R v Munday - [2016] VSC 114

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

CRIMINAL DIVISION

S CR 2015 0133

THE QUEEN
v
GARRETH MARK MUNDAY	Accused

---

JUDGE:	T FORREST J
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATES OF HEARING:	5 February, 3, 15 March 2016
DATE OF SENTENCE:	21 March 2016
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	R v Munday
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2016] VSC 114

---

CRIMINAL LAW – Sentence – Recklessly cause serious injury – Early plea of guilty – Likely diagnosis of schizophrenia - Sentenced to 407 days imprisonment considered time served, combined with a three-year Community Corrections Order – No parole period – Standard CCO conditions – Additional conditions including mental health assessment and treatment, drug rehabilitation and treatment, supervision, judicial monitoring.

---

APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Crown	Ms S. Coombes	Office of Public Prosecutions
For the Accused	Ms N. Karapanagiotidis	Victoria Legal Aid

HIS HONOUR:

Mr Munday, you have pleaded guilty to one charge of recklessly causing serious injury.

On 3 February 2015 you brutally assaulted your uncle, Colin Rowlings, with a tomahawk, which you had secreted some months earlier. You were initially charged with attempted murder and, inclusive of today, have served 407 days in custody by way of pre-sentence detention. You were 18 when you committed this crime and suffering from a serious psychiatric illness.

The short background to your offending is as follows. As I understand it, your mother and her brother, Mr Rowlings, share ownership of a small house in Old Belgrave Road, Upper Ferntree Gully. In early 2015, accommodation there was cramped. Your mother, Sharon, shared a room with her partner Mark Van Der Brink. Janet, your sister, had her own bedroom. Your uncle slept mostly on a couch and you also slept on a couch in the kitchen/meals area. Space was tight and over time tempers became frayed.

You and Colin Rowlings did not get along. He would lecture you about your poor attitude around the house. You resented this and you argued with him frequently. During the evening of 2 March into the early morning of 3 March, your arguing became more serious. Your uncle remarked to you that he wouldn’t care if you jumped in front of a train and killed yourself. This is an irresponsible and foolish remark from an adult to a late adolescent. It cannot, however, in any way justify your vicious and grossly disproportionate response.

You retrieved your tomahawk from under a couch in the dining area of the house. Mr Rowlings had his head down preparing food. You stood in front of the couch, swung the tomahawk high and struck your uncle to the top of the head with significant force. He turned around and you repeated your action, this time striking him to the left cheek/eye socket area. You were only prevented from striking Mr Rowlings again by the brave interventions of your sister, Mr Van der Brink and Mr Rowlings himself. Mr Van der Brink pushed you away and you fled the house.

Mr Rowlings…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Munday

Details

AGLC: R v Munday [2016] VSC 114
Case: [2016] VSC 114
Decision Date: 21 March 2016

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v Munday, the appellant was convicted of recklessly causing serious injury to another person. The matter was heard in a court of criminal jurisdiction, where the appellant had pleaded guilty at an early stage. The appellant’s likely diagnosis of schizophrenia was a significant factor considered during sentencing. The court imposed a sentence of 407 days imprisonment, which was deemed to be time served, and a three-year Community Corrections Order (CCO) with no parole period. The CCO included standard conditions as well as additional conditions tailored to the appellant's specific circumstances, including mental health assessment and treatment, drug rehabilitation and treatment, supervision, and judicial monitoring.

The primary legal issues before the court were the appropriate sentencing approach given the appellant's early guilty plea and the nature of the offence, as well as the consideration of the appellant's mental health condition in determining the appropriate terms of the CCO. The court had to balance the need for punishment and deterrence with the requirements of rehabilitation and reintegration into society. The court also had to consider whether the sentence would adequately address the underlying issues contributing to the offence, particularly the appellant's mental health and substance abuse.

In determining the sentence, the court emphasised the significance of the appellant's early guilty plea, which was acknowledged as a mitigating factor. The court recognised the appellant's likely diagnosis of schizophrenia as a critical consideration, highlighting the need for appropriate mental health treatment as part of the sentence. The court also took into account the seriousness of the offence and the need for general deterrence. The court concluded that a combination of time served and a structured CCO, with specific conditions tailored to address the appellant's mental health and substance abuse issues, was the most appropriate sentence. The court was satisfied that this approach would provide the necessary balance between punishment, rehabilitation, and public protection.

The final orders included the imposition of a 407 days imprisonment sentence, considered time served, and a three-year CCO with no parole period. The CCO included standard conditions such as reporting to a corrections officer, obeying all laws, and refraining from alcohol and drug use. Additionally, specific conditions were imposed, including mandatory mental health assessment and treatment, participation in a drug rehabilitation and treatment program, regular supervision, and judicial monitoring. These conditions were intended to address the appellant's specific needs and to ensure that the sentence achieved its rehabilitative and deterrent objectives.

Orders