R v Price - [2021] NSWSC 1191

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Summary available

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Price [2021] NSWSC 1191
Hearing dates: 9, 10, 13, 15 September 2021
Date of orders: 20 September 2021
Decision date: 20 September 2021
Jurisdiction: Common Law - Criminal
Before: Rothman J
Decision:
The Court reaches the following verdict:
(1)   On the charge that, on 24 June 2019, at Parkes in the State of New South Wales, the accused, Nathan Joseph Price, did murder Jesse Herridge, the accused is found not guilty;
(2)   On the alternative charge that, on 24 June 2019, at Parkes in the State of New South Wales, the accused, Nathan Joseph Price, did unlawfully kill Jesse Herridge, the accused is found not guilty.
The Court makes the following further orders:
(1)   the accused, Nathan Joseph Price, is discharged on this offence;
(2)   the exhibits may return to the Crown; and
(3)   the proceedings are otherwise dismissed.

Catchwords:
CRIME – murder – judge-alone trial – only issue is self-defence – facts relatively uncontroversial – firearm brought into altercation to deter deceased from threats of grievous bodily harm to accused’s mother – deceased affected by methylamphetamine – deceased runs towards accused raising pick handle – accused shoots causing death – Crown fails to disprove accused acted believing it necessary to defend himself and/or his mother – Crown also fails to prove that conduct was, in the circumstances as the accused perceived them, unreasonable – accused acquitted of both murder and manslaughter

Legislation Cited:
Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW), s 15A
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 23, 418, 421

Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Regina (Crown)
Nathan Joseph Price (Accused)
Representation:
Counsel:
L Shaw (Crown)
I Nash (Accused)
Solicitors:
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Crown)
Aboriginal Legal Service (Accused)

File Number(s): 2019/195991
Publication restriction: Pursuant to the terms of s 15A of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW), publication of the name of, or any matter which could identify, juvenile witnesses is prohibited.

REASONS FOR VERDICT

HIS HONOUR: Despite efforts to prevent it, the death of Jesse Herridge (hereinafter “the deceased”) occurred as a result of injuries sustained from a shot gun wound to the chest. The deceased passed away almost immediately after the infliction of the wound on 24 June 2019.
The wound that caused death entered the body at the left lateral chest of the deceased and consisted of a central irregular defect surrounded by satellite pellet holes. The central irregular defect was caused by the wad surrounded by pellets, each of which was discharged from a sawn-off shotgun.
The facts are relatively uncontroversial, and the parties should be congratulated on the degree of cooperation in relation to the proceedings. That cooperation has spared trauma to a significant number of witnesses whose statements were tendered and otherwise were not required for cross-examination.
As earlier stated, the facts are relatively uncontroversial. There is one aspect of controversy to which I will return in the course of these reasons.
As earlier stated, the accused discharged the firearm at the deceased and caused his death. The discharge of the firearm was a deliberate act of the accused and the accused was, almost immediately, arrested and charged. The charges with which the Court is required to deal are charges for each of murder and manslaughter, the latter offence being charged as an alternative on the same Indictment as that which charged the murder. Even if the charge of manslaughter were not to have been expressly preferred, it is available as an alternative to murder when murder has been charged.
The fundamental issue in the proceedings is whether the Crown has proved, beyond reasonable doubt, that the discharge of the firearm and the death of the deceased was not a result of self-defence. In that respect, it is the Crown’s duty to negative that the accused had a genuine belief, relevantly, that his conduct was necessary to defend himself or another (the subjective element). It is also necessary for the Crown to disprove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the conduct was a reasonable response in the circumstances as the accused perceived them (hereinafter “the objective element”).^[1] If the Crown disproves the subjective element and otherwise proves, beyond reasonable doubt, the elements of murder, then the accused is guilty of murder.
1. Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 418.
Relevantly for these proceedings, in the absence of a genuine belief as to the necessity to act in self-defence, the crime of murder would have been committed if the Crown had proved, beyond reasonable doubt, that the act of shooting the deceased was deliberate; that it caused the death of the deceased; and, at the time of the shooting, there was an intention to kill the deceased or to inflict grievous bodily harm upon him.
The intention to kill and/or cause grievous bodily harm may be inferred from the conduct, but the determination of the test is not objective; it is the actual intent or state of mind of the accused, at the time of the conduct, that is to be determined. Nevertheless, a person who is acting rationally generally intends the obvious and inevitable consequences of their conduct.
The distinction between murder and manslaughter is the existence of the relevant intention at the time of the conduct. Thus, for manslaughter, which is ordinarily to be determined only after the Court has determined a not-guilty verdict on murder, the elements remain that it was the accused’s deliberate act that caused the death of the deceased, but intention to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm is not required. Instead, relevantly, the conduct of the accused that caused death must be unlawful and dangerous.
Where manslaughter is being considered, absent self-defence, the Crown does not have to establish that the act of the accused was done with any particular intention to injure. The offence of manslaughter is committed even if no injury was intended by the accused and even if the accused had not realised that he or she was exposing the deceased to such a risk of injury.
The question is whether a reasonable person, in the position of the accused, would have realised that the accused was exposing the deceased to an appreciable risk of serious injury.
Where, as here, the evidence discloses that there is an issue of self-defence, it is for the Crown to prove that the conduct of the accused was not done in self-defence. As earlier stated, that requires disproving the subjective aspect of self-defence or proving that the conduct of the accused, performed in the belief that the conduct was necessary to defend himself or another person, was not a reasonable response in the circumstances as the accused perceived them.
If the Crown fails to disprove the subjective aspect of self-defence then, in the case of murder, the issue arises as to whether the objective aspect has been disproved. If the Crown were not to disprove the subjective element but to disprove the objective element, then self-defence becomes a partial answer to the offence and the accused would be guilty of manslaughter.^[2]
2. Crimes Act, s 421.
In practice, this works in a manner which provides, in the case of the death of a victim, that if the Crown disproves that the conduct was performed, subjectively, in the belief that the conduct was necessary to defend the accused or another person, then subject to the proof of the other elements of murder, the accused is guilty of murder. If, on the other hand, the Crown fails to discharge its onus to prove that the accused did not believe the conduct was necessary to defend himself or another person, but does disprove that the conduct was a reasonable response in the circumstances as the accused perceived them, then the accused would be guilty of manslaughter.
Lastly, if the Crown fails to prove that the conduct was not performed with the subjective belief that the conduct was necessary to defend the accused or another person and also fails to prove that the conduct was not a reasonable response in the circumstances that the accused perceived them, then the accused is not guilty of murder and not guilty of manslaughter.
Self-defence is, in some respects, a misnomer. It is not strictly a “defence”. Rather, when it arises on the evidence, its disproof, either in one or both of the aspects, becomes an element of the crime for which the Crown bears the onus.
In respect of murder, self-defence works differently than it does for other offences. In relation to all other offences, it is sufficient for the Crown to disprove either one of the objective or subjective aspects of self-defence. In the case of murder, disproof of the subjective element would be sufficient to prove guilt. But if the subjective aspect is not disproved then proof of the unreasonableness of the response results in guilt for the lesser offence of manslaughter, where the Crown proves that the response was not a reasonable one.
The rationale for the difference in approach is obvious. Criminal law is predicated on the capacity of an individual to obey the law and the possession in individuals of free will. It assumes that the perpetrator of the crime has the capacity not to commit it.
As a consequence, the law makes allowance for incapacity to act rationally in certain circumstances. One of those circumstances is the need to defend oneself or another. Thus, where an accused has killed in circumstances where the accused genuinely believed that the conduct was necessary to defend himself or another, but the response was not reasonable, the law makes an allowance and allows for the lesser offence of manslaughter. Extreme provocation is another circumstance that the law takes into account in determining whether the crime is murder or manslaughter.^[3]
3. Crimes Act, s 23.
It is necessary to deal with the evidence before the Court. As stated, the circumstances of the death of the deceased are relatively uncontroversial. The description of the circumstances is, with one exception, consistent.
At about 4:30 PM on 24 June 2019, a young girl, MT,^[4] who was living at 3 Porter Street, Parkes, being the address at which the death of the deceased occurred, needed to speak with her mother. MT was living with the accused’s mother and her family at 3 Porter Street and her mother lived at 18 Porter Street, Parkes.
4. As a result of the effect of s 15A of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW), this witness and other juvenile witnesses will be referred to other than by their names and there is a prohibition on the publication of their identities.
The circumstances of the discussion between MT and her mother was such as to give rise to a degree of anxiety in MT and, no doubt, she was otherwise upset and/or anxious when returning from speaking with her mother. As she returned, she passed 10 Porter Street, Parkes, the address of the deceased. At the time, the deceased’s dogs were barking, and MT yelled at the dogs to “Shut the fuck up”.
The deceased responded by yelling back at MT: “You, shut the fuck up, you red-headed slut!”
The deceased then came out of the room from which he had yelled, went to his lounge room and obtained a mobile phone. He then walked outside and, it seems, telephoned a friend, Ezekiel Gorman-Griffiths and asked him to come out the front. Mr Gorman-Griffiths was a resident of the same street.
The deceased then returned inside his own house for a short period. Then, the deceased went onto the footpath outside his house. Mr Gorman-Griffiths was present at that time, across the street. The deceased told Mr Gorman-Griffiths about the exchange about the dogs.
By this stage, MT had walked into the house at 3 Porter Street. Once inside, MT told the accused’s mother, Tracey Simpson, that she had been verbally abused by the man at number 10. At this, Ms Simpson went outside the house and moved towards her letterbox at the front of the premises. She then moved from the front of the letterbox up the road towards 10 Porter Street at the same time as the deceased moved from 10 Porter Street down the street towards 3 Porter Street.
There was an exchange between Ms Simpson and the deceased. According to Ms Simpson, which account I accept in this regard, she walked onto the bitumen of the road after calling out to the man: “what’s the matter”. I take the view that it was an exchange that was less a question than an admonition. There was then a yelling match between Ms Simpson and the deceased. Ms Simpson described the deceased as having an aggressive look on his face.
There were other witnesses, some of whom described the deceased as “acting staunch”, which I accept. However, I also take the view that Ms Simpson responded in like manner.
I also partly accept the Crown’s submission that “acting staunch”, in the context with which the Court is now dealing, meant, to the people living in Porter Street at that time, to act in a way which disclosed that one was not prepared to take a backward step or to “cop abuse” from anyone. I do not consider it necessary to determine whether this involved intimidation.
Ms Simpson is described by the accused as a person who is extremely protective, like a “mother hen” and I accept this description. It accords with the circumstances of their living arrangements at 3 Porter Street.
At this point in time Ms Simpson was engaged in an exchange with the deceased. Outside number 3 Porter Street were Ms Simpson’s daughter, NP and the accused’s partner, AB. The exchange was nasty and verbal.
The version that the Court accepts is that the accused came out of the house at or about this time. At that time, the accused did not have possession of a firearm or any other implement.
Shortly after the accused came out and witnessed the exchange between the deceased and his mother, the deceased returned the short distance to the front of his own house and obtained a pick or axe handle from under the motor vehicle in the front of the house. Apparently, he had asked his partner, Stefanie Leonard, to obtain the pick handle for him, but she refused. He returned to the exchange.
The accused, seeing the deceased armed with the pick handle, returned inside, obtained a shot gun with a sawn-off barrel, assembled it and returned to the front yard. The accused moved, on exiting the front door, to his right, which was away from the scene of the exchange.
It is necessary at this point to describe the pick handle. Photographs of the pick handle and measurements of it are in evidence.^[5] It is approximately 60 cm (two foot) long and is 45 mm wide. Its cross-section is elliptical or oval in shape and the pick handle is made of timber. It is, as one would expect of a pick or axe handle, an extremely solid implement.
5. Photographs 122-127, at p 61-66 of Evidence Book (Ex A).
The version that I accept is that, on seeing the deceased armed with the pick handle, the accused returned to his house and obtained the weapon. The only evidence against that proposition is that of Ms Leonard.
I consider that Ms Leonard was being truthful, but may have elided the circumstance of seeing something in the accused’s hands and the time when that was seen. All of the other evidence, including the evidence of Mr Gorman-Griffiths and other independent witnesses, who were not living at 3 Porter Street, are consistent with the accused coming out to the front twice, the latter time when he was armed.
It is possible that the sequence of events is more in line with that described by Ms Leonard and the deceased obtained the pick handle after he observed or would have observed the accused being armed. Nevertheless, the predominance of the evidence is to the opposite effect and I conclude that it is more probable than not that the accused obtained the gun at a time after the deceased was armed with the pick handle.
It is also clear from all the versions of events that the deceased was threatening Ms Simpson, the accused’s mother. He was threatening her with the pick handle. It was those threats and the belief that it was necessary for the accused to defend his mother that occasioned the accused’s return to the house and the obtaining of the shotgun.
The deceased was, prior to the obtaining of the weapon, moving down the road at medium speed; he was holding the pick handle in his hands; and was yelling out something like “come on then” as he was running down the road.^[6] In this regard, I accept the version of events given by other witnesses and given by Ms Leonard contemporaneously; not that given in the witness box, some two years’ later.
6. Statement of Stefanie Kate Leonard, dated 25 June 2019, at [21] (MFI 1); Tcpt, 9 September 2021, at pp 39-41.
Ms Leonard called out to the deceased to stop but he was not listening, and Ms Leonard ran down the street after the deceased. Her intention was to stop him getting involved in a fight.
As he approached the women, including the accused’s mother, the accused held up the weapon and told the deceased to stop. The deceased did not.
All of the witnesses, including Ms Leonard, then described the deceased pushing past the women; moving purposefully towards the accused; with the pick handle raised above the deceased’s head, held in both hands over his right shoulder ready to swing it.
While Ms Leonard describes the distance between the accused and the deceased at the time of the fatal shot as 50 cm, I regard that assessment as merely a statement that they were close to each other. The expert evidence is consistent with the other lay evidence that the accused and the deceased were between one and a half and two metres apart; the deceased was approaching the accused, in a position described earlier, with the pick handle raised for the purpose of swinging it at the accused; the accused fired the shot gun; and the result was the death of the deceased.
It is unnecessary to be more detailed in the summary of the evidence. There are, however, a number of matters with which the Court is required to deal that go to the details of the events in question. First, it is abundantly clear on the version of events accepted by the Court that the accused was of the genuine belief that it was necessary to conduct himself in the manner he did in order to defend his mother.
In that regard, I am referring to the obtaining of the shotgun. Of course, the obtaining of the shotgun did not, itself, cause the death of the deceased. In obtaining the shot gun the accused acted, plainly, in the genuine belief that he was defending his mother and that it was necessary to defend his mother. The purpose of obtaining the shot gun was, on the material before the Court, in order to have the deceased desist from the threats with the pick handle.
Further, the discharge of the shot gun was occasioned by a genuine belief that it was necessary for the accused to defend himself from the threat posed by the deceased. The foregoing pays little or no regard to the onus borne by the Crown or the standard of proof necessary. The circumstance that the Crown is required to negative the subjective belief of the accused is an unnecessary discussion in the circumstances before the Court. The Court is persuaded, at least on the balance of probabilities, that the accused acted in defence of his mother in obtaining the weapon and acted in his own defence in discharging the weapon.
The Crown relies upon the description of the deceased as “acting staunch” and relates that description to the accused. While I understand the submission, which is open to the Crown, in my view the description does not pertain to the accused. It does pertain to the accused’s mother, Ms Simpson.
However, it has not been shown that the accused acted in that manner. Rather, the accused acted in a manner, perhaps misguidedly, which sought to defuse the threat to his mother and the altercation that was occurring or about to occur.

That, which remains for the Court to deal with, is the question of whether the conduct was reasonable. In that regard, the Court takes account of the circumstances as the accused perceived them and that, in turn, must take into account the circumstances of the accused himself. The accused is an 18-year-old boy, whose mother was under attack with a pick handle, or about to be. At the point at which the accused fired the shotgun, the accused himself was under attack with the pick handle.
In the walk-through that is the subject of a video,^[7] the accused refers to looking for a baseball bat and considering the use of a golf club as impracticable. The walk-through was conducted, it seems, without the accused having received advice and the accused was giving an unguarded reconstruction of the events that occurred.
7. Exhibit L.
The walk-through occurred the morning after the events in question and my impression of the accused’s demeanour and attitude during the course of the walk-through is that the statements in the walk-through were unguarded, uncontrived and largely a reconstruction. I accept, unusually, that the reconstruction sought to explain possible alternatives to the obtaining of the weapon. I consider that to be a reconstruction that I am not persuaded accurately reflects the events in question.
First, the accused alleges he looked for his baseball bat. There is no independent evidence that the accused possessed a baseball bat.
Even though a crime scene was created very shortly after the events in question and a thorough search of the house occurred, no baseball bat was located.
The evidence of the contents of the house disclosed that the accused possessed golf clubs. There were two bags of golf clubs.
While I am prepared to assume from my general knowledge that golf clubs were once made of wood, that has not been the case for at least 70 years, to my knowledge. Nowadays, golf clubs are deliberately designed to be light and a golf club can easily be bent or broken by the application of force such as a pick handle.
The use of a golf club in the circumstances of the threat posed by the deceased would be neither reasonable nor appropriate. Having made that clear, I do not consider that the possibility of using the golf clubs was even considered by the accused. The explanation given by the accused during the walk-through was an explanation and reconstruction, after the fact.
Further, the test for self-defence in terms of reasonableness does not require that the accused acted optimally. It requires that the accused acted reasonably.
The accused is a young person whose intention, it seems, was to obtain the shotgun for the purpose of deterrence and the diffusing of the altercation. I consider that, in all of the circumstances, the obtaining of the weapon for that purpose was reasonable conduct.
More importantly, by the time the weapon was discharged, the accused was under significant threat of being severely injured by an attacking deceased wielding a pick handle. The conduct in discharging the weapon was, at that time, a reasonable one.
The foregoing provides some concern. One must be wary of treating as reasonable the bringing of a weapon into an altercation that was otherwise of lesser intensity.
However, in this case, the pick handle, as stated, could have and most likely would have caused grievous bodily harm and quite possibly death. As a consequence, if deterrence was the intent of the accused, a weapon that was significantly more dangerous was necessary. If there were a baseball bat in the accused’s possession and he had brought it to the altercation, the result would have been an altercation with the baseball bat and pick handle in which one or other person would have been severely injured if not killed.
One would expect, when faced with the possibility of being shot with a shotgun, the deceased would have retreated. Instead, the deceased seemed to become more enraged and rushed at the accused in the manner described earlier in these reasons. I attribute that reaction to the fact that the deceased was affected by methylamphetamine.
According to the expert evidence, the deceased was affected by methylamphetamine at the time of the incident. That evidence discloses that the methylamphetamine could result in anxiety, paranoia, hallucinations, delirium and related mood disorders. More importantly, it involves increased aggression and violent outbursts.
At the time of his death, or immediately after, the deceased had 0.33 mg/L of methylamphetamine in his blood, together with 0.04 mg/L amphetamine. The latter was due, on all probability, to the partial breakdown of methylamphetamine that had been consumed.
As a consequence, when consumed and at the time of the incident immediately before death, the deceased had consumed more methylamphetamine than would otherwise have resulted in 0.33 mg/L in his blood. The toxic blood level of methylamphetamine is reported to be from 0.15 mg/L, although one must take account of tolerance built-up by regular users of the drug. Nevertheless, tolerance affects the “high” resulting from the consumption of methylamphetamine; it does not affect the negative aspects.
The expert evidence establishes that chronic methylamphetamine users display aggressive and irrational behaviour with blood levels ranging from 0.15 to 0.56 mg/L. It would seem that the aggressive and, to some extent at least, irrational behaviour of the deceased was a result of the methylamphetamine by which he was affected.
There are some other more detailed aspects to which the Court turns. First, the evidence suggests that there was only one cartridge in the possession of the accused at the time of the incident. A search of the accused’s premises discloses no other cartridges.
I accept that version of the loading of the firearm that involves the single cartridge, in the accused’s possession, being stored in the disassembled barrel of the firearm. Such a method of storage was not dangerous and seems to accord with the most convenient place for the cartridge to be stored.
The firearm itself can be assembled in under five seconds. It consists of three pieces which, as described by an expert, can be easily assembled. The accused was absent from the front yard after first going there, for a very short time, being a matter of seconds.
At the time of his return, the accused saw the deceased standing very close to his mother and his partner, AB. I have earlier in these reasons taken the view that the accused told the deceased to stop.
No other witness recounts hearing any conversation. Given the short duration of all of the events, it is not necessarily unexpected that all of the details would not be recounted or recalled. Nevertheless, even if the accused said nothing, which is inconsistent with the view the Court takes, the display of the firearm would, in and of itself, give rise to the kind of warning that, in the view the Court takes, was given verbally.
The firearm was discharged, as stated, into the left side of the chest. It caused a collapsed lung and the wound went from front to back and left to right in the horizontal plane. The wound is consistent with the evidence otherwise before the Court that the shot was not aimed but, rather, a reaction to the threat of attack. The Police were called at 4:56 PM and arrived within four minutes.
The Crown suggests that one of the avenues available to the accused as a reasonable step to be taken to defuse the events that were occurring in the front yard was to call the Police. Plainly, that was action that was available to the accused. However, on all accounts, if the Police took four minutes to arrive, the altercation would have already concluded. The accused’s first reaction, when asked by Constable McKinnon^[8] was to admit that it was he that shot the deceased and to proclaim that he was “protecting [his] family; he [the deceased] threatened to kill them”. The accused was arrested at that point.
8. Exhibit F, at [6].
As is clear from the foregoing, on all of the evidence before the Court, I have come to the conclusion that the accused acted genuinely believing that his conduct was necessary to defend, initially, his mother and, ultimately, himself. I am also of the view that the conduct of the accused was reasonable and proportionate in the circumstances as the accused perceived them.
To put it in terms of the requirements of the law, I am not satisfied that the Crown has, beyond reasonable doubt (or otherwise), proved that the accused did not act as part of his belief that it was necessary so to act to defend himself or his mother; and that the Crown has not, beyond reasonable doubt (or otherwise), proved that conduct in which the accused engaged as a result of his belief that it was necessary to defend himself or his mother was not a reasonable response in the circumstances as the accused perceived them. As a consequence, the Crown has not disproved self-defence and has failed to negative both the subjective and objective aspects of self-defence.
The accused raised provocation as an alternative. Strictly, it is unnecessary for the Court to deal with the issue. However, I accept that the evidence before the Court does not disclose that the deceased lost self-control.^[9]
9. Crimes Act, s 23(2)(c).
While it is for the Crown, if there be evidence of provocation, to negative, beyond reasonable doubt, that the accused acted in response to extreme provocation, in my view, on the evidence before the Court, the Crown has proved that, despite the presence of extreme provocation, the accused did not lose self-control and has proved the absence of that loss of self-control, beyond reasonable doubt. The finding on extreme provocation makes no difference to the determination of the Court on the issue of self-defence.
As a consequence of the foregoing, the Court reaches the following verdict:

On the charge that, on 24 June 2019, at Parkes in the State of New South Wales, the accused, Nathan Joseph Price, did murder Jesse Herridge, the accused is found not guilty;

On the alternative charge that, on 24 June 2019, at Parkes in the State of New South Wales, the accused, Nathan Joseph Price, did unlawfully kill Jesse Herridge, the accused is found not guilty.

The Court makes the following further orders:

the accused, Nathan Joseph Price, is discharged on this offence;

the exhibits may return to the Crown; and

the proceedings are otherwise dismissed.

**********

Endnotes

Decision last updated: 20 September 2021

Medium Neutral Citation:	R v Price [2021] NSWSC 1191
Hearing dates:	9, 10, 13, 15 September 2021
Date of orders:	20 September 2021
Decision date:	20 September 2021
Jurisdiction:	Common Law - Criminal
Before:	Rothman J
Decision:	The Court reaches the following verdict: (1) On the charge that, on 24 June 2019, at Parkes in the State of New South Wales, the accused, Nathan Joseph Price, did murder Jesse Herridge, the accused is found not guilty; (2) On the alternative charge that, on 24 June 2019, at Parkes in the State of New South Wales, the accused, Nathan Joseph Price, did unlawfully kill Jesse Herridge, the accused is found not guilty. The Court makes the following further orders: (1) the accused, Nathan Joseph Price, is discharged on this offence; (2) the exhibits may return to the Crown; and (3) the proceedings are otherwise dismissed.
Catchwords:	CRIME – murder – judge-alone trial – only issue is self-defence – facts relatively uncontroversial – firearm brought into altercation to deter deceased from threats of grievous bodily harm to accused’s mother – deceased affected by methylamphetamine – deceased runs towards accused raising pick handle – accused shoots causing death – Crown fails to disprove accused acted believing it necessary to defend himself and/or his mother – Crown also fails to prove that conduct was, in the circumstances as the accused perceived them, unreasonable – accused acquitted of both murder and manslaughter
Legislation Cited:	Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW), s 15A Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 23, 418, 421
Category:	Principal judgment
Parties:	Regina (Crown) Nathan Joseph Price (Accused)
Representation:	Counsel: L Shaw (Crown) I Nash (Accused) Solicitors: Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Crown) Aboriginal Legal Service (Accused)
File Number(s):	2019/195991
Publication restriction:	Pursuant to the terms of s 15A of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW), publication of the name of, or any matter which could identify, juvenile witnesses is prohibited.