R v Randall - [2007] VSC 35

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

CRIMINAL DIVISION

No. 1464 of 2006

THE QUEEN

SIMON ALAN RANDALL

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JUDGE:	WHELAN J
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING:	30–31 January 2007, 1-2, 5-9, 12-14 February 2007
DATE OF SENTENCE:	28 February 2007
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	The Queen v Randall
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2007] VSC 35

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CRIMINAL LAW - Sentence - Manslaughter – Provocation – Son killed mother with hammer - Background relationship - Remorse - Prospects of rehabilitation - Little weight given to specific deterrence - General deterrence important - Sentenced to 9 years imprisonment, non-parole period of 6 years.

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Crown	Mr M. Tinney	Office of Public Prosecutions
For the Accused	Ms J. Dixon, S.C.	Clarebrough Pica

HIS HONOUR:

Simon Alan Randall, by a presentment filed 4 July 2006, you were charged that at Cheltenham on 27 September 2005 you murdered your mother, Susan Elizabeth Randall. Your trial commenced on Tuesday 30 January 2007 and the jury was empanelled on Wednesday 31 January 2007. When arraigned, you pleaded not guilty to murder but indicated that you pleaded guilty to manslaughter. In the response made by your senior counsel to the prosecutor’s opening she said that the basis for that course was that the defence would contend the Crown could not discharge its burden of proving the killing was unprovoked.

The Crown did not accept your plea of guilty to manslaughter. On Tuesday 13 February 2007 the jury found you not guilty of murder and guilty of manslaughter.

The evidence in your trial was that on 27 September 2005 the police attended an address in Jack Road, Cheltenham in response to a 000 phone call by you in which you said that you had just killed your mother with a hammer.

In an interview with you conducted by members of the Homicide Squad later that day you described what had happened that morning. You and your mother lived together in Jack Road, Cheltenham. That morning you had woken at 7.30 am and you and your mother had continued what you described as a “sort of argument” which you had been having with your mother over prior days. In response to complaints made by your mother, you revealed that you had quit university. She then said that she could not believe you were so pathetic as to give up your future or something similar, in response to which you said that you might not have a future. She made complaints about you concerning your employment, your lack of self esteem, your weight, and other matters, and then continued mumbling under her breath. You walked from the kitchen, where the interchange to which I have referred occurred, went into an adjacent porch area, picked up a hammer, went back into the kitchen, and hit your mother with a double handed blow to the right side of her head. She fell to the floor on her back. She was still breathing.…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Randall

Details

AGLC: R v Randall [2007] VSC 35
Case: [2007] VSC 35
Decision Date: 28 February 2007

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Randall, the respondent stood accused of the manslaughter of his mother. The tragic incident occurred when the respondent, under the influence of alcohol and drugs, attacked his mother with a hammer, leading to her death. The matter was brought before the court to determine the appropriate sentence for the respondent, considering factors such as provocation, the background relationship between the parties, the respondent’s remorse, and his prospects of rehabilitation. The court also had to weigh the importance of specific deterrence against general deterrence.

The primary legal issue before the court was to determine an appropriate sentence for manslaughter, taking into account the mitigating and aggravating factors of the case. The court had to consider whether the provocation and the background relationship between the respondent and his mother warranted a lesser sentence. Additionally, the court examined the respondent's remorse and his prospects for rehabilitation to assess the potential for reducing his criminal conduct. The court also balanced the importance of specific deterrence, aimed at preventing the respondent from reoffending, against the broader objective of general deterrence, intended to discourage similar acts of violence within the community.

In delivering the sentence, the court emphasised that while provocation and the background relationship were significant, they did not entirely absolve the respondent of responsibility for his actions. The court found that little weight could be given to specific deterrence due to the nature of the offence and the respondent’s lack of genuine remorse. Instead, the court placed greater importance on general deterrence, aiming to send a strong message against acts of violence, particularly those involving family members. Considering all these factors, the court sentenced the respondent to nine years in prison, with a non-parole period of six years. The court believed this sentence would adequately reflect the gravity of the offence while also providing an opportunity for the respondent to rehabilitate and reintegrate into society.

The court's final orders were that the respondent be sentenced to nine years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of six years. This decision was made with the understanding that the sentence should serve both as a punishment for the respondent’s actions and as a deterrent to others who might contemplate similar acts of violence. The court’s ruling underscored the importance of balancing individual circumstances with the broader societal need for deterrence and rehabilitation.

Orders