R v Rana - [2023] SADC 67

DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal)
R v RANA
Criminal Trial by Judge Alone
[2023] SADC 67
Reasons for the Verdict of his Honour Judge Barklay
6 June 2023
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - MONEY LAUNDERING
The accused, Mr Hassan Zia Rana, is charged with 20 counts of money laundering. It is alleged that the accused was intimately involved in a scheme involving the fraudulent ordering of new Apple iPhones through an online shopping system operated by Telstra Corporation Limited ACN 051 775 556. The scheme was designed to subvert the security features of Telstra’s online shopping system and used the accounts of unwitting Telstra customers to order Apple iPhones, with a nominated delivery address linked to the accused.
Verdict. Guilty of all counts.
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 130, 138; Juries Act 1927 (SA) s 7(1), referred to.
Douglass v The Queen (2012) 86 ALIR 1086; Kanaan v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 109; Peacock v The King (1911) 13 CLR 619; Plomp v The Queen (1963) 110 CLR 234; R v Baden-Clay (2016) 258 CLR 308; Barca v The Queen (1975) 133 CLR 82; R v C, CA [2013] SASCFC 137; R v Tran [2017] SASCFC 99; Shepherd v R (1990) 170 CLR 573; Zoneff v The Queen (2000) 200 CLR 234, considered.

R v RANA
[2023] SADC 67
Introduction

The accused, Mr Hassan Zia Rana (Mr Rana), is charged on an Information dated 9 July 2021 with 20 counts of money laundering.[1] The charges relate to the accused knowingly taking possession of mobile phones that had been illegally obtained from Telstra Corporation Limited (Telstra) (counts 1 to 15 (inclusive)), or by directly or indirectly causing illegally obtained mobile phones to be brought into the State (counts 16 and 17), and in the case of counts 18 to 20 (inclusive) by possessing cash totalling $65,435 which he knew to have been obtained by unlawful activity.
[1] Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) (‘CLCA’) s 138(1).
Mr Rana has elected to be tried by a judge alone.[2] He pleaded not guilty to all charges. For reasons which follow, I find the accused guilty of all counts.
[2] Juries Act1927 (SA) s 7(1)(a).
The charge
I set out the charges:
First Count
Statement of Offence
Money Laundering.[3]
[3] CLCA (n 1) s 138(1).
Particulars of Offence
Hassan Zia Rana on the 27^th day of April 2020 at Mawson Lakes, directly or indirectly engaged in a transaction involving property, namely four Apple iPhone mobile phones, by receiving the property, knowing that the property was tainted.
Second Count
Statement of Offence
Money Laundering.[4]
[4] Ibid.
Particulars of Offence
Hassan Zia Rana on the 29^th day of April 2020 at Mawson Lakes, directly or indirectly engaged in a transaction involving property, namely four Apple iPhone mobile phones, by receiving the property, knowing that the property was tainted.
Third Count
Statement of Offence
Money Laundering.[5]
[5] Ibid.
Particulars of Offence
Hassan Zia Rana on the 30^th day of April 2020 at Mawson Lakes, directly or indirectly engaged in a transaction involving property, namely six Apple iPhone mobile phones, by receiving the property, knowing that the property was tainted.
Fourth Count
Statement of Offence
Money Laundering.[6]
[6] Ibid.
Particulars of Offence
Hassan Zia Rana on the 1^st day of May 2020 at Mawson Lakes, directly or indirectly engaged in a transaction involving property, namely six Apple iPhone mobile phones, by receiving the property, knowing that the property was tainted.
Fifth Count
Statement of Offence
Money Laundering.[7]
[7] Ibid.
Particulars of Offence
Hassan Zia Rana on the 4^th day of May 2020 at Mawson Lakes, directly or indirectly engaged in a transaction involving property, namely four Apple iPhone mobile phones, by receiving the property, knowing that the property was tainted.
Sixth Count
Statement of Offence
Money Laundering.[8]
[8] Ibid.
Particulars of Offence
Hassan Zia Rana on the 5^th day of May 2020 at Mawson Lakes, directly or indirectly engaged in a transaction involving property, namely six Apple iPhone mobile phones, by receiving the property, knowing that the property was tainted.
Seventh Count
Statement of Offence
Money Laundering.[9]
[9] Ibid.
Particulars of Offence
Hassan Zia Rana on the 6^th day of May 2020 at Mawson Lakes, directly or indirectly engaged in a transaction involving property, namely an Apple iPhone mobile phone, by receiving the property, knowing that the property was tainted.
Eighth Count
Statement of Offence
Money Laundering.[10]
[10] Ibid.
Particulars of Offence
Hassan Zia Rana on the 13^th day of May 2020 at Mawson Lakes, directly or indirectly engaged in a transaction involving property, namely five Apple iPhone mobile phones, by receiving the property, knowing that the property was tainted.
Ninth Count
Statement of Offence
Money Laundering.[11]
[11] Ibid.
Particulars of Offence
Hassan Zia Rana on the 18^th day of May 2020 at Mawson Lakes, directly or indirectly engaged in a transaction involving property, namely four Apple iPhone mobile phones, by receiving the property, knowing that the property was tainted.
Tenth Count
Statement of Offence
Money Laundering.[12]
[12] Ibid.
Particulars of Offence
Hassan Zia Rana on the 19^th day of May 2020 at Mawson Lakes, directly or indirectly engaged in a transaction involving property, namely an Apple iPhone mobile phone, by receiving the property, knowing that the property was tainted.
Eleventh Count
Statement of Offence
Money Laundering.[13]
[13] Ibid.
Particulars of Offence
Hassan Zia Rana on the 19^th day of May 2020 at North Adelaide, directly or indirectly engaged in a transaction involving property, namely an Apple iPhone mobile phone, by receiving the property, knowing that the property was tainted.
Twelfth Count
Statement of Offence
Money Laundering.[14]
[14] Ibid.
Particulars of Offence
Hassan Zia Rana on the 21^st day of May 2020 at Mawson Lakes, directly or indirectly engaged in a transaction involving property, namely two Apple iPhone mobile phones, by receiving the property, knowing that the property was tainted.
Thirteenth Count
Statement of Offence
Money Laundering.[15]
[15] Ibid.
Particulars of Offence
Hassan Zia Rana on the 21^st day of May 2020 at North Adelaide, directly or indirectly engaged in a transaction involving property, namely 13 Apple iPhone mobile phones, by receiving the property, knowing that the property was tainted.
Fourteenth Count
Statement of Offence
Money Laundering.[16]
[16] Ibid.
Particulars of Offence
Hassan Zia Rana on the 22^nd day of May 2020 at North Adelaide, directly or indirectly engaged in a transaction involving property, namely two Apple iPhone mobile phones, by receiving the property, knowing that the property was tainted.
Fifteenth Count
Statement of Offence
Money Laundering.[17]
[17] Ibid.
Particulars of Offence
Hassan Zia Rana on the 25^th day of May 2020 at North Adelaide, directly or indirectly engaged in a transaction involving property, namely four Apple iPhone mobile phones, by receiving the property, knowing that the property was tainted.
Sixteenth Count
Statement of Offence
Money Laundering.[18]
[18] Ibid.
Particulars of Offence
Hassan Zia Rana between the 6^th day of May 2020 and the 27^th day of May 2020 at Mawson Lakes or elsewhere, directly or indirectly engaged in a transaction involving property, namely bringing 17 Apple iPhone mobile phones into the State, knowing that the property was tainted.
Seventeenth Count
Statement of Offence
Money Laundering.[19]
[19] Ibid.
Particulars of Offence
Hassan Zia Rana between the 29^th day of April 2020 and the 4^th day of June 2020 at Mawson Lakes or elsewhere, directly or indirectly engaged in a transaction involving property, namely bringing 23 Apple iPhone mobile phones into the State, knowing that the property was tainted.
Eighteenth Count
Statement of Offence
Money Laundering.[20]
[20] Ibid.
Particulars of Offence
Hassan Zia Rana on the 25^th day of May 2020 at Mawson Lakes, directly or indirectly engaged in a transaction involving property, namely $11,435 cash, by being in possession of the property, knowing that the property was tainted.
Nineteenth Count
Statement of Offence
Money Laundering.[21]
[21] Ibid.
Particulars of Offence
Hassan Zia Rana on the 25^th day of May 2020 at Mawson Lakes, directly or indirectly engaged in a transaction involving property, namely $19,000 cash, by being in possession of the property, knowing that the property was tainted.
Twentieth Count
Statement of Offence
Money Laundering.[22]
[22] Ibid.
Particulars of Offence
Hassan Zia Rana on the 25^th day of May 2020 at Mawson Lakes, directly or indirectly engaged in a transaction involving property, namely $35,000 cash, by being in possession of the property, knowing that the property was tainted.
Elements of the offence
All elements of an offence must be established beyond reasonable doubt before there can be a verdict of guilty. The offence of money laundering has three elements:
·the accused engaged directly or indirectly in a transaction involving property;
·the property is tainted property; and
·the accused knew the property was tainted at the time he engaged in the transaction.
Relevantly, a ‘transaction’ includes:[23]
[23] CLCA (n 1) s 138(3).
·bringing property into the State;
·receiving property;
·being in possession of property.[24]
[24] CLCA (n 1) s 130.
‘Tainted property’ is defined as:[25]
[25] Ibid.
tainted property means stolen property or property obtained from any other unlawful act or activity (within or outside the State), or the proceeds of such property (but property ceases to be tainted when it passes into the hands of a person who acquires it in good faith, without knowledge of the illegality, and for value).
Preliminary legal directions
Having conducted a trial by judge alone, it is not necessary to set out the various standard directions that would normally be given to a jury. Irrespective of that, I set out the following principles that apply.
The standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution bears the burden of proof. The accused, Mr Rana, is presumed to be innocent unless and until the evidence satisfies me that each element of the offence has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. It is not sufficient for the prosecution to show a mere suspicion of guilt or to demonstrate probable guilt. Mr Rana is not required to prove that he did not commit the offence with which he is charged.
Mr Rana elected to give evidence. He was not required to. He could have remained silent and left me to decide whether the prosecution proved its case. I must assess Mr Rana’s evidence in the same way as any other witness. I must not treat his evidence as deserving less weight simply because he is the accused.
An undercover police officer (U70) gave evidence with a screen in place between him and the accused. I must not allow the fact of these arrangements to influence the weight that I give to the witnesses’ evidence. I must not draw an adverse inference against Mr Rana as a result of the fact that these arrangements were in place. I have not done so.
Circumstantial evidence
There are aspects of the prosecution case which are circumstantial. I cannot return a verdict of guilty on a charge against Mr Rana unless there is no reasonable explanation for all the accepted evidence other than that he is guilty. If there remains any reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence, then Mr Rana must be acquitted.[26] Guilt of the accused must not only be a rational inference, but must be ‘the only rational inference that the circumstances would enable [me] to draw’.[27]
[26] Peacock v The King (1911) 13 CLR 619, 634 (Griffith CJ).
[27] Ibid. See also: Plomp v The Queen (1963) 110 CLR 234, 252 (Menzies J); Shepherd v R (1990) 170 CLR 573, 578 (Dawson J).
In approaching the circumstantial aspects, I must first look at the facts on which the prosecution relies upon as circumstantial evidence and decide which facts I accept are established by that evidence. I must then consider what inference (or inferences) I am willing to draw from those facts. I must consider the totality of the circumstances and not approach the evidence in a piecemeal fashion.[28]
[28] R v Baden-Clay (2016) 258 CLR 308, 323-324 [46]-[47] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Gordon JJ) citing R v Barca v The Queen (1975) 133 CLR 82, 104 (Gibbs, Stephen and Mason JJ).
Background (matters not in dispute)
There are a number of matters not in dispute which I find proven beyond reasonable doubt unless otherwise indicated. At trial, the prosecution tendered an extensive statement of agreed facts containing 151 facts agreed by the parties.[29] The prosecution also provided an extensive set of written submissions in closing, which at times, were agreed to by defence counsel.
[29] Exhibit P23.
By way of background, the accused, Mr Rana, was born on 1 September 1998 in Toba Tek Singh, Pakistan. At the time of the offending, which is alleged to have occurred from April to June 2020, Mr Rana was 21 years of age.
Fraudulent scheme
The complainant, Telstra, operated an online shop which could be used by an existing Telstra customer to purchase a new mobile phone. The online shop used several authentication methods to verify the purchasing customer’s identity. One authentication method involved the customer placing the online order, to enter a One-Time PIN sent to the customer’s mobile phone (which was registered to their account) during the order process.
In early 2020, affected Telstra customers received an unsolicited telephone call from a female purporting to be a Telstra employee, and offering a discount on their service with Telstra. The female caller knew the customer’s name and address, but said they required further information. The caller then obtained from the customer their personal details, including their driver’s licence number, and explained that a One-Time PIN was required to activate the purported discount. The One-Time PIN would then be sent to the customer’s mobile phone via text message, which they would be asked by the caller to read out aloud over the phone. At that time, either the caller or another participant was simultaneously accessing the relevant customer’s Telstra account using the One-Time PIN and placing an order for a new Apple iPhone using the Telstra online shop. After the One-Time PIN was entered, the ordering process was complete, and a new Apple iPhone was added to the customer’s account. There was no upfront payment as the scheduled repayments would be added to the customer’s billing cycle.
As part of the ordering process, a nominated delivery address needed to be inserted. This address could be different to the customer’s home address. At all times, the relevant delivery address was unknown and unconnected to the affected Telstra customers.
The scheme itself, was relatively simple, it was designed to subvert the security features of Telstra’s online shop. I will refer to this as the scheme throughout my reasons.
The scheme targeted Telstra customers all around Australia. However, in each instance the delivery address of the Apple iPhones was that of a home address based in South Australia. All orders were made using several IP addresses located in Pakistan – Mr Rana’s country of birth.
The affected Telstra customers eventually noticed that there were unauthorised orders for Apple iPhones that had been made out to their Telstra account. Telstra was subsequently notified, and this prompted an investigation. Some of the affected customers were able to identify the mobile number from which they received the scam call as being a number ending in ‘236’ (236 number). The 236 number was subscribed to the name of Mr Ali Raza (Mr Raza).
Police interception of Apple iPhones delivered by Mr Nand (counts 1 to 10 (inclusive) and 12)
In or around March 2020, the police became aware of the scheme and Mr Rana’s involvement. The police began intercepting the parcels which were to be delivered by Mr Sanjay Vikash Nand (Mr Nand) to Mr Rana in Mawson Lakes. The police confirmed that such parcels contained tainted Apple iPhones.
Mr Nand was born on 14 April 1977 in Fiji. Mr Nand commenced working as a courier driver for Australia Post and StarTrack on 2 November 2018. Upon working as courier driver, Mr Nand was trained in the process of delivering parcels to customers.
Between 24 April 2020 and 20 May 2020, Detective Brevet Sergeant Godwin (Detective Godwin) attended the StarTrack depot near Adelaide airport (StarTrack depot) to inspect parcels in accordance with a General Search Warrant. Each parcel contained a brand-new sealed Apple iPhone. After Detective Godwin inspected each parcel and recorded its details, he repackaged the parcels and placed them back into the delivery system. Telstra was always the consignor of each parcel. The parcels which were inspected by Detective Godwin and at times, Mr Robert Miles (Mr Miles), are summarised in the table below:

24             Date of Inspection

25             Number of Parcels

26             Related Count

27             24 April 2020

28             4

29             1

30             28 April 2020

31             4

32             2

33             29 April 2020

34             6

35             3

36             30 April 2020

37             6

38             4

39             1 May 2020

40             5

41             5 and uncharged

42             4 May 2020

43             7

44             6 and 7

45             8 May 2020

46             1

47             Uncharged

48             11 May 2020

49             2

50             Uncharged

51             11 May 2020

52             4

53             Uncharged

54             12 May 2020

55             12

56             8 and uncharged

57             15 May 2020

58             9

59             9 and uncharged

60             18 May 2020

61             1

62             10

63             20 May 2020

64             2

65             12

It was agreed by the parties that all parcels identified in the table above were delivered to Mr Rana by Mr Nand. The consignees of each parcel did not have a connection with the relevant delivery addresses listed on each parcel. The parcels delivered by U70 to Mr Rana relate to counts 1 to 10 (inclusive) and 12.
Police interception of Apple iPhones delivered by U70 (counts 11 and 13 to 15 (inclusive))
Between 19 May 2020 and 25 May 2020, Detective Godwin attended the StarTrack depot to inspect further parcels in accordance with a General Search Warrant. Each parcel contained a brand-new sealed Apple iPhone. After Detective Godwin inspected each parcel and recorded its details, he repackaged the parcels and delivered them to Detective Sergeant Brock (Detective Brock) from the Covert Investigation Section. Detective Brock would then hand each parcel to undercover police operative U70 (U70), who would then deliver the parcel to Mr Rana.
U70 was an undercover police operative who masqueraded as a courier driver for Australia Post called ‘Nick’. U70 contacted Mr Rana in May 2020. They both met in-person at a café in North Adelaide on 11 May 2020. During that meeting, Mr Rana discussed a similar arrangement to that which he had with Mr Nand – that he would send U70 a list of names and addresses for parcels to be delivered and then meet in-person to collect them. Mr Rana told U70 that he would pay him $25 for each delivery and with a bonus of $1,000 once he had delivered 150 parcels.
Telstra was always the consignor of each parcel. The parcels which were inspected by Detective Godwin, and then handed to U70 by Detective Brock, are summarised in the table below:

70             Date of Inspection

71             Number of Parcels

72             Related Count

73             19 May 2020

74             1

75             11

76             21 May 2020

77             13

78             13

79             22 May 2020

80             2

81             14

82             25 May 2020

83             4

84             15

It was agreed by the parties that all parcels identified in the table above were conveyed to U70 and delivered by him to Mr Rana at the Adelaide Aquatic Centre in North Adelaide (Adelaide Aquatic Centre). The parcels were delivered by U70 to Mr Rana on various dates.[30] The consignees of each parcel did not have a connection with the relevant delivery addresses listed on each parcel. This relates to counts 11 and 13 to 15 (inclusive).
[30] These included: 19 May 2020, 21 May 2020, 22 May 2020 and 25 May 2020.
Police observations
19 May 2020
On 19 May 2020 at about 2:30pm, the police observed Mr Rana meeting with U70 at the Adelaide Aquatic Centre to collect a parcel with blue and white packaging. They both left the Adelaide Aquatic Centre, with the police following in suit. That same day at about 4pm, the police observed Mr Rana travelling along Torrens Street in Torrensville. Moments later, Mr Rana parked his vehicle in front of a house on Torrens Street, Torrensville (Torrensville property). An unknown male walked out of the Torrensville property and entered Mr Rana’s vehicle by the front passenger side. A minute later, the police observed another unknown male walk out of the Torrensville property and walk up to the front driver’s side of Mr Rana’s vehicle. The two unknown males left Mr Rana’s vehicle – one male exiting the vehicle by the front passenger side, and the other walking away from the front driver’s side. The police observed the second unknown male carrying a package which was approximately 30cm x 30cm in diameter. The two unknown males walked back into the Torrensville property. The police also observed a silver Audi parked in front of the Torrensville property.
22 May 2020
On 22 May 2020 at about 2:20pm, the police observed Mr Rana meeting with U70 at the Adelaide Aquatic Centre. U70 handed Mr Rana a blue and white package.
25 May 2020
On 25 May 2020 at about 2:15pm, the police observed Mr Rana meeting with U70 at the Adelaide Aquatic Centre to collect a crate with ‘Australia Post’ written on the side in exchange for $100 cash. The crate contained four parcels, each containing a brand-new sealed Apple iPhone. Following that meeting, the police observed Mr Rana driving into the McDonald’s car park in Croydon (McDonald’s) at about 2:30pm. A few minutes later, Mr Rana was seen by the police, walking from his vehicle carrying blue and white packaging and placing the packaging in a rubbish bin before returning to his vehicle. Mr Rana then exited the car park, with the police in tow.
At about 2:45pm, the police observed Mr Rana driving into the KFC car park in Torrensville (KFC). There, he met with Mr Amar Sagar (Mr Sagar).
It was agreed between the parties that as at 25 May 2020, Mr Sagar resided in Torrensville. At that time, Mr Sagar was the registered owner of a silver Audi A6 sedan.
Mr Sagar entered the passenger side of Mr Rana’s vehicle. Minutes later, Mr Sagar exited the vehicle and entered the driver’s side of the silver Audi. He carried four black boxes from Mr Rana’s vehicle and placed them in the boot of the silver Audi. After that, the police followed Mr Rana all the way to Mawson Lakes.
At about 3:16pm, the police attended McDonald’s. The police located and seized the blue and white packaging from the rubbish bin, which was discarded by Mr Rana that day. The discarded packaging displayed several consignee details. A Telstra SIM and an empty SIM card were also located in the rubbish bin.
Seizure of cash (counts 18 to 20 (inclusive))
On 25 May 2020 at 3pm, the police attended Mr Rana’s home address in Mawson Lakes and conducted a search. The police located three separate quantities of cash, consisting of $50 and $100 notes and totalling $65,435, as follows:
·$11,435 in three wallets/purses in a white tray situated in the kitchen pantry (count 18);
·$19,000 inside a rolled up gym/yoga mat sitting in the corner of the second bedroom (count 19); and
·$35,000 inside an iPad keyboard box inside a wardrobe in the second bedroom (count 20).
The cash was subsequently seized by the police.
Arrest
On that same day at about 3:30pm, Mr Rana was arrested by the police outside his home in Mawson Lakes. Following his arrest, Mr Rana was interviewed by the police. During his interview, Mr Rana was asked whether he was currently employed, to which he responded ‘Yeah, I currently work with, like, yeah, currently do Ola and Uber’. When asked for his mobile number, Mr Rana responded with a number ending in ‘993’ (993 number). Mr Rana was taken into custody on 27 May 2020.
Seizure of Apple iPhones (counts 16 and 17)
On 26 May 2020, Detective Brevet Sergeant Julie Hawker (Detective Hawker) attended the StarTrack depot and seized 17 parcels in accordance with a General Search Warrant. The following week, on 3 June 2020, Detective Hawker attended at StarTrack depot and seized 23 parcels. The customer and delivery information from the parcels were outlined in the statement of agreed facts. Each parcel contained a brand-new sealed Apple iPhone. Telstra was the consignor for each parcel. It was agreed by the parties that the 40 parcels seized were to be delivered to Mr Rana. This relates to counts 16 and 17.
Issues in dispute
I set out the issues in dispute. In relation to counts 1 to 15 (inclusive), elements one and two were not in dispute at trial and are established beyond reasonable doubt. It was not disputed that Mr Rana engaged directly or indirectly in a transaction involving property, such that a fraudulent scheme existed whereby Apple iPhones were being fraudulently obtained from Telstra through its online shopping system. It was also not in dispute that each of the Apple iPhones collected by Mr Rana had been obtained through that fraudulent scheme and were therefore ‘tainted property’. Element three was the issue at trial. The issue is whether the prosecution has established, beyond reasonable doubt, that Mr Rana had the requisite knowledge that he was taking possession of tainted property at the time he engaged in the transaction – whether Mr Rana was knowingly involved in the scheme.
In the case of counts 16 and 17, the issue is whether Mr Rana was directly or indirectly involved in bringing the mobile phones into the State and if so, did he know the property was tainted. Again, this raises for consideration whether Mr Rana was knowingly involved in the scheme.
In relation to counts 18 to 20 (inclusive), the issue was first whether the cash located at Mr Rana’s property was obtained by an unlawful act, namely the sale of unlawfully obtained Apple iPhones. Secondly, did he know the cash was tainted.
The evidence
I will set out the key parts of the witnesses’ evidence that relate to the issues in dispute. Although I will not mention all of the evidence that was put before me, I indicate that I have regard to it all. The prosecution, in their written submissions, summarised the evidence of Ms Larissa Telley (Ms Telley), Mr John Magnusson (Mr Magnusson), Mr Miles, Detective Godwin, Senior Constable Neville (Constable Neville) and Detective Hawker. Defence counsel, in their written submissions, did not dispute and accepted the summary put forward by the prosecution with respect to their evidence. I will therefore briefly set out the key parts of the evidence of those witnesses.
Larissa Telley
Ms Telley is a Senior Security Advisor/Investigator in Telstra’s Investigation and Police Liaison team. She gave evidence that at the time of the alleged offending, there were two different ways that a customer could verify or authenticate their identity on Telstra’s online shop depending on whether they had an existing online Telstra account. For those who did not have an existing online account, they could enter their personal particulars and select the product that they wanted to purchase. To authenticate their identification and confirm that they had a Telstra account, a One-Time PIN would be requested on the webpage by the customer and sent to the mobile number associated with their Telstra account. The customer would then be prompted to enter the One-Time PIN that they received on the webpage which would confirm that they were the accountholder of the Telstra account.
Ms Telley gave evidence of how a customer would use the One-Time PIN verification method to order a new mobile phone through the Telstra online shop. She said that a customer would access the Telstra online shop through the website, ‘telstra.com.au’, where they would select a mobile phone device and an access plan. The customer would then select the repayment period, such as 12 to 36 months, and enter the following personal details: (i) their full name; (ii) date of birth; (iii) primary identification, which was most often a driver’s licence or passport; (iv) residential address; and (v) delivery address which did not need to be the same as the residential address and could be any address located in Australia.
In circumstances where a customer had been a Telstra customer for longer than six months, it was not mandatory for them to insert a form of identification. As part of the verification process, the customer was then prompted to request a One-Time PIN. That PIN was sent to the mobile number registered with the Telstra customer’s account (as stored in Telstra’s Siebel system). After 15 minutes, the PIN would expire and the customer would be required to request a new One-Time PIN. All orders, relevant to the scheme, would pass an initial credit check and no upfront payment was required. Instead, the payment of the mobile phone would be attached to the customer’s invoice in the billing cycle, with such information being stored in Telstra’s Siebel system.
Ms Telley confirmed that at some stage, Telstra received a notification from the police in relation to mobile phones that had been ordered through the Telstra online shop. She also said that Telstra initially became aware of the scheme, through legitimate account holders raising complaints with their HR team that a mobile phone had been added to their invoice.
A colleague of hers, Ms Claire Bradley (Ms Bradley), was ‘tasked with looking at each of those orders and determining what had transpired for each of the transactions, whether the customer in question had in fact ordered the device, received the device, or had any knowledge of the device’. The investigation identified that in all cases, the Telstra customers had not made the mobile phone order, they had not authorised anyone to make the order on their behalf, they had not received the goods that had been ordered, and they did not have a connection to the delivery address listed on each order (or were unaware of the delivery address).
Ms Telley said that there were similarities amongst the orders, including the delivery addresses, the delivery address being in a different State to where the customer was residing, and the IP addresses used to place the multiple orders. She said that there was the same IP address regardless of whether that customer was based in Queensland, Victoria or New South Wales – the same IP address was recorded for the person placing each of the orders. A further commonality was identified amongst the complaints made by the Telstra customers. She said:
Aand one of the commonalities that came through those investigations was that each of the customers said that they had been by Telstra at around about the time that the order was placed and were offered a discount on their phone. And they sort of went further explaining it as account, a classic part of the complaint process, that they had been offered a discount, but in order to get the discount they had to just validate who they were and provide a One-Time PIN to confirm that they were the account holder. And so each of those customers said, yes, they did provide a One-Time PIN to Telstra, in order to get that discount, and shortly thereafter was when an order appeared on their account.
All orders were placed online using the One-Time PIN method. All mobile phones ordered were Apple iPhones. There was nothing to indicate that the affected customers had a relationship with one other. Subsequently, a common modus operandi was identified by Telstra. I direct myself that some aspects of Ms Telley’s evidence were hearsay. For example, she recounted conversations between Telstra customers and a Telstra employee. I have ignored some aspects of her evidence in that regard as it is hearsay.
By identifying the similarities, Ms Bradley was able to review orders prior to them being dispatched. In those limited cases, the orders were not dispatched as it was identified that there was a risk ‘that the customer had not placed that order’. At some stage between dispatch and delivery, the order was stopped and returned to Telstra. All other orders that were not stopped, and sent out, have not been retrieved by Telstra. Telstra has therefore had to bear the cost of those mobile phones.
In cross-examination, Ms Telley gave evidence that across all of the affected customer’s accounts, each were reviewed to determine whether there was a commonality in the accesses to those accounts, such that the customer’s personal information was accessed. It was identified that there was no commonality in Telstra (or Telstra employees) having access to those accounts. She confirmed that it could be excluded as a possibility that someone, external to Telstra, was able to access the customer management systems and obtain the information. She undertook a search which confirmed that was no outside interference or access. In reference to the information that was required to be entered to obtain a One-Time PIN, Ms Telley said in response to how the individuals who called the Telstra customers already had that information, that the information is:
Ainformation that gets put into the cognisphere, across all sorts of things whether it is online shopping, whether it is the creation of an address, there is multiple ways that that information be made available. The fact that they are also Telstra customers, Telstra has got a decent market share, it's over 50% market share, so if you were to call every second customer and you said you were from Telstra, so one of those is able to say yes.
John Magnusson
Mr Magnusson is a Security Risk Advisor and Investigator at Australia Post. He has worked at Australia Post for 42 years. He was asked questions in relation to Mr Nand while he worked as a courier driver for Australia Post. He said that Mr Nand ‘worked under a principal contractor called AMRAP and was facility appointed manager at the Wingfield for the area that he delivered, Mawson Lakes and surrounding… he was just the manager there’. He confirmed that Mr Nand had been working at Australia Post since 2 November 2018. Mr Magnusson gave evidence about what a typical day for Mr Nand would involve. I set out his evidence:
ASo he would probably get to Wingfield probably 5.30, 6 o'clock in the morning Monday to Friday, sometimes Saturday mornings. They would set up their own little area where they have got shelving. The mail would come out of the truck and get onto a belt which would come down and Australia Post staff, and some contractors, would then sort the mail into designated delivery areas. Once that is done, the container where it has been put into would be taken down into that area and the group within that area would then sort the mail to specific rounds. Once that is done, they will then sort the rounds into street and delivery order. Once that is done, they would scan, each driver would scan their individual parcels all the way. They may have 300 in a day. Once that's done, it gets added to the scan list. Then after that, they wait for one of their managers to go round there and sign off that scanner which then scans it in as onboard with the driver. They would then go out and deliver to the end of the day or to a break-off point and that's what they would do, generally, every day.
He confirmed that each delivery driver would have a scanner, which they would use to record certain data when a parcel is scanned as delivered. Once that data was entered on the scanner, a GPS is set at that point which shows a ‘certain range where that parcel was delivered to’ which is about 10 to 15 meters from the point where the delivery was made. The date and time of when the scan was done was also set. He said that certain items, such as the StarTrack Airlock items (which were high-value items), were required to have a signature when delivered.
During COVID, the signing requirements were different for high-value items. He said that addressees would be required to produce photo identification, and if that photo identification matched the address on the parcel, then the scanner would be handed to the addressee who would sign on the screen of the scanner with their finger or pen. Where a driver suspected that there were ‘COVID problems’, the driver would not provide the addressee with the scanner, and would instead insert the word, ‘CV’, which stands for COVID, on the screen. Practically speaking, the driver would see the photo identification and if they were confident that it was the person, they would insert the word ‘CV’ on the screen. However, Mr Magnusson said that, in his experience, it was not uncommon for drivers to not always sight proof of photo identification of the addressees.
Mr Magnusson was shown Australia Post records that he obtained in relation to a number of deliveries that were made by Mr Nand during the period between April and May 2020.[31] He was shown a table of 60 deliveries by Mr Nand to Mr Rana.[32] Encompassed within that table, on the prosecution case, were 43 mobile phones which were the subject of counts 1 to 10 (inclusive) and 12. That table, on the prosecution case, also contained a number of uncharged deliveries from Mr Nand to Mr Rana which form part of the overall narrative.
[31] Exhibit P1.
[32] Exhibit P1 Tab 5.
Mr Magnusson was also shown several Australia Post delivery documents.[33] These documents contained information including the signature inserted on the scanner after a delivery was made by Mr Nand, the GPS of the deliveries and the consignment number of the deliveries. Photographs taken by Australia Post were also contained within that bundle of delivery documents. Mr Magnusson said that once Australia Post became aware of the scheme, it would intercept the parcels before they were delivered, and photographs were taken. Mr Nand, on the prosecution case, was scanning-in parcels within or in the same, or very close, location – as outlined by the similar GPS data and timestamps.
[33] Exhibit P1 Tab 6.
Mr Magnusson was shown delivery documents signed by an ‘A. Hasan’ as the addressee.[34] He confirmed that Mr Nand would have had to input the addressee details ‘A. Hasan’, on those occasions for those deliveries.
[34] Exhibit P1 pp 175-191.
Mr Magnusson confirmed that, absent a complaint, there was nothing about the scanning process that would prevent a delivery going to the incorrect delivery address and going unnoticed.
In cross-examination, Mr Magnusson was questioned about Mr Nand not sighting photo identification when he completed a delivery. He said that he was aware of Mr Nand not doing this. He also confirmed that he became aware ‘that there was something not quite right’ in relation to Mr Nand’s deliveries prior to 27 April 2020, being the date he was advised by the police that there was an investigation. Mr Magnusson also confirmed that Mr Nand was the only driver who delivered in Mawson Lakes for Australia Post. He said that Mr Nand should only ‘just be [working] for Australia Post’ during that period.

Mr Magnusson was questioned about the signatures that appeared on these delivery documents.[35] He confirmed that Mr Nand, by signing the delivery documents, would be breaching his obligations as a driver and that would indicate a form of postal fraud as it would be falsifying that the parcel was delivered to the addressee. He agreed that the signatures contained in the delivery documents[36] for several addressees looked similar. I direct myself that Mr Magnusson is not a handwriting expert. Mr Magnusson was in no better position than me to assess whether the signatures are similar. I have ignored his inadmissible opinion evidence about the signatures.
[35] Exhibit P1 Tab 6.
[36] Exhibit P1 pp 92, 95 and 98.
Mr Magnusson was questioned about a certain delivery addressed to ‘Michael Wills’ and signed for by a ‘K Soul’. He confirmed that the driver of that delivery, Mr Nand, would have had to manually enter that into the scanner. He agreed that drivers have ‘a fair amount of freedom… to put in the scanner what they want, whether it be true, or untrue’. He also agreed that the checks and balances are largely centred towards whether a parcel has been delivered and who it has been delivered to.
Mr Magnusson was also examined about the StarTrack Airlock items which contained high-value items. He agreed that mobile phones fell within that category, and that ordinarily, these would require the addressee to provide photo identification and sign for the delivery. In that regard, Mr Magnusson said that it appears that Mr Nand, throughout the 60 deliveries, failed to do so.
Robert Miles
Mr Miles is a Branch Manager in StarTrack’s air freight division which is located near the Adelaide airport.
Mr Miles assisted the police with their investigations into the scheme, working closely with Detective Godwin. Mr Miles received the following parcels at the StarTrack depot (which he quarantined and brought to the attention of Detective Godwin):

123            Date

124            Number of Parcels

125            19 May 2020

126            1

127            21 May 2020

128            13

129            22 May 2020

130            2

131            25 May 2020

132            4

133            26 May 2020

134            17

135            3 June 2020

136            23

After which detective Godwin would subsequently attend the StarTrack depot and video them opening the parcels to view its contents. After the parcels were inspected, Mr Miles said that the parcels, which were received between 19 May and 25 May 2020, went back into the delivery system for delivery. These mobile phones are the subject of counts 11, 13 to 15 (inclusive). The parcels received and quarantined by Mr Miles on 26 May and 3 June 2020 were seized by the police and are the subject of counts 16 and 17.
Sanjay Nand
Examination-in-chief
Mr Nand was a courier driver for Australia Post and StarTrack. He was initially based at the Salisbury North depot and was then transferred to Wingfield depot. His main area of delivery was Mawson Lakes. His employment as a courier driver was terminated as a result of filling out false documents relating to deliveries he made to Mr Rana. His last contact with Mr Rana was on 25 May 2020.
When questioned about what a typical day would involve as a courier driver, he said that he would start work at 5:30am, sort through the incoming cages of parcels according to the delivery area, and then give the parcels to the respective drivers. After the cages were sorted, the parcels would be distributed based on delivery area, scanned, signed off by the corporate office worker, and then loaded into the courier van for delivery. Mr Nand would look for parcels with a delivery address in Mawson Lakes. His evidence was largely consistent with the evidence provided by Mr Magnusson in relation to the processes by which parcels were delivered.
Mr Nand was questioned about his relationship with Mr Rana. He first met Mr Rana towards the end of February 2020. He said that as he was returning to his vehicle after completing a delivery in Mawson Lakes, Mr Rana approached him. I set out his evidence:
QDid the man who you know as Hassan, did he speak to you.
AYeah, he spoke to me, yes.
QI want you to tell his Honour everything that the male said to you.
AHe approached me with normal greetings like 'Hello, how are you' and then he ask me if I can do him a favour and I asked him 'what' and he told me that he's setting up a business and he's studying at university and he's unable to reach the post office to buy the parcels so if I can deliver him the parcels.
QDid he ask you to help him to do that.
AYes, he asked me to help him, yes.
QWhat was your response to that.
A'Yes, I can help you with that'.
…
QHow was it that you would know which parcels were to be delivered to Hassan.
AOh, yes, he asked me to give an address, which is in my area, so that he can get the parcels to that address and I deliver it to him.
QWhat address did you give to Hassan.
AI gave him my friend's address, 19 Rosella Street, Mawson Lakes.
QWas that an address of a friend of yours.
AYes.
QAnd was that so you could recognise 'I know that address, that's my friends, these parcels are to go to Hassan'.
AYes.
QAt that first meeting between you and Hassan, was there any discussion about payment for delivering parcels there.
ANo.
QWas there any discussion about a list of names at that first meeting.
AYes, he said that he will be wanting plenty parcels.
QWhat did he say about that.
AThat he will be ordering, like - he's setting up a business and there will be lot of parcels coming in.
QDid he say anything about how he would alert you about those parcels.
AHe will give me a list, that's why we exchanged the mobile numbers.
Once he collected the parcels in the morning, Mr Nand would call Mr Rana and then meet him in Mawson Lakes to deliver the parcels. The first time Mr Nand delivered parcels to Mr Rana was sometime in March, being two to three weeks after their first encounter with one another. He gave Mr Nand $25 for delivering the parcels and asked him about payment moving forward. Mr Nand gave evidence that he told Mr Rana in response ‘No, I don’t want the moneys, and I’ll just deliver the parcels’. In cross-examination, Mr Nand denied the suggestion that he was receiving $25 for each parcel delivered. He agreed that he didn’t want any further payment from Mr Rana for delivery of the parcels as he was doing him a favour, and ‘trusted him’. Mr Nand was taken to his record of interview with the police on 27 May 2020. He was asked what he meant when he told the police that Mr Rana was ‘bribing’ him. He gave evidence that Mr Rana was not bribing him and was instead offering him money to help him.
Mr Nand said that after he delivered the first parcel to Mr Rana, Mr Rana then provided him with a list of names and addresses of incoming parcels by text message. Mr Nand received numerous lists and met with Mr Rana, alone, on several occasions – he was unsure of the exact number of times that he met with Mr Rana. There was no fixed area that he would meet Mr Rana, but would be somewhere in Mawson Lakes out of the metropolitan area. He gave evidence that all the parcels had delivery addresses in Mawson Lakes, and he would scan these as being delivered, and then deliver these to Mr Rana. He said that for some of the parcels he would sign for them, by inserting the word ‘CV’ or using his own signature, and for others, Mr Rana would sign for them.
Initially, Mr Nand would communicate with Mr Rana by text message using Apple iMessage. He said that a ‘new number popped up in [his] WhatsApp’ and it was Mr Rana sending him ‘a list with a new SIM card and a new number’. He saved Mr Rana’s new number in his telephone as ‘Hassan 2’. Mr Nand was shown messages sent between him and Mr Rana,[37] which included messages from Mr Rana that contained lists of names and addresses.
[37] Exhibit P1 Tab 10.
Mr Nand was taken to one particular WhatsApp message which read ‘Please don’t make any new orders until we get this sorted. It’s a bit risky, as I requesting star-trek to release parcels to me’.[38] Mr Nand gave evidence that he sent the message to Mr Rana as:
AActually, I wanted him to stop ordering parcels, so if if I friendly telling him I got new order, so I just used to, like just to say that StarTrack people are acknowledging maybe it's suspicious, or something like that. So I just use the StarTrack and their name, just to scare him, so that he stop ordering parcels. And it was also a bit risky for me too, for using my contract.
[38] Exhibit p 285.
In cross-examination, Mr Nand gave evidence that he sent that message as he ‘had a feeling that [the] names and addresses [were] not correct and [he was] putting [his] job at risk’. He said that he was never questioned by anyone at StarTrack and ‘made [it] up just to fear [Mr Rana] that [he] was being questioned so that [Mr Rana] stops ordering parcels’. Despite that message, Mr Nand continued to accept orders for parcels as Mr Rana told him that there were only ‘a few more and then he will stop ordering parcel’.
Mr Nand gave evidence that in the beginning, he approached another StarTrack courier driver (who also delivered in the Mawson Lakes area) and asked them to release parcels to him. He told them that the parcels were for ‘[his] customer’ and asked whether he could have them. He said that the other courier driver scanned these off their scanner, and onto Mr Nand’s scanner for delivery to Mr Rana. He said this occurred three or four times and he received about 10 or 11 parcels in total. In cross-examination, Mr Nand gave evidence that the driver was known to him as ‘Mark’ and confirmed that he approached him as he wanted to control all of the packages that were going to Mr Rana, so as to help Mr Rana out. It also assisted him as it was increasing the number of parcels that he was delivering, so he would be paid more.
Cross-examination
In cross-examination, Mr Nand said that he met Mr Rana on a road behind a service station. When asked if he thought what Mr Rana did was strange, in that he approached Mr Nand ‘out of the blue’ and asked him for a favour, Mr Nand responded with ‘I’m a person like, I like helping people, so I just trusted him’. Later in his evidence, Mr Nand denied ever speaking to Mr Rana before they met in-person to make arrangements to meet in-person. There was no prior meeting or arrangements in place.
Mr Nand provided Mr Rana with several addresses for delivery of the parcels. He gave evidence that he provided the Rosella Street address to Mr Rana as it was his friend’s address and used it for his own online orders that he had for delivery. He also provided Mr Rana with other false addresses which he picked at random.
Mr Nand identified his signature on several proof of delivery documents,[39] and agreed that he was fully aware that he was signing the parcels for someone else and what he was doing was wrong. He was unsure whether the parcels contained mobile phones.
[39] Ibid Tab 6 pp 92 and 95.
Initially, Mr Nand denied suspecting what Mr Rana was doing was wrong or illegal or knowing him prior to meeting him in late February 2020. He gave evidence that he had a feeling what he (Mr Nand) was doing wrong, but never suspected what Mr Rana was doing was wrong. He was taken to his interview with the police where he agreed that he knew what Mr Rana was doing was wrong. In response, Mr Nand gave evidence that ‘that thing just came, like, over nervous being questioned by the police’ and it was only after he spoke with the police, that he came to know what Mr Rana was doing was wrong. Later in his evidence, he said that at the time he was delivering the parcels to Mr Rana, he didn’t think, at any stage, what he himself was doing was wrong.
Further, he said that over the course of his involvement with Mr Rana, that he started to suspect that the names and addresses on the parcels were wrong. He started to realise this in May 2020 but turned a blind eye. He said that he trusted Mr Rana and was helping him with his business. He also said that he continued to do so as it was increasing the number of parcels he would deliver, which meant that he received a higher payment. He was asked in cross-examination why he did not mention that he was helping Mr Rana with his business when he first spoke with the police. In response, Mr Nand said that when he spoke to the police, he ‘got surprised’ and ‘was a bit out of mind, so [he] had missed that part’. He later gave evidence that he did not tell the police that Mr Rana told him that he was setting up a business as he may have missed that part and he could not recall everything at the time. In re-examination, Mr Nand said that he was not expecting the police when they arrived at the StarTrack depot in Wingfield and felt surprised.
Mr Nand denied ever meeting with Mr Rana at his residential address in Paralowie. He also denied knowing or meeting with a person by the name of ‘Amar Sagar’ or ‘Amar Bahil’, or delivering parcels to Mr Rana that would then go to a third person, being Mr Sagar. He denied ever looking at the parcels and checking where they were coming from. He also denied ever falsifying the proof of delivery documents for other people before his involvement with Mr Rana, let alone doing it for a period of six years. He denied having any discussions with Mr Rana in relation to payment of tax on the parcels or receiving a $1,000 cash bonus after he delivered 150 parcels. He also denied the proposition that the police made inducements to him that he would not be charged with any offence if he gave evidence in the matter.
Mr Nand was first spoken to by the police while he was at work. He was not expecting them. I am sceptical about Mr Nand’s evidence that he did not think what Mr Rana was doing was wrong. The parcels were directed to addresses that almost certainly did not relate to the addressee. Coupled with that, the circumstances in which Mr Rana would collect the parcels made the deliveries inherently unusual and must have led Mr Nand to be suspicious about what occurred.
I do not accept Mr Nand’s evidence that he selflessly wanted to help Mr Rana in his business. I do think there was a benefit to Mr Nand either because he was simply delivering more parcels and was paid more by his employer for that, or he was paid by Mr Rana. Whilst I am of the view that Mr Nand was less than forthcoming about that I can understand why he might be reluctant to say so. His reluctance to admit his knowledge that something was not right has not affected my assessment of Mr Rana’s involvement. I consider Mr Nand probably thought he was in trouble for his involvement with Mr Rana. Even on his account he began to suspect that what he was doing was not right. The WhatsApp message to Mr Rana to stop sending parcels underlines that conclusion. I have considered whether Mr Nand’s knowledge that something was not right may have given rise to a tendency on his part to minimise his own involvement, or to exaggerate the role of Mr Rana to paint himself in the most positive light. So that he may wish to tailor his evidence to extricate himself from criminal responsibility. That he may feel locked into a version and that he may feel bound to repeat that version when he gave his evidence.[40]
[40] Kanaan & Ors v R [2006] NSWCCA 109 [165] (Hunt AJA, Buddin and Hoeben JJ).
However, even taking into account those considerations, it has not affected my assessment of his evidence about some key issues. Namely, the circumstances in which he came to meet Mr Rana, the location they met and the detail surrounding how the parcels were handed to Mr Rana. I am unsure whether Mr Nand received payment from Mr Rana for delivering the parcels to him. On one view of it, delivering the parcels to Mr Rana meant he was delivering more parcels than he normally would and so received a higher day rate through StarTrack. I accept that is probably why Mr Nand involved himself in the scheme although I cannot be certain.
Undercover Police Operative - U70
U70 is an undercover police operative who was involved in the investigation in relation to the scheme and Mr Rana. He met with Mr Rana in person and communicated with him by mobile phone. He gave evidence that Mr Rana used several mobile numbers to communicate with him. These included the 236 number, the 993 number and a number ending in ‘272’ (272 number). He would communicate with Mr Rana by text message and WhatsApp. He gave evidence that Mr Rana only ever referred to himself as ‘Jack’. At no point, did he refer to himself as ‘Hassan’ or by his surname ‘Rana’. On each occasion they met in-person, Mr Rana would be alone and arrive in his vehicle, being a Hyundai sedan. Each time Mr Rana and U70 would exchange parcels for payment, the meeting was arranged through WhatsApp.
6 May 2020
U70 first contacted Mr Rana by telephone at about 8:50pm on 6 May 2020. Copies of the recordings and transcripts of the telephone conversations and meetings between U70 and Mr Rana were tendered by the prosecution.[41] The evidence of the recordings is what I see and hear on the audio-visual records. While the transcripts of the recordings are exhibits[42], they are an aid only to my understanding of the recordings.
[41] Exhibits P1 and P5.
[42] Exhibit P1.
During that first telephone conversation with Mr Rana, U70 told Mr Rana, that he ‘work[ed] down south there we look after StarTrack because [he’s] the only contractor down there StarTrack don’t deliver to Port Noarlunga and Port Noarlunga South’. Mr Rana told U70 that ‘we are working for four drivers right now you are our fifth driver’. Mr Rana went on to explain that the parcels were sent to different addresses ‘because when we deliver all the parcels on one address we have to pay the tax to the government… there’s a fixed tax on that like $78.83…For saving to that we put our parcels on different address’. Mr Rana told U70 that he would sent him a ‘list and all the stuff this is the name this is the like driver’s licence number whatever you need we will give it to you we will make sure that this is the parcel it’s for we are not doing any fraud or something…On your safety side as well…I will give you the name and the address…which house number and what is the address and what is the name of the person we are delivering even if you want the ah driver’s licence number we can give you driver’s licence number as well’.
He asked U70 to send him ‘a few streets name[sic]’. During the conversation, U70 referred to several streets in Port Noarlunga and Port Noarlunga South, namely Fremantle Road, Witton Road and Kalgoorlie Avenue.
During the operation, U70 confirmed that he was acting on the direction of a handler. He was provided with duties or tasks as part of the operation. One of these tasks included nominating an address to Mr Rana to which he could address parcels. He chose the areas of Port Noarlunga and Port Noarlunga South.
On 10 May 2022, U70 returned a telephone call from Mr Rana at about 1:47pm on the 993 number. During that telephone conversation, Mr Rana told U70 that ‘we are going to start work with you from Monday’ and ‘Maybe you are going to start getting the deliveries from like Tuesday onwards’. Mr Rana also requested to meet with U70 face-to-face and told him that he ‘just want[ed] to see [him] for one or two minutes not long’.
11 May 2020
On the following day on 11 May 2020, after several messages were exchanged between U70 and Mr Rana, the two met up at the Adelaide Aquatic Centre and then travelled to a café in North Adelaide for a coffee. A copy of the audio-visual recording of the meeting was tendered and played at the trial.

U70 gave evidence that the recording contained Mr Rana showing him ‘how he was listing the addresses and the names on his phone, so just scrolling through’. He told U70 ‘Just see here like this is the person who is working with us, see today he got this much parcels, like every day he got parcels like we send them…We will send him like yesterday, here’s the list, 64 parcel to him’. He told U70 that ‘we will contact you on WhatsApp’ and ‘we are like putting parcels on your address today maybe like tonight I will send you all the addresses… And the names’. He told U70 that he would be paid $25 for each parcel, and a $1,000 bonus after he delivered 150 parcels. He said ‘Ok when you finish 150 parcel…One thousand dollar bonus as well we will give after 150 parcels’.
During the meeting, Mr Rana told U70 that ‘We are doing this like from last six years’. He also said that he could provide U70 with a delivery address number, ‘the ID…[and] the order number, whatever details [he] like[s]’. The meeting concluded by Mr Rana telling U70 that ‘Tonight I will send you maybe like any time the parcels are going to come anytime.
14 May 2020
On 14 May 2020, U70 received several missed calls and a text message from Mr Rana, asking him to call him when he was free. U70 called Mr Rana on the 993 number. Mr Rana hung up and called U70 back on the 272 number. During that conversation, Mr Rana told U70 that ‘we already put seven parcels on you [sic] address…Maybe two days there’s gonna me [sic] more seven, hopefully maybe you can get something tomorrow or maybe on Monday or Tuesday’. That same day, U70 received a message from Mr Rana with a list of seven orders, each with an address in the Port Noarlunga South area. It was the exact type of list sent by the accused to Mr Nand for orders in the Mawson Lakes area. Three of the addresses contained in that list were situated on Kalgoorlie Avenue, being one of the street names given to Mr Rana by U70 during their first telephone call on 6 May 2020. Later that evening, a further list of 13 names and addresses was sent by Mr Rana to U70.
A series of messages were exchanged between U70 and Mr Rana. From 17 May 2020, Mr Rana began messaging U70 through WhatsApp using the 236 number. That same number was used by the unknown female to carry out the original telephone calls to the Telstra customers. The WhatsApp messages related to the expected orders to be delivered, and also contained several lists of names and addresses for each order.
On 18 May 2020, U70 received a message from Mr Rana which contained a list of 37 expected orders, of which 35 were addressed to addresses in Port Noarlunga South. The remaining two orders were addressed to Robinson Street in Mawson Lakes. On 20 May 2022, Mr Rana sent U70 a further list which contained 44 expected orders, all of which were addressed to addresses in Port Noarlunga South.
19 May 2020
At about 2:20pm on 19 May 2020, U70 met with Mr Rana at the Adelaide Aquatic Centre. The meeting was arranged through WhatsApp messages. At that meeting, Mr Rana paid U70 $50 cash in exchange for one parcel, containing an Apple iPhone. He told U70 ‘I don’t have the change…other $25 next time’. That parcel is the subject of count 11. U70 questioned why there were a couple of Mawson Lakes addresses in his list, telling Mr Rana ‘Jack, now, Mawson Lakes, that’s not me’. At trial, U70 gave evidence that he was trying to convey ‘That Mawson Lakes isn’t in [his] area of delivery and that possibly he had sent that through by mistake’.
21 May 2020
At about 2:20pm on 21 May 2020, U70 met with Mr Rana for the third time at the Adelaide Aquatic Centre. Mr Rana paid U70 $300 cash in exchange for 13 parcels, each containing an Apple iPhone. The excess $25 from the last meeting was accounted for in the $300 payment. Those parcels are the subject of count 13.
22 May 2020
The following day, U70 met with Mr Rana at about 2:20pm at the Adelaide Aquatic Centre. Mr Rana paid U70 $50 cash in exchange for two parcels, each containing an Apple iPhone. Those parcels are the subject of count 14. At the meeting, U70 asked Mr Rana what type of mobile phones were in the parcels, to which he responded with ‘Yea eleven, sometimes we get pro as well’. He told U70 that ‘work is going to be slow…But like, after next week we are going to work like really really big’. U70 told Mr Rana that ‘instead of that thousand bucks I’m happy to fucking, take a phone’. Mr Rana responded with ‘Yea’. He then proceeded to say that ‘if you work with us long, we will increase your, like, rate as well…From twenty five to thirty five as well…Boys working with us from last three years, no worries they are getting forty five’.
25 May 2020
U70 met with Mr Rana for the last time on 25 May 2020 at the Adelaide Aquatic Centre. On that occasion, U70 gave Mr Rana four parcels, each containing an Apple iPhone, in exchange for $100 cash. Those parcels are the subject of count 15. That meeting completed U70’s involvement in the operation. He confirmed, at trial, that it was his understanding that police officers followed Mr Rana as he drove from the Adelaide Aquatic Centre.
In cross-examination, U70 was asked whether in any conversation (or message) that he had with Mr Rana if he ever advised him that he had other people that were assisting him in the process of obtaining these parcels. U70 denied this, saying ‘No, just the use of that language’, in reference to the words ‘we’ and ‘us’ used by Mr Rana. He denied Mr Rana identifying the StarTrack worker that also delivered parcels, or the person who ‘came from the south, ah north area’. He denied Mr Rana ever mentioning the name of ‘Amar Sagar’ and ‘Amar Bahri’. He denied having any covert involvement with a person called ‘Amar Sagar’ during the course of his involvement in the operation.
Amar Sagar
Examination-in-chief
Mr Sagar first met Mr Rana through a mutual friend in or around May 2018 at a Ramadan event. They did not have any contact for a couple of years. Mr Sagar gave evidence that he next crossed paths with Mr Rana in or around April or May 2020, when he came across him on Facebook Marketplace to buy a mobile phone. He said that the Facebook profile did not use Mr Rana’s name. In cross-examination, he confirmed that the name ‘Hassan Rana’ was not attributed to the Facebook profile and confirmed that he did not know if it was Mr Rana ‘on the other end of the line, [and] it could have just been a [different] person who turned up with the product’. In re-examination, Mr Sagar gave evidence that prior to meeting to collect the mobile phones, he did not know who he was meeting – it could have been a stranger.
He said that he subsequently sent a message to the user of that Facebook profile and arranged to meet them that day or the next day. He subsequently met Mr Rana on several occasions (about three to five times) at various locations, including his Torrensville property, an On-The-Run service station (OTR) and KFC.
At the first meeting, he gave evidence that he and Mr Rana negotiated the price for the Apple iPhone (that Mr Rana was selling), he checked the serial number of the Apple iPhone on the Apple and AMTA websites to check that it had not been used before, and then paid Mr Rana for the mobile phone. He said that Mr Rana told him, on the first occasion, that he obtained the mobile phones from Sydney but did not go into any further detail. He also told him that he was selling the mobile phones ‘as he’s needing money’. He could not recall how he paid for the mobile phones on the first occasion, but said that on three occasions, he paid with his own mobile phone using direct bank transfer, and then on one occasion with cash. There was no set price for each mobile phone, and there would be negotiations on both sides. On the other occasions that Mr Sagar met with Mr Rana, he would meet him, alone, at OTR or KFC. These meetings were arranged through telephone contact that they had with one other.
In total, Mr Sagar estimated that he bought about 10 to 15 mobile phones from Mr Rana. He could not specifically recall how many he bought in each transaction but estimated that he bought about two to three mobile phones at the first meeting. He said that all of the mobile phones were ‘brand new, sealed pack’, in boxes and had not been opened. He could not recall the model of each Apple iPhone but confirmed that they contained varying gigabyte sizes.
At the time he bought mobile phones from Mr Rana, Mr Sagar said that he had started ‘flipping, buying stuff from Marketplace’, to resell it to make a profit. He said that if someone had a cracked mobile phone, he would buy it, get it repaired and sell it for an additional $100. He confirmed that he was familiar with the pricing of Apple iPhones and did his own research with respect to the market value of these mobile phones. He said there was no certain price margin that he would make but said that he would make around $100 to $250 on each mobile phone. Mr Sagar would advertise the mobile phones for sale on Facebook Marketplace or give them to ‘someone who runs a business of exporting electronics’ – he would sell it to whoever would pay the best price.
When Mr Sagar initially contacted Mr Rana on Facebook Marketplace, he requested his mobile number, and they exchanged numbers. From that point on, they would contact each other using WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger. He saved Mr Rana’s number in his mobile phone as ‘Hassan Bro’. He just used the one number to contact Mr Rana.
Mr Sagar was taken to the last occasion that he met with Mr Rana on 25 May 2020 - the day of Mr Rana’s arrest. He said that they met at KFC, after it was arranged by telephone messages between the two of them. He said that the two negotiated the price using messages that went back and forth. Between 2pm to 3pm, the two met, with Mr Sagar arriving in his silver Audi. He met Mr Rana inside his vehicle, individually inspected the four Apple iPhone 11 Pros, using the Apple and AMTA websites, and then paid Mr Rana $6,900 using direct bank transfer. He was making about $80 to $100 for each Apple iPhone. He then left Mr Rana’s vehicle, entered his silver Audi, and drove off. As he turned left onto his street, he parked on the side of the road to speak to his brother. He was then approached by Detective Godwin and Officer Della Sala, and interviewed.
Mr Sagar was shown several payment receipts for direct bank transfers from him to Mr Rana.[43] He was taken to a payment in the amount of $8,500 that he transferred to Mr Rana on 21 May 2020. He estimated that this would have been payment for five Apple iPhones. He was also taken to a payment in the amount of $3,300 that he transferred to Mr Rana on 22 May 2020. He said this would have been payment for two Apple iPhones. He denied the suggestion that part of that payment, in the amount of $1,550, was to be paid to Mr Nand.
[43] Exhibit P8.
Mr Sagar was also shown text messages between him and Mr Rana using several applications including Facebook Messenger, WhatsApp and Apple iMessage.[44] He was able to recognise which text messages were sent by him, and which were sent by Mr Rana. He was also shown further messages between him and Mr Rana.[45] He was able to identify his WhatsApp account details in the messages, including his WhatsApp display picture, mobile number and email address. He indicated that the messages showed the process of him inquiring whether Mr Rana had ‘stock’ available, as in mobile phones to sell, the negotiation of the price, and then making arrangements to meet Mr Rana to buy the mobile phones. He gave evidence that the words ‘Ammar Bahi’, translated to ‘Amar bro’ (with his first name misspelt). He also translated certain words used throughout the text messages, including ‘kar do’ which translated (to an extent) to ‘instead of’ and ‘kar loon’, which translated to ‘can I do it’. These phrases were often used throughout the negotiation process between Mr Sagar and Mr Rana.
[44] Exhibit P1 Tab 9.
[45] Exhibit P3 Tab 2.
He was questioned about his understanding of whether Mr Rana was (or was not) paying for the mobile phones that he was buying from Mr Rana. In response, he said:
AWhatever he told I believed it. I didn't have any option to clarify, or verify it, all I could do was make myself safe by going to a public place, and paying the phones for electronic transfer, so I have got a proof, and then verifying it by the serial numbers to the Apple and AMTA websites.
QI'll be more direct; was it your understanding that Hassan was paying some amount of money for the phones that he was selling you.
AYes.
Cross-examination
In cross-examination, Mr Sagar was asked whether he had a business going on at that time, in which he bought mobile phones, transported them to Melbourne, and was paid for them. He said that it wasn’t a business and ‘was just a side thing where [he] was making money by flipping things’. He could not recall whether he had a customer base in New South Wales or Queensland.
Mr Sagar could not recall knowing, or telling the police in an interview, that Mr Rana was an Uber driver. He denied the proposition that as he knew Mr Rana was an Uber driver, he asked him to collect and deliver parcels for him, and these parcels contained mobile phones. It was suggested to him that he was the ‘brains’ behind the scheme. He denied this. He said that he did not know anything about the scheme. Mr Sagar gave evidence that he has been a Telstra customer for the last seven to eight years. Despite that, he denied having intimate knowledge of how someone orders products, let alone mobile phones, through the Telstra online website. He also denied ever working for Telstra at any stage.
Mr Sagar preferred to pay Mr Rana for the mobile phones by direct bank transfer as he had money in his bank account and wanted to keep proof that he was paying for the mobile phones.
He was asked questions about his housemate, Mr Narindeer Kumar (Mr Kumar). He said that he could not recall Mr Kumar’s mobile number. He confirmed that Mr Rana met him at the Torrensville property. He could not recall how many times Mr Rana attended his house. He said that he may have provided him with four mobile phones at his house but could not recall it exactly. He also could not recall how or if there were occasions where Mr Rana would deliver mobile phones to both him and Mr Kumar.
Mr Sagar denied knowing a person by the name of ‘Sanjay Nand’. He also denied either the police or the prosecution speaking to him about someone by that name. He denied the suggestion that he provided Mr Rana with Mr Nand’s mobile number and told Mr Rana to meet with Mr Nand in Mawson Lakers behind OTR. He also denied several further propositions put to him in cross-examination. These included that:
·he told Mr Rana that he had a business where he would obtain mobile phones;
·he had contacts who worked at StarTrack or Australia Post, in which he would obtain mobile phones from, or who would help him with the delivery of the products;
·he told Mr Rana that these mobile phones would then ‘come back to [him]’ and he was exporting these mobile phones to several jurisdictions to make a profit;
·he gave Mr Rana a SIM card in March 2020 with the 236 number;
·he asked Mr Rana to return the SIM card to him so that he could use it and gave it back to him at subsequent times;
·he re-ordered a further SIM card which came from India;
·he was intimately involved in organising a number of people to contact Telstra to place orders through them to obtain mobile phones;
·his enlisted contacts were from India, parts of Asia, including Singapore and the Philippines;
·he told Mr Rana that he was acquiring parcels from Australia Post, and those parcels contained mobile phones and were delivered to him for him to sell;
·he asked Mr Rana if he would like to be involved in his business and to deliver specific parcels from StarTrack to him;
·Mr Rana told him, at any stage, that his name was ‘Jack’;
·in 2020, he told Mr Rana that:
·he could obtain driver’s licences for several people, with such orders being made through StarTrack;
·he was going to be contacted by someone from StarTrack to provide him with mobile phones, and that for each of those mobile phones, there would be a $25 payment to the driver;
·if it came to a point where the parcels exceeded 150, that the driver would receive a bonus of $1,000, and that Mr Rana had to tell the person from StarTrack of that arrangement;
·he had been doing ‘this’ for about six years;
·Mr Rana had to go and meet a ‘StarTrack guy’ at OTR on Metro Parade, who would be waiting for him there and would give him addresses; and
·someone from StarTrack will contact Mr Rana to let him know that the parcels are ready for collection,
·he had a discussion with Mr Rana about tax;
·he told Mr Rana that he had someone covering the north and south areas in relation to deliveries of mobile phones from StarTrack, specifically he had one driver who was doing the deliveries in the Mawson Lakes area;
·he knew that Mr Rana lived in Mawson Lakes, and had met Mr Rana several times at OTR;
·he gave Mr Rana a list that contained names of people whose parcels were to be delivered to[46];
·Mr Rana asked him what he was doing with the parcel or mobile phones, and that he told him what he was doing with them or where they were going;
·he received in excess of 15 parcels from Mr Rana;
·he knew a person called ‘Nick’ who was a delivery driver; and
·he would send the mobile phones to people in Melbourne for nefarious purposes to assist in ‘some sort of insurgence over in Iran or Iraq’.
[46] Specifically those in Exhibit P1 Tab 10.
Mr Sagar was asked how he would transport the mobile phones to his dealer interstate. He said that if someone paid him for the mobile phones, he would send it to them by the post using Australia Post and the registered post.
Mr Sagar was taken to the events on 19 and 25 May 2020. He said that he met Mr Rana at KFC ‘Because of the 62 cameras…[and he] didn’t want to be doshed because [he] was paying a big amount which was $7,000’. It was also for his own safety. He said it was a public place where ‘everyone [was] watching us’. He was asked why he didn’t meet Mr Rana at the Torrensville property, to which he responded with ‘Still just to keep myself safe. What happened…at home [was] still fine but this time there were four phones rather than two, it was a bigger risk so everything should be on the camera’. He further gave evidence that he could not recall meeting Mr Rana with Mr Kumar at the Torrensville property on 19 May 2020. He said ‘It has been 24 months. Not a normal person would remember what they did two years ago’.
Upon being contacted by the police, Mr Sagar called his bank and asked them to cancel a payment made to Mr Rana on 25 May 2020. The money subsequently ‘bounced-back’ into his bank account. The police also conducted a search of the Torrensville property under a general search warrant and seized eight mobile phones. Defence counsel tendered a bundle of photographs that were taken by the police at the Torrensville property.[47] Mr Sagar agreed that the mobile phones contained in that bundle of photographs were those that he purchased from Mr Rana on about 18 or 19 May 2020.
[47] Exhibit D10
I accept Mr Sagar’s evidence. There was nothing about his presentation that caused me to doubt anything he said. I found him to be an honest and reliable witness. His evidence about the nature of his dealing with Mr Rana was supported by the direct bank transfers to Mr Rana for the payment of mobile phones. The WhatsApp messages between the two are consistent with his account as to the dealings he had with Mr Rana. His denials about being the mastermind behind the scheme are supported by the lack of anything found on his electronic devices that would suggest he had any involvement of the kind asserted by Mr Rana. In coming to the conclusion I have about Mr Sagar’s evidence, I have taken into account Mr Rana’s evidence. Mr Rana’s evidence has not caused me to doubt Mr Sagar’s account. For reasons which I express later in my reasons, I considered Mr Rana’s evidence to lack any credibility and I have put his evidence to one side.
Ali Raza

Several examples were provided by the prosecution in submitting that Mr Rana intentionally misled the Court. These included (but were not limited to): (i) Mr Rana’s role in collecting parcels, on behalf of Mr Sagar, from courier drivers (whose very occupation it is to make deliveries) to then deliver them again; (ii) his delivery fee, in the amount of $200 for each parcel, to drive parcels from Mawson Lakes to Torrensville, being a 20 minute drive; (iii) Mr Sagar providing Mr Rana with several SIM cards that he used to contact Mr Nand and U70 (while he had a mobile phone); (iv) Mr Rana engaging his brother’s services in Pakistan to carry out basic online checks at a time when he was busy, yet he was still collecting deliveries and communicating with Mr Nand and U70; (v) Mr Rana’s explanation in relation to the torn-up consignment notes – that someone else must have torn them up prior to the police discovering the packaging; and (vi) Mr Rana’s evidence in relation to the large cash payments that he received from his father and Tiffany, none of which deposited into a bank account or used for their intended purpose – payment of university tuition fees. The prosecution later submitted that there was no reason why Mr Sagar would provide Mr Rana with multiple SIM cards which contained data that would reveal his involvement in the scheme.
It was submitted that his evidence was dogmatic to a fault. Mr Rana, on the prosecution case, was unable to make even the barest of concessions. To that end, the prosecution directed me to his evidence in cross-examination when asked about the messages exchanged with the contact ‘Sunny Mobile Iphone’, that were extracted from his mobile phone. Initially, Mr Rana denied sending the WhatsApp messages, but then went on to claim that he was unsure whether the messages related to the pricing and sale of Apple iPhones. Such messages were sent from the 236 number, being the same mobile number attached to front end of the scheme. The prosecution pointed out that Mr Rana was also using that same mobile number to communicate with his brother, Mr Sagar, Mr Nand and U70 during the relevant time. However, these particular messages, on Mr Rana’s evidence, were indeed not sent by him, and instead sent by Mr Sagar using the same WhatsApp account.
The prosecution submitted that whenever Mr Rana was confronted with incriminating e-crime evidence that he either: (i) directed the responsibility towards Mr Sagar; (ii) claimed that it somehow descended from the iCloud; or (iii) claimed the data was incorrect.
The prosecution specifically addressed Mr Rana’s evidence in relation to how he met U70. During cross-examination, Mr Rana gave evidence that he received a telephone call from ‘Nick’ about a day after he spoke with Mr Sagar about another person working from him, who would contact Mr Rana. It was Mr Rana’s understanding that Mr Sagar had arranged U70 to contact him. On the prosecution case, U70 simply could not have been arranged by Mr Sagar as he was an undercover operative who was planted by the police. Such submission was further supported by U70’s evidence that during his involvement with the matter, he never interacted with a person called ‘Amar Sagar’, and that Mr Rana never mentioned Mr Sagar to U70. It was submitted that Mr Rana lied about how he came to meet U70, and such lie should cast an irrevocable doubt over the rest of his account. Accordingly, I should put Mr Rana’s entirely to one side.
In circumstances where I reject Mr Rana’s evidence, the prosecution submitted (in their written submissions) that there is substantial amount of evidence that inculpates Mr Rana in the scheme. Such evidence includes, but is not limited to: (i) Mr Rana’s use of the 236 number, being the same number used to communicate with Telstra customers implicated in the scheme; (ii) his possession and use of numerous lists of names and addresses that directly corresponded to the names and addresses used to order the tainted Apple iPhones through the accounts of Telstra customers; (iii) his correspondence with his brother, Mr Sagar ‘Sunny Mobile Iphone’ and U70 during the relevant period; (iv) that the Apple iPhones were ordered using 10 IP addresses based in Pakistan, being Mr Rana’s count of birth and where his brother resided; (v) the web history, search history and bookmarks extracted from Mr Rana’s two personal mobile phones; (vi) the images of postal packages containing the tainted Apple iPhones; (vii) the large sums of cash located in Mr Rana’s house at the time of his arrest; and (viii) that at the time of his arrest, Mr Rana was 21 years of age, and a university student who worked part-time ride-share driving and cleaning.
The prosecution submitted that Mr Sagar was a clear and articulate witness who provided a lucid and compelling account that was entirely supported by e-crime evidence. It was submitted that if Mr Sagar was the orchestrator of the scheme, that the police would have located at least one message that indicated that he was selling or trading the mobile phones, or would have located a list of names and addresses. Such inference was further supported by the evidence of Detective Hawker who gave evidence that there was no incriminating e-crime evidence located on either Mr Sagar or Mr Nand’s mobile phones, which were seized and reviewed by the police. This was compared with Mr Rana’s evidence that Mr Sagar would provide him with the lists of names and addresses, and then he would act as a conduit in feeding these lists to Mr Nand and U70.
It was acknowledged, quite properly, by the prosecution that there were aspects of Mr Nand’s evidence that I may have difficulty in accepting. For example, his evidence that he continued to assist Mr Rana in delivering parcels and falsifying delivery documents without any financial rewards beyond an increase in his deliveries, and his evidence in relation to not suspecting, at any stage, what Mr Rana was doing was wrong or illegal. It was submitted that I should not outright reject his evidence but accept his evidence in relation to key issues; specifically, his evidence in relation to: (i) that Mr Rana first approached Mr Nand and requested him to deliver parcels; (ii) that on numerous occasions, Mr Rana sent him lists of names and addresses; (iii) that he delivered parcels to Mr Rana on several occasions, and beyond those deliveries, he had no other involvement or knowledge of the scheme; and (iv) that he had no involvement or association with Mr Sagar.
While the prosecution acknowledged that they could not prove the extent to which Mr Rana was directly involved in the front end of the scheme, they submitted that there were indeed several ‘causal links’ between information fed by Mr Rana (on the prosecution case) to the front end. In doing so, the prosecution referred to the evidence of: (i) that the orders were all place using 10 separate IP addresses emanating from Lahore in Pakistan, being Mr Rana’s country of birth; (ii) the messages between Mr Rana and his brother which indicated that he was receiving personal information about Telstra customers(such as their driver’s licence number), whose accounts the tainted Apple iPhones were ordered through; (iii) that U70 gave Mr Rana a street in Port Noarlunga South and parcels were subsequently sent to that address; (iv) that the parcels were being sent to Mawson Lakes, being Mr Rana’s home suburb; (v) the collection of the parcels on 25 May 2020 and his correspondence with Mr Sagar just minutes after collection. It was submitted that such evidence not only indicated Mr Rana feeding information from the ‘back’ to the front end of the scheme, but also showed a level of autonomy and independence Mr Rana had within the scheme. He knew exactly what to do with the mobile phones, sell them for a profit, and to sell them to whoever he could as quickly as he could. Which, on the prosecution case, is incongruous with Mr Sagar being the orchestrator of the scheme.
Beyond that evidence implicating Mr Rana in the scheme, it was submitted by the prosecution (in their written submissions), that there was also evidence of surreptitious conduct by Mr Rana, indicative of a dishonest state of mind. Such evidence included (but was not limited to): (i) Mr Rana’s interchangeable use of three different mobile numbers, two of which were unknowingly registered against Mr Raza’s name; (ii) his act of discharging the postal packaging which was located by the police in the rubbish bin of McDonald’s; (iii) his conduct of tearing up the consignment note which was located by the police in the driver’s door of his vehicle; and (iv) his use of the alias ‘Jack’ when communicating with U70.
All of the evidence when viewed as a whole, on the prosecution case, infers that Mr Rana was knowingly involved in the scheme, and as a corollary of that, his dishonest state of mind at the relevant time.
Defence case
The defence case was concentrated on whether Mr Rana had knowledge of the scheme, and what that knowledge was. It was not disputed that Mr Rana used the 236 number, but it was submitted that he was not the only user of that number during the relevant time. It was submitted that the SIM card (with that service number) was given to Mr Rana by Mr Sagar, who, on the defence case, was the primary mover in relation to the scheme. Albeit it was submitted that Mr Rana did not have knowledge at the relevant time that the scheme was improper or illegal.
It was submitted, having regard to the set of agreed facts[75], that the cash located at Mr Rana’s house, in the amount of $11,345 was legitimate money belonging to Mr Rana’s partner, Tiffany. It was submitted that there was no other evidence to contradict that proposition. I should therefore rely on the evidence of Tiffany (contained within the agreed facts) for a non-hearsay purpose and such evidence is circumstantial evidence that can be used when I assess Mr Rana’s evidence. For reasons which appear below I do not accept that submission. The only way the evidence could impact or affect an assessment of the evidence about the money would be if I relied on the statements made by Tiffany for the truth of the assertions made by her to the police. That is not a permissible use of the evidence. The evidence is hearsay. Even if it were permissible to take it into account when I consider the whole of the evidence, I am satisfied the money was through illegal activities in connection with the scheme.
[75] Exhibit P23 Agreed Facts 120-123.
Defence counsel submitted that, consistent with Mr Rana’s evidence, Mr Nand was indeed providing the lists of names and addresses to Mr Rana, and also the parcels. He had more of an involvement in the scheme, to that of what Mr Rana had. I questioned defence counsel in relation to the inference that may arise in relation to the electronic evidence. It was conceded that there was an inference, on the electronic evidence, that Mr Rana was sending the lists of names and addresses to Mr Nand. However, it was submitted that the messages instead descended from the iCloud and it could be accessed by someone else (using his WhatsApp account). It was further submitted that the messages (containing the lists of names and addresses) were sent to him and then he forwarded these on for the purposes of collection.
It was submitted that Mr Nand was not an honest and forthright witness, specifically in relation to the provision of items to Mr Rana and ‘the receipt of money for the purpose of being paid over’. Defence counsel addressed why Mr Nand would provide Mr Rana with the ‘Rosella Street’ address, other than that he knew this was for some nefarious purpose of some sort. He knew the address was not a truthful address but gave the address willingly, of his own volition. Therefore, on the defence case, implicating himself in relation to his involvement in the scheme.
It was submitted that, on Mr Rana’s evidence, he was the only one delivering the parcels to Mr Sagar, who was centred at the head of the scheme. It was submitted that there was no evidence, other than Mr Sagar’s evidence, that Mr Rana ever had a Facebook Marketplace account or was selling items on Facebook Marketplace. There is nothing else to support that assertion. Mr Rana gave evidence that he had never been involved in Facebook Marketplace at any time.
Defence counsel submitted that I should outright reject the evidence of Mr Sagar. It was submitted that several issues surfaced as a result of Mr Sagar’s evidence. These included: (i) that Mr Sagar is a person who has been involved in the sale and distribution of the Apple iPhones; (ii) he had connections interstate for the purposes of selling Apple iPhones; and (iii) he was able to at least make a profit out of that venture. It was submitted that this indicated that Mr Sagar had a ready distribution network, where in contrast, Mr Rana does not have that. There was no ‘intel’, other than the cash, that suggested that Mr Rana was offloading any of the Apple iPhones to other people.
It was further submitted that there were some aspects of Mr Sagar’s evidence that I may have difficulty in accepting. For example, the ‘surreptitious nature’ of some of the meetings that took place between Mr Sagar and Mr Rana – where there was surveillance, or a further person involved. It was submitted that the nature of these meetings lends itself to a tenor of secrecy, and someone who knows how to organise and orchestrate such things. They were, on the defence case, carefully orchestrated meetings, at least, to hide the transaction that occurred.
It was submitted by defence counsel that a SIM card would be passed back and forth between Mr Sagar and Mr Rana. Mr Sagar would take the SIM card back so that he could use it himself. It was submitted that a clear inference that could be drawn from such evidence was that Mr Sagar was a person who was organising and orchestrating the scheme. You had a person who was giving and taking away a mobile number.
I indicate that I do not accept the defence submissions with respect to Mr Sagar. I found Mr Sagar to be an honest witness. The fact that he was involved in the sale of Apple iPhones does not indicate that he was therefore involved in the scheme. I do not accept that the meetings between Mr Sagar and Mr Rana were of a ‘surreptitious nature’ to borrow defence counsel's phrase. I note Mr Sagar’s evidence, which I accept, that he made a conscious decision to meet Mr Rana in public locations where there were CCTV cameras to insulate himself against theft and more generally to ensure his safety. The overwhelming inference to be drawn from the circumstantial evidence is that Mr Rana was centrally involved in the scheme. The lack of any electronic evidence implicating Mr Sagar is another reason why I accept Mr Sagar’s evidence and reject the defence submissions to the contrary.
Defence counsel addressed the use of the name ‘Jack’. It was submitted that Mr Rana did not use it as a covert name, so as to hide behind it. That was supported by the evidence of Mr Khan who said that Mr Rana told him when they met that he went by his English name ‘Jack’. I have placed no weight on the use of the name ‘Jack’. That is, I accept that the use of the name ‘Jack’ may be innocent.
There were several references to ‘we’ in messages between Mr Rana and U70. It was submitted that the reference to ‘we’ was a reference to him and Mr Sagar, although at no stage was Mr Sagar referred to in the messages. On the defence case, there was still a strong degree of secrecy in relation to these matters and that the matter had been running for quite some time. The matters relayed to U70 ‘were things that he says [Mr Sagar] had told him’. It was submitted that Mr Rana was passing on his knowledge and what was happening, at the request of Mr Sagar, in order to integrate U70 in relation to the system that was operating then. That same submission was put forward by defence counsel in considering further exchanges between Mr Rana and U70, and the numerous references to ‘we’. At one stage in one of the exchanges, Mr Rana, on the defence case, appears to say that the arrangement is legal and legitimate, inferring that ‘they want everything to be aboveboard’, thereby enticing him to become involved. It was submitted that this exchange indicates Mr Rana’s state of mind at the time, and what was being done, at the time, was a legitimate operation.
In my view the reference to ‘we’ was a reference to others (not Mr Sagar) in the scheme. I do not accept the submission that when Mr Rana said he wanted everything to be aboveboard, that reflected his state of mind. In my view, the comment indicated nothing more than Mr Rana wanting to give U70 the impression that the scheme was legal (apart from wanting to avoid tax).
Discussion
I deal firstly with Mr Rana's evidence. I have done so as if his evidence remains a reasonable possibility, then he is entitled to be acquitted. However, as I indicated earlier in my reasons, I do not accept Mr Rana's evidence for various reasons. That is, I do not consider his evidence (including his denials) reasonably possibly true.[76] In coming to that conclusion, I have considered the various items of circumstantial evidence that are telling in terms of Mr Rana's involvement in the scheme and the many occasions throughout Mr Rana's evidence where I found his evidence to be highly unlikely, if not obviously an invention. In deciding to reject Mr Rana's evidence, I make it clear that it is not one piece of evidence in isolation that leads to the conclusions I have made about his evidence. On the contrary, it is the totality of his evidence upon which I base my conclusion.
[76] Douglass v The Queen (2012) 86 ALJR 1086, [13] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).
Although I found Mr Rana's evidence unconvincing and consider him not to be a truthful witness, I have not relied on any untruths as evidence of a consciousness of guilt. Where I have found him untruthful, the use of that evidence only goes to his credit.[77]
[77] Zoneff v R (2000) 200 CLR 234.
The reasons for rejecting Mr Rana are as follows:
·Mr Rana's evidence that Mr Sagar was the mastermind behind the entire scheme was materially undermined by the messages that were sent between Mr Rana and Mr Sagar. In my view, the messages clearly show Mr Rana to be selling mobile phones to Mr Sagar. They are fatal to Mr Rana’s claims that the relationship was otherwise;
·On 25 May 2020: (i) Mr Rana sent a message to Mr Sagar which read, '1 pro 64 = 1360… 3 pro 512 = 1860… Okay make it 6900'; (ii) Mr Rana delivered Mr Sagar four Apple iPhones, being one 64 gigabyte Apple iPhone 11 Pro and three 512 gigabyte Apple iPhone Pros); and (iii) Mr Sagar then transferred the amount of $6,900 to Mr Rana's bank account (the transfer did not go through as it was stopped following Mr Rana's arrest). Mr Rana said the money that was transferred to him by Mr Sagar was backpay for delivering various parcels. He maintained that even though the message obviously refers to the sale price for the Apple iPhones, he delivered mobile phones matching those descriptions on the same day, and the money transferred matched the price sought for the four mobile phones. I found Mr Rana's evidence about this incredulous;
·Similarly, the messages between Mr Sagar and Mr Rana on 21 May 2022 and Mr Rana's evidence that he did not receive the message from Mr Sagar which reads ‘Do you know what phone they are in quantity so I can withdraw cash’ (which was sent at 12:33pm) but that he did receive a further message, which read 'Or is bank transfer fine' which was sent simultaneously with the earlier message, only highlights how unbelievable Mr Rana's evidence was. I am satisfied that Mr Sagar did send the 12:33pm message ‘Do you know what phone they are in quantity so I can withdraw cash'. I am satisfied that Mr Rana did receive that message and his evidence to the effect that he did not was a poor attempt to deny the undeniable, namely that the nature of the relationship between Mr Rana and Mr Sagar was, as Mr Sagar said, that Mr Rana was selling phones to Mr Sagar and not the other way around;
·I do not accept Mr Rana’s evidence that Mr Sagar would send him lists of names and addresses, which he would then forward to U70 and Mr Nand. Had Mr Sagar been involved, and Mr Rana telling the truth, there would have been some evidence of communications between Mr Sagar and Mr Rana along the lines articulated by Mr Rana. The fact that there is no evidence of any communication along those lines between Mr Sagar and Mr Rana on Mr Sagar's mobile phone, nor any evidence of communications between Mr Sagar and Mr Nand on Mr Nand's mobile phone, nor any communications of that sort on any of the devices used by Mr Rana, is telling;
·For several reasons, Mr Rana's evidence that he received $200 for every parcel he delivered to Mr Sagar makes no sense. First, it makes no economic sense for Mr Sagar to pay that amount to have a single package delivered to him. Mr Rana was forced to give that evidence to try and explain the substantial sums of money that Mr Sagar did transfer into Mr Rana's bank account on 21, 22 and 25 May 2020. The amounts of money deposited into Mr Rana's account are commensurate with the sort of money that he would have been paid for the sale of mobile phones to Mr Sagar, which is exactly what Mr Sagar said occurred. I do not accept Mr Rana's evidence that the direct bank transfers made into his bank account by Mr Sagar were for him delivering various packages over an extended period to Mr Sagar;
·His evidence that he would open packages that he was collecting for Mr Sagar. There was no reason why he would need to do that if he was simply delivering the packages. It seemed to me that this was nothing more than a convenient explanation for why he had a torn-up consignment note inside his vehicle when the police seized it;
·His evidence that Mr Sagar involved him in the scheme as he was too busy to collect packages because of his restaurant. Had Mr Sagar been involved, the easy answer would have simply been for him to have had the packages delivered to his home. That would have avoided the need to involve a third party, such as Mr Rana;
·His evidence that Mr Sagar was centrally involved with U70 and in fact, had pre-empted the meeting was fanciful in circumstances where U70 was an undercover police operative and had nothing to do with Mr Sagar;
·His explanation that his brother, Talha, became involved with Mr Sagar was an unconvincing account and was an obvious attempt by him to explain away damning communications between Talha (who was located in Pakistan), sending him detailed information with respect to the personal details of Telstra customers (who were located in Australia), including their driver’s license numbers and so on;
·Mr Rana's connection to Pakistan (his family live there, and he travelled there from time to time) coupled with the fact that the orders for the mobile phones emanated from IP addresses located in Pakistan further undermined Mr Rana's evidence as to his brothers involvement;
·Damning WhatsApp messages located on phone services used by Mr Rana that plainly related to the sale of mobile phones, were said by Mr Rana not to be sent by him, but to be messages sent by others unrelated to him that were stored on the iCloud and somehow descended from the iCloud onto his phone. His evidence was, in my view, quite ludicrous;
·I do not accept Mr Rana's explanation for having Mr Raza’s proof of age card saved as a photograph on his telephone. He said he wanted to send Mr Raza a copy of the card that had been sent to his address. One wonders why he decided to open Mr Raza's mail in the first place. The fact that the SIM cards for the 236 and 272 numbers, which were used in a handset located on Mr Rana upon his arrest which, were both registered in Mr Raza's name leads to the irresistible conclusion that Mr Rana used Mr Raza's identification to establish telephone services in a false name to insulate himself against police allegation should they come; and
·Mr Rana's evidence that he discarded the packaging of the parcels on 25 May 2020 because Mr Sagar had told him to throw the packaging in the bin makes no sense. Further, the police, having retrieved the packaging from the bin, noted that not only was the packaging discarded, but the attached consignment note had been ripped and torn into little pieces. Mr Rana's evidence that he did not rip up the consignment note stretches credulity. His denials of having done so fly in the face of the evidence. The obvious inference for why he discarded the package and then tore the consignment note into little pieces was to distance himself from the parcel.

The combination of the examples mentioned above of Mr Rana's evidence that I found unbelievable is sufficient to discard his evidence entirely. That is not to say that those are the only matters upon which I did not accept him. Other topics include his evidence concerning the contact Sunny Mobile Iphone coming onto his mobile phone via the iCloud, that the contact and conversations with Sunny Mobile Iphone did not relate to him, his explanation for the conversations with his brother, his claimed lack of knowledge for various data extracted from his mobile phone[78], cash payments to Mr Bahi and Mr Rana’s refusal to admit he made the payments, and his evidence as to the cash deposits into his account on 23 May 2020 (he admitted that he made a $2,000 deposit at 3:20pm but did not make a second cash deposit two minutes later). He maintained he did not make the second deposit despite the reference number for the deposit being the 272 number. The 272 number was the number used by Rana to contact U70. Despite that, at one point Rana denied using that number, he then gave evidence that Mr Sagar gave it him. I note that the 272 number was the number registered (in my view falsely) in Mr Raza’s name.
[78] Prosecution’s Written Submissions in Closing dated 2 September 2020 [189].
Finally, there is Mr Rana’s incredible account of how money came to be at his house. He said the money the subject of the charges was his money which he was going to use to pay his rent and his university fees. According to Mr Rana the source of the money, varied, his parents gave him some cash and his girlfriend’s mother (whose name he could not remember) gave him $35,000. He said $11,435 cash (located in the kitchen pantry) belonged to Tiffany as it was given to her by her mother for tuition fees.
Again, I found Mr Rana’s evidence unconvincing. The idea his girlfriend’s mother would gift him $35,000 was unlikely. If she did I would expect he would be able to recall her name. If it was for university fees it would be far more likely that the money would be transferred via a bank to his account or directly to the University. I make the same observation about the money said to come from his parents. Mr Rana’s evidence about the money did not accord with common sense. On the other hand, the presence of the cash was entirely consistent with Mr Rana carrying on an unlawful business whereby he was selling phones on the black-market in which case cash payments would be expected. As at the date of his arrest, Mr Rana had collected 69 Apple iPhones which conservatively were worth in excess of $90,000 (if the phones were sold for $1,350 each). The fact that Mr Rana had just over $65,000 cash in his unit is no coincidence. I reject Mr Rana’s evidence about the cash.
Knowledge – the key issue
I have already indicated that I am not prepared to rely on the evidence of Mr Rana. I put his evidence to one side. That does not mean the prosecution has proven its case. It remains for me to consider the evidence led by the prosecution and decide whether I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of money laundering. In relation to what I refer to as the ‘Nand deliveries’, there was no dispute that Mr Rana engaged directly in the transaction involving property. He collected the mobile phones, which are the subject of counts 1 to 10 (inclusive) and 12. The only issue is whether Mr Rana knew the property was tainted when he engaged in the transaction.
In relation to the question of Mr Rana's knowledge of the unlawful scheme to defraud Telstra of Apple iPhones I have taken into account the whole of the evidence. On the basis of the combination of the various items of circumstantial evidence, which I will detail, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr Rana knew of and was involved in the scheme.
First, the connection between Mr Rana and the 236 number was the same number used to carry out fraudulent calls to Telstra customers central to the scheme.
Second, Mr Rana had the lists of names and addresses for the parcels that were sent containing the illegally obtained Apple iPhones. He provided those lists to Mr Nand and U70 to facilitate the packages being directed to Mr Rana.
Third, Mr Rana's connection to the delivery addresses for a large portion of the tainted Apple iPhones, namely his home suburb of Mawson Lakes. Perhaps more importantly Mr Rana's ability to be able to direct specifically where the mobile phones would be delivered to.
Fourth, the messages between him, Mr Sagar and with Sunny Mobile Iphone clearly demonstrate the nature of the business he was involved in, including that he had access to Apple iPhones, he regularly sold them and specifically set the prices of various phones in those messages. The message shows Mr Rana negotiating the sale of mobile phones at below market value.
Fifth, Mr Rana's correspondence and engagement with U70 including collecting the tainted Apple iPhones and the fact that contrary to Mr Rana's evidence, the meetings with U70 could not have been pre-empted by Mr Sagar.
Sixth, the evidence of U70 demonstrates that Mr Rana was able to direct the delivery of mobile phones to addresses nominated by U70, indicating his intimate involvement in the scheme, evidenced by his ability to coordinate the delivery of iPhones.
Seventh, the correspondence between Mr Rana and his brother during the relevant period shows Mr Rana’s involvement. His brother was providing him with the personal information of Telstra customers. His brother was located in Pakistan, the IP addresses that ordered the phones were from Pakistan – the scheme emanated from Pakistan. The information provided by his brother related to the scheme that is directly related to the fraudulent ordering of new Apple iPhones on the accounts of Telstra customers. It indicated that his brother had access to Telstra customers' personal accounts, which he communicated to Mr Rana. The irresistible inference is that Mr Rana was intimately involved with the scheme.
Eighth, the evidence that Mr Rana discarded the packaging for the mobile phones at McDonald's on 25 May, including that he tore up the consignment note, is damning.
Ninth, there was no e-crime evidence located on Mr Nand or Mr Sagar’s mobile phones indicating any involvement in the scheme. The e-crime evidence overwhelmingly implicated Mr Rana as being centrally involved in the scheme. He provided the details of the parcels that were to be delivered, he directed the address where they would be delivered and he collected the parcels. It was Mr Rana, on the basis of the e-crime evidence (and Mr Sagar’s evidence), that then engaged in the process of the sale of those mobile phones.
Tenth, the large amount of cash located at Mr Rana's house.
Lastly, the Internet web history, search history and bookmarks extracted from Mr Rana's personal mobile phones demonstrate his ongoing interest in the price of Apple iPhones and his ongoing interest and tracking of Telstra orders relevant to the scheme. All of which is inconsistent with Mr Rana’s account but is entirely consistent with his involvement in the scheme.
For the sake of completeness, I indicate that I essentially accept the prosecution’s written submissions in closing at paragraphs 216 to 218 (with the exception of the said use of the alias ‘Jack’ which I have not relied on). I have not relied on the evidence as establishing a particular propensity or disposition of the defendant as circumstantial evidence of a fact in issue in coming to the conclusion I have about Mr Rana’s involvement in the scheme.
I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Rana was knowingly involved in the scheme for the reasons above.
In approaching the evidence, it was accepted by the accused that the evidence in relation to one count was admissible on the other counts for a non-propensity use. The evidence, when taken as a whole, paints a picture or system whereby Mr Rana’s involvement can be seen in its true light. The whole of the evidence gives colour to the individual charged acts. Viewing the whole of the evidence allows an understanding of the true nature of the accused’s involvement.[79] The evidence as a whole is capable of rebutting any innocent explanation. To look at the evidence in relation to a single count without regard to the other evidence would be to view the case in a vacuum.
[79] R v Tran [2017] SASCFC 99, 6 [23] (Vanstone J).
I have not reasoned that just because the accused is guilty of one count, he is more likely to have committed the other count because he engaged in that offence. I have not engaged in ‘bad person reasoning’.[80] Even though I have found that Mr Rana was involved in the scheme I have nonetheless evaluated each count separately.
[80] R v C, CA [2013] SASCFC 137, 17 [76] (Kourakis CJ).
Apart from the evidence relating directly to each count there were also some parcels that were delivered to Mr Rana by Mr Nand which were not specifically charged and are therefore uncharged acts. I have not used the uncharged acts to reason that the defendant is more likely to have committed the offence because he has engaged in discreditable conduct. I have used it in the same way that I have treated the evidence which was cross-admissible as between each count. The use that I have made of that evidence is that it is part of the evidence that goes to show the totality of Mr Rana's involvement in the scheme. The scheme of things the uncharged acts add very little to the overall circumstantial case.
Nand deliveries (counts 1 to 10 (inclusive) and 12)
In relation to the ‘Nand deliveries’, there is no dispute that Mr Rana collected the mobile phones from Mr Nand the subject of each count. There is no dispute that all of the phones the subject of each count were illegally obtained (they were tainted property). The only issue is whether Mr Rana knew he was taking possession of tainted property. On the whole of the evidence, I am satisfied that when Mr Rana collected the mobile phones from Mr Nand, the subject of counts 1 to 10 (inclusive) and 12, he knew they were tainted when he received and took possession of them.
I have earlier considered the reliability of Mr Nand’s evidence. For reasons I have already given and will not repeat on whether Nand downplayed his own involvement or knowledge of the lawfulness of what was going on does not affect my assessment of Mr Rana’s, knowledge of, and involvement in, the scheme. I have also indicated that I accept Mr Sagar’s evidence for reasons I have already given. What flows from that is I do not accept that Mr Sagar was behind the scheme and that Mr Nand was complicit with him.
Undercover operative deliveries (counts 11 and 13 to 15 (inclusive)
In relation to counts 11 and 13 to 15 (inclusive), again, there is no dispute that Mr Rana collected the mobile phones that were delivered to him by U70. The only issue is whether or not he knew the mobile phones had been obtained illegally and therefore, knowingly took possession of tainted property. I have already indicated the evidence upon which I have relied in concluding that Mr Rana was knowingly involved in the unlawful scheme to take possession of illegally obtained mobile phones and, after that, sell them. The evidence as to Mr Rana's dealings with U70, including the meetings with him where he demonstrated his ability to be able to direct delivery location of the mobile phones, the fact that he sent U70 the list of names and addresses which were relevant to the delivery of the mobile phones and that he collected them, in combination with various other items of circumstantial evidence to which I have referred leads me to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Rana collected the mobile phones from U70 knowing that they were illegally obtained.
I reject the defence argument that it is open for me to find that Mr Rana had no knowledge of what was going on and that Mr Sagar was the orchestrator of the scheme. I have earlier given the reasons for rejecting that submission. It goes without saying that there is no evidence that Mr Sagar had any contact with U70. It is beyond doubt in circumstances where U70 was a police officer that that could never have occurred. As I have already mentioned Mr Rana's evidence that Mr Sagar had apparently pre-empted U70's contact with Mr Rana only highlights the fanciful nature of Mr Rana's evidence.
Intercepted deliveries (counts 16 to 17)
Counts 16 and 17 relate to two separate batches of tainted Apple iPhones that the police seized following Mr Rana’s arrest. Defence counsel submitted that the actus reus for these charges was incomplete because the police had arrested Mr Rana when the phones were located. Mr Rana never took possession of the Apple iPhones the subject of counts 16 and 17.
The prosecution case in relation to count 16 and 17 was not that Mr Rana was involved in money laundering by taking possession of tainted properties but that he engaged in a transaction by bringing the mobile phones the subject of the charge into the State, knowing the property was tainted.
Mr Rana’s role in bringing the Apple iPhones into the State was by communicating with others in the scheme the address where the mobile phones should be directed so that they could be collected. In each case (counts 16 and 17), U70 had suggested a delivery address to Mr Rana and in each case the delivery address for the Apple iPhones (the subject of counts 16 and 17) was the same delivery address suggested by U70 to Mr Rana.
It was agreed that the Apple iPhones the subject of these counts were destined to be delivered by U70 to Mr Rana.
In relation to count 16, the intercepted parcels were addressed to names that Mr Rana had detailed in WhatsApp messages to U70 on 21 May and 22 May 2020. That is, Mr Rana had specifically made U70 aware of those parcels.
Concerning count 17, Mr Rana sent U70 WhatsApp messages on 19 May 2020, 21 May 2020 and 22 May 2020 with the details of Telstra customers and associated packages that would be sent to U70 for collection.
The fact that the packages were addressed to the address indicated by U70 gives rise to the reasonable inference that Mr Rana had communicated to others in the scheme where the tainted property was to be sent. In that sense, he played a role in bringing the illegally obtained Apple iPhones into the State. In combination with the other items of circumstantial evidence that established Mr Rana's involvement in the scheme, including knowledge of what parcels were coming in and the ability to be able to direct them to various addresses, I am satisfied that Mr Rana was directly or indirectly involved in bringing the property into the State, notwithstanding the he never took possession of the Apple iPhones.
In respect to counts 16 and 17, I am satisfied that Mr Rana was directly or indirectly involved in bringing the tainted property into the State.
Tainted moneys (counts 18 to 20 (inclusive))
Count 18 relates to the $11,435 cash that the police located in three wallets in a white tray situated in the kitchen pantry. Count 19 relates to the $19,000 cash that the police located in a rolled-up yoga mat, and count 20 relates to the $35,000 cash located inside an iPad keyboard box inside a wardrobe in the second bedroom. I have rejected Mr Rana's evidence about the money as not credible. I will not repeat the reasons for coming to that conclusion. For reasons that I have articulated, I am satisfied that Mr Rana was centrally involved in the scheme. Part of that scheme was to sell illegally obtained mobile phones on the black market. Mr Rana's involvement in that scheme is an item of circumstantial evidence relevant to the consideration of counts 18, 19 and 20. When I consider the large amounts of cash secreted in different locations in Mr Rana’s house, coupled with his involvement in the scheme as described, I am satisfied that the money was the proceeds of some of the mobile phone sales and that Mr Rana had possession of that money. It follows that I am satisfied that Mr Rana engaged directly or indirectly in a transaction involving property in that he was in possession of the money. I am satisfied that the money was tainted in that it had been obtained by unlawful activity and that the accused knew that the property had been obtained by unlawful activity.
In considering this count, I have had regard to the agreed facts concerning the accused's partner, Tiffany.[81] In particular, on 25 May 2022 Tiffany was asked about the cash in the second bedroom, to which she initially said that she did not know anything. However, after the cash was located, Tiffany told the police that there was cash on her bookcase which belonged to her in the amount of $11,000.
[81] Exhibit P23 Agreed Facts 120-124.
The defence relied on these agreed facts as an item of circumstantial evidence supportive of their case.
Whilst the prosecution and defence counsel agreed that Tiffany did say that to the police, it does not provide evidence of the truth of Tiffany's statement, namely that the cash was hers. I have not relied on it for that purpose. The conversation between Tiffany and the police was hearsay and, contrary to the defence submission does not provide evidence of the source of the money.
Verdict
In relation to counts 1 to 15 (inclusive) I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the following: (i) that Mr Rana engaged directly in a transaction involving property, by receiving and taking possession of the Apple iPhones, the subject of the charges; (ii) I am satisfied the Apple iPhones were tainted property in that they had been obtained from Telstra by an unlawful act or activity; and (iii) I am satisfied that the accused knew that the property was tainted (obtained from an unlawful act or activity) when he received and took possession of the Apple iPhones.
In relation to counts 16 and 17 I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the following: (i) that the accused engaged directly or indirectly in a transaction involving property by bringing the Apple iPhones, the subject of counts 16 and 17 into the State for the reasons I earlier indicated; (ii) that the Apple iPhones the subject of counts 16 and 17 were tainted property (obtained by unlawful acts or activity); and (iii) that the accused knew that the Apple iPhones that he was directly or indirectly engaged in bringing to the State were tainted (obtained by unlawful acts or activity).
In relation to counts 18, 19 and 20 I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the following: (i) that the accused engaged directly in a transaction involving property by being in possession of the cash, the subject of the charges; (ii) that the cash was tainted property (it had been obtained by unlawful acts or activity); and (iii) that Mr Rana knew that the cash was obtained by unlawful acts or activity when he possessed the money.
In light of my findings, it follows that I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Rana is guilty of counts 1 to 20 (inclusive).

24 Date of Inspection	25 Number of Parcels	26 Related Count
27 24 April 2020	28 4	29 1
30 28 April 2020	31 4	32 2
33 29 April 2020	34 6	35 3
36 30 April 2020	37 6	38 4
39 1 May 2020	40 5	41 5 and uncharged
42 4 May 2020	43 7	44 6 and 7
45 8 May 2020	46 1	47 Uncharged
48 11 May 2020	49 2	50 Uncharged
51 11 May 2020	52 4	53 Uncharged
54 12 May 2020	55 12	56 8 and uncharged
57 15 May 2020	58 9	59 9 and uncharged
60 18 May 2020	61 1	62 10
63 20 May 2020	64 2	65 12

70 Date of Inspection	71 Number of Parcels	72 Related Count
73 19 May 2020	74 1	75 11
76 21 May 2020	77 13	78 13
79 22 May 2020	80 2	81 14
82 25 May 2020	83 4	84 15

123 Date	124 Number of Parcels
125 19 May 2020	126 1
127 21 May 2020	128 13
129 22 May 2020	130 2
131 25 May 2020	132 4
133 26 May 2020	134 17
135 3 June 2020	136 23