R v Ninnes

In the case of R v Ninnes, the appellant was convicted of the crime of possessing methylenedioxymethamphetamine (ecstasy) for sale, contrary to section 32(1)(e) of the Controlled Substances Act 1984 (SA). The appellant appealed against his conviction, raising two grounds of appeal. The first was that the statutory presumption established by section 32(3) of the Act could not be applied to the particular offence with which the appellant was charged, as the presumption applied to a charge of possession of a prohibited substance "for the purpose of sale or supply" whereas in this case the appellant had been charged with possession for sale only. The second ground of appeal was that reliance on the presumption amounted to an abuse of process resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

The court examined the legal issues regarding the application of the statutory presumption established by section 32(3) of the Controlled Substances Act 1984 (SA) and whether section 44 of the Act precluded the operation of the presumption. The court found that the prosecution had correctly charged the appellant with possession for sale, and there was no need for the prosecution to include the words “or supply” in circumstances where the prosecution alleged that possession was for possession for sale only. The court held that the trial judge correctly directed the jury in respect to the application of the presumption and that the presumption operated to establish a presumption for sale. The court dismissed the appeal and concluded that the appellant was rightly convicted.

The court found that the presumption in section 32(3) operated, and a presumption for sale arose. The trial judge correctly directed the jury in respect to the application of presumption. The appellant was rightly convicted, and at that point, the operation of section 32(3) was spent. The court held that section 32(3) had no further work to do. The court also noted that when imposing sentence, the offence of possession of ecstasy for sale is under consideration, and the onus remains on the prosecution to prove any circumstances of aggravation identified in section 44 or otherwise beyond reasonable doubt.