about five where the offender took her and her brother DU into a shed, removed her shirt, and that both the offender and her brother, on instructions from the offender, touched her on the breast area, tracing a finger around her nipples. No evidence, however, was given by DU about this alleged incident.

17. The victim also gave evidence about what she said was the "last time" that the offender sexually offended against her. This was when she was being driven by him on the tractor when aged about 10 or 11. She gave evidence that after she got back on the tractor, after getting off to open a gate, the offender tried to put his hands back inside her pants, and that she responded by saying she did not want this to happen anymore and would tell her father about it.

18. There is no doubt that the offender had a tractor and a twin cab utility, and I accept beyond reasonable doubt the evidence of Ms BI that she would often be given a ride in those vehicles where she would sit on the offender's lap. While the mother of Ms BI agreed that in a statement she said she did not have a specific memory of the victim, or any of her children, riding on the offender's tractor, this is hardly surprising. As the witness herself said, "They were farm kids. It wasn't unusual for them to be on tractors." In other words, there would have been no reason for the mother to have logged in her memory any specific event. The fact that the mother of Ms BI does not recall her daughter being on the offender's tractor does not, therefore, cause me reasonable doubt about Ms BI' evidence that this occurred, and while the

19. offender gave evidence that it was not his practice to give rides on the tractor to the children, I do not accept his evidence about this. Nor, apparently, did the jury, given its guilty verdict on count 1, which occurred when RU was sexually touched by the offender while on the tractor.

20. I also accept beyond reasonable doubt the victim Ms BI's evidence that the offender would also drive her in his twin cab, and I note that this is supported by the offender's evidence to the effect that he may well have done so. There is also no doubt that as a child, Ms BI would have sleepovers at the offender's house. The offender accepted this in his evidence and said that it would have been about four or five times a year from when Ms BI, was around five till she was maybe ten or 11. While Ms BI's evidence was that the sleepovers were perhaps once a month, the evidence of the offender's daughter was that they were less regular, perhaps every couple of months.

21. Having assessed the evidence given by Ms BI, I am satisfied that she was an honest and essentially reliable witness. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the unlawful sexual relationship carried on by the offender with respect to her occurred on a regular and ongoing basis when she was aged around five until about age ten. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offender engaged in sexual contact with the victim as and when the opportunity arose during that period, and that this involved many incidents. The unlawful sexual acts involved multiple incidents where the offender used a finger or fingers to touch the outside of, and then insert, a finger or fingers into the victim's vagina. These incidents occurred whenever the victim was riding alone with the offender either on his tractor or in his twin cab utility. I am satisfied that such incidents of digital penetration in one or other of the vehicles occurred relatively frequently and around six to ten times per year from when the victim was about five years old until she was about ten.

22. I am also satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the specific incident which the victim described as the "last incident", being an occasion when the victim was aged about ten, and where the offender commenced touching the outside of the victim's vagina before she told him to stop. Furthermore, I am satisfied that there were multiple occasions where the offender penetrated the victim's vagina with a finger or fingers whilst she was sleeping over at the offender's house. I am satisfied that these incidents occurred at least four or five times a year from when the victim was about five until she was aged about ten.

23. In addition, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there was an incident when the victim was aged about five where the offender took her and her brother DU to a shed, removed her shirt, and touched her on the nipples and caused DU to do likewise. While DU gave no evidence of this incident, this does not leave me with a reasonable doubt that the incident occurred, given my assessment of Ms BI as an honest and essentially reliable witness. Furthermore, in my view, her description of this incident was most compelling, given the detail she recalled and given her description of her feelings as she walked home with her brother afterwards, and her realisation that she was not the only one subject to such activity, given that "DU was brought into it".

24. Those are the relevant factual findings on which I proceed to sentence.

OBJECTIVE SERIOUSNESS

25. It is important that I make an assessment of the seriousness, in an objective sense, of the three offences. They each carry maximum penalties of terms of imprisonment, which marks them as being potentially of real seriousness. This is particularly the case with respect to count 7, which has a maximum penalty of life imprisonment.

26. Each of the offences involved crimes of a sexual nature against children, which makes them of potential extreme seriousness. That is because there is a presumption that such offences usually cause significant and usually long-lasting harm to children. It is also because of the realisation in recent decades of just how common sexual offending against children is.

27. Turning, firstly, to count 1. This indecent assault offence occurred when the nine to ten year old RU was sitting on the offender's lap on a tractor while the offender was ploughing a paddock. This was the first occasion that the victim could remember where anything sexual took place. The offender used his hand to rub the victim's penis and testicles through his pants over a period of a few minutes while they were riding on the tractor. As I have said, the victim was aged nine or ten. Given that the offence of indecent assault at that time did not have an age component, it follows that the offence could be committed against both children and adults. The fact that the victim was young, being nine or ten, therefore increases its seriousness.

28. The offender was about 30 years older than the victim. The offender, who was a trusted and close family friend, was in a position of trust, and the offence involved a breach of that trust. The touching was through clothing and not skin on skin. There is no evidence that it was a planned or sophisticated offence, and I regard it as an opportunistic offence. The offence was not accompanied by any violence or threats, which would have made it more serious if these aspects had been involved. In my view, it is an offence that is in or towards the lower range of objective seriousness.

29. Turning then to count 2. This is an offence of committing an act of indecency towards the same victim, the victim being under 16 years, namely nine or ten. It occurred on the same occasion as count 1 after the defendant and the victim got off the tractor. It occurred on the bank of a river or creek where the offender exposed his penis and then masturbated to ejaculation in the presence of the nine- to ten-year-old victim. The offender was at the time about 30 years older than the victim, who was well under the age of 16. The offender was in a position of trust. The offence was not sophisticated or one involving planning, but it was an opportunistic offence. The offence was not accompanied by any violence of threats, which would have made it more serious if these aspects had been present. In my view, this is an offence that is in or towards the lower range of objective seriousness.

30. I have earlier stated that I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, based on the victim's evidence, that the events in counts 1 and 2 were not the only times where sexual acts were done to the victim or were carried out in his presence. I have stated that I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there were at least two other occasions where the offender touched the victim on the genitals through his clothing while riding on the tractor, and where the offender subsequently masturbated in the victim's presence.

31. This finding of other occasions of sexual offending does not increase the seriousness of either the count 1 or count 2 offences. However, it means that the offences in counts 1 and 2 cannot be treated as a one off, or as an aberration, in otherwise appropriate behaviour towards the victim. My finding has the effect that the offender is not entitled to the leniency that might have been appropriate if counts 1 and 2 had been the only occasions where any form of sexual offending occurred.

32. Turning then to count 7. This offence relates to the victim, BI, who is the younger sister of RU. During the period of the offence, the offender was the victim's godfather. In order for the jury to find the offender guilty of this offence, it had to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that he engaged in two or more unlawful sexual acts with her. In RA v R [2024] NSWCCA 149, Wilson J set out a non-exhaustive list of matters relevant to the objective seriousness of an offence of this kind. In relation to these, I make the following observations and findings.

33. Firstly, the offending in this case extended over a period of about five years.

34. Secondly, the relationship in which the unlawful sexual acts occurred was one where the offender was a trusted friend of the victim's family. He was also her godfather. I do not treat this "breach of trust" as a statutory aggravating factor, but rather I consider it a matter relevant to the objective seriousness of the offence. I might add that in referring to breach of trust, when I was considering counts 1 and 2, I was also treating it in that same fashion; in other words, not as a statutory aggravating factor. It might also be said that the offence in count 7 involved a breach of authority, given the offender's age and position relative to the victim. However, there is a great deal of overlap in this case between trust and authority, and so I disregard the aspect of breach of authority because it would involve double counting.

35. Thirdly, with respect to the matters referred to by Wilson J, the offending in this case commenced when the victim was about five years old, and therefore very considerably under the age of 16, which is an element of the offence. The offending continued until the victim was about ten years old, and thus still considerably under the age of 16.

36. Fourthly, there was a very substantial age differential of about 35 years between the victim and the offender.

37. Fifthly, based on the findings I have made, the number of unlawful sexual acts committed against the victim is very considerably greater than the statutory threshold of two.

38. Sixthly, and as I have found, the unlawful sexual acts were regular and relatively frequent, and occurred opportunistically whenever the offender was alone with the victim, and in a physical position to carry them out.

39. Seventhly, as to the nature of the unlawful sexual acts that were carried out, I have already set out my conclusion that, for the most part, these involved acts of digital penetration, but there were also the acts involving the touching of the nipples and the touching of the outside of the victim's vagina, being the "last time" that anything sexual happened. These last two incidents to which I have referred, involving the touching of the nipples and the touching involved on the "last occasion", are of a lesser degree of seriousness to the other acts, which involved digital penetration, and so, they do not add greatly to the overall objective seriousness of the count 7 offence.

25. Eighthly, by reference to the matters referred to by Wilson J in the RA decision, and as required by s 66EA(8), it is necessary that I have regard to the maximum penalties relevant to the particular unlawful sexual acts at the time they were committed. In this regard, an agreed document, MFI 1, was provided to the Court this morning setting out the relevant maximum penalties that applied during the period of the offending when the victim was aged five to ten years. I have regard to these relevant maximum penalties, which I do not intend to set out, but, of course, I am not bound by them.

26. Having regard to the various matters I have set out, I assess the objective seriousness of the count 7 offence as being slightly below the mid-range.

VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS

42. A Victim Impact Statement was read to the Court by Ms BI, and a Victim Impact Statement for RU was also admitted and read. The Crown does not rely on these to support a finding of "substantial harm", as referred to in s 21A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. However, Courts which deal with this sort of offending regularly know that child sex offences have profound and deleterious effects on victims for many years, if not the whole of their lives: see the observations in R v CMB [2014] NSWCCA 5 at para 92. Furthermore, in R v Gavel [2014] NSWCCA 56 at para 110, it was said that, "Sexual abuse of children will inevitably give rise to psychological damage". The absolute prohibition on sexual activity with a child is founded on a presumption of harm, and is intended to protect children from the physical and psychological harm taken to be caused by premature sexual activity: see Clarkson v R [2011] VSCA 157.

SUBJECTIVE MATTERS

43. Turning then to subjective matters relating to the offender himself. The offender is now aged 78, and he has no previous criminal history. The Sentencing Assessment Report, and structured case note attached to it, notes that he has been married for 56 years and has two adult children with whom he has a good relationship. The report notes that prior to retiring, the offender was a schoolteacher for 38 years. The offender does not have any history of problematic gambling, or drug and alcohol abuse, and denied that he has had any mental health interventions. There is no suggestion that the offender suffered or suffers with negative emotional regulation, impulsivity or problems with his cognitive or problem-solving skills. There is nothing in the offender's subjective circumstances to reduce his moral culpability for the offences, which must be regarded as high.

44. The offender has for some years been the full-time carer for his wife, who suffers hereditary spastic paraparesis. A letter from Mrs Renaud's GP notes that she now requires a wheelchair and cannot walk, has difficulty speaking, has memory impairment and has a permanent catheter due to urinary incontinence. I will return to this aspect of the case in a few moments.

45. There is a large volume of character references testifying to the views of the authors of these documents that in their experience the offender is of a generous and trustworthy character, and a person who has given his time to assist many people in his life.

46. While I take this material into account, and accept that there is this element to the offender's character, the weight to be attached to this material is significantly diminished by the fact that a jury has unanimously found him guilty of the offences for which he must be sentenced. Furthermore, although good character as a factor supporting leniency may be given weight in relation to an individual offence or event, that is not the case where there is an ongoing course of conduct over weeks or months, and indeed, the count 7 offence involves conduct over years: see Baldwin-Davies v R [2024] NSWCCA 220 per Basten AJA at para 37.

HARDSHIP TO FAMILY

47. It has been argued in this case that the sentence to be imposed should be reduced by reason of the hardship that the offender's imprisonment has caused and will cause to his wife. The offender's wife, as noted earlier, suffers from hereditary spastic paraparesis, and has required full time care for over ten years. The letter from her GP further states that she has been cared for by the offender for the past ten years before his incarceration. She requires care with all toileting, showering, dressing, and transfers from bed to chair. She has a history of agoraphobia and depression. Her care has been managed very well by the offender up until his incarceration. There is evidence that since the offender's remand into custody the care of Mrs Renaud has largely been carried out by their daughter, who has taken extensive leave from her employment. However, this is a stop-gap situation, and not one that can continue for much longer. It is probable, therefore, that the offender's continued incarceration will have the effect that his wife will have to be removed from her home and placed in aged care or other supported accommodation. The GP notes that in view of Mrs Renaud's history of agoraphobia, going into aged care is likely to seriously affect her well-being.

48. There is an extensive body of case law which sets out the principles to be applied where there is evidence of hardship to family members and others by reason of an offender's imprisonment. In R v Edwards [1996] 90 A Crim R 510, Gleeson CJ at p 515 said:

"There is nothing unusual about a situation in which the sentencing of an offender to a term of imprisonment would impose hardship on some other person. Indeed...it may be taken that sending a person to prison would more often than not cause hardship, sometimes serious hardship, and sometimes extreme hardship, to another person. It requires no imagination to understand why this is so. Sentencing judges and magistrates are routinely obliged in the course of their duties to sentence offenders who may be breadwinners for families, carers, paid or unpaid, of the disabled, parents of children, protectors of persons who are weak or vulnerable, employers upon whom workers depend for their livelihood, and many others in a variety of circumstances bound to result in hardship to third parties if such an offender is sentenced to a term of full time imprisonment."

49. In another case which considered these principles, Dipangkear v R [2010] NSWCCA 156, it was said at para 34 that, firstly:

"Where all the features of the particular case point to the need to impose a custodial sentence, but there is evidence of extreme hardship, a Court may take into account the extraordinary features of the case in any of three ways. It may suspend the sentence of imprisonment. Alternatively, the sentence may be shortened, or the non-parole period decreased. Each will, to a very great degree, depend upon its own facts involving an evaluation of the seriousness of the objective circumstances of the offence committed, the extent of the requirement for general and perhaps specific deterrence, and the nature and degree of the impact of the sentence upon the third person."

50. In Mr Renaud's case, it is argued on behalf of the offender that the Court should find that the likely hardship to the offender's wife is exceptional, such that it should have the effect of reducing to a significant extent the period of imprisonment that is required to be imposed. I have considered carefully this submission, and I have considered a number of cases involving arguments based on alleged hardship to others. Of course, each case will depend on its particular circumstances.

51. I accept that the offender's imprisonment will involve very significant hardship to his wife, and likely to his family generally. I am, however, not of the opinion that the hardship in this case can be described as exceptional such that it can be used to significantly reduce the otherwise appropriate sentence. Nonetheless, that hardship remains a highly relevant matter in the sentencing exercise, and a matter to which I have given attention both in determining the head sentence, and in particular, the non-parole period.

52. I have also taken into account that the offender's time in custody will be rendered more onerous by reason of a number of factors.

53. Firstly, his separation from his wife, and the likelihood that she will be unable to visit the offender in custody, or at least with any frequency.

54. Secondly, his age and likely deteriorating health, and in this regard I note the reference in the custodial history to the offender currently having a hernia. There is no other evidence, however, suggesting that he has any serious medical issues.

REMORSE, RISK AND REHABILITATION

55. There is no remorse in this case, given that the offender always has maintained his innocence.

56. The Sentencing Assessment Report notes that the offender is a low risk of re-offending, based on the LSI R assessment tool. Given his lack of other convictions, his age, and the fact that there is no evidence of other offending since the matters before the Court, I accept that he is a relatively low risk of re-offending in any way.

THE OFFENDER’S AGE

57. I am conscious of the offender's age. I accept that, as was submitted on his behalf, each year that he spends in custody is likely to represent a substantial portion of his remaining life. However, there is no sentencing principle which requires that a sentencing Court should impose a sentence which provides some prospect of an offender being released before his or her death. Rather, the fundamental principle is that the sentence must adequately reflect the totality of the criminality before the Court: see R v Holyoak [1995] 82 A Crim R 502 at p 607.

DETERMINATION

58. Turning then to my ultimate determination. I have had regard to the purpose of the sentencing set out in s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, all of which are of relevance.

59. I am satisfied, for the purposes of s 5 of that Act, that no penalty other than imprisonment is appropriate.

60. In determining the indicative sentences, given that I will be imposing an aggregate sentence, and also in determining the ultimate aggregate sentence, I have had regard to a number of decisions of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, including those referred to in the Crown's submissions. I do not suggest that any of those cases are truly comparable to this one, but they have been of some guidance. I have had regard also to statistics maintained by the New South Wales Judicial Commission, although I am conscious of the limited value of such general information.

61. I have also had regard, as required by s 25AA of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 to the trauma arising from sexual offences on children, as it is understood today rather than in times past.

62. The offender is convicted of each of the offences.

63. I intend to impose an aggregate sentence. I have made a finding of special circumstances for adjusting the ratio between head sentence and non-parole period. I have done that on the basis of three matters. Firstly, that this is the offender's first period in custody. Secondly, that I am satisfied that his custody will be more onerous due to his age and his separation from his wife. Thirdly, the hardship to the offender’s wife and family.

64. Given that I am imposing an aggregate sentence, I must set out the indicative terms which otherwise would have been imposed.

65. For count 1, the indicative term is one year and three months' imprisonment.

66. For count 2, the indicative term is eight months' imprisonment.

67. For count 7, the indicative term is nine years and six months' imprisonment.

TOTALITY

68. I have given careful consideration to totality principles, given that there are three offences on which the offender is being sentenced. I have considered the extent, if any, to which there should be any notional accumulation involved in the aggregate sentence. In my view, there does need to be some notional accumulation so as to acknowledge that there are two separate victims, and offending against them that occurred on different occasions. With respect to counts 1 and 2, however, it seems to me that there should be a significant level of concurrency, given that those two offences were part of essentially a single incident.

69. I impose an aggregate head sentence of ten years and six months. I impose a non-parole period of six years. They will date from 17 June 2025. The head sentence, therefore, will expire on 16 December 2035; the non-parole period will expire on 16 June 2031.

70. Mr Crown, Mr Terry, anything that needs to be raised?

71. LYNCH: Your Honour, those dates are correct, the maths is correct.

72. HIS HONOUR: Mr Terry, anything you need to raise?

73. TERRY: No, your Honour.

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Decision last updated: 26 September 2025