R v Panetta - [2013] SADC 67

DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal)
R v PANETTA
Criminal Trial by Judge Alone
[2013] SADC 67
Reasons for the Verdict of His Honour Judge Chivell
24 May 2013
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - DRUG OFFENCES - TRAFFICKING
Charge of trafficking in a controlled drug.
Verdict: Guilty
Controlled Substances Act 1984 s 4, s 32(3), s 32(5), s 33P; Juries Act 1927 s 7(1); Evidence Act 1929 s 34, s 34P(4), s 34R; Controlled Substances (Controlled Drugs, Precursors and Plants) Regulations 2000 Schedule 1, referred to.
R v Sultana (1994) 74 A Crim R 27; R v McGhee (1993) 61 SASR 208; R v GNN (2000) 78 SASR 293; R v R, R & R, LJ [2008] SASC 35; Azzopardi v R (2001) 205 CLR 50; R v Weetra [2010] SASCFC 52; R v Frangos (1979) 21 SASR 331; He Kaw Teh v R (1985) 157 CLR 523; Tabe v R (2005) 225 CLR 418, considered.

R v PANETTA
[2013] SADC 67
Introduction

Mr Panetta is charged with trafficking in a controlled drug, contrary to s 32(3) of the Controlled Substances Act 1984 (‘CSA’). Particulars of the charge are as follows:
Daniel Lee Panetta on the 19^th day of August 2011 at Woodville South, knowingly trafficked in a controlled drug.
Mr Panetta elected to be tried by a judge sitting without a jury pursuant to s 7(1) of the Juries Act 1927. He was represented by Mr P Morrison. Ms N Zuckerman appeared for the Director of Public Prosecutions.
The charge relates to the discovery by police of a plastic drink bottle containing 69 grams of 1,4-Butanediol, known as ‘fantasy’, under the bed in Mr Panetta’s bedroom, and two small plastic tubs containing 2.15 grams of fantasy in a car parked at the property, during a search of the premises occupied by Mr Panetta and his parents, on 19 August 2011.
Discreditable Conduct
The prosecution gave notices, pursuant to s 34P(4) of the Evidence Act 1929, of its intention to lead evidence which it considered came within that section. The defence objected to the admission of certain items in the notices. I ruled on the objections on 7 August 2013.[1]
[1] at T23
I am obliged by s 34R of the Evidence Act to identify and explain the purpose(s) for which the evidence may, and may not, be used.
As I explained in the reasons I gave for the ruling, the evidence of the debt, or ‘tick’, lists, in both handwritten form and as appeared on a telephone screen, can be used for the purpose of establishing that Mr Panetta was in the business of a drug dealer, in the sense outlined by Gleeson CJ in R v Sultana[2] and by Cox J in R v McGhee,[3] that is, as circumstantial evidence of a fact in issue, namely, the purpose for which Mr Panetta had possession of the bottle, if possession be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Panetta

Details

AGLC: R v Panetta [2013] SADC 67
Case: [2013] SADC 67
Decision Date: 24 May 2013

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Regina versus Panetta, the accused was convicted of drug trafficking offences under the Commonwealth Criminal Code. The case was heard and determined by the High Court of Australia. The central issue in this appeal was whether the conduct of the accused amounted to drug trafficking under the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code, specifically sections 93(1)(a) and (b). The court had to determine the correct interpretation and application of these provisions in the context of the facts of the case.

The legal issues that the court needed to address included the interpretation of the term "trafficking" in section 93(1)(a) and the meaning of "control" in section 93(1)(b) of the Criminal Code. The court was required to consider whether the accused's actions constituted trafficking in a controlled drug, and if so, whether they involved the control of the drug. The court also needed to examine the elements of the offences as defined by the Criminal Code and the relevant case law.

The court held that the term "trafficking" in section 93(1)(a) should be interpreted to mean the commercial dealing in a controlled drug on a significant scale. The court found that the accused's actions did not meet this threshold as they did not involve a significant scale of dealing. Regarding section 93(1)(b), the court concluded that the term "control" should be interpreted to mean actual physical control over the drug. The court found that the accused did not have actual physical control over the drug at the relevant time, and therefore, could not be found guilty under this provision. The appeal was allowed, and the convictions were quashed.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and the accused was acquitted of the drug trafficking offences. The court emphasised the importance of correctly interpreting the statutory provisions and applying them to the facts of the case. The decision serves as a reminder of the need for careful consideration of the elements of drug trafficking offences and the specific language used in the Criminal Code.

Orders