R v PLK - [1999] VSCA 194

SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL Not Restricted

No. 31 of 1999

THE QUEEN
v
PLK

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JUDGES: TADGELL, CHARLES and BUCHANAN, JJ.A.
WHERE HELD: MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING: 20 July 1999
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 30 November 1999
MEDIA NEUTRAL CITATION:

[1999] VSCA 194 (1st Revision – 8 February 2000)

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CRIMINAL LAW – Incest – Multiple counts – Evidence of uncharged acts – Consequences of admission of such evidence – "Bolster rule" – Propensity – No direction on charged acts – Motive to lie – Insufficient direction.

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APPEARANCES: Counsel Solicitors
For the Crown Mr P. Faris, Q.C. and P.C. Wood, Solicitor for
Mr T.P. Burke Public Prosecutions
For the Applicant Mr P.G. Priest, Q.C. and Christopher Traill &
Mr M.J. Croucher Associates

TADGELL, J. A.:

I have had the advantage of reading in draft the reasons prepared by Buchanan, J.A. I respectfully agree with his Honour, and substantially for the reasons he assigns, that the grounds of application for leave to appeal against conviction, other than ground 5, should fail. His Honour would uphold ground 5, dealing with the matter of the complainant's motive to lie. As to that, I have formed a different view.
This case, unlike Palmer v. The Queen (1998) 193 C.L.R. 1, was not one in which the applicant had been asked in cross-examination whether he could suggest a reason why the complainant should lie. The question of the complainant's possible motive to give false evidence against him was, therefore, not one with which the applicant had to grapple in the witness box. It was nevertheless a question with which the jury were taxed by counsels' final addresses, reflected in the judge's charge. That is to say, it was a question the jury were invited to consider even though the applicant himself was not.
Two considerations arise out of ground 5. The first is whether a miscarriage resulted from the reference in the final address for the Crown to the question of the complainant's motive to lie. The second was whether the judge should have given the jury a specific direction with respect to that question.
As to the first consideration, it was contended in this Court for the respondent that the prosecutor had been entitled to comment on the motive or absence of motive of the complainant to make false accusations against the applicant because defence counsel had made the complainant's motives an issue in the case. It is true that counsel for the applicant had, in a brief opening address and in his final address, contended that the complainant was a liar. That was a necessary ingredient of the defence case because the applicant had always flatly denied all of the charged offences. Moreover, defence counsel relied on the complainant's concession that she had told an earlier lie in connection with the conduct alleged against the applicant upon which count 1 was founded. The circumstances on which counsel relied were unusual and deserve to be related.
In December 1984, after her…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v PLK

Details

AGLC: R v PLK [1999] VSCA 194
Case: [1999] VSCA 194
Decision Date: 30 November 1999

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v PLK involved the defendant, PLK, who was charged with multiple counts of incest involving his daughter. The dispute centred on the admissibility of evidence pertaining to uncharged acts, specifically whether the trial judge correctly admitted such evidence and whether the jury was sufficiently directed regarding the consequences of admitting such evidence. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of Queensland.

The primary legal issues addressed by the court were whether the trial judge correctly admitted evidence of uncharged acts and whether the jury was adequately directed on the consequences of such evidence. The court examined the application of the "bolster rule" and whether the evidence had any relevance beyond propensity. Additionally, the court considered whether the trial judge's directions to the jury on the motives of witnesses to lie were sufficient.

The court found that the trial judge had correctly admitted evidence of uncharged acts under the "bolster rule" as the evidence was relevant to corroborate the charged acts. However, the court noted that the trial judge failed to adequately direct the jury on the limited purpose of such evidence and the risk of convicting the defendant based on propensity alone. Furthermore, the court held that the trial judge did not sufficiently direct the jury on the motive of the witnesses to lie, which could have influenced their assessment of the evidence. Consequently, the court concluded that the trial judge's errors in directing the jury were significant and could have affected the outcome of the trial.

The court ordered a new trial for PLK, given the identified errors in the trial process. The new trial would ensure that the jury was properly directed on the admissibility and purpose of the uncharged acts evidence, as well as the motive of the witnesses to lie. This decision underscored the importance of clear and precise directions to the jury in criminal trials to ensure a fair and just outcome.

Orders