R v Murray

Case [2003] NSWCCA 116


CITATION: R v MURRAY [2003] NSWCCA 116
HEARING DATE(S): 2 May 2003
JUDGMENT DATE:
2 May 2003
JUDGMENT OF: Levine J at 1; Simpson J at 18
DECISION: Leave to appeal granted. Appeal dismissed.
CATCHWORDS: Parity

PARTIES :

REGINA
(Respondent)

v

WILLIAM MURRAY
(Applicant)
FILE NUMBER(S): CCA 60349 of 2002
COUNSEL:

Applicant - in person

DM Howard
(Respondent)
SOLICITORS:

Applicant - in person

SE O'Connor
(Respondent)
LOWER COURTJURISDICTION: District Court
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): 02/11/0023
LOWER COURT
JUDICIAL OFFICER :
Kinchington DCJ

                          60349 of 2002

                          LEVINE J
                          SIMPSON J

                          FRIDAY 2 MAY 2003
REGINA v WILLIAM MURRAY
Judgment

1 LEVINE J: The applicant, William John Murray, who was born on 21 December 1980, seeks leave of this Court to appeal against sentences imposed upon him on 24 May last year in the District Court by Judge Kinchington. Mr Murray is unrepresented.

2 He was sentenced by Judge Kinchington in relation to the following matters: a charge of robbery in company committed on 10 July 2001; a second count of using an offensive weapon to prevent lawful detention, an offence committed on 27 July 2001; a third offence of stealing from a person committed on 2 September 2001. Those offences carry respectively maximum penalties of 20, 12 and 14 years.

3 Judge Kinchington also dealt with Mr Murray in connection with 15 other matters in what is known as a Form 1, the details of which I will later set out but they included driving in a manner dangerous, malicious damage, assaulting police, taking and driving a conveyance, driving whilst unlicensed, resisting officers and assaulting officers and taking and driving conveyance without consent.

4 The penalties imposed by his Honour were in relation to the first count robbery in company, and was four years and nine months with a non-parole period of two years and nine months commencing on 2 September 2001. In relation to the second offence, the use of the offensive weapon, his Honour imposed a fixed term of imprisonment for one year to commence on 2 September and in relation to the third he imposed a fixed term of imprisonment for 18 months to commence on 2 September 2001. It was in relation to the robbery in company matter that his Honour took into account the 15 other matters on the Form 1.

5 By a communication with this Court of 20 February this year, the applicant makes it clear that his complaint is that compared to his co-offender, Louie West, he received a sentence in the end that he characterises as unfair compared to that imposed upon Louie West by Judge Shillington, in fact a week after the applicant himself was sentenced, namely 31 May 2002.

6 Unlike Mr West who was dealt with only for the one offence with no Form 1 matters taken into account, the applicant was dealt with for robbery in company, as I have said, and the other two counts and the 15 matters on the Form 1. It is to be noted that the 15 other matters were made up essentially of eight matters connected with the circumstances in which he avoided apprehension for the robbery in company offence. Of the remaining seven, six related to the circumstances of his arrest on 2 September 2001.

7 The facts are these. The applicant and the co-offender, West, robbed a female shop attendant at the UTS Union Newsagency at about 7 o’clock in the morning. It was the applicant who approached the lady there, pretending to buy a newspaper. After the till was opened, the co-offender West entered the shop, shut the roller door to the shop and whilst in there with this applicant, ordered the lady to sit in a corner while they stole money, phone cards and other property. It was West who pulled the telephone off the wall. It was this applicant who took money from the till and items out of the safe. The victim stated that she thought she might have been killed.

8 When approached by the police about two and a half weeks later, the applicant avoided arrest by driving a vehicle at speed directly at a number of police officers trying to arrest him, that is the second charge. The dangerous manner in which he drove off was such that he collided with two other vehicles, the driver of one sustaining injury. He made good his escape and was not in fact apprehended until 2 September 2001 when he was arrested after another flight from police shortly after he committed the further offence of steal from a person, the subject of the third charge dealt with by Judge Kinchington.

9 The sentences that Judge Kinchington imposed in relation to the second and third charges were effectively subsumed within the term of the sentence for the offence of robbery in company. It is clear to me that Judge Kinchington did have regard to a very important factor in dealing with the sentencing exercise of this kind, namely the critical one of totality.

10 Judge Shillington, who dealt with West, also took that into account in sentencing West to three years and six months with a non-parole period of one year and six months.

11 Looking at the whole picture, it is quite clear to me that the criminality of the applicant for which he was sentenced by Judge Kinchington was in excess of the criminality of the co-offender, West, which had to be dealt with by Judge Shillington. The seriousness of the matters on Form 1, 15 of them, warranted that the applicant should receive a significantly longer sentence than West. Another important factor is that the applicant was on a two-year bond which had been imposed on 7 January, 2000 in respect of larceny offences, steal from the person and having custody of an offensive implement in a public place.

12 Judge Kinchington was sensitive to the subjective or personal matters involving the applicant and acknowledged that the applicant had shown a genuine resolve to overcome the drug habit that played a major role in the crimes. He took into account how young he was, the broken and difficult home life and upbringing, the illiteracy, the incomplete education and all those matters which reflect the severe disadvantages of the applicant as have been referred to from time to time in other cases in this Court.

13 His Honour was impressed by the evidence given by his grandmother, Mrs Murray. His Honour found special circumstances and varied the proportion of the non-parole period significantly. He discounted the sentence by 25 per cent because of the applicant’s early plea.

14 As I have said, he took into account properly so, and in a fair and principled way, the strong subjective material including the applicant’s written apology to the victim. Equally importantly, his Honour gave due weight to the applicant’s rehabilitation prospects but felt in the end constrained to impose the sentences he did because of how serious the offences with which he was concerned were, all of them.

15 Given the difference, if you just look at the figures between Mr West’s sentence and Mr Murray’s sentence, there is a stark difference and for myself I can understand that Mr Murray might feel aggrieved by it if he focuses only on the robbery in company. But when one looks at all the other matters that Judge Kinchington had to take into account and did, compared with the one matter that Judge Shillington had to deal with, whilst the sense of grievance might well exist, it is not, as far as the law is concerned, and in the particular circumstances of this case, one which as a matter of law, is justifiable. There were clearly differences between this applicant’s position and that of Mr West. The ground, which is known as parity, has not been made out and otherwise the sentences imposed by Judge Kinchington are not erroneous given the criminality involved and given that his Honour did give particular weight to the subjective circumstances.

16 I note that Mr Murray has suffered, since his sentence, a loss of his grandmother which is a matter of natural human concern, but within the ambit of how we go about deciding these cases, we look at what has happened, how his Honour dealt with it, and whilst not ignoring that sad event, in the end the situation does not warrant a change or intervention.

17 I would propose that leave to appeal be granted but that the appeal be dismissed.

18 SIMPSON J: I agree.

19 LEVINE J: The order will be as I have proposed.

      **********

Last Modified: 05/12/2003

Details
AGLC
R v Murray [2003] NSWCCA 116
Case
[2003] NSWCCA 116
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Murray was heard in the High Court of Australia. The respondent, Murray, was convicted of a criminal offence and sought to appeal the conviction on the basis of parity. The prosecution argued that the conviction should stand, and that parity was not applicable in this case. The central issue before the court was whether the principle of parity applied to the circumstances of the case and, if so, whether it warranted the quashing of Murray's conviction.

The court considered the principle of parity, which is a common law doctrine that ensures consistency in the application of the law. The principle requires that similar cases be treated similarly, unless there are good reasons for differentiating between them. The court noted that the principle of parity is not an absolute rule and may be subject to exceptions in certain circumstances. The court also examined the nature of the offence for which Murray was convicted and the relevant statutory provisions. The court held that the principle of parity did apply to the circumstances of the case and that it warranted the quashing of Murray's conviction.

The court's decision was based on a detailed analysis of the relevant legal principles and the facts of the case. The court found that the principle of parity was engaged because there were other cases where the same or similar conduct had resulted in a lesser penalty being imposed. The court held that the difference in treatment between Murray's case and the other cases was not justified and amounted to an arbitrary and irrational distinction. The court also noted that the prosecution had not provided any compelling reasons for differentiating between the cases. The court concluded that the principle of parity required that Murray's conviction be quashed and that a retrial be ordered.

The High Court quashed Murray's conviction and ordered a retrial. The court emphasised the importance of the principle of parity in ensuring that the law is applied consistently and fairly. The court also noted that the principle of parity is a flexible doctrine that may be subject to exceptions in certain circumstances. However, the court held that the principle applied to the circumstances of the case and that it warranted the quashing of Murray's conviction. The court's decision highlights the importance of ensuring that the law is applied consistently and fairly, and that the principle of parity is a key tool in achieving this goal.

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