R v Rate

Case [1996] QCA 541


COURT OF APPEAL

[1996] QCA 541

WILLIAMS J
AMBROSE J

BYRNE J

CA No 184 of 1996
THE QUEEN
v.

DANIEL BRENT RATE Applicant

BRISBANE
..DATE 12/07/96
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WILLIAMS J: I will ask my brother Ambrose to deliver the first
judgment.

AMBROSE J: This is an application for leave to appeal against the sentence imposed upon the applicant on 15 April 1996 for six years' detention or imprisonment for the part he played in the armed robbery by a number of persons with personal violence of persons employing him at the time on a farm.

Upon this application it is contended by him that he really was not a party to the robbery although he accepts that he ought to have informed investigating police officers that he was aware of the identity of some of the persons involved in it.

However, this contention before this Court is quite inconsistent with the Crown case which was accepted by the jury who convicted him of being a joint offender with others who committed the robbery in question. His principle objection, as I understand it, is that because other persons involved in the robbery who had played a more active role in the commission of the offence all received the benefit of an early recommendation for parole he ought also receive such a recommendation.

The problem with that contention is that he defended the matter whereas the other persons where more severe penalties were imposed pleaded guilty and obviously the recommendation made for early parole eligibility for them was based upon that fact.

In my view, on all of the material, there is no basis upon which
120796 D.1 T9/SB M/T COA157/96
the applicant could claim that the learned sentencing Judge
erred in the exercise of his discretion in simply allowing the
statutory entitlement to eligibility for parole to operate. He
will, in fact, become eligible for parole after serving 50 per
cent of the sentence imposed and as it happens that will be the
time at which the other offenders become eligible for parole.

However, in my view there is nothing to suggest that the special circumstances which justified a reduction in the statutory period in their case applies in his case. I would simply therefore reject the application.

WILLIAMS J: I agree.

BYRNE J: I agree.

WILLIAMS J: The order of the Court will be leave to appeal refused, application dismissed.

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Details
AGLC
R v Rate [1996] QCA 541
Case
[1996] QCA 541
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of The Queen v. Daniel Brent Rate, the applicant, Rate, sought leave to appeal against his sentence, which was imposed on April 15, 1996. He was sentenced to six years of detention for his involvement in an armed robbery with personal violence, which he committed alongside several other individuals while working on a farm. Rate's primary contention was that he was not actually a party to the robbery, despite acknowledging that he should have disclosed the identities of some of the perpetrators to the police. However, this argument contradicts the Crown's case, which was accepted by the jury, establishing Rate as a joint offender with others who carried out the robbery. His main objection was that since other individuals involved in the robbery, who played more active roles, received an early parole recommendation, he should also receive such a benefit.

The legal issues that the court had to determine were whether Rate was indeed a party to the robbery and if the sentencing judge erred in his discretion regarding parole eligibility. Rate argued that since the other offenders received an early parole recommendation based on their guilty pleas, he should also be granted the same benefit. However, the court found that Rate's contention was inconsistent with the Crown's case, and the jury had already established him as a joint offender. Furthermore, the court concluded that there was no basis to claim that the sentencing judge erred in his discretion by allowing the statutory entitlement to parole eligibility to operate. Rate would become eligible for parole after serving 50% of his sentence, which would coincide with the time when the other offenders also become eligible for parole.

The court rejected Rate's application, finding no basis to claim that the sentencing judge had erred in his discretion. Justices Williams, Ambrose, and Byrne all agreed that there was no error in the sentencing judge's decision. The final order of the Court was to refuse leave to appeal and dismiss the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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