R v Quirey - [2001] QCA 64

[2001] QCA 64

COURT OF APPEAL

DAVIES JA
WILLIAMS JA
AMBROSE J

CA No 281 of 2000

THE QUEEN

BRENDON JOHN QUIREY Applicant

BRISBANE

..DATE 27/02/2001

JUDGMENT

DAVIES JA: The applicant was sentenced in the District Court on 10 October last to an effective term of five years and four months imprisonment with a recommendation that he be considered for parole after serving two years. A declaration was made that 62 days pre-sentence custody be imprisonment already served under the sentence.

The effective sentence of five years and four months imprisonment was a sentence imposed by the learned sentencing Judge for a large number of offences, 59 in all. He imposed a two year sentence in respect of two other offences which were offences of stealing. The total of
61 offences for which the applicant was sentenced were committed between 18 April 1999 and 29 January 2000.

They were 23 counts of fraud, one of fraud with a circumstance of aggravation, one of attempted fraud, 18 of receiving with a circumstance of aggravation, 10 of breaking, entering and stealing, one of entering a dwelling house and stealing, three of unlawful possession of a motor vehicle with a circumstance of aggravation, one of unlawful possession of a motor vehicle, one of uttering a false document and, as I have already mentioned, two of stealing.

It is common ground that in respect of a large number of offences for which his Honour imposed a sentence of five years and four months, the maximum penalty was less than the sentence which was imposed. It will accordingly be necessary to set aside those sentences and re-sentence the applicant in respect of those counts.

The parties are also agreed that appropriate sentences for each of counts 1, 7, 9, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 27, 30, 33, 36, 39, 40, 48, 49, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60 and 61 would be three years and for each of counts 18 and 45, 18 months. The setting aside of those sentences and the substitution of the sentences suggested does not in any way alter the substance of this application. I would make the orders suggested in respect of those counts.

At the time of commission of these offences the applicant was 28 years of age. He had previously been sentenced on five charges of fraud and one of stealing in the Magistrates Court in April 1998 and was on probation in respect of those offences when he committed these and he had earlier in 1997 been sentenced by a fine in New South Wales for obtaining a benefit by deception.

The offences the subject of the present sentences involved the construction of false identification, the use of people's credit card details, the use of stolen cheques, the construction of false ID in relation to the applicant including the obtaining of a false driver's licence and, as appears from some of the offences themselves, involved the applicant in breaking and entering premises in relation to some…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Quirey

Details

AGLC: R v Quirey [2001] QCA 64
Case: [2001] QCA 64
Decision Date: 27/02/2001

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Quirey involved an appeal against the sentencing imposed by the District Court. The applicant, Brendon John Quirey, was sentenced to an effective term of five years and four months imprisonment for a series of 59 offences, with a recommendation that he be considered for parole after serving two years. The offences were committed between April 18, 1999, and January 29, 2000, and included multiple counts of fraud, receiving, breaking and entering, and other related charges. The primary legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the sentences imposed for some of these offences were excessive, particularly in light of the applicant's guilty plea and the recommendation for parole eligibility after two years.

The Court of Appeal considered the nature and extent of the applicant's criminal conduct, which was described as systematic fraud on a commercial scale, involving false identification and stolen property worth over $140,000. The Court noted that while the applicant had a history of similar offences and was on probation at the time of the current offences, his plea of guilty should be given some weight. However, the Court also highlighted the applicant's lack of full cooperation with the police, including failing to disclose the whereabouts of much of the stolen property and refusing to name co-offenders. The Court found that the discount for the guilty plea should be limited to the time and resources saved by an early plea. Additionally, the Court noted that the applicant had already spent a significant amount of time in custody for related traffic offences, which had been factored into the sentencing.

The Court of Appeal determined that while the sentences for some of the offences were excessive, the overall sentence, including the parole recommendation, was not manifestly excessive. The Court granted the appeal only to the extent of setting aside the sentences for certain counts and substituting them with the suggested sentences. The Court of Appeal judges, Davies JA, Williams JA, and Ambrose JCA, all agreed with the outcome and the orders proposed by Davies JA. The Court's final orders involved setting aside certain sentences and substituting them with the proposed sentences, as detailed in the judgment.

Orders