R v Predragovic

[1992] QCA 422

[1992] QCA 422

PINCUS JA
McPHERSON JA
de JERSEY J

CA No 144 of 1991

THE QUEEN

v

PREDRAGOVIC, Nemanja  Appellant

BRISBANE

11 NOVEMBER 1992

JUDGMENT

PINCUS JA:  This is an appeal against conviction and an application for leave to appeal against sentence.  The offences of which the appellant was convicted were two charges of official corruption, one of unlawful possession of a motor vehicle with a circumstance of aggravation, two of unlawful possession of a motor vehicle.  As to the official corruption charges there was a plea of guilty.  In respect of the sentence, all that has been said is that the sentence imposed was excessive.  It should be mentioned that in respect of the official corruption charges, the sentence was six months imprisonment.

As to the unlawful possession with a circumstance of aggravation, there was a sentence of three and a half years and as to the two charges of unlawful possession, three years imprisonment with a recommendation for parole after six month on each term.  The ground which is urged, that the appellant should not have been convicted and therefore the sentence is too heavy, appears to me not to have any substance and indeed the sentence seems, particularly if one takes the recommendation for parole into account, quite moderate.  I would be inclined to dismiss the application for leave to appeal against sentence.

In respect of conviction, it is necessary to say that the appellant initially asked that his appeal be adjourned.  The ground of that application was that an inquiry being conducted by the Honourable W J Carter QC has investigated matters which the appellant implies were involved in his trial.  The mere existence of that inquiry and the fact that it has not reported is plainly not a ground for an adjournment and we refused the adjournment which was sought.

Then the appellant took a number of points of a factual kind in respect of the trial.  It was said by Mr Butler for the Crown that in essence what the appellant complained of was that the Crown witnesses were believed when they should have been rejected.  And that appears to me to be a fair summary of what was said.  It is not, on its face, a particularly good basis of appeal.  However, some details should be given of particular points which were taken.

It was said by the appellant that a vehicle, which is mentioned at page 72 of the record as having been partly disassembled and which was identified by a witness, one Carmont, with a vehicle mentioned at pages 73 and 74 of the record, should not have been so identified.  That is, the appellant argued that the witness Carmont could not have properly said that the two vehicles were one and the same and therefore, presumably, that evidence should have been excluded.  In my opinion the point has no substance.  It is true that there might have been difficulty in Carmont's identifying the two vehicles, which were in different conditions; nevertheless, he did so and it was a matter for the jury, as it appears to me, whether his evidence was true.  One does not, of course, know whether the jury particularly relied upon that.

Another point which was taken was that a witness, one Reisenweber, according to the appellant, should not have been believed when he said, in effect, that he knew the appellant socially to some extent and knew him in a business sense hardly at all.

The appellant says that both those statements were untrue and that he could have but did not give evidence contradicting them.  In my opinion, that is not a good ground of appeal.  Reisenweber was apparently called at the insistence of the defence.  The evidence which he gave, whether true or untrue, was apparently uncontradicted.

Another aspect of the matter which was criticised by the appellant was that he said that he was deprived of natural justice.  He said there were documents apparently consisting of receipts and photos, in the possession of the police, which were relevant to his defence and which he could not obtain.  He told us that he asked the police for them on a number of occasions without result.  One would have expected that if the documents were relevant to the defence then the appellant's legal advisers would have sought to obtain them.  Mr Predragovic was unable to inform us whether that occurred.  In the circumstances, it seems to me impossible to establish that there was, as alleged, any breach of the rules of natural justice.

It is also said, in a separate complaint, that at page 206 the Judge formed a wrong view, or expressed a wrong view, to the jury when he said, and I quote:

"The inference sought to be asserted by the Crown is that this vehicle was stolen by Stead on 19 October 1989 to fulfil the accused's order for a vehicle of that make, model, colour and description".

The appellant explained that he now objects to the Judge having told the jury that he had ordered the vehicle.  In fact, the Judge did not say that.  He simply explained what was the Crown's case and it appears to me that nothing has been said to suggest that the Judge's statement was untrue.

On the whole of the appeal, it is my opinion that none of the points taken appear to have any substance.  The Crown case obviously had some strength.  It no doubt had difficulties as well, one of which was that perhaps one or more of the witnesses was not wholly reliable.  Nevertheless, the jury accepted sufficient of the Crown case to convict and I am far from thinking that there was anything unsafe about the convictions.

I would therefore be inclined to order that the application for leave to appeal against sentence be refused and the appeal against conviction dismissed.

McPHERSON JA:  I agree with the reasons given by Mr Justice Pincus for dismissing both the application and the appeal.

de JERSEY J:  I also agree.

PINCUS JA:  The orders will be as I have indicated.