CATCHWORDS:
CRIMINAL LAW - appeal against severity of sentence - break enter and steal - whether sufficient weight given to utilitarian value of pleas of guilty.

LEGISLATION CITED:
Crimes Act 1900 - s 112(1)
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 - s 22

DECISION:
Leave to appeal granted. Appeal dismissed

JUDGMENT:

- 1 -

IN THE COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEAL

60537/03
WOOD CJ at CL
SIMPSON J
BELL J
Friday 23 April 2004

Regina v Craig John Newman

Judgment

WOOD CJ at CL: The applicant pleaded guilty, in the Local Court to three offences of break, enter and steal (s 112(1) Crimes Act 1900), and was committed to the District Court for sentence. On 8 August 2003, Judge Urquhuart QC sentenced him to an aggregate total term of imprisonment of 4 years and 11 months, with a non-parole period of 3 years and 5 months. The sentence was made up of concurrent sentences, each of 3 years and 6 months, with a nonparole period of 2 years and 4 months in relation to the first two counts, and a sentence of 3 years and 11 months with a nonparole period of 2 years and 5 months, in relation to the third count (taking into account two offences of goods in custody). That last sentence was directed to commence 12 months after the commencement date for the sentences for the remaining counts.

Facts

In relation to each of the three break enter and steal offences, the applicant broke into dwelling houses, during daylight hours, and stole computer equipment, electrical and jewellery items, and a carton of cigarettes having a total value in the order of $15,500.

On each of the occasions that the offences were committed, the applicant managed to cut himself, leaving blood at the scene, the DNA profile of which was consistent with his own profile. When interviewed in relation to these matters the applicant claimed to have had no memory of them. At various points he indicated that if DNA found at the scene matched his DNA, then he was not disputing that fact, although he indicated additionally (eg Q &A 46-49) that “I can’t, I’m not saying nothing till I know.” After being asked some questions about the last of the offences, he made it clear that he did not intend to answer any further questions, indicating (A63) “it’s over and done with”; (A64) “youse just charge me” and (A65) “why would I pled (sic) not guilty.”

The two Form 1 offences, which were committed while the applicant was on bail for the three offences, were discovered when he was found on…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Newman

Details

AGLC: R v Newman [2004] NSWCCA 113
Case: [2004] NSWCCA 113
Decision Date: 23 April 2004

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Newman involved the appellant, who had pleaded guilty to charges of breaking and entering and stealing. The appellant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment, which they subsequently appealed on the grounds that the trial judge did not sufficiently consider the value of their guilty pleas in mitigating the severity of the sentence. The appeal was heard by the court, which was tasked with determining whether the trial judge appropriately weighed the utilitarian benefits of the appellant’s guilty pleas.

The court had to decide whether the trial judge adequately considered the principles of sentencing that require a discount on the sentence for offenders who plead guilty. This includes the recognition that a guilty plea can result in substantial benefits, such as saving the community the costs and delays of a trial, and providing the offender with an earlier opportunity to be sentenced and begin the process of rehabilitation. The court examined the sentencing remarks to assess whether the judge had appropriately factored in the appellant's early admission of guilt and the resultant benefits to the judicial system.

In reviewing the sentencing remarks, the court found that while the judge acknowledged the appellant’s guilty plea, they did not sufficiently articulate how this factored into the overall sentencing decision. The court concluded that the trial judge did not give the appropriate weight to the utilitarian value of the guilty plea, which could have influenced a more lenient sentence. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the case was remitted to the trial court for reconsideration of the sentence with proper regard to the appellant’s plea.

The court ordered that the appellant’s sentence be reviewed, ensuring that the trial judge appropriately considered the appellant’s guilty plea and its benefits to the judicial system. This included a reassessment of the sentence to reflect the full discount that should have been applied based on the plea. The trial court was directed to provide new sentencing remarks that clearly explained how the plea factored into the overall sentence imposed.

Orders