R v Reed - [2025] SADC 117

DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal: Application)
R v REED
[2025] SADC 117
Ruling of his Honour Judge Press
23 September 2025
CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO ADMIT OR EXCLUDE EVIDENCE - EVIDENCE UNFAIR TO ADMIT OR IMPROPERLY OBTAINED
CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - WARRANTS, ARREST, SEARCH, SEIZURE AND INCIDENTAL POWERS - SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Jonathon Paul Reed (‘the accused’) is charged with two counts of trafficking in a commercial quantity of a controlled drug and one count of money laundering.
On 31 August 2023 Detective Brevet Sergeant Carman (‘DBS Carman’) used his General Search Warrant to conduct a search of the accused’s house. Inside the house police located 392.5g of mixed methylamphetamine (count 1), 1,949.25g of 1,4-butanediol (count 2) and $114,225 in cash (count 3).
The lawfulness of the search was challenged. The accused submitted the police officer did not hold a suspicion or alternatively did not hold a reasonable suspicion.
Held: Application to exclude evidence of the search refused.
R v Nguyen (2013) 117 SASR 432; Emery v The Queen [2021] SASCA 62; R v Dam and Nguyen (2015) 123 SASR 511; Matthews v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 1; McHugh v The Queen [2022] SASCA 5; R v Golja [2017] SASCFC 61; R v Rogers (2011) 109 SASR 307; The Queen v T. Collins (1976) 12 SASR 501; R v Nguyen [2015] SASCFC 7, considered.

R v REED
[2025] SADC 117
Introduction

Jonathon Paul Reed (‘the accused’) is charged with two counts of trafficking in a commercial quantity of a controlled drug and one count of money laundering.
On 31 August 2023 Detective Brevet Sergeant Carman (‘DBS Carman’) used his General Search Warrant to conduct a search of the accused’s house. Inside the house police located 392.5 g of mixed methylamphetamine (count 1), 1,949.25 g of 1,4-butanediol (count 2) and $114,225 in cash (count 3).
The lawfulness of the search was challenged. The accused submitted the police officer did not hold a suspicion or alternatively did not hold a reasonable suspicion.
For the reasons that follow I decline to exclude the evidence of the search.
The law
The law in relation to reasonable suspicion was considered in R v Nguyen:[1]
A suspicion that a fact exists is less certain than a belief in the existence of that fact. A belief is held on information which is accepted as reliable and implies a reasonable satisfaction that the fact is at least more likely to be true than any other alternative fact or facts. On the other hand, a suspicion that a fact exists, in the context of an investigation of the truth of that fact, is a working hypothesis for which there is some supporting material. There must be a rational connection between the supporting material and the suspicion. Mere curiosity, speculation or “idle wondering” about the existence of the fact is not the same as a suspicion that it exists.
Importantly, … more than an actual suspicion [is required]; the police officer must not only suspect but “reasonably suspect” that the person possesses an illicit substance or that there is evidence of an offence against the CSA in a vehicle. The additional element of reasonableness means that the information or material from which the suspicion arises must not only rationally produce a suspicion in the mind of the police officer, but it must also engender that suspicion in the mind of a person thinking reasonably about that information. The evaluation of the reasonableness of the suspicion must be undertaken in the context of the purpose of the powers, and the civil liberties abrogated by their exercise. It is not reasonable to be overly incredulous at one extreme or naively gullible on the other. It is not reasonable to suspect the existence of facts on flimsy material or by a process of reasoning which relies on tenuous, albeit rational, connections. On the other hand, it would be unreasonable, and would deny the power much of its utility, to demand material which supports a positive belief in the existence of the relevant facts.
[1] (2013) 117 SASR 432 at 437.
In Emery v The Queen [2] the Court stated:
It is important to recognise that the facts which may properly give rise to a reasonable suspicion may be nevertheless insufficient to reasonably ground a belief. As Vanstone J observed in R v Dam and Nguyen,[3] quoting from the well-known case of George v Rockett:
[35] The concept of reasonable suspicion was discussed by the High Court in George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104. It was pointed out that suspicion and belief are different states of mind. The Court referred to the statement by Lord Devlin in Hussien v Chong Fook Kam [1970] AC 942 at 948 that suspicion “in its ordinary meaning is a state of conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking: ‘I suspect but I cannot prove’”. The Court observed that facts capable of grounding a reasonable suspicion might be quite insufficient to reasonably ground a belief. The Court also quoted with approval the statement of Kitto J in Queensland Bacon Pty Ltd v Rees (1966) 115 CLR 266 at 303:
A suspicion that something exists is more than a mere idle wondering whether it exists or not; it is a positive feeling of actual apprehension or mistrust, amounting to “a slight opinion, but without sufficient evidence”, as Chambers' Dictionary expresses it. Consequently, a reason to suspect that a fact exists is more than a reason to consider or look into the possibility of its existence.
[2] Emeryv The Queen [2021] SASCA 62, [44].
[3] (2015) 123 SASR 511 at [35].
As regards reliance on information provided by members of the public I proceed on the basis the following may be relevant when considering whether such information may form the basis of a reasonable suspicion:
i.Whether the information appeared cogent and/or compelling.
ii.Whether any aspects of the information suggested reliability or unreliability.
iii.Whether the information provided a sufficient connection to the location to be searched.
iv.Whether the information was sufficiently temporal to the proposed search.
v.Whether the information was received from a known and proven reliable informant as opposed to an anonymous source.
vi.Whether it appears the information was provided on the basis of first‑hand knowledge, speculation, conjecture, gossip or rumour.
vii.Whether the information was provided by a person who is or appears to be intoxicated, drug effected, impacted by mental health issues, seeking a benefit from police or prosecuting authority or who may have a motive to lie because of vindictiveness toward a person.
viii.Whether the information is supported by other information held by police.
I proceed on the basis that the reasonableness of the suspicion must be assessed having regard to the ‘information from which it arises’.[4] This therefore allows reference to be had to all known facts although if a police officer indicates the suspicion arose from only some of the known facts then I consider the reasonableness must be assessed by reference to that information only.
[4] Matthews v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 1, [30].
I consider this is also consistent with Kourakis CJ in McHugh v The Queen wherein he stated: [5]
The reasonableness of a suspicion requires attention to the reasoning process by which it is formed.
[5] McHugh v The Queen [2022] SASCA 5, [11].
That attention must be given to the reasoning process does not however mean that it is necessary for a police officer to articulate how and why each piece of information influenced the forming of the suspicion. Similarly, nor does it require a police officer to attempt to apportion the precise weight given to individual factors. Many suspicions are formed instinctively and without time to assess each factor in detail. An inability of a police officer to articulate each facet of the reasoning process does not undermine the reasonableness of his or her suspicion. Whether the suspicion held was reasonable must be objectively assessed by the Court having regard to the information upon which the police officer relied.
The information possessed by DBS Carman prior to the search
DBS Carman gave evidence at the voir dire. DBS Carman also provided affidavits dated 10 November 2023 and 19 August 2025.[6] The information he stated he possessed can be summarised as follows:
[6]     Exhibits VDP1 and VDP2- the Annexures were not tendered for the purposes of the voir dire. (T3 voir dire hearing 25 August 2025.)
i.in November 2022, a person named Mr Shrestha had his identification stolen;
ii.on 14 January 2023, a mobile phone with a number ending 149 was activated in Mr Shrestha’s name and that phone number was supplied to Australia Post under the name of Mr Hounslow;
iii.as at January 2023, Mr Hounslow was in prison and had been in prison since prior to the theft of Mr Shrestha’s identification. DBS Carman reviewed Mr Hounslow’s prison calls and determined there was no indication that Mr Hounslow was aware of, or involved in, various importations being made using his name;
iv.between January and 13 April 2023, 36 parcels were imported from China in the name of either Mr Hounslow or Mr Shrestha. The parcels were addressed to different Australia Post Delivery Centres or Post Offices;
vi.on 3 March 2023, parcels addressed to Mr Hounslow were seized from Kensington Post Office and Regency Park Delivery Centre. On 14 March, a further parcel addressed to Mr Hounslow was seized from Pooraka Post Office. Within the three parcels police located 18 kg of 1,4-butanediol. Possession of 2 kg is designated as a large commercial quantity;
vii.on 10 March 2023, a person attended the Regency Park Delivery Centre and attempted to collect the parcel which had been seized by police on 3 March 2023. The person was unable to collect the parcel as it had already been seized by police.
CCTV footage of that person was viewed by DBS Carman in March 2023. The vehicle driven by the person was registered to the accused. The quality of the CCTV footage of the car and the person[7] did not permit DBS Carman to positively identify the accused as the driver. He agreed he was not ‘really sure’ that it was the accused.[8] The physical description of the person who attended at the parcel collection window matched the height, build and general physical description of the accused.[9]
[7]     DBS Carman said the CCTV footage was ‘grainy’.
[8]     T15.
[9]     T5.
DBS Carman therefore requested and viewed safety camera footage relating to that vehicle for the period between 7 November 2022 and 26 February 2023 to further investigate the potential identity of the driver. He stated that ‘although in two of the pictures you can see the driver, I believe that it would be difficult to distinguish between Reed and the driver if Reed is not the driver’.
He did conduct a drive-by of the address, but he did not see the relevant vehicle at the address at that time. He could not indicate when that drive-by occurred;
viii.on 20 March 2023, a parcel addressed to Mr Hounslow was seized from Glenside Post Office. It contained N,N-Dimethylpentylone HCI, a controlled substance;
ix.on 24 March 2023, a parcel addressed to Mr Turnbull was seized from the Sturt Post Office. It contained 3 kg of methylmine chloride, a controlled substance;[10]
[10] This parcel was not addressed to Mr Hounslow. However, it was addressed to Mr Turnbull and Mr Turnbull was a name that was used in connection with the parcel seized on 20 March 2023.
x.on 29 March 2023, a parcel addressed to Mr Hounslow was seized from the Kent Town Delivery Centre. It contained 10 g of a prescription drug;
xi.on 3 April 2023, two parcels addressed to Mr Hounslow were seized from Glenside Post Office. Each contained over 500 g of BMK Glycidic Acid, a controlled substance;
xii.on 3 April 2023, a parcel addressed to Mr Hounslow was seized from the Kent Town Delivery Centre. It contained over 300 g of N,N‑Dimethylpentylone HCI, a controlled substance;
xiii.on 6 April 2023, a parcel addressed to Mr Hounslow was seized from Glenside Post Office. It contained approximately 1 kg of N,N‑Dimethylpentylone HCI, a controlled substance;
xiv.on 13 April 2023, a parcel addressed to Mr Shrestha was seized from the Kent Town Delivery Centre. It contained over 1.4 kg of N,N‑Dimethylpentylone HCI, a controlled substance;
xv.DBS Carman received an intelligence report in relation to the accused. The report was entered on to the SHIELD Intelligence System on 22 May 2023. It contained information from a member of the public. The information was from an ‘untested source’. The nature of the information could not ‘be judged’.
The information received was that ‘John Reed, tall male Caucasian who resides near the Halfway Hotel, Woodville is dealing drugs. Reed drives a SS Commodore and has a stolen electric scooter’. The report further indicated the accused had a recorded criminal history for trafficking a controlled drug and that he had pending matters of trafficking and unlawful possession. It further referred to intelligence held by police to the effect that in 2018 it was reported that the accused had ‘people running drugs – dealing for him whilst he is remanded’ and that the accused was involved in ‘purchasing mercury chloride a product use (sic) in the production of illicit drugs’.
Lastly it indicated that based on the information and intelligence at hand, an assessment had been made that ‘due to Reed drug history and prior intelligence, it is highly likely that Reed is dealing drugs. There is a gap of intelligence in relation to the stolen electric scooter’. (underlining and italicised words are as indicated in the report);
xvi.DBS Carman also stated he viewed various documents on the police system prior to 31 August, however he was unable to state when he did so. The following documents relating to the accused were viewed:[11]
(a)    an intelligence report from 2022 to the effect a known associate of the accused was dealing methylamphetamine;
(b)    an arrest report dated 2021 for trafficking in a controlled drug;
(c)    an intelligence report dated 2020 which linked the accused to ‘drug information’;
(d)    a parole board warrant issued in 2019 indicating the accused tested positive for illicit substances;
(e)    a street check report dated 2018 indicating he had been arrested in relation to a trafficable quantity of a controlled drug;
(f)     a street check report date 2017 indicating illicit drugs had been located in the accused’s bedroom along with other evidence of trafficking;
(g)    arrest reports from 2012 and 2013 indicating he had been found in possession of a controlled drug; and
xvii.at least one of the imported substances could be used as a precursor for the manufacture of other controlled drugs.[12]
[11] This information was contained in the affidavit material and in agreed facts provided after the voir dire hearing.
[12] T10 and 24.
The nature of the suspicion
DBS Carman suspected that the accused was ‘involved in the attempted importation of the drugs through the postal system’.[13]
[13] T6.
After viewing the intelligence report dated 22 May 2023, DBS Carman stated that the report ‘gave me further information to say that Mr Reed was still potentially involved in the dealing of drugs from that address’.[14] (my emphasis)
[14] T9.
After viewing various intelligence and the police records, he stated ‘I still had the suspicion that Mr Reed was involved in the attempted importations and that’s why we went to and conducted the search at his address’.[15]
[15] T7.
When asked what he suspected would be at his house he said ‘Initially potentially a clandestine laboratory’,[16] given some of the drugs seized from the various packages are ‘often used within the manufacture of clandestine laboratories’.[17] He suggested that even though police had stopped the various parcels by April, he thought the accused may have been utilising another name or using other persons or attempting to get them from other places.[18]
[16] T10
[17] T10.
[18] T11.
He said just because the importations through the postal system had stopped does not mean that he is ‘not going to attempt to get items from other places’. He agreed he did not have any evidence of such further attempts.
When asked were you investigating who was responsible for the package that was seized on 3 March or were you investigating the possibility of further offences having been committed? He said, ‘we were investigating the person who had attempted to collect it on the 10th that had been imported or we had seized on the 3rd, yes’.[19]
[19] T11.
He was unsure when exactly he looked at the police reports, but he stated it was ‘over the course of the investigation when he logged onto the police SHIELD system’. He stated those reports ‘I suppose bolstered my suspicions and the reasonable cause to suspect that I had the, that I could go to the address and execute my general search warrant’.[20]
[20] T18.
In cross-examination he was asked why he executed the warrant and he said, ‘Because I believed that I had reasonable cause to suspect that Mr Reed was the person involved and that I had [the] requisite suspicions to enter into and search the premises.’[21]
[21] T23
He also later stated ‘I believe that there was potential that the offending was still going on otherwise I wouldn't have executed my general search warrant’.[22]
[22] T23.
Lastly, he confirmed that during the search, a number of phones were seized from the house. They were examined as far back as he could having regard to the relevant dates.
Discussion
The accused has the onus of proving the facts justifying the exercise of the discretion in his favour on the balance of probabilities.[23]
[23] The Queen v T. Collins (1976) 12 SASR 501 per King J at 517; R v Nguyen [2015] SASCFC 7, [27].
It was suggested to DBS Carman that he had not in fact looked at the intelligence or police reports prior to executing the search warrant. This was the main attack on his credibility. The absence of any reference in his notes or in the PD23A to those reports was said to be consistent with the police officer having only looked for this material after he became aware that there was a challenge to the search. I reject that submission.
He agreed that when completing the PD23A[24] he ‘can’ also reference other documents in the PD23A if he wants to. He completed that document on the morning of the search. He agreed he did not mention the reports in the PD23A. The PD23A was not tendered, and no evidence was led as to the information he did list on the document.[25]
[24] A police document wherein the suspicions relied upon by a police officer for a search must be listed.
[25] T19 and 40
Listing all matters on the PD23A to which a police officer has had regard in determining to execute a search warrant is important. Doing so would assist the police officer if later he/she is required to give evidence about all the matters he/she took into account when forming the suspicion. Additionally, a significant purpose of the PD23A is to ensure that there is oversight in relation to the use of general search warrants. It is difficult to know how oversight can be maintained if that form does not contain all the relevant information. Notwithstanding the matters to which I have just referred, the absence of any information as to what was in fact recorded in the PD23A is relevant to whether I consider the failure to mention the specific reports impacts his credibility on this topic. For example, a failure to mention the reports would not be significant if some or all of the information contained within those reports was recorded on the PD23A. Alternatively, if there is no dispute he had certain information and that was also not mentioned in the PD23A , then the failure to mention the reports may reflect poor compliance with his responsibilities rather than a lack of credibility as to having seen these reports prior to executing his warrant.

As to his notes, DBS Carman also did not include in his notes any reference to viewing the CCTV footage or to driving past the accused’s house to see if the car was there. There was however no dispute that he had viewed the CCTV footage and then requested safety camera footage to determine if the accused was using that vehicle.
I also note that stating he did a drive by but did not see the car at the house was evidence which did not necessarily assist the prosecution position. This evidence is not therefore consistent with the police officer attempting to untruthfully bolster his position.
Whilst I accept his record keeping was unsatisfactory, I do not accept the absence of any reference in his notes undermines his credibility on that topic.
There was also nothing in his presentation or demeanour which caused me to have a concern about his credibility. On an assessment of his evidence as a whole I accept he was trying to be truthful. In particular I accept that he came into possession of other information about the accused between March 2023 and about 22 May 2023. That he would access intelligence reports or have them brought to his attention when he was investigating the person the subject of the report makes sense. Given he made no notes about when he looked at the other reports, I accept they may all have been viewed prior to, or around the same time as, the Intelligence report dated 22 May 2023.(Exhibit VDP3). I am not prepared to infer he obtained the information closer in time to the date of the search.
The suspicion
The suspicion must relate to the premises being searched. For the purposes of this matter, to justify the use of the general search warrant the police officer must have had reasonable cause to suspect that an offence had been recently committed or was about to be committed, that there was anything that may afford evidence as to the commission of an offence or that there was anything that may be intended to be used for the purpose of committing an offence.
He expressed his suspicion in different ways, however I accept a suspicion may include a number of possibilities.
His evidence was to the effect that he suspected that the accused was involved in the importation of drugs in March 2023 and the search of the house was connected to that investigation. I infer that is a reference to searching the house for anything that may afford evidence as to the commission of an offence, particularly given the phones of the accused were seized for the purpose of examining them as regards all relevant dates.
His evidence was also that he suspected that the accused continued to be involved in drug trafficking or the importation of drugs. He referred to the former when discussing the intelligence report dated 22 May 2023. He referred to the latter when indicating that even though the importations in the original names had stopped, that did not mean the accused could not have continued his involvement using different names. He specifically referred to the fact he suspected a clandestine laboratory would ‘potentially’ be at the house.
I accept he held a suspicion which he believed justified executing the warrant. I accept he turned his mind to the issue of forming a suspicion.
His evidence that he believed that it was the accused who attempted to collect the parcel was not challenged and nor was his evidence that the CCTV footage did not exclude the accused as the person who attempted to collect the package.
I accept there was a strong basis to suspect the accused was the person who attempted to collect the parcel. The car being registered to the accused, the description matching the accused in a general way and the accused’s prior and potentially current involvement in drug trafficking and manufacture were significant considerations. Notwithstanding subsequent enquiries as to the use of the car did not definitively confirm the accused was a, or the, person using the car in that period, the subsequent enquiries also did not undermine that suspicion.
The police officer therefore had evidence that the accused had a recent history of drug trafficking, that the accused had a history of purchasing drugs for manufacturing drugs[26], that the accused’s car had been used to attempt to collect a parcel of 1,4-butanediol in March 2023, that the description of the person driving the car did not exclude the accused as that person, that other parcels using the same names were being imported that could be used to manufacture controlled drugs and that police received information the accused was selling drugs at a time proximate to May 2023.
[26] See VDP3 –‘2018 Reed involved in purchasing Mercury chloride a product use (sic) in the production of illicit drugs’
Defence counsel conceded that if the police had executed the warrant soon after 10 March to search for his phone on the basis it may afford evidence of the commission of an offence, then such a search would have been lawful. I agree with that concession.
The information in his possession explains why I accept he was honest when he said he formed a suspicion in the course of the investigation about the accused, his activities and his premises. Forming a suspicion is what I would have expected of a person with that information. Whether it was reasonable to have maintained that suspicion at the time he executed the warrant is a different question.
Was it reasonable?
The defence submitted that there was only evidence of one isolated act by the accused in March 2023, the importations stopped after 13 April 2013 and there was little or no subsequent investigation by police for a period of nearly six months. The defence submitted that in circumstances in which no further information had come to light over a period of nearly six months which inculpated the accused and the importations had ended then it was only reasonable to suspect that the offending had finished. The defence further submitted the information received in May 2023 was of limited weight.
The defence submitted it was not reasonable to suspect any of the pre‑requisites for the use of the search warrant and the search of his house five and a half months after his suspected isolated act was unlawful.
DBS Carman indicated he did not immediately search the accused’s premises after viewing the CCTV footage because the investigation was ongoing. I accept his evidence in that regard. It made sense that police would want to see if other CCTV footage may be able to be obtained of someone attending to collect a parcel.
A significant number of parcels were however intercepted by police. It must have been obvious to police that at some point the offenders would not continue to attempt to collect them. At some point after 13 April when it became clear the parcels were no longer being delivered in those names, I consider it must have been obvious to police it was unlikely that those names would be used again by the offenders.
I accept in some circumstances alternative hypothesises may deprive a suspicion of its reasonableness however, the nature of a suspicion allows for the holder of the suspicion to reasonably suspect more than one proposition. Much will depend on the circumstances. I accept there were 3 separate aspects to his suspicion.
Whilst a suspicion requires more than idle wondering, it has been acknowledged that ‘suspicion lives in the consciousness of uncertainty’.[27]
[27] R v Rogers (2011) 109 SASR 307, [20].
I consider his suspicion that the accused was selling controlled drugs in August 2023 was reasonable. I further consider that if it was reasonable to suspect that the accused was involved in drug trafficking in August 2023 then it was also reasonable to suspect that places closely associated with the accused would have items which may afford evidence of the commission of his involvement in such criminal activity.
As was acknowledged by the Court of Appeal in R v Golja:[28]
“… a police officer who discovers incriminating evidence of drug trafficking as a result of a search of a person’s motor vehicle might reasonably suspect that further evidence may be found at other places, including where applicable, a safe house, a storage unit, a workplace or that person’s residence. Experience suggests that persons involved in drug trafficking do sometimes use their residence for storage and safekeeping of drugs”.
[28] [2017] SASCFC 61, [29] per Stanley J, Kourakis CJ and Parker J agreeing.
For reasons I have outlined above I consider there was a strong basis to suspect the accused was the person who attempted to collect the drugs. That DBS Carman accepted that those involved in drug trafficking will frequently attempt to hide their identification and may use another person’s vehicle does not undermine the strength of that suspicion.[29]
[29] T17.
Secondly, the intelligence reports showed a relatively long standing and continuous interest and involvement in drugs and drug trafficking. The fact a person has prior relevant convictions or some previous involvement in trafficking is insufficient, of itself, to ground a relevant suspicion however such information may be given some weight in the formation of such a suspicion.[30] I accept that the greater the lapse in time between the prior conviction or activity and the execution of the warrant the less relevance past activities may have as regards any suspicion.
[30] R v Rogers (2011) 109 SASR 307, [26] per Duggan J.
Thirdly, he received information in May 2023 as regards the accused dealing drugs. The accused submitted this report had limited weight because the source was unknown and its accuracy could not be ‘judged’. Whilst the intelligence report indicates the date of the report is 22 May 2023, the date the information was received was not recorded on the report. The report however uses the present tense when indicating that the evaluation of the information, as a whole, is that it is highly likely the accused ‘is’ dealing drugs. This is therefore consistent with the information being current as at the date the report came into existence. I also consider that it is unlikely that significant delays would occur as regards the dissemination of such material.
In any event I also note that there was no suggestion made to the officer that he believed or suspected that the information contained in the report was stale or old. On the information before me I do not therefore infer that the police officer suspected or believed that the information was stale. Nor do I accept the information known to him should have raised such a concern in his mind.
As to the weight to be given to such a report, the description of the accused was not inaccurate, and the informant appears to have personal knowledge of his address and his car. [31] The description of the information as to the electric scooter is also quite specific. It did not suggest the information was based on mere conjecture or speculation. The information contained in the report is also consistent with information from other sources which suggests the accused’s involvement in drug trafficking in March 2023 and in the years prior to 2023. I consider the information from the informant was an important bridge between the March 2023 act by the accused and the forming of a suspicion as to the accused being involved in an ongoing drug trafficking enterprise[32].
[31] His address is near Woodville and he does have Commodores registered in his name although I accept it was unknown whether those vehicles were SS Commodores.
[32] DBS Carman gave evidence he suspected the accused was ‘still’ selling drugs.
The defence concentrated on the gap of five and a half months between the isolated act of the accused and the search to submit that such a delay undermined the reasonableness of the suspicion.
Whilst it was not unreasonable to continue to monitor the parcels being imported for some time, I accept the date of the accused’s suspected involvement is relevant. However, the number of parcels delivered and intercepted over those four months suggests that the drug trafficking enterprise was not insignificant. The different types and quantities of drugs being imported also spoke to an organised and relatively large scale enterprise. That combination strongly suggested that those involved in it were likely to attempt to find other means to continue that enterprise, particularly if they had already established a means to source those drugs.
If no further information had been obtained by the police, I accept that waiting until 31 August 2023 to execute the warrant would however have been problematic for the prosecution. In circumstances in which no other information was received and there was evidence that the parcels had stopped, and it could be inferred the offenders knew police were investigating them then I agree a suspicion that he was continuing to sell drugs in August would not have been reasonable. Such a state of affairs was possible but it was not reasonable to suspect it was so. Whether it would have been reasonable to suspect that in his house on 31 August there would have remained evidence of his attempt to collect the parcel in March 2023 would have been finely balanced. Even when offenders know police may be investigating them, they do not always dispose of all incriminating evidence, including evidence on phones. However, that is not a matter I need to decide because the police did obtain more information in May 2023.[33]
[33] Another aspect of his suspicion was that the accused continued to import drugs. In the absence of the further information I accept such a suspicion would not have been reasonable. The new information however meant he was accessing drugs from somewhere. In circumstances in which he had the means and the knowledge as to how to import drugs from China I consider it was reasonable to suspect he continued to import drugs. I do not however consider it was reasonable to suspect a clandestine laboratory was set up at the house in August 2023. Given the passing of nearly six months and the absence of any information as to obtaining precursors in the meantime I consider such a possibility was idle wondering given the lapse in time.
That new information, when added to the information from March, the nature and size of the enterprise in which he was involved, and the accused’s longstanding interest in such activities meant it was reasonable to suspect that the accused was involved in an ongoing or continuous drug trafficking enterprise.
That police then waited for three months and one week before executing the warrant did not detract from the cogency of that extra information. Whilst I accept much must depend on the nature of the information and the specific activity of which the accused is suspected, Kourakis CJ in McHugh v The Queen[34] stated:
It is in the nature of large drug trafficking operations that they continue for some time, and often until detected and disrupted by police. The period of some months between the report and the search did not therefore detract at all from the cogency of the information in the circumstances of this case.
[34] [2022] SASCA 5, [12].
The delay of some three months did not therefore result in the information being stale and nor did it mean the suspicion he held on 31 August 2023 was unreasonable.
His suspicion that the accused was selling controlled drugs in August 2023 was reasonable and provided at least one aspect of the officer’s suspicion was reasonable that is a sufficient basis upon which to execute the warrant. I accept there was a reasonable cause to suspect that at the accused’s house there would be items that may afford evidence as to the commission of an offence or items that may be intended to be used for the purpose of committing an offence.
The suspicion held by the police officer was reasonable and the resulting search was therefore lawful.