Supreme Court
New South Wales
Case Title: R v Perish; R v Lawton; R v Perish Medium Neutral Citation: [2011] NSWSC 1112 Hearing Date(s): 17 August 2011 Decision Date: 18 August 2011 Jurisdiction: Common Law - Criminal Before: Price J
Decision: Leave is not granted to the Crown to cross-examine Witness E upon the previous representations made by Witness B.
Leave is granted to the Crown to cross-examine Witness E upon the identified prior inconsistent statement made during the committal proceedings.Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW - unfavourable witness - whether leave granted to Crown to cross-examine should be extended - considerations of fairness.
Legislation Cited: Evidence Act 1995
Cases Cited: R v Teasdale [2004] NSWCCA 91; (2004) 145 A Crim R 345
Texts Cited: Category: Interlocutory applications Parties: Anthony John Perish
Matthew Robert Lawton
Andrew Michael PerishRepresentation - Counsel: Mr P Leask (Crown)
Ms C Davenport SC (Anthony Perish)
Mr S Hanley SC (Matthew Lawton)
Mr W Terracini SC with J D O'Sullivan (Andrew Perish)- Solicitors: Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown)
William O'Brien & Ross Hudson Solicitors (Anthony Perish)
Matouk Joyner Lawyers (Matthew Lawton)
Archbold Legal (Andrew Perish)File number(s): 2009/00148002 2009/001452602009/00150111 Publication Restriction:
Judgment
HIS HONOUR: Mr Crown asks that the grant of leave pursuant to s 38 (1) Evidence Act 1995 be extended to permit him to cross-examine Witness E upon his recollection of meetings with Witness B at a cafe at McMahon's Point and at the St George Rowing Club. The effect of Witness E 's evidence-in-chief was that he had no recollection of the meeting at the ca fe and despite the photographs (e xhibit H) and the tape (e xhibit J) being played to him, he had little recollection of a meeting with Witness B at the St George Rowing Club.
During yesterday's argument on the voir dire, I found that the triggering events in s 38 (1) (a) and (b) Evidence Act applied. I was satisfied that Witness E 's evidence was unfavourable to the Crown: s 38 (1) (a), and it appeared to the court that Witness E was not, in his evidence-in-chief, making a genuine attempt to give evidence of matters of which he may reasonably be su pposed to have knowledge: s 38 (1) (b) .
I am further satisfied, so far as a meeting at McMahon's Point is concerned, that Witness E 's testimony was inconsistent with evidence given by him during the committal hearing when he said during cross-examinatio n by Ms Davenport (T447.15-18):
"I recall that Anthony was having a conversation with [Witness B] and did make reference to the Falconer abduction. I don't remember the exact content of what was said. I really didn't want to get i nvolved in the conversation."
Ms Davenport argued that leave should not be granted. She submitted that the Crown is, in essence, choosing to accept the version of one Crown witness over another and that during cross-examination at the committal proceedings Witness E denied that he forced Witness…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read R v Perish; R v Lawton; R v Perish and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2011] NSWSC 1112
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the trial judge had misapplied the principles governing the grant of leave to cross-examine an unfavourable witness. The court was required to consider the balance between the rights of the accused to a fair trial and the potential prejudice to the administration of justice if such leave were to be granted. This involved a detailed examination of the case law and statutory provisions relevant to the grant of such leave, as well as the specific circumstances of the case.
In its reasoning, the court highlighted that the grant of leave to cross-examine an unfavourable witness is not an absolute right, but rather a matter to be determined by the trial judge based on the circumstances of each case. The court noted that the trial judge had carefully considered the potential prejudice to the administration of justice and the interests of fairness in denying leave to cross-examine the witness. The court found that the trial judge had correctly applied the relevant legal principles and had not erred in denying the leave. The appeal was thus dismissed.
The court's decision underscores the importance of the trial judge's discretion in granting leave to cross-examine an unfavourable witness, and the need to balance the rights of the accused with the broader interests of justice. The outcome of this case provides clarity for future cases involving similar issues, reinforcing the principle that the grant of such leave is not a matter of right but rather one to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi