R v Muja - [2018] SADC 58

DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal: Application)
R v MUJA
[2018] SADC 58
Reasons for Ruling of His Honour Judge Costello
4 June 2018
EVIDENCE - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - VOIR DIRE
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - DRUG OFFENCES - PROCEDURE - SEARCHES OF PERSONS, PROPERTY OR PREMISES
CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO ADMIT OR EXCLUDE EVIDENCE - EVIDENCE UNFAIR TO ADMIT OR IMPROPERLY OBTAINED
Application to exclude evidence of search of a farmhouse in which the applicant, Muja was residing - police attended farmhouse at night for the purpose of locating two possible suspects (other than Muja) and if so to arrest them - police confronted by presence of locked gate some 100-200 metres from farmhouse - police climbed over gate and approached farmhouse on foot - on arrival at farmhouse police pushed open front door and announced themselves - police then noticed strong smell of chemicals and observed glassware containing possible chemicals - police suspected premises being used as clandestine drug laboratory and entered the farmhouse - at time of entry no police officer was in possession of a search warrant - consideration of lawfulness of entry and search - consideration of discretion to exclude unlawfully obtained evidence.
HELD: In climbing over the gate and proceeding to the farmhouse police were trespassing and thereby acted unlawfully - evidence of the 'fruits' of the search should nevertheless be admitted in the exercise of the Court's discretion - application to exclude evidence refused.
District Court Rules 2014 r 49(1)(e)(h), referred to.
Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427; Halliday v Nevill (1984) 155 CLR 1; Kuru v New South Wales (2008) 236 CLR 1; Bennett v Police [2016] SASC 139; R v Golja [2017] SASCFC 61; Pollard v The Queen (1992) 176 CLR 177; R v Rockford [2015] SASCFC 51; R v Nguyen (2013) 117 SASR 432; Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54, considered.

R v MUJA
[2018] SADC 58
Introduction

Todi Muja (‘the applicant’) is charged with the following offence:
Statement of Offence
Manufacturing a Controlled Drug. (Section 33J(1) of the Controlled Substances Act, 1984).
Particulars of the Offence
Todi Muja between the 9^th day of September 2016 and the 9^th day of October 2016 at Tailem Bend, manufactured a controlled drug, namely methylamphetamine, knowing or being reckless as to the fact the substance was or was to be a controlled drug.
The applicant has filed an application pursuant to the provisions of r 49(1)(e)(h) of the District Court Rules 2014 seeking the following order:
1. That the Prosecution not be permitted to lead evidence of, nor make reference to, the ‘fruits’ of a search conducted at about 10:15pm on Saturday 8 October 2017 (sic) at 6.29 (sic) Westbrook Road, Tailem Bend, South Australia.
The grounds upon which the applicant relies are:
1.1That the search was unlawful in that, police at all material times acted as trespassers. Police had neither leave nor licence…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Muja

Details

AGLC: R v Muja [2018] SADC 58
Case: [2018] SADC 58
Decision Date: 4 June 2018

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Muja involved the applicant, Muja, contesting the admissibility of evidence obtained during a police search of a farmhouse where he resided. The dispute centred on whether the evidence obtained during the search was lawfully obtained and, if not, whether the court should exercise its discretion to exclude it. The case was heard in a court of law in Australia.

The legal issues the court was required to decide were whether the police entry and search of the farmhouse were lawful, and if not, whether the court should exclude the evidence obtained from the search under its discretion. Specifically, the court needed to determine if the police's actions in climbing over a locked gate and entering the farmhouse without a search warrant constituted a lawful entry and search. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the evidence obtained from the search should be admitted, despite the unlawful nature of the search, under the court's discretion.

The court held that the police's actions in climbing over the gate and proceeding to the farmhouse constituted trespassing and were therefore unlawful. Despite this, the court exercised its discretion to admit the evidence obtained from the search. The court found that the entry and search were conducted in good faith and the evidence obtained was directly related to the investigation. Consequently, the application to exclude the evidence was refused.

The final orders of the court were that the evidence obtained from the search of the farmhouse would be admitted, despite the unlawful nature of the police's entry and search. The court's decision hinged on the exercise of its discretion, balancing the need to uphold the integrity of the criminal justice system with the importance of obtaining evidence in criminal investigations.

Orders