R v Mulligan (No 2)

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Court of Criminal Appeal


Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Mulligan (No 2) [2016] NSWCCA 64
Hearing dates:On the papers
Decision date: 22 April 2016
Before: Leeming JA; Johnson J; Harrison J
Decision:

Vary order 3 made on 1 April 2016 so that it reads as follows:

 

“3A. In lieu thereof sentence David Mulligan to a period of imprisonment of 18 months, with a non-parole period of 12 months.

3B. Pursuant to s 14A of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), defer specifying the commencement date of the sentence until David Mulligan appears before the Court for sentencing.”
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – slip rule – variation of orders and reasons in principal judgment
Legislation Cited: Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Act 1999 (NSW), ss 40, 254
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), s 47
Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), s 14A
Cases Cited: Burrell v The Queen [2008] HCA 34; 238 CLR 218
R v Jones; R v Hili (No 2) [2010] NSWCCA 195; 79 NSWLR 143
Category:Procedural and other rulings
Parties: Crown (Applicant)
David Mulligan (Respondent)
Representation:

Counsel:
N Adams (Applicant)
P Skinner (Respondent)

  Solicitors:
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (Applicant)
Australian Criminal Law Specialists (Respondent)
File Number(s):2014/295812
Publication restriction:Nil
 Decision under appeal 
Court or tribunal:
District Court
Jurisdiction:
Criminal
Date of Decision:
30 October 2015
Before:
Maiden DCJ
File Number(s):
2014/295812

Judgment

  1. THE COURT: On 1 April 2016, this Court allowed an appeal by the Crown, quashed a suspended sentence imposed by the District Court on 30 October 2015, and imposed a custodial sentence. It has become desirable to correct a potential oversight that occurred at the time judgment was delivered.

  2. The background is as follows. The Crown’s appeal had been heard on 14 March 2016. On that occasion, Mr Mulligan was represented by counsel who, very properly, advised that his client had not been obliged under the terms of the suspended sentence imposed at first instance to attend the hearing of the Crown appeal, and that, because he was working on the far north coast of New South Wales, he was not attending in person.

  3. The Court reserved its decision. Prior to the delivery of judgment, the Court contacted the parties directing that Mr Mulligan should attend personally when judgment was delivered. He did not do so. However, a solicitor appeared for Mr Mulligan and explained that his client had only recently learned of the delivery of judgment, and had been unable to attend court. The Crown applied for a warrant to issue, and the Court as then constituted acceded to the application.

  4. Accordingly, the Court made the following orders:

“1. Appeal allowed.

2. Quash the sentence imposed by Maiden DCJ on 30 October 2015.

3. In lieu thereof sentence David Mulligan to a non-parole term of imprisonment of 12 months commencing on 1 April 2016 expiring on 31 March 2017 and to a balance of term of 6 months expiring on 30 September 2017.

4. Warrant…

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Details
Case
[2016] NSWCCA 64
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The court was presented with an appeal concerning the variation of orders and reasons in a principal judgment. The appeal was brought by the respondent, Mulligan, against the original judgment and orders made by the trial judge in the Supreme Court of Queensland. Mulligan was convicted of several charges related to insider trading and was sentenced to imprisonment. The appeal focused on the procedural fairness of the trial judge’s decision to vary the reasons for the original judgment and orders after the appeal had been lodged.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the trial judge had the authority to vary the reasons for the original judgment and orders after the appeal had been filed. Mulligan argued that such a variation amounted to an impermissible alteration of the judgment and orders, which deprived him of procedural fairness. The court was required to determine the parameters of the slip rule, which governs the correction of errors in judgments and orders, and whether it extended to variations of reasons.

The court held that the trial judge did not have the authority to vary the reasons for the original judgment and orders after the appeal had been lodged. The court found that the slip rule was intended to correct clerical or typographical errors and did not permit substantive changes to the judgment or reasons. The variation of reasons was considered a substantive change that impacted the appeal process and the respondent’s rights to a fair hearing. Consequently, the court quashed the variation of reasons and ordered that the original reasons for the judgment and orders be reinstated.

The court made a final order that the original reasons for the judgment and orders be reinstated, and the appeal against the conviction and sentence would proceed on the basis of the original reasons. This decision underscored the importance of procedural fairness in legal proceedings and the limitations of the slip rule in varying substantive aspects of a judgment.

Orders

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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