R v Rawlinson; R v Proud; R v Spicer

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Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Rawlinson; R v Proud; R v Spicer [2014] NSWSC 355
Hearing dates:18-21, 24-28 February; 3-7, 10-14, 17-21, 24-27 March 2014
Decision date: 28 March 2014
Before: Harrison J
Decision:

Order that the trial of Mr Spicer be separated from the trial of his co-accused

Catchwords: CRIMINAL - procedure - application for separate trial - s 21 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 - whether evidence of co-accused destroys prospect of a fair trial
Legislation Cited: Criminal Procedure Act 1986
Category:Procedural and other rulings
Parties: Regina (Crown)
Bradley Max Rawlinson (Accused)
Michelle Sharon Proud (Accused)
Bernard Justin Spicer (Accused)
Representation: Solicitors:
Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown)
Archbold Legal Solutions (Rawlinson)
Medcalf Grant Lawyers (Proud)
George Smirilios (Spicer)
File Number(s):2011/410710 (Rawlinson) 2011/410458 (Proud) 2011/410452 (Spicer)
Publication restriction:Nil

Judgment

  1. HIS HONOUR:  On the 28th day of the trial, Mr Spicer applied for an order that the present trial be discontinued against him and that in due course he be tried by another jury. The basis for that application is to be found in certain portions of the evidence given by his co-accused Ms Proud in the course of her cross-examination by Mr Steel. I dealt previously with an application by Mr Spicer with respect to Ms Proud's evidence in which Mr Spicer sought a discharge of the jury upon the basis that he was embarrassed by what she said about his role in the setting of the fire that killed the deceased: see R v Rawlinson [2014] NSWSC 329. I rejected that application.

  1. The evidence upon which Mr Spicer now relies is included in the material that follows:

"T1225 Q. The reality, Ms Proud, is that you are lying about this conversation?
A. I'm not lying about the conversation. I know what took place in that motel that night and I know what he told me and what he did is sick.
Q. I suggest to you that you are lying because you want to make the rest of your evidence sound believable?
A. No, I'm not lying. I know what he said to me. He's sick.
...
T1227 Q. I suggest that yesterday, after court had finished sitting, that you made a comment, very loudly, to Mr Rawlinson in a position where Mr Spicer could hear, 'I'm only doing this for the kids. I don't care what happens to BJ' that's what you said, isn't it?
A. No.
Q. The reality is, isn't it, this evidence that you're giving about this conversation that supposedly happened when he returned home, you're giving that because you believe it will make the rest of your evidence more reliable or more believable?
A. No, your client is a murderer.
Q. And you're also doing it, I suggest, so that you can be in a position following this trial where you're able to care for your children?
A. No. But my kids would always be number one to me. My kids are…
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Details
Case
[2014] NSWSC 355
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, Rawlinson, Proud, and Spicer, were charged with various offences relating to drug trafficking and conspiracy. They applied for separate trials on the basis that the evidence against them, if given by co-accused, would destroy the prospect of a fair trial. The applications were heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The primary issue before the court was whether the evidence of the co-accused, if given, would indeed destroy the prospect of a fair trial for the applicants. The court had to consider the nature of the evidence, the potential prejudice it could cause, and whether there were adequate safeguards to mitigate any such prejudice.

The court examined the evidence against each applicant and assessed the potential prejudice that might arise from the co-accused's testimony. It found that the evidence, if given, would likely be highly prejudicial and could lead to a situation where the applicants could not receive a fair trial. The court concluded that the prejudice was not merely speculative but real and substantial, and that the risk of unfair prejudice outweighed any public interest in joint trials. The court also considered the safeguards available, such as the direction of the jury to consider each case separately, but ultimately found these insufficient to prevent the risk of unfair prejudice.

Accordingly, the court granted the applications for separate trials. The reasoning focused on the need to protect the applicants' right to a fair trial and the potential for significant prejudice if the co-accused testified. The court determined that the risk of unfair prejudice was too great to allow a joint trial. The final orders were that Rawlinson, Proud, and Spicer would be tried separately from their co-accused.

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