R v Murphy

[1995] QCA 568

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

C.A. No. 416 of 1995

Brisbane

[R. v. Murphy]

T H E Q U E E N

v.

PATRICK ALAN MURPHY

Appellant

McPherson JA
Pincus JA

Thomas J

Judgment delivered 19 December 1995

Separate concurring reasons by each member of the Court

APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION DISMISSED

CATCHWORDS:	CRIMINAL LAW - evidence - identification - whether photoboard identification acceptable - Alexander v. R. (1980-1981) 145 CLR 395, R v. Pitkin (1995) 130 ALR 35 discussed - whether breach of Commissioner's directions - whether breach of s.4.9 Police Service Administration Act 1990- effect of other supporting evidence.
Counsel:	Mr K. Copely with Ms D. Richards for the Appellant Ms L. Clare for the Respondent
Solicitors:	Legal Aid Office for the Appellant Director of Public Prosecutions for the Respondent

Hearing Date: 4 December 1995

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

C.A. No. 416 of 1995

Brisbane

BeforeMcPherson J.A.

Pincus J.A. Thomas J.

[R. v. Murphy]

T H E Q U E E N

v.

PATRICK ALAN MURPHY Appellant

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - McPHERSON J.A.

Judgment delivered the 19th day of December 1995

I have read and agree with the reasons of Thomas J. and Pincus J.A. The

appeal should be dismissed.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

C.A. No. 416 of 1995.

Brisbane

BeforeMcPherson J.A.

Pincus J.A. Thomas J.

[R v. Murphy]

T H E Q U E E N

v.

PATRICK ALAN MURPHY

Appellant

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - PINCUS J.A.

Judgment delivered 19/12/1995

I have had the advantage of reading the reasons of Thomas J. The authorities

since Alexander (1981) 145 C.L.R. 395 do not generally support the view that

identification tests arranged by the police and not consisting in a line-up should

necessarily be excluded from evidence. One example of the approach taken is Pearsall

(1990) 49 A.Crim.R. 439 where it was said in the New South Wales Court of Criminal

Appeal (per Hunt J at 444):

"The absence of an identification parade may in some cases mean that the weight to be afforded to the evidence of identification is so little that the trial judge is obliged to reject it, upon the basis that its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect . . ."

Another is the Victorian decision in Vincec (1990) 50 A.Crim.R. 203, where evidence

of identification from a collection of photographs was admitted and the court said that it did not understand it to be the law that "a conviction must inevitably be set aside when

the only evidence of identification is that of a stranger by photograph" (206). Then in

Garlin, 56 A.Crim.R. 195, a Queensland case, evidence of identification by a witness

who viewed two men only (one the accused) in separate rooms was admitted. Ryan

J said in effect that if that had been the only evidence of identification "the liability to

mistake would have been so great that a conviction based on such identification would

have been unsafe" (197). His Honour referred to Currie, another Queensland case

(Court of Criminal Appeal, C.A. No. 313 of 1990, 21 December 1990, unreported)

where identification from an album of photographs was used and it was said that:

"where there is other evidence implicating the accused, a trial judge should be reluctant to exercise his discretion to exclude identification evidence simply upon the basis of its quality, although appropriate warnings must be given".

I am in respectful agreement with that statement. Of course, the argument that the

photo-board identification should have been excluded faces the additional hurdle

constituted by the decision of the High Court in Pitkin (1995) 69 A.L.J.R. 612.

The theory upon which the argument for the appellant, relating to identification,

is based is that unless this Court firmly insists upon identification by line-up, by

generally excluding photo board identification, present police practice will tend to

become entrenched. That may well be so, but it does not appear to me that this Court

has a general jurisdiction to reform police methods of investigation by excluding relevant

evidence on the ground that (although not obtained by improper conduct) it is not of the

best possible quality, rather than merely giving the jury directions about it. Even

obviously dubious evidence, such as a confession obtained during an interview not

electronically recorded, is not necessarily excluded: McKinney (1991) 171 C.L.R. 468.
In the present case the evidence of identification from a collection of

photographs was of considerable strength. If random selections from the 12

photographs had been made by the three witnesses in question, there would have been

only a very small chance (1 in 1728) that all three would independently have made the

same choice. The fact that all three did so provided a solid basis for thinking that if the

offender was not the appellant, then he was a person whose facial appearance strongly

resembled that of the appellant. Whether the photo-board identifications would have

been enough to sustain a conviction, by themselves, is not a question which arises

here, because the prosecution put forward a body of other evidence, discussed by

Thomas J, which pointed towards the appellant as the offender. Of that evidence,

perhaps the strongest single item was the observation by one of the witnesses, Mrs

Corliss, of a tattoo of a blue bird with spread wings on one of the offender’s hands. It

was not suggested that evidence of this fact or of the circumstance that the appellant

had just such a tattoo on each of his hands should have been excluded as being, like

the photo board identifications, not sufficiently conclusive. It is fallacious to consider

each piece of evidence pointing towards the accused as the offender separately and

to exclude it unless, considered in isolation, it strongly identifies the accused.

Commonly, the question whether or not an accused has been proved to be the offender

to the requisite standard depends, as in this case, upon the jury’s consideration of a

number of pieces of evidence of varying strength. The notion that, to prove a fact

beyond reasonable doubt, only facts proved beyond reasonable doubt may be taken

into account seems to be erroneous: cf. Chamberlain (1984) 153 C.L.R. 521 at 535,
To return to the question of modes of identification, even dock identification may,

in appropriate circumstances, be allowed: see Chatters (Court of Appeal, C.A. No. 428

of 1994, 15 March 1995, unreported) in which the cases are discussed at p. 5. In

particular circumstances special tests of identification may be both fair and appropriate;

an example is Hamood (1987) 46 S.A.S.R. 340, where a rape suspect was asked to

mix with dozens of other men in the bar of a hotel, where he was picked out by the

complainant. In prison assault cases, where there may be only a small number of

possible offenders, a prompt inspection of those people by the victim will be the obvious

course. Identification by comparing video images appears to be a promising technique;

it can enable the witness conveniently to observe and compare the appearance of quite

a number of rather similar people, depicted in the course of movement. I should add

that the practice, adopted in the present case, of taking a video record of the witness’

responses during the process of identification seems a very useful one. A process of

identification from a collection of photos, safeguarded from malpractice by being

recorded on video, may well be sounder than a line-up without such a safeguard.

But, for the reasons I have given, I agree with Thomas J that the trial judge did

not err in declining to exclude the identification by means of photo boards. I would add

that there appears to me to be no substance in the suggestion that evidence which has

been collected in ways which do not comply with Police Commissioner’s Directions

must be excluded; non-compliance with those directions may have disciplinary

consequences, but will not ordinarily lead to exclusion of relevant evidence.

With respect to the question of the safety of the verdict, I agree with what

Thomas J has said and would add that in my view the argument that the verdict was

unsafe is devoid of substance.

I agree that the appeal should be dismissed.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

C.A. No. 416 of 1995

Brisbane

Before McPherson JA

Pincus JA Thomas J

[R. v. Murphy]

T H E Q U E E N

v.

PATRICK ALAN MURPHY

Appellant

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - THOMAS J

Judgment delivered 19 December 1995

The appellant was convicted of armed robbery. He challenges the reception of evidence

identifying him through the use of a photoboard.

The robbery occurred at about 2.45 p.m. on 15 March 1995 at the post office at Redbank

Plaza. The counter attendant (Mrs Parcell) was approached by a man who held his right hand

under his clothing, pretending to be armed, and who demanded money from her. He repeated

his demand for money, told her to open the drawer and made other statements including "Give

me the fifties first" and "Move faster". He told another person present to stand still or he would

"blow her away". She noticed that he had a tattoo on his left hand. She was unsure of its

precise location but thought it was in the area above the thumb and forefinger. His upper

garment was "checked" and "like a lumber-jacket". He took about $1700 and ran out of the post

office where another man was waiting outside. Two men were then observed running away and

getting into a dark blue Ford sedan.

Mrs Parcell had a clear view of the offender, particularly from the chest up, and she

focussed particularly on his face.

Another witness, Mrs Corliss, also noticed a tattoo on his left hand. She described it as

a blue bird with opened wings, and as being in the area between the forefinger and middle

finger. She also noticed that he wore a checked loosely hung jacket. These witnesses, and

others, made multiple observations of aspects of the appearance of the offender. A summary of

their main observations is included in a schedule appended to these reasons. For the moment

attention will be directed to the tattoo and shirt. Mrs Larson, who was outside the building saw

the get-away. She saw two men running, looking backwards from time to time. One of them

was carrying something under his arm. They ran to the car-park and got into an old dark blue

Ford sedan. She described the car as a bit noisy, although her observation about the noise did

not appear in her original statement. A few weeks later, she inspected the appellant's car at

Goodna Police Station and gave evidence that it was "pretty well exactly the same car that I had

seen at the Plaza", describing the colour and shape as exactly the same.

On the morning after the robbery the appellant was driving his old dark blue Ford sedan

when he was apprehended for a traffic violation. Police had been made aware of details of the

robbery, including the make and colour of the car and the existence of the tattoo. The

uniformed policeman called the CIB who quickly responded. Detective Sergeant Fynes-Clinton

told the appellant that he was investigating the robbery at Redbank Plaza the previous day. The

following conversation ensued:

"Where were you yesterday afternoon?---I was at the pub all yesterday afternoon

with the others.

Where was the car?---The car was getting a new muffler.

Where was the car fixed?---At Mr Muffler at Sumner Park.

What time did you go there?---About 2.30.
What pub did you go to?---The Centenary Tavern.
How long did you stay at the Tavern for?---A couple of hours.
. . . . .

Did you have anything to do with the robbery at the Redbank Plains Post Office yesterday afternoon?---No.

There's one way to sort this out once and for all and that is to take a photo of you
to show to the witnesses. Would you be prepared to give us a photo?
---Yes, I've got nothing to hide. It wasn't me.

What we do is put your photo among eleven others. We don't just show them your photo and say, 'Is that him?'. They've got to pick you out. Are you happy with that?---Yeah."

Sergeant Fynes-Clinton regarded himself as at an early stage of the investigation at that point,

and regarded the proposed exercise as an attempt to eliminate a suspect.

Mr Wakeham, the muffler shop proprietor, failed to support the alibi. The appellant had

certainly brought his vehicle to the shop for repairs to the muffler, but had not done so until 4

p.m, which was more than an hour after the robbery. (His shop is at Sumner Park which is a

neighbouring suburb of Redbank Plains). The appellant, who was wearing a checked shirt, had

driven his car to the shop in company with three other persons. Mr Wakeham had driven them

to the Centenary Tavern leaving them there while he returned to do the repairs. Eventually

about an hour and a half later the appellant had returned, remarking among other things that he

had had a good day at the races and had won $2000. In driving his vehicle out from the

workshop, the appellant had collided with a roller door upright. When the invoice was being

prepared the appellant had given his name as Pat Davies and the registered number of his

vehicle as 510 AIY. (It was really VMS 130.) Mr Wakeham had adequate opportunity and

reason to take good notice of the appellant.

Mr Wakeham, was able to identify the motor vehicle conclusively, having performed repairs on it. He also identified the appellant from the photoboard. He observed however that the photograph showed the appellant's hair to be shorter than it had been on 15 March. When

the police visited the appellant's premises on 17 March they found cuttings of his hair on the top

of the rubbish inside the wheelie-bin. The appellant admitted that he had cut his hair but

claimed to have done so a week previously. It may be noted that Mrs Ryder (a witness at the

post office) observed that the robber had long hair and a cap, and Mrs Corliss described his hair

as falling below his hat. In summary, a number of witnesses say the robber had long hair at the

time of the robbery; Mr Wakeham says that the appellant had long hair later on the day of the

robbery; it is common ground that the appellant had short hair the following day when the

police apprehended him; and cuttings of his hair were found in his wheelie-bin two days after

the robbery.

The appellant gave no evidence in his defence.

The present case is not one in which the only evidence implicating the appellant is

identification evidence by means of a photoboard. A number of additional circumstances are

present including what could be regarded as an attempt to set up a false alibi.

The first ground of appeal is that the learned Trial Judge erred in not exercising his

discretion to exclude the identification evidence. Mr K. Copley QC for the appellant submitted

that although evidence obtained through use of a photoboard identification is admissible in law

the procedure is not acceptable. He submitted that if by any means a line-up could be held, then

evidence obtained by an alternative procedure such as photoboard ought invariably to be

excluded. He relied primarily upon statements in Alexander v. R (1980-1981) 145 CLR 395,

and additionally on the circumstance that since the time of Alexander's case the Police

Commissioner has under the Police Service Administration Act 1990 (s.4.9) issued

Commissioner's Directions concerning procedures used in the identification of offenders. One

such direction is, "Officers are to use identification parades whenever practical" (sic). That

direction appends guidelines for line-ups, mentioning such matters as the nature of the rooms, lighting, recording of the procedure and other protective steps. Section 4.9(3) of the Police

Service Administration Act provides that all police officers must comply in all respects with

such directions. Under the regulations, disciplinary action may be taken against a police officer

who breaches the Commissioner's Directions.

In my view it has not been shown that Sergeant Fynes-Clinton breached the above

direction by proceeding as he did. During the evidence on voir dire he mentioned that his police

station does not have closed rooms or double-sided mirrors, and that he did not have readily

available another eleven people similar to the man described. He further mentioned that a

senior police officer, independent of the investigation, would need to have been brought in

along with a scenes of crime officer to organise the video-recording of such a procedure. In his

opinion, this was not a practicable procedure for the elimination of a suspect at that stage. He

conceded that he had not actually considered holding an identification parade at that point, and

that he had never seen one done.

For present purposes it is enough to say that the sergeant was not in breach of the

direction, and that Mr Copley's argument does not contain the added dimension of "illegality"

through the breach for which he contended.

The essential remaining argument is that photoboard identification has been disapproved

in Alexander and that the time has come when the courts should say that they will no longer

countenance photoboard identification. Although close scrutiny is required whenever this

method is used, a careful reading of Alexander, and of a more recent High Court decision

(Pitkin (1995) 130 ALR 35), fails to support the submission that photoboard identification is

unacceptable.

In truth there is no entirely satisfactory system whereby a witness' recollection can at a

particular moment safely and fairly be applied to the person of the suspect. It has long been

recognised that it is unacceptable that an accused person be charged, brought before a magistrate, and in due course identified by witnesses who were at the scene who answer the

question, "Is this the man?" (Davies and Cody v. R (1937) 57 CLR 170; R v. Chapman (1911)

7 Cr.App.R. 53). The police must produce evidence of an intermediate procedure through

which an observer can be proved to have made a connection between his or her observations

and the accused person in a fair an acceptable way. Although methods so far devised are

imperfect, those which have best survived the concerns of the courts are identification by parade

(or line-up), and identification by showing witnesses a selection of photographs (or photoboard).

The latter procedure is essentially a line-up by means of photographs.

Gibbs CJ regarded an identification parade as "the safest and most satisfactory way of

ensuring that a witness makes an accurate identification" (Alexander p.399-499). His Honour

added:

"However as a matter of legal principle, it seems to me impossible to say that the admissibility of evidence of a prior act of identification depends on the fact that an identification parade was held. As a matter of law it would be equally admissible to prove that an identification was made by a witness who was shown a collection of photographs and selected one which he said was the photograph of the person concerned."

His Honour then stated two grounds of objection to the latter method. The first of these was

that the accused is necessarily absent and has no means of knowing whether there was any

unfairness in the process, or how the identifying witness reacted. In the present case this

objection has been overcome because the police very properly video-taped the photoboard

identification procedures and counsel was able to cross-examine the witnesses at some length

upon their reactions. The second objection is that the production of such photographs from the

possession of the police is likely to suggest to the jury that the accused had a police record. In

the present case there was and can be no such objection because the accused was invited to

permit a photograph to be taken of him for use in this procedure. The jury knew that it was

specially made for use in the procedure and that it did not come from police records.

It may be noted that in Alexander's case the High Court dismissed an appeal that was

based on the ground of using photographs to identify the accused after suspicion had fastened

upon him. In sanctioning this practice, the majority (Gibbs CJ, Mason and Aickin JJ) departed

from English cases which deny the use of photographic identification after the accused has been

taken into custody (R v. Wainwright (1925) 19 Cr.App.R. 52). Gibbs CJ thought however,

consistently with a New Zealand decision that

"Only in exceptional cases should photographs be used at a stage when some particular person is directly suspected by the police and they are able to arrange an identification parade or some other satisfactory alternative means whereby the witness can be asked directly to identify the suspected person".

Mason J (with whom Aickin J agreed) simply rejected the rigid distinction in the English cases

(p.431).

The extent to which suspicion has already fastened upon the accused is only one of

many factors that may influence a decision whether a particular identification has been fairly

undertaken and carried out. In the present case the procedure was instigated at a fairly early

stage of an ongoing investigation, and it does not appear to have been an unreasonable course to

pursue.

Stephen J added a third objection to photographic identification which he described as

"the displacement effect". This recognises the possibility that once a witness sees a photograph,

the memory of it may supplant the memory of the original sighting. Consequently, any

subsequent face-to-face identification such as upon a later identification parade, or in court, may

be devalued or rendered valueless. In the present case, no factor of this kind arises.

In Pitkin (1995) 130 ALR 35, Deane Toohey and McHugh JJ acknowledged the use of

photographs of suspects for the purpose of identifying an offender to be a necessary and

justifiable step in the course of efficient criminal investigation. Its dangers were of course

recognised, and the need for careful scrutiny of it before accepting it as evidence of positive identification was emphasised. However I do not understand Their Honours to require more

than sensitive and careful scrutiny, or to advocate a "line-up or nothing" approach. In that case

the ambiguity of the only viable identifying witness's reference to the photographs was the

decisive factor against the validity of the exercise.

It would be unrealistic to regard line-ups as always preferable to photographic

identification. Some of their unsatisfactory features (both from the point of view of defence and

prosecution) are persuasively described in Glanville Williams The Proof of Guilt, 3rd ed. pp.

120-121. Furthermore in relatively small communities a line-up is likely to be completely

unsuitable because of the high level of personal knowledge of a high proportion of persons

available for comparison. Even in a large community it is easy to understand the difficulty of

assembling at short notice a sufficient number of persons of similar shape, size, physiognomy

and ethnicity as the described suspect. The degree of difficulty will of course vary from case to

case, and this may lead to one method or another being the preferred method for the particular

case. There can be no universal rule that line-ups must be held, although their advantages are

obvious enough, especially the availability of the whole person with the prospect of observance

of some body movement. In the present case however it is fair to say that the principal

objections to photoboard identification are substantially eliminated except for the inherent two-

dimensional disadvantage.

Having said this, the Court remains concerned to ensure that the police treat suspects

fairly and that investigations are conducted so as to avoid miscarriages of justice through

mistaken identification. In the experience of the members of this Court (and, it would seem, of

the learned Trial Judge) the holding of a line-up by Queensland Police is a relatively rare

occurrence. It is unacceptable that a city the size of Ipswich has no proper facility enabling a

line-up to be conveniently held. Also, if the attitude expressed by the investigating sergeant in

this case is widely held, which seems likely, considerable work remains to be done in training and preparation for the use of this procedure. This is not to imply that a line-up will necessarily

always be the best option. Factors such as the stage of the enquiry, urgency, public safety, the

area (country or city), the degree of suspicion, the number of suspects or potential suspects, and

many others may play a part. The Court's concern is that unless the facilities and training are

provided to enable line-ups to be a genuine option in police investigations a proper choice is not

available. A warning should therefore be sounded that continuation of the position as it has

been described in this case will inevitably lead to rejection by the Courts of evidence so

obtained, with undesirable consequences (Alexander at p.410; R v. Burchielli [1981] VR 611,

621). Unless and until police stations in populated areas have a two-room facility with a

double-sided mirror the Commissioner's direction will be an empty exhortation.

In the present case immediately after the robbery the persons who had been present

gathered together in a group and gave what might be regarded as a collective description to

Constable Donald who was the first policeman upon the scene. This factor was able to be

brought out at the trial, and used as an argument for discounting the observations of the eye-

witnesses. The consensus may account for the fact that a number of the witnesses described the

offender as 5'7" or 5'8" tall, whereas the appellant is 6'1". This matter goes against the value of

their evidence irrespective of the means by which further identification took place. It was

however a matter for the jury, and the learned Trial Judge adequately summed up in relation to

its depreciatory effect upon the evidence.

The point was also taken that Mrs Parcell, in identifying the photograph of the appellant

(which was No. 3 on the board) made the comment, "Number 3 I think". She was cross-

examined about this, and although conceding that she had used those words said that she was

quite certain that the photograph was of the person who had done the robbery. Even leaving

aside the fact that identification comes from a number of sources in the present case, Mrs

Parcell's confirmatory evidence in court makes the case very different from Pitkin. Mention was also made of Mrs Parcell's concession in cross-examination that a photograph published in the

press of the suspect (with his face duly obscured) "didn't look like him". These matters of

course were for the jury to assess, but they do not intrinsically deprive her identification of

force.

Some divergence may exist between the majority in Alexander as to the nature of the

discretion which might be called upon to exclude such evidence. All three members of the

majority (Gibbs CJ, Mason and Aickin JJ) agreed that it might be excluded on the grounds of

undue prejudicial effect in relation to probative value. However Gibbs CJ also referred to the

discretion to exclude evidence "if the strict rules of admissibility operate unfairly against the

accused" (p.402). His Honour went on to suggest that if such evidence were admitted by a Trial

Judge, the true question for the Court of Criminal Appeal would be whether it was unsafe and

unsatisfactory to allow the conviction to stand (p.403).

I have concluded that the evidence of the witnesses who were shown the photoboard

was admissible, and that the learned Trial Judge was not bound in the exercise of his discretion

to exclude it on the ground of undue prejudice. Nor in my view should it have been excluded

on the ground that it was unfairly or illegally obtained.

Ground two of the appeal is that the learned Trial Judge erred in ruling that the evidence

was sufficient to support a verdict of guilty. I do not understand that ground to have been

pressed once it is accepted that the identification evidence was properly before the jury.

The third ground of appeal is that the verdict of the jury should be set aside as unsafe

and unsatisfactory.

When the case is looked at as a whole it is quite strong. The attached schedule contains

typical variances in observations of different witnesses. Mrs Corliss' observation of the blue

bird with spread wings is particularly striking, when compared with the appellant's tattoo which

is in evidence by means of a photograph. It was submitted that he also has a tattoo on his fingers, and a similar tattoo on his right hand, but that hardly detracts from what was observed.

It was further submitted that the tattoo also contains some yellow and red colouring; however

the dominant effect seems to be blue. It also happens to have its wings spread in flight. This

feature is a persuasive one, and when it is considered in conjunction with what may be regarded

as satisfactory evidence concerning the car, his checked shirt (which he was shown to have been

wearing not very much later that same day), the circumstances of removal of some of his hair,

his comment to Mr Wakeham that he had just won $2000 at the races (when $1700 had just

been taken from the post office), and the evidence capable of establishing an attempt to set up a

false alibi, there is collectively a satisfactory case.

No complaint is taken as to the summing up. The reasons already given are sufficient to

indicate that it was open to the jury, acting reasonably, to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt

of the appellant's guilt.

The appeal should be dismissed.

SCHEDULE OF WITNESS DESCRIPTIONS

(The accused was 26 years old, 6'1" tall and stocky. Photographs of him appear in exhibits 30 and 35)

WITNESS HEIGHT BUILD AGE SKIN HAIR TATTOO JACKET ETC DIFFERENCES IDENTIFICATIO OPPORTUNIT

ROBBER & N Y

PHOTO

Wakeham	Shorter than	Big	Quite long	Checked	Hair much shorter in	Identified appellant	Close range,
(Muffler Shop)	Wakeham	Broad	fringe & back	flannelette shirt	photo	on photoboard;	relaxed
(185 cm) -	& baggy shorts	identified car	conversation for
179 - 181 cm	through dents &	10 to 15 minutes
muffler

Mrs Parcell	5'7".	Stocky.	Very clear	Dark hair.	Tattoo on left	Checked	Robber had day's	Was sure, but said,	Directly across
Taller than 5'7"	Thought coat	Only recall the	hand above	lumber jacket	growth	"That's number 3, I	service counter.
husband.	made him look	sides	thumb &	think" (sic)	Clear view, chest
bigger	forefinger	Had "no doubt".	up. Focussed on
But said that	face
newspaper photo was "not him".

Mrs Corliss	Can't recall	Not thin. Fairly	Mid 20's around	Light tan	Hair fell	Only saw left	Checked,	Robber's hair was	"I felt it was him".	Staff behind
because did not	heavily built.	26	below hat	hand. Blue bird	loosely hung	different - longer	"Very much like	counter. Staring
stand but leaned	Chubby face.	(never noticed	jacket	him, not absolutely	straight at him
on counter. Not	Covered up.	other colours).	positive". Couldn't	for a few
refer to height	Didn't know if	Between	be 100% sure on a	seconds.
in statement	fat or not.	forefinger &	photo.
Didn't look fat.	middle finger; wing opened
Mrs Balkin	5'8".	Big round face.	Flushed red	Cap.	Checked	Did not ID.	Customer robber
Thought	Could have	or blotchy on	Couldn't	"flannel" or	Thought no. 3 but not	pushed in front
Mr Lynch was	been fat. Can't	white skin.	distinctly see	jockey shirt &	100% sure. Photos
5'8" or 5'9"	say if fat or	One or two	hair	long pants	can be deceptive.
muscle.	pimples.	Saw A at committal
Day's	& became certain of
growth.	ID.
WITNESS	HEIGHT	BUILD	AGE	SKIN	HAIR	TATTOO	JACKET ETC	DIFFERENCES	IDENTIFICATIO	OPPORTUNIT

ROBBER & N Y

PHOTO

Mr Parcell	5'8"; Taller	Stocky, bigger,	25 to 30	Checked	Watched running
than witness	broader	lumber jacket to	for 20 feet
(5'6").	shoulders than	knees
Stooped	witness.
running.	Solid, did not think fat

Mrs Woods	5'8"	Thick-set,	Unshaven	Dark hair with	Lumber jacket	Few seconds
well built; side	cap	flannelette
Coulson
view only. Not	(green)
described as fat
Mrs Ryder	"Average guy"	Long hair &	Heavy coat.	Robber's back
Heavy dressed	cap	Thick clothes	was to witness. Unable to see limbs

Mrs Larson	19 to 25	Car only. (two	Concentrating on
weeks after	car, suspicious
robbery)	movements.
Same colour,	Unaware of
shape. Noisy (like	robbery.
muffler or exhaust)