R v Natasha Ridley
[2016] ACTSC 97
•2 May 2016
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: | R v Natasha Ridley |
Citation: | [2016] ACTSC 97 |
Hearing Date: | 2 May 2016 |
DecisionDate: | 2 May 2016 |
Before: | Burns J |
Decision: | See [10]-[11] |
Catchwords: | CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Judgment and Punishment – Sentence – particular offences – property offences – arson – plea of guilty – no criminal history – young offender – good prospects for rehabilitation – terms of imprisonment imposed – suspended sentence. |
Parties: | The Queen (Crown) Natasha Ridley (Offender) |
Representation: | Counsel Ms A Jamieson-Williams (Crown) Mr R Davies (Offender) |
| Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown) Legal Aid ACT (Offender) | |
File Number: | SCC 243 of 2015 |
BURNS J:
Natasha Ridley, you have entered a plea of guilty to one charge of arson which was committed on 30 May 2015. A Statement of Facts has been provided to me, and I will not now recite them. It is sufficient to note that the offence relates to the setting on fire of a motor vehicle in Fyshwick on the night of 30 May 2015.
The vehicle was set afire by your co‑offender, Aaron Slater, when he placed a number of lit sparklers into the cabin of the vehicle. These caused the vehicle to catch fire and ultimately the vehicle was burned out. I am told that the vehicle was not a particularly expensive vehicle and the value of the vehicle was set at some $2,500. I note that there has been no effort to make reparation to Mr Jack Bookham, the owner of the vehicle, either apparently by yourself or by your co‑offender. I accept the submission made by Mr Davies that offences of arson cover a wide variety of circumstances and, in particular, a wide variety of offending conduct. Such offences may relate to the setting on fire of buildings or other objects and in circumstances where there may be significant risk not only to property of considerable value, but also to human life.
The present offence, in my opinion, falls in the lower end of the range of offences of this nature. Whilst the offence occurred at night, it was in a relatively deserted area of Canberra, and in circumstances such that there was little prospect of the fire spreading or of anybody being injured as a consequence of the fire. It is, of course, a significant circumstance to take into account in determining your moral culpability for this offence that the offence was committed for revenge, you having a grudge against the owner of the vehicle.
I take into account the fact that you were only just 18 years of age at the time that you committed this offence. You are now 19, of course, but in any event you are still a very young person. Whilst you were not a child at the time you committed this offence, you were of such an age that rehabilitation is a very significant sentencing consideration, and in my opinion should be given greater weight than punishment and deterrence.
That is not to say that general deterrence, in particular, can play no part in sentencing for this offence. General deterrence is well recognised as being a significant sentencing consideration for offences of this type, but in the circumstances where this offence occurred, when you were 18 years of age and, as I have said, taking into account the particular circumstances of the offence, it is appropriate to moderate general deterrence and to give greater consideration to rehabilitation.
I also take into account the fact that you have no previous convictions. You are entitled to a degree of leniency based upon that fact. Whilst you did not physically set fire to the vehicle, that having been done by your co‑offender, it is clear that you were part of an agreement that that should take place. I am satisfied that you were part of a common purpose or a common agreement to destroy or damage the vehicle by fire.
I take into account your plea of guilty. I note that the plea of guilty was not entered at the earliest opportunity, but I do accept that it does reflect a degree of remorse on your part and also had a significant utilitarian value.
I note that your co‑offender was 24 years of age. I also note from the sentencing comments of Robinson AJ, who sentenced your co‑offender, that he was a particularly immature person. However, it is not clear to me from the evidence before me that you were aware of his immaturity and psychological issues. As such the fact that he was somewhat older than you is a circumstance which is relevant to sentencing.
I also take into account the fact that you are in employment which, of course, is a very significant factor assisting in your rehabilitation and making it less likely that you will reoffend. You have spent one day in custody with respect to this offence. In my opinion, the appropriate course is to impose a term of imprisonment but to suspend that term forthwith.
Sentence
I will record a conviction and you will be sentenced to nine months imprisonment. I have reduced that by 20 per cent, which is a little over two months, in order to reflect your plea of guilty. I have then rounded it up to three months. So I have reduced it by, in total, three months, taking into account the day that you spent in custody prior to sentencing.
That sentence will commence today, but it will be suspended from today with a Good Behaviour Order for a period of two years with the conditions that you are:
(a)to accept the supervision of ACT Corrective Services for a period of 12 months or such lesser period as deemed appropriate by your supervising officer; and
(b)you are to obey all reasonable directions of officers of that service.
| I certify that the preceding eleven [11] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence his Honour Justice Burns. Associate: D Scuteri Date: 16 May 2016 |
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