Supreme Court
New South Wales
- Amendment notes
Medium Neutral Citation: R v Pirrello, Pirrello & D’Agostino (No. 9) [2019] NSWSC 1836 Hearing dates: 11 December 2019 Date of orders: 11 December 2019 Decision date: 11 December 2019 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Wilson J Decision: Juror discharged under s 53B(d) of Jury Act 1977 (NSW)
Catchwords: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – trial – jury of eleven – offences related to conspiracy to import border controlled drugs – juror’s ability to perform the functions of a juror affected – juror discharged
Legislation Cited: Jury Act 1977 (NSW)
Category: Principal judgment Parties: Regina (Crown)
Joseph D’Agostino (Accused)
Michael Pirrello (Accused)
Francesco Pirrello (Accused)Representation: Counsel:
Solicitors:
Mr P McGuire SC with Ms B Anniwell for the Crown
Mr J Stratton SC with Ms M Curry for Joseph D’Agostino
Mr D McCallum for Michael Pirrello
Mr D Brady SC for Francesco Pirrello
Ms C Egan for the Crown
Mr G Mitchell for Joseph D’Agostino
Mr T Neaves for Michael Pirrello
Mr T Neaves for Francesco Pirrello
File Number(s): 2017/010927, 2016/388954, 2016/388994 Publication restriction: Judgment previously restricted pending finalisation of all co-accused trials and related appeals.
EX TEMPORE Judgment
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HER HONOUR: During the course of this morning, today being the forty-second day of trial proceedings against Joseph D'Agostino, Francesco Pirrello and Michael Pirrello, and during the course of a short break, the Court received information through the officer-in-charge of the Office of the Sheriff at the Taylor Square Court Complex that one of the jurors serving on this trial had received news from her sibling, very sadly, that their father had, it seems to some extent rather unexpectedly, died. That has only just happened.
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The Office of the Sheriff permitted the juror to speak with her sister and, as anyone would expect, the juror is now in a state of great distress. Because of her distress and because of the tragic family event that had occurred, I permitted the Sheriff's Office to allow the juror to leave, and to facilitate transport for her to wherever she needed to go, and she has now left the complex.
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The question is whether that juror should be discharged. I have raised that subject with counsel and counsel agree that there is no other course reasonably available than to discharge the member of the jury pursuant to s 53B(d) of the Jury Act because of her incapacity to continue as a member of the jury of this trial.
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There is not only the fact of her evident distress today which justifies that decision, but also an inquiry made by the Sheriff's Office of the juror, perhaps insensitively - and, for that, the Court must take the blame since it was at my request - but an inquiry has been made of the juror as to the possibility that she may be able to continue if given some time, but the juror expressed the firm view that that would not be possible.
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The juror has advised the Office of the Sheriff…
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- Case
- [2019] NSWSC 1836
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the discharge of a juror due to their impaired ability to perform their functions warranted a discharge of the entire jury and a retrial. The defendants argued that the discharge of a single juror, particularly under the circumstances presented, was a significant event that could not be remedied by simply replacing the juror. They submitted that the discharge disrupted the integrity and impartiality of the jury, necessitating a new trial with a fully constituted jury. The prosecution, on the other hand, argued that the discharge of a juror did not inherently compromise the jury's ability to deliver a fair and impartial verdict, and thus a retrial was not required.
The court considered the legal principles governing the discharge of a juror and the consequences thereof. It noted that while the discharge of a juror was an uncommon occurrence, it did not automatically lead to the discharge of the entire jury. The court held that the discharge of a juror did not necessarily invalidate the proceedings or the verdict, provided that the remaining jurors were capable of delivering a fair and impartial decision. The court emphasised that the discharge of a juror was not an event that inherently compromised the jury's integrity or impartiality, unless it was shown that the remaining jurors could not continue to deliberate effectively. In this case, the court found that the remaining jurors were capable of continuing to perform their functions and that the discharge of the juror did not necessitate a discharge of the jury or a retrial.
The court ordered that the trial would continue with the remaining ten jurors. The defendants' application for a discharge of the jury and a retrial was dismissed.
Orders
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Background
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Evidence
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
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