IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
[1997] QCA 388
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
C.A. No. 479 of 1995
C.A. No. 266 of 1996
Brisbane
[R. v. Nicholls]
T H E Q U E E N
v.
MELINDA ANNE NICHOLLS
(Applicant) Appellant Davies J.A.
McPherson J.A.
Pincus J.A.
Judgment delivered 31 October 1997
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court; each concurring as to the orders made.
APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION ON THE COUNT OF MURDER ALLOWED AND A
VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL ORDERED.
CATCHWORDS: CRIMINAL LAW - CONVICTION APPEAL - MURDER - SENTENCE APPLICATION - Entering a dwelling with intent - Section 8 Criminal Code - Intention to prosecute unlawful purpose - Common intention to steal - Whether appellant’s knowledge of principal offender being armed sufficient to sustain charge of murder. Hind and Harwood (1995) 80 A.Crim.R. 105; R. v. Barlow (1997) 71 A.L.J.R. 680; R. v. Solomon [1959] Qd.R. 123; Stuart v. The Queen (1974) 134 C.L.R. 426.
| Counsel: | Mr M. Griffin for the appellant Mr D. Meredith for the respondent |
| Solicitors: | Legal Aid Queensland for the appellant Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent |
| Hearing Date: | 15 August 1997 |
| REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - DAVIES J.A. |
Judgment delivered 31 October 1997
I have had the advantage of reading the reasons for judgment of McPherson J.A. I agree with his conclusion that the appeal should be allowed and a verdict of acquittal entered. I adopt his Honour's statement of the relevant facts.
I agree with his Honour that the only common intention to which it could be inferred Nicholls was a party, within the meaning of s.8 of the Criminal Code, was one to steal with violence or threats of violence from Mr. and Mrs. Cowie. The first question which then arises under s.8 is whether the act by Gwilliams of stabbing Mr. Cowie with a knife was a probable consequence of the prosecution of that common intention. It is only if an affirmative answer is given to that question that it would be necessary to consider whether the circumstances in which the act of stabbing was done or its result or the state of mind with which it was done was a probable consequence of the prosecution of the common unlawful purpose. Here not even that act, in my view, let alone those aspects of the nature of the offence committed by Gwilliams, was a probable consequence of the prosecution of that purpose. But plainly Mr. Cowie's death, in any event, was not.
I agree with McPherson J.A. that an attempt by the respondent to establish a narrower and more heinous common purpose, arising out of the fact that the appellant was somewhere in the house when Mr. Cowie emerged from it having been stabbed by Gwilliams, fails for the reasons which he gives.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - McPHERSON J.A.
Judgment delivered 31 October 1997
The appellant Melinda Anne Nicholls was, with Darlene Jeanette Gwilliams, found guilty at their joint trial in the Supreme Court on…
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- Case
- [1997] QCA 388
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal against the conviction, ordered a verdict of acquittal on the count of murder, and discharged the appellant from detention. The appellant had already served the sentences for the other charges, so she was entitled to immediate release. The Court held that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction under Section 8 of the Criminal Code, and therefore, the appellant could not be deemed to have committed murder. The Court also noted that the circumstances did not necessarily point to a plan involving or likely to involve fatal violence, making it unlikely that the stabbing was a probable consequence of their common unlawful purpose.
Background
Background to the litigation
Nicholls was charged with the murder of Mr Cowie and found guilty at her joint trial with Gwilliams. She appealed against her conviction on the count of murder. The appeal was heard in the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the appellant’s knowledge of the principal offender being armed was sufficient to sustain a charge of murder under section 8 of the Criminal Code.
2. Whether the stabbing of Mr Cowie by Gwilliams was a probable consequence of the prosecution of the common intention to steal or rob with violence or threats of violence.
3. Whether the appellant formed a common intention with Gwilliams to use life-threatening violence against Mr Cowie.
Held
1. The court concluded that the appellant's knowledge of the principal offender being armed was not sufficient to sustain a charge of murder under section 8 of the Criminal Code, leading to the allowance of the appeal on the count of murder and ordering a verdict of acquittal.
2. The stabbing of Mr Cowie by Gwilliams was not deemed a probable consequence of the prosecution of the common intention to steal or rob with violence or threats of violence, further supporting the allowance of the appeal on the count of murder.
3. The court found that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the appellant formed a common intention with Gwilliams to use life-threatening violence against Mr Cowie, which was a crucial element in upholding the murder conviction under section 8 of the Criminal Code.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court of Appeal, in its reasons for judgment, examined the evidence presented and the legal principles underpinning section 8 of the Criminal Code. The court acknowledged that the appellant and her co-offender, Darlene Gwilliams, had a common intention to steal from Mr and Mrs Cowie with threats of violence. However, the crucial issue was whether the act of stabbing Mr Cowie was a probable consequence of prosecuting that common intention, a requirement under section 8 for the appellant to be charged with murder. The court found that the act of stabbing, and even more so, Mr Cowie's death, were not probable consequences of the common intention to steal or rob. The court emphasised the need for the jury to fully consider the nature of the unlawful purpose and its prosecution before concluding under section 8. In this case, the evidence did not sufficiently support a conclusion that the stabbing was a probable consequence of the common intention, leading to the appeal being allowed on the count of murder.
Furthermore, the court addressed the issue of whether the appellant formed a common intention to use life-threatening violence against Mr Cowie. While it was evident that Gwilliams threatened Mr Cowie with a screwdriver and later stabbed him, the appellant's actions and intentions were less clear. The court noted that the appellant might have re-entered the house after hearing Gwilliams's threat, but this was not certain. The court found that the evidence did not support the inference that the appellant shared a common intention with Gwilliams to use life-threatening violence against Mr Cowie. The reasoning of the court was grounded in the necessity for certainty in the shared intention to use violence, a certainty not met in this case.
In conclusion, the Court of Appeal found that the evidence did not support the necessary elements to convict the appellant of murder under section 8, leading to the allowance of the appeal and the ordering of an acquittal on the count of murder. The court's decision was based on the lack of probable consequences of the common intention to commit a violent crime and the insufficient evidence to establish a shared intention to use life-threatening violence.