R v Mubake - [2025] SADC 58

DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal)
R v MUBAKE
Criminal Trial by Judge Alone
[2025] SADC 58
Reasons for the Verdicts of Her Honour Auxiliary Judge Tracey
26 May 2025
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - PROPERTY OFFENCES - THEFT
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - PROPERTY OFFENCES - PROCEEDS OF CRIME, MONEY LAUNDERING AND RELATED OFFENCES
STATUTES - ACTS OF PARLIAMENT - INTERPRETATION - PARTICULAR WORDS AND PHRASES
The accused was charged with seven counts of theft pursuant to s 134(1) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) (CLCA) and 14 counts of money laundering pursuant to s 138(2) of the CLCA. The accused pleaded not guilty to all counts and elected to be tried by judge alone.
Verdicts:
Guilty of counts 1-9 and 12-21.
Not guilty of counts 10 and 11.
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 130, s 130(3), s 131, s 132, s 134, s 134(1), s 134(1)(c), s 134(2), s 138(1), s 138(2) and s 138(3), referred to.
Police v Smith [2025] SASCA 37; Hocking v Director-General of the National Archives of Australia (2020) 271 CLR 1; Russell v Scott (1936) 55 CLR 440; Parsons v The Queen (1999) 195 CLR 619; Lordianto v Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police; Kalimuthu v Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police [2019] HCA 39; EPA v Sydney Water Corporation Ltd (1997) 98 A Crim R 481; Hayes v Kenning [1992] SASC 3616; Joachimson v Swiss Bank Corporation [1921] 3 KB 110; Croton v The Queen (1967) 117 CLR 326; R v Pfitzner (1976) 15 SASR 171; Johnson v Miller (1937) 59 CLR 467; Kelly v The Queen (2004) 218 CLR 216; SkyeCity Adelaide Pty Ltd v Treasurer of South Australia [2024] HCA 37; R v Tran [2017] SASCFC 99, considered.

R v MUBAKE
[2025] SADC 58

Mr Mubake (the accused) is charged with 7 counts of theft pursuant to s 134(1) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (CLCA), and 14 counts of money laundering pursuant to s 138(2) of the CLCA on an Information dated 16 August 2024. The accused pleaded not guilty to all counts and elected to be tried by judge alone. The charges are as follows:
Count 1:
Offence Details:
Theft. (Section 134(1) of the CLCA).
Particulars
Mugabe Rapheal Mubake on the 30^th day of October 2021 in the State of South Australia, dishonestly dealt with property to the value of $200,000.00, without the consent of Stephen Shane Parry, the owner of that property, intending to permanently deprive the owner of the property or make a serious encroachment on his proprietary rights.
Count 2:
Offence Details:
Theft. (Ibid).
Particulars
Mugabe Rapheal Mubake on the 30^th day of October 2021 in the State of South Australia, dishonestly dealt with property to the value of $250,000.00, without the consent of Stephen Shane Parry, the owner of that property, intending to permanently deprive the owner of the property or make a serious encroachment on his proprietary rights.
Count 3:
Offence Details:
Theft. (Ibid).
Particulars
Mugabe Rapheal Mubake on the 31^st day of October 2021 in the State of South Australia, dishonestly dealt with property namely $50,000.00, without the consent of Stephen Shane Parry, the owner of that property, intending to permanently deprive the owner of the property or make a serious encroachment on his proprietary rights.
Count 4:
Offence Details:
Theft. (Ibid).
Particulars
Mugabe Rapheal Mubake on the 1^st day of November 2021 in the State of South Australia, dishonestly dealt with property to the value of $250,000.00, without the consent of Stephen Shane Parry, the owner of that property, intending to permanently deprive the owner of the property or make a serious encroachment on his proprietary rights.
Count 5:
Offence Details:
Theft. (Ibid).
Particulars
Mugabe Rapheal Mubake on the 2^nd day of November 2021 in the State of South Australia, dishonestly dealt with property to the value of $240,000.00, without the consent of Stephen Shane Parry, the owner of that property, intending to permanently deprive the owner of the property or make a serious encroachment on his proprietary rights.
Count 6:
Offence Details:
Theft. (Ibid).
Particulars
Mugabe Rapheal Mubake on the 2^nd day of November 2021 in the State of South Australia, dishonestly dealt with property to the value of $200,000.00, without the consent of Stephen Shane Parry, the owner of that property, intending to permanently deprive the owner of the property or make a serious encroachment on his proprietary rights.
Count 7:
Offence Details:
Theft. (Ibid).
Particulars
Mugabe Rapheal Mubake on the 3^rd day of November 2021 in the State of South Australia, dishonestly dealt with property to the value of $24,816.09, without the consent of Stephen Shane Parry, the owner of that property, intending to permanently deprive the owner of the property or make a serious encroachment on his proprietary rights.
Count 8:
Offence Details:
Money Laundering. (Section 138(2) of the CLCA).
Particulars
Mugabe Rapheal Mubake on the 30^th day of October 2021 in the State of South Australia, directly or indirectly engaged in a transaction involving property, of the value of $20,000.00, by disposing of that property in circumstances in which he ought reasonably to have known that the property was tainted.
Count 9:
Offence Details:
Money Laundering. (Ibid).
Particulars
Mugabe Rapheal Mubake on the 30^th day of October 2021 in the State of South Australia, directly or indirectly engaged in a transaction involving property, of the value of $20,000.00, by disposing of that property in circumstances in which he ought reasonably to have known that the property was tainted.
Count 10:
Offence Details:
Money Laundering. (Ibid).
Particulars
Mugabe Rapheal Mubake on the 31^st day of October 2021 in the State of South Australia, directly or indirectly engaged in a transaction involving property, of the value of $1,000.00, by disposing of that property in circumstances in which he ought reasonably to have known that the property was tainted.
Count 11:
Offence Details:
Money Laundering. (Ibid).
Particulars
Mugabe Rapheal Mubake on the 31^st day of October 2021 in the State of South Australia, directly or indirectly engaged in a transaction involving property, of the value of $1,000.00, by disposing of that property in circumstances in which he ought reasonably to have known that the property was tainted.
Count 12:
Offence Details:
Money Laundering. (Ibid).
Particulars
Mugabe Rapheal Mubake on the 1^st day of November 2021 in the State of South Australia, directly or indirectly engaged in a transaction involving property, of the value of $200,000.00, by disposing of that property in circumstances in which he ought reasonably to have known that the property was tainted.
Count 13:
Offence Details:
Money Laundering. (Ibid).
Particulars
Mugabe Rapheal Mubake on the 1^st day of November 2021 in the State of South Australia, directly or indirectly engaged in a transaction involving property, of the value of $80,000.00, by disposing of that property in circumstances in which he ought reasonably to have known that the property was tainted.
Count 14:
Offence Details:
Money Laundering. (Ibid).
Particulars
Mugabe Rapheal Mubake on the 1^st day of November 2021 in the State of South Australia, directly or indirectly engaged in a transaction involving property, of the value of $20,000.00, by disposing of that property in circumstances in which he ought reasonably to have known that the property was tainted.
Count 15:
Offence Details
Money Laundering. (Ibid).
Particulars
Mugabe Rapheal Mubake on the 1^st day of November 2021 in the State of South Australia, directly or indirectly engaged in a transaction involving property, of the value of $6,000.00, by disposing of that property in circumstances in which he ought reasonably to have known that the property was tainted.
Count 16:
Offence Details:
Money Laundering. (Ibid).
Particulars
Mugabe Rapheal Mubake on the 2^nd day of November 2021 in the State of South Australia, directly or indirectly engaged in a transaction involving property, of the value of $20,000.00, by disposing of that property in circumstances in which he ought reasonably to have known that the property was tainted.
Count 17:
Offence Details:
Money Laundering. (Ibid).
Particulars
Mugabe Rapheal Mubake on the 2^nd day of November 2021 in the State of South Australia, directly or indirectly engaged in a transaction involving property, of the value of $50,000.00, by disposing of that property in circumstances in which he ought reasonably to have known that the property was tainted.
Count 18:
Offence Details:
Money Laundering. (Ibid).
Particulars
Mugabe Rapheal Mubake on the 2^nd day of November 2021 in the State of South Australia, directly or indirectly engaged in a transaction involving property, of the value of $20,000.00, by disposing of that property in circumstances in which he ought reasonably to have known that the property was tainted.
Count 19:
Offence Details:
Money Laundering. (Ibid).
Particulars
Mugabe Rapheal Mubake on the 2^nd day of November 2021 in the State of South Australia, directly or indirectly engaged in a transaction involving property, of the value of $20,000.00, by disposing of that property in circumstances in which he ought reasonably to have known that the property was tainted.
Count 20:
Offence Details:
Money Laundering. (Ibid).
Particulars
Mugabe Rapheal Mubake on the 2^nd day of November 2021 in the State of South Australia, directly or indirectly engaged in a transaction involving property, of the value of $50,000.00, by disposing of that property in circumstances in which he ought reasonably to have known that the property was tainted.
Count 21:
Offence Details:
Money Laundering. (Ibid).
Particulars
Mugabe Rapheal Mubake on the 3^rd day of November 2021 in the State of South Australia, directly or indirectly engaged in a transaction involving property, of the value of $100,000.00, by disposing of that property in circumstances in which he ought reasonably to have known that the property was tainted.
Prosecution Case
The prosecution allege that the accused dishonestly received over $1,200,000 from the complainant Stephen Parry (Mr Parry), who had transferred those funds into the accused’s Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) account ending ‘090’ (the accused’s primary bank account).
Mr Parry conducted seven separate transactions over five days, under the mistaken belief that he was transferring the funds to the trust account of his conveyancer, Graham Woodhouse (Mr Woodhouse), for the purchase of a property in Hobart. Those seven transactions were made between 30 October 2021 and 3 November 2021 and are the subject of counts 1-7, relating to the charge of theft by receiving the funds from Mr Parry. As at 29 October 2021, the balance in the accused’s primary bank account was $1,450.64.
The prosecution further alleges that upon receiving those funds from Mr Parry, the accused then disposed of a total of $608,000 from the accused’s primary bank account by making 14 separate transfers to other financial accounts, by disposing of the funds in circumstances where the accused ought reasonably to have known that the funds were tainted. Those transfers are the subjects of counts 8-21, charged as the offence of money laundering.
The bank records show that the funds received by the accused and the transactions out of the accused’s primary bank account occurred within a window of five days, between 30 October 2021 and 3 November 2021.
It is alleged that from the total of $608,000 the accused transferred $300,000 to three separate CBA accounts held in his own name, over three separate transactions within a day or two of receiving the funds. These transactions are the subject of counts 9, 12 and 13.
The accused also transferred the sum of $60,000 to an Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (ANZ) trust fund held by his brother, Daniel Aganze Mubake (Aganze Mubake), over three separate transactions. These transactions are the subject of counts 8, 14 and 18.
Another $26,000 was transferred by the accused to the NAB account held by his sister, Joelle Sara Mubake (Joelle Mubake) over two separate transactions. These transactions are the subject of counts 15 and 19.
A further $170,000 was transferred from the accused's primary bank account over three separate transactions to an account he held with CoinSpot, a cryptocurrency trading platform. These transactions are the subject of counts 16, 17 and 21.
A transfer of $50,000 was made to an ANZ account held by Mr Terence James (Mr James) who, on the prosecution case, has no apparent connection to the accused. This transaction is the subject of count 20.
Counts 10 and 11, relate to two separate PayID transactions of $1,000 each, from the accused’s primary bank account to two accounts, in the names of Mohamed Koroma and Badjoko Bunyoma.
The prosecution alleges that subsequent post-offending transactions show what happened to the funds after they were disposed of by the accused. On the prosecution case the relevance of those transactions is to rebut any innocent explanation that the accused was holding the funds for another, or indeed, for himself in safer accounts.
Following the original transactions made by Mr Parry, the CBA was able to freeze and recover over $602,000 from the accused's primary bank account, that is, the remaining funds that were deposited by Mr Parry, which were not the subject of any charged money laundering transfer.
The CBA also recovered an amount of nearly $300,000 from the three other CBA bank accounts held in the accused’s name. The sum of $100,000 was also recovered from the accused’s CoinSpot account, resulting in a total sum of $1,008,150.95 recovered, leaving the sum of $206,665.05 unrecovered.
The initial transfers by Mr Parry to the accused's primary bank account were made in response to a fraudulent email he received from his conveyancer, Mr Woodhouse on 29 October 2021.
The prosecution did not allege that the accused was the sole operator responsible for designing and executing the alleged offending and suggested that it may have been the case that the accused was part of a joint enterprise, and directed by others to provide his bank account for the purpose of receiving Mr Parry's funds as part of a wider scam. The prosecution alleges that at the time the funds were deposited into the accused’s primary bank account, the accused was acting dishonestly in receiving the funds, which he knew did not belong to him.
The prosecution relied on the number of transfers and the significant amounts involved as circumstantial evidence from which it could be inferred that the accused was acting dishonestly. The prosecution submitted that evidence of the transactions the subject of counts 1-7 are cross-admissible in proof of each other and when considered holistically, they allow the inference to be drawn that the funds were received by the accused dishonestly; that is, he received them knowing they did not belong to him. On the prosecution case, when considered holistically, the transactions suggested there was a system or process in place for the accused receiving those funds during the relevant period.
Additionally, the 14 outgoing transactions from the accused’s primary account that are the subject of the money laundering charges totalling $608,000 (counts 8-21), are cross-admissible against each other, and together with the seven counts of theft (counts 1-7), prove that the accused was acting dishonestly.
On the prosecution case, the manner in which the accused dealt with the funds by distributing them to his other personal accounts, including to a cryptocurrency platform and to accounts held by his close family members, rebuts any hypothesis that he innocently came across the funds and then disposed of them honestly.
With respect to the particulars of the charged offences, the prosecution submitted that the property the subject of the charges is particularised on the Information as the monetary amount that was transferred in each transaction.
The definition of ‘property’ in Part 5 of the CLCA includes both ‘money’ and ‘things in action’.[1] Therefore, on the prosecution case, there was no ambiguity or unfairness to the accused as to how the funds which were received into the accused’s primary account were described. The prosecution had made a deliberate decision that the property was described as the monetary value of the funds that were transferred, rather than in any other way on the Information.
[1] S 130 CLCA.
The prosecution called Mr Parry, Mr Woodhouse and the investigating officer, Detective Brevet Sergeant McPherson (DBS McPherson) to give evidence.
An affidavit sworn by Mr James sworn on 10 August 2022 was tendered by consent.
Defence Case
On the defence case, the accused did not, at any point deal with the property owned or particularised as being owned by Mr Parry.
The defence identified that the particulars and the way the Information was drafted was a live issue, particularly with respect to counts 1-7.
Furthermore, with respect to the money laundering offences, the prosecution could not prove the act of disposing of the property in circumstances where a chose in action is only increased or decreased with the bank when a transaction is made, and not actually disposed of.
General Directions
I direct myself as follows:
·The accused is presumed innocent unless and until his guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must prove each element of an offence beyond reasonable doubt, and it is not sufficient for the prosecution to prove a mere suspicion of guilt or that the accused is possibly or probably guilty.
·The accused elected not to give evidence and remained silent in court. He was not bound to give evidence and had the right to decline giving evidence. I have not drawn any inference adverse to him because of his exercise of that right.
·I must bring an open and unprejudiced mind to the case.
·I must assess each witness as to their truthfulness and reliability and I can reject or accept all or a part of a witness’s evidence.
·My use the words ‘proved’, ‘established’ or ‘satisfied’, means to a standard of beyond reasonable doubt.
·I must assess each charge separately in light only of the evidence which applies to it.
Elements of the Offences
Theft: s 134(1) CLCA
In relation to counts 1-7, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt each of the following elements:
Element 1: The accused dealt with property.
Property is defined as:[2]
[2] S 130 CLCA.
real or personal property and includes—
(a)money;
(b)intangible property (including things in action);
(c)electricity;
(d)a wild creature that is tamed or ordinarily kept in captivity or is reduced (or in the course of being reduced) into someone's possession;
Dealing is defined as:[3]
deal—a person deals with property if the person—
(a)takes, obtains or receives the property; or
(b)retains the property; or
(c)converts or disposes of the property; or
(d)deals with the property in any other way;
As such, a charge under s 134 of the CLCA can involve either the accused having stolen the property, or the accused having received stolen property.[4]
[3] S 130 CLCA.
[4] S 134 CLCA.
Element 2: The dealing was dishonest.
Dishonesty is defined as:[5]
[5] S 131 CLCA.
(1)A person's conduct is dishonest if the person acts dishonestly according to the standards of ordinary people and knows that he or she is so acting.
(2)The question whether a defendant's conduct was dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people is a question of fact to be decided according to the jury's own knowledge and experience and not on the basis of evidence of those standards.
(3)A defendant's willingness to pay for property involved in an alleged offence of dishonesty does not necessarily preclude a finding of dishonesty.
(4)A person does not act dishonestly if the person—
(a)finds property; and
(b)keeps or otherwise deals with it in the belief that the identity or whereabouts of the owner cannot be discovered by taking reasonable steps; and
(c)is not under a legal or equitable obligation with which the retention of the property is inconsistent.
(5)The conduct of a person who acts in a particular way is not dishonest if the person honestly but mistakenly believes that he or she has a legal or equitable right to act in that way.

Element 3: The dealing was without the owner’s consent.
Owner of property means—[6]
[6] S 130 CLCA.
(a)     a person who has a proprietary interest in the property other than an equitable interest arising under—
(i)an agreement to transfer or grant an interest in the property; or
(ii)a constructive trust; or
(b)     in relation to property subject to a trust (other than a trust arising from an agreement to transfer or grant an interest in the property or a constructive trust)—a person who has a right to enforce the trust; or
(c)     in relation to property received from or on account of another by a person who is under an obligation to deal with the property or its proceeds in a particular way—the person from whom, or on whose account, the property was received; or
(d)     a person who is entitled to possession or control of the property, (and, if there are 2 or more owners of property, a reference in this Part to the owner is a reference to both or all of them);
The prosecution must prove that the accused acted without the actual or implied consent of the owner, or of a person who had the authority to consent on behalf of the owner. That is, the prosecution must prove that the owner of the property did not agree to the accused dealing with the property.
Element 4: The accused intended to:[7]
[7] S 134(1)(c) CLCA.
(i)    Permanently deprive the owner of the property; or
(ii)     Make a serious encroachment on the owner’s proprietary rights.
Pursuant to s 134(2) of the CLCA:[8]
(2)     A person intends to make a serious encroachment on an owner's proprietary rights if the person intends—
(a)to treat the property as his or her own to dispose of regardless of the owner's rights; or
(b)to deal with the property in a way that creates a substantial risk (of which the person is aware)—
(i)that the owner will not get it back; or
(ii)that, when the owner gets it back, its value will be substantially impaired.
[8] S 134(2) CLCA.
Money Laundering: s 138(2) CLCA
In relation to counts 8-21, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt each of the following elements:
Element 1: The accused engaged in a transaction involving property;
Transaction includes any of the following:[9]
(a)bringing property into the State;
(b)receiving property;
(c)being in possession of property;
(d)concealing property;
(e)disposing of property.
[9] S 138(3) CLCA.
Element 2: The property was tainted property;
Pursuant to s 130 of the CLCA, tainted property is defined as:[10]
stolen property or property obtained from any other unlawful act or activity (within or outside the State), or the proceeds of such property (but property ceases to be tainted when it passes into the hands of a person who acquires it in good faith, without knowledge of the illegality, and for value).
Stolen property means:[11]
property stolen within or outside the State, but property ceases to be stolen property when—
(a)it is restored to the person from whom it was stolen or other lawful custody; or
(b)the person from whom it was stolen ceases to have a right to restitution;
[10] S 130 CLCA.
[11] S 130 CLCA.
Element 3: The accused ought reasonably to have known the property was tainted property.
Agreed Facts
The following facts were agreed between the parties:
1.On 28 October 2021 at 8:47pm, Mr Parry sent an email addressed to Graham Woodhouse at [email protected], requesting trust account details for Graham Woodhouse Conveyancing. That email was copied to billie‑[email protected].
2.On 29 October 2021 at 7:37am, Mr Parry received an email from [email protected], attaching a letter, which contained the following bank accounts:
a.     Account name: M.M.G Woodhouse Conveyancing
b.    Bank: CBA
c.     BSB: [omitted]
d.    Account number: [omitted] [ending] 090
e.     Reference: MB:28957
3.The email sent on 29 October 2021 was not sent by Graham Woodhouse, Graham Woodhouse Conveyancing or any authorised person.
4.An IT technician performed an analysis of the Graham Woodhouse Conveyancing Microsoft Office 365 software and established that one email was sent on 29 October 2021 at 7:37am to Mr Parry. The content of this email could not be recovered from the system.
5.The IT technician concluded that Mr Woodhouse’s password and email account were accessed remotely by an unknown individual.
6.Daniel Aganze Mubake (date of birth: 26 August 1992) is the brother of Mugabe Raphael Mubake (date of birth: 13 December 1999).
7.Joelle Sara Mubake (date of birth: 15 April 2001) is the sister of Mugabe Raphael Mubake.
8.Mugabe Raphael Mubake was the holder of the following account with the CBA:
a.     Account name: Mugabe Raphael Mubake Trading as Mugabe Raphael Mubake
b.    BSB: [omitted]
c.     Account number: [omitted] [ending] 090
9.The account ending in ‘090’ was opened on 16 September 2020.
10.Mugabe Raphael Mubake was the holder of the following account with the CBA:
a.     Account name: Mugabe Raphael Mubake
b.    BSB: [omitted]
c.     Account number: [omitted] [ending] 4771
11.Mugabe Raphael Mubake was the holder of the following account with the CBA:
a.     Account name: Mugabe Raphael Mubake
b.    BSB: [omitted]
c.     Account number: [omitted] [ending] 4585
12.Mugabe Raphael Mubake was the holder of the following account with the CBA:
a.     Account name: Mugabe Raphael Mubake
b.    BSB: [omitted]
c.     Account number: [omitted] 1378
13.Steven Shane Parry was the joint holder of the following account with the CBA:
a.     Account name: [omitted]
b.    Account number: [omitted] [ending] 205
14.Stephen Shane Parry was the joint holder of the following account with the CBA:
a.     Account name: [omitted]
b.    Account number: [omitted] [ending] 770
15.Stephen Shane Parry was the joint holder of the following account with the CBA:
a.     Account name: [omitted]
b.    Account number: [omitted] [ending] 980
16.The following ANZ bank accounts were operating in the name of Aganze Mubake as Trustee for the Sara Investment Trust:
a.     Account number: [omitted] [ending] 046
b.    Account number: [omitted] [ending] 308
c.     Account number: [omitted] [ending] 967
17.The following NAB account was operating in the name of Joelle Sara Mubake:
a.     Account number: [omitted] [ending] 3907
18.Terence James was the holder of the following ANZ bank accounts:
a.     Account number: [omitted]
b.    Account number: [omitted] [ending] 643
19.Mugabe Raphael Mubake opened an account with CoinSpot, a cryptocurrency trading platform, on 18 August 2021.
20.On 2 November 2021 Mugabe Raphael Mubake transferred 0.82030275 BTC to an external wallet which had a value of $68,545.85.
21.A total of $1,008,150.95 was recovered by the CBA and CoinSpot and were returned to Mr Parry.
22.Daniel Aganze Mubake was the director of Bernie Lux Pty Ltd from 11/10/18 until 11/08/22.
Evidence of Mr Parry
Mr Parry is a director of several companies. He resides in Tasmania. In October 2021, he engaged Mr Woodhouse, trading as Woodhouse Conveyancing, or Graham Woodhouse Conveyancing, to assist with the conveyancing for the purchase of a property in Hobart.[12]
[12] T 9.14-9.22.
Mr Parry had engaged Mr Woodhouse as a conveyancer previously. In the past he provided funds to Mr Woodhouse’s trust account via electronic transfer from a bank account that Mr Parry had the authority to operate. He had never encountered any difficulties in sending money to Mr Woodhouse’s trust account.[13]
[13] T 10.13-10.16.
Emails in relation to the purchase of the property
On 28 October 2021, Mr Parry sent an email to Mr Woodhouse, requesting the relevant bank account details for the transfer of the purchase monies because he had not transacted with Mr Woodhouse for about two years.
Mr Parry received an email response[14] with a PDF letter bearing Graham Woodhouse Conveyancing’s details and a letterhead for the conveyancing firm attached.[15]
[14] Exhibit P1, page 2.
[15] Exhibit P1 page 3.
Mr Parry used those account details to transfer the first payment. He did not cross-check the bank account details, but he knew that Mr Woodhouse had always used the CBA.[16]
[16] T 12.31-12.36
As an employee who Mr Parry knew at the conveyancing firm was also copied in on the email, nothing appeared untoward to him.[17]
[17] T 12.37-13.16.
Funds transferred to ‘MMG Woodhouse Conveyancing’
Mr Parry gave detailed evidence with respect to the dates on which he transferred money to Mr Woodhouse, along with the amounts and the accounts from which the money had been sent from.
Unknowingly, Mr Parry transferred his funds to the nominated bank account which was actually, the accused’s primary bank account. This occurred over seven separate transactions from two of Mr Parry’s bank accounts with the CBA. Only he and his wife had access and control over those accounts.[18]
[18] T 13.27-13.29.
Mr Parry had not received a response after transferring the funds to what he thought was Mr Woodhouse’s conveyancing firm, so he made a phone call on or around 3 November 2021 to inquire if the funds had been received and to confirm they were ready for the settlement date. After two or three phone calls, it was established between Mr Parry and Mr Woodhouse, that the funds had not been received by Mr Woodhouse. They agreed to immediately contact the bank and in addition, Mr Parry contacted Tasmanian police.[19]
[19] T 17.26-17.30.
Return of funds from the CBA
Mr Parry discovered that the account number to which he sent the funds did not belong to the Graham Woodhouse Conveyancing Trust Account. After contacting the CBA, Mr Parry eventually received the money he had transferred back, excluding the sum of $206,660.05 which was not recovered.[20]
[20] T 17.35-18.06.
Mr Parry was not cross-examined.
Evidence of Mr Woodhouse
Mr Woodhouse confirmed that he is a conveyancer in Burnie, Tasmania. In October 2021, he was engaged by Mr Parry in relation to a transfer of property in Hobart. He had previously acted for Mr Parry in prior conveyancing transactions.
In relation to the purchase of the property, Mr Woodhouse said that there was ‘quite a bit’ of correspondence between himself and Mr Parry.[21] However, there was no correspondence in relation to the payment of any funds because at that point in time, being the November long weekend, they still had not received settlement figures from the vendor’s solicitor. The settlement statement had not yet been provided to Mr Parry as at the beginning of November 2021.[22]
[21] T 21.22.
[22] T 21.28-21.30.
Monday 1 November 2021 was a public holiday in Northern Tasmania. When Mr Parry contacted Mr Woodhouse’s conveyancing firm on Tuesday 2 November 2021, he discovered that they had not received his funds.[23]
[23] T 22.01-22.09.
Mr Parry told Mr Woodhouse that he had made some inquiries as to whether he could start transferring funds and that he got an email back to say ‘Yes, go ahead’.[24] The email had some trust account details and a bastardised form of their operating name. Mr Woodhouse could not see a record of those emails when he checked his email account, and he engaged an IT expert to investigate.[25]
[24] T 22.15.
[25] T 22.19-22.20.
Mr Woodhouse was shown an email from Mr Parry dated 28 October 2021 at 8.47pm to [email protected]. Mr Woodhouse confirmed that he did not send the email, or authorise someone else to send the email from his email account.[26]
[26] T 24.04-24.09.
Mr Woodhouse first saw the PDF attachment (labelled ‘trustdetail.PDF’) containing the trust details that were forwarded to Mr Parry when Mr Parry sent it to him on the Tuesday. The letter contains the firm’s letterhead, but the trust account details (BSB, account number and account name) were incorrect.
At that time, Mr Woodhouse did not know anyone by the name of Mugabe. The IT consultant determined that the computer system at the firm had been breached.[27]
[27] T 26.06-26.09.
Mr Woodhouse was not cross-examined.
Evidence of DBS Brevet Sergeant McPherson
DBS McPherson was the investigating officer in this matter.[28]
[28] T 27.09-27.11.
As part of the investigation, efforts were made to determine what had happened to Mr Woodhouse’s computer system. It was found that someone had breached Mr Woodhouse’s email account, however, there was no evidence to suggest that the accused was responsible for that IT breach.[29]
[29] T 27.27-27.29.
The IT consultant was able to establish that the original email sent from Mr Woodhouse’s email address was deleted.[30]
[30] T 27.35-27.38.
As part of his investigations, DBS McPherson obtained bank statements from Mr Parry, as well as the bank records relating to the accused’s primary bank account.[31] The balance of the accused’s primary bank account as at 29 October 2021 had been the sum of $1,450.64 and there did not appear to be any significant transactions in the sum of hundreds of thousands of dollars being deposited into that account previously.[32]
[31] T 28.04-28.11.
[32] T 28.18-28.25.
Transfers into the accused’s primary bank account
The seven transfers from Mr Parry’s accounts to the accused’s primary bank account were as follows:
·On 30 October 2021, two transfers totalling $450,000 ($200,000 and $250,000).[33]
·On 31 October 2021, one transfer in the sum of $50,000.[34]
·On 1 November 2021, one transfer in the sum of $250,000.[35]
·On 2 November 2021, two transfers totalling $440,000 ($250,000 and $240,000).[36]
·On 3 November 2021, one transfer in the sum of $24,816.09.[37]
[33] T 29.04-29.11, referring to Exhibit P1, page 19.
[34] T 29.12-29.15, referring to Exhibit P1, page 18.
[35] T 29.16-29.18, referring to Exhibit P1, page 18.
[36] T 29.19-29.24, referring to Exhibit P1, page 18.
[37] T 29.25-29.27, referring to Exhibit P1, page 17.
After further investigation, DBS McPherson found that after the funds were deposited into the accused’s primary bank account, they were transferred to the following six main destinations as follows:
1.Three other CBA accounts in the name of the accused.[38]
2.An ANZ trust fund held by the accused’s brother, Aganze Mubake.[39]
3.A NAB account held by Joelle Mubake.[40]
4.A CoinSpot account held by the accused.[41]
5.An ANZ account in the name of Mr James.[42]
6.Two individuals received PayID transfers to the tune of $1,000 each.[43]
[38] T 29.35-29.37.
[39] T 29.38-30.02.
[40] T 30.03-30.05.
[41] T 30.06-30.07.
[42] T 30.08-30.10.
[43] T 30.15-30.18.
DBS McPherson was unable to determine whether there was any previous financial engagement between Mr James and the accused.[44]
[44] T 30.11-30.14.
Destination 1: Transfers to the accused’s other CBA accounts
From the accused’s primary bank account, the following transfers were made:
·On 30 October 2021, the sum of $20,000 to the accused’s account ending in ‘4771’.[45]
·On 1 November 2021, the sum of $200,000 to the accused’s account ending ‘1378’.[46]
·On 1 November 2021, the sum of $80,000 to the accused’s account ending ‘4585’.[47]
Destination 2: Transfers from the accused’s primary bank account to an ANZ trust fund held by Aganze Mubake
[45] T 31.14-31.19, referring to Exhibit P1, page 18.
[46] T 32.14-32.18, referring to Exhibit P1, page 18.
[47] T 31.09-31.13, referring to Exhibit P1, page 16.
Three transfers, each in the sum of $20,000 were transferred from the accused’s primary bank account to an ANZ trust account ending in ‘046’ described as ‘Sara Investments’, which was an account held in the name of Aganze Mubake.[48]
[48] T 33.12-33.18.
The opening and closing balance of the ANZ account was in the sum of $109.09 for the period of 20 May 2021 to 20 August 2021.
DBS McPherson highlighted five transactions which related to withdrawals from this ANZ account to other accounts held by Aganze Mubake, with the funds further transferred to other accounts, up until February 2022.
Destination 3: Transfers from the accused’s primary account to the NAB account held by Joelle Mubake.
From the accused’s primary bank account, the following transfers were made into Joelle Mubake’s account:
·On 1 November 2021, the sum of $6,000.[49]
·On 2 November 2021, the sum of $20,000.[50]
Destination 4: Transfers from the accused’s primary account to a CoinSpot account held by the accused.
[49] T 39.32-40.03, with reference to Exhibit P1, page 18.
[50] T 39.32-39.37 and T 40.04-40.07, with reference to Exhibit P1, page 17.
DBS McPherson said that the accused had opened an account with CoinSpot using identity cards bearing the accused’s details.[51]
[51] T 42.10-42.19.
From the accused’s primary bank account to a CoinSpot account in his name the following transfers were made:
·On 2 November 2021, the sum of $20,000.[52]
·On 2 November, a pay ID transfer in the sum of $50,000.[53]
·On 3 November, a transfer in the sum of $100,000.[54]
[52] T 42.32-42.35, with reference to Exhibit P1, page 17.
[53] T 42.36-42.38, with reference to Exhibit P1, page 17.
[54] T 43.01-43.03, with reference to Exhibit P1, page 17.
The sum of $70,000 was transferred from CoinSpot to a ‘Binance’ account, being a different cryptocurrency platform. The Binance account was held by an account holder who resided in Sub-Saharan region in Africa. When the $70,000 was transferred to cryptocurrency it was an equivalent to $68,545.85, after transfer fees were deducted.[55]
[55] T 43.31-43.34.
Destination 5: Transfer to ANZ account in the name of Mr James.
An ANZ statement for account ‘643’ in the name of James Terence Derek showed a deposit of $50,000 made on 2 November 2021, described as a payment from ‘Mugabe Mubake’. An amount of $15,000 was sent to Juan Martinez and $30,000 to Andrea Remfrey. Investigations showed that each was a possible money ‘mule’, where they have received money in the past. DBS McPherson confirmed, there was not a lot of information to identify who they actually were.[56]
[56] T 45.06-45.08.
Investigations revealed that Mr James is now deceased. There were no previous dealings between the accused and either Mr Martinez or Ms Remfrey.
Destination 6: PayID transfers of $1,000 from the accused’s primary account
A transfer for $1,000 was made on 31 October 2021 to Badjoao Bunyoma, described in the bank statement as ‘Female Best Dressed prize’.[57] There was a second outgoing transaction for $1,000 made on 31 October 2021 to a Mr Mohamed Koroma described as ‘Male Best Dressed prize money’.[58] DBS McPherson conducted an investigation as to the identity of those people through SAPOL and internationally. While there were ‘quite a few’ under Koroma, mainly New South Wales and WA, there were no holdings for Bunyoma.[59]
[57] T45.20-45.25, with reference to Exhibit P1, page 18.
[58] T 45.26-45.32, with reference to Exhibit P1, page 18.
[59] T 45.3345.38.
DBS McPherson arrested the accused on 11 August 2022 and seized his laptop and mobile phone. No relevant evidence on those devices was found.[60]
[60] T 46.03-46.07.
Cross-examination
In cross-examination, DBS McPherson confirmed that there was a deposit in the amount of $940.50 on 21 October 2021 with the reference ‘Fashion Gala’. He confirmed that no police inquiries were made in relation to an Adelaide ‘Fashion Gala’.
On 20 October 2020, there were two transfers from bank account in the amount of $1,000, each referenced ‘Best Dressed Prize’. These amounts are the same as the transfers on 31 October 2021.[61]
[61] T 46.19-46.32.
Aside from the transfers that DBS McPherson identified as coming from Mr Parry, he said that he did not see any other transfers in this bank account that caused him concern at around the time of the transfers. The accused’s primary bank account was set up in the name of the accused using his identification documents.[62]
[62] T 47.17-47.19.

Sara Investments was an account that he ultimately determined was held in the name of Aganze Mubake. There was no evidence to suggest that the accused had access to that account. This was one of several accounts held by Sara Investments.[63]
[63] T 47.31-47.34.
DBS McPherson confirmed that he identified accounts ending ‘046’, ‘967’ and ‘308’ as being held by Aganze Mubake.[64] There was no evidence to suggest that the accused had access to those accounts. DBS McPherson also confirmed that he identified a discretionary trust deed involving three companies, being Bernie Lux Pty Ltd, Bernie Lux Capital Pty Ltd and Tim Bouc Pty Ltd.[65]
[64] T 47.35-48.05.
[65] T 48.12-48.19.
DBS McPherson identified Aganze Mubake as the brother of the accused who was born on 26 August 1992. He determined that Aganze Mubake was the sole director of Bernie Lux Pty Ltd and the account holder of the three Sara Investment trust accounts with ANZ. Bernie Lux Pty Ltd had accounts with ANZ, and Aganze Mubake was identified as the account holder.[66] There was no evidence to suggest that the accused had control of those accounts.[67]
[66] T 48.35-49.01.
[67] T 49.02-49.04.
DBS McPherson confirmed there were also Bendigo Bank accounts held by Bernie Lux Pty Ltd. They were operated by Aganze Mubake. There was a further Westpac account in the name of Bernie Lux that was held by Aganze Mubake and another account with Suncorp in Aganze Mubake’s account.[68]
[68] T 49.10-49.15
DBS McPherson confirmed that there was a total of $26,000 transferred by the accused to his sister Joelle Mubake, who transferred a portion of those funds, being $18,000, to Sara Investments. There was no evidence that the accused had any control or access to Joelle Mubake’s account. Joelle Mubake also transferred $2,000 to Tim Bouc Pty Ltd on 3 November 2021. Aganze Mubake was the majority shareholder and sole director of that company.[69]
[69] T 49.34-50.03.
DBS McPherson seized documents from Adelaide Business Accountants on 18 August 2022 relating to Bernie Lux Pty Ltd, Bernie Lux Capital and Tim Bouc Pty Ltd. One of the documents seized was a trust deed showing that Aganze Mubake was the director of those companies.[70]
[70] T 50.12-50.14.
DBS McPherson confirmed nothing of evidentiary value was found on the accused’s laptop and phone. The initial compromise of GM Woodhouse came from the IP address ‘20.37.246.254’. That IP address was identified as originating from a Microsoft server in Canberra. DBS McPherson made inquiries as to the origin or details of that IP address. As those inquiries can take up to two or more years, he ultimately decided not to pursue any further investigations into that IP address.[71]
[71] T 50.33-51.03.
DBS McPherson said that he had been an officer at the Serious and Organised Financial Cyber Crime Investigation Branch for over 10 years and has investigated numerous cybercrime matters. He confirmed that he is familiar with various scams or attempted scams. He agreed that scams can include online dating scams which are linked with and financial scams and often involve the scammer building a level of trust with the potential victim and are well-rehearsed or scripted. Telephone calls are often made to businesses or individuals, and they may pretend to be an overseas investor. Many scammers use actual mules through romance scams so the financial scams will have different mules already set up to receive the funds. The mule is likely lulled into a false sense of security, so they do not necessarily know that they are doing anything wrong.[72]
[72] T 52.17-52.22.
DBS McPherson identified that Mr James had previously been a scam victim, prior to him receiving the $50,000. He said that it is not uncommon for scammers to use multiple innocent accounts to transfer money. Mr James might then transfer some money to another scam victim before it is transferred to the intended scammer.[73]
[73] T 52.34-52.37.
He said there are numerous examples of these types of scams. They obviously target certain types of people, mostly the elderly and young people. The idea of the scam is to make sure that the target, the victim, does not think they are doing anything wrong.[74]
[74] T 53.19-53.22.
Mr James was a victim in this matter. DBS McPherson identified that Mr James transferred two amounts to other ‘money mules’. That was Remfrey and Martinez. From the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre information, DBS McPherson determined that they appeared to be money mules. They were receiving funds from other sources and that money was being passed on again, so DBS McPherson could only presume that they were not going to make any profit and were likely victims of a scam.[75]
[75] T 56.21-56.23.
DBS McPherson had executed a general search warrant at Adelaide Business Accountants on 18 August 2022 and seized documents. From those documents he identified an IG account. IG was a share trading platform, with offices in Melbourne and Sydney.[76]
[76] T 57.13-57.21.
DBS McPherson had identified a withdrawal from a Bendigo Bank account held by Bernie Lux Capital on 3 November 2021 in the amount of $55,000 into IG Markets.[77] DBS McPherson determined that the IG account was held in the name of Aganze Mubake.[78]
[77] T 57.30-57.33, referring to Exhibit P1, page 197.
[78] T 57.34-57.36.
DBS McPherson located the application form and account details which included an application on behalf of Aganze Mubake dated 18 September 2020. There was no evidence to suggest that the accused had control over the IG account.[79]
[79] T 58.04-58.06.
One of the documents seized by DBS McPherson from Adelaide Business Accountants was a Bernie Lux group structure document.[80] It described a number of companies and shareholding from trusts that he had given evidence about. The individual trustee for Sara Investment Trust is Aganze Mubake.
[80] Exhibit D2.
In relation to the $1,000 transfers to Mr Badjoko Bunyoma and Mohamed Koroma, DBS McPherson identified that Mohamed Koroma resided in Port Adelaide.[81]
[81] T 59.36-59.38.
When DBS McPherson gave his initial statement on 13 January 2023, inquiries with respect to Mr Koroma were continuing, but DBS McPherson had not, at that point, followed up on those further inquiries.[82]
[82] T 60.01-60.09.
DBS McPherson said that he had sought several banker’s orders in the matter but had not contacted any bank other than the CBA in relation to the accused.
He did not make inquiries about the accused’s employment, nor did he check with the CBA the accused’s daily transfer limit as at 30 October 2021. He was unsure as to whether the CBA conducted their own investigation into this matter. He did not inquire with them whether the accused had provided an account to the CBA regarding these funds.[83]
[83] T 61.09-61.12.
DBS McPherson said that he was not sure where Aganze Mubake was residing as at 31 October 2021. Information revealed that he resided either Canberra or at West Lakes.[84]
[84] T 61.13-61.19.
From DBS McPherson’s review of the documents provided by Adelaide Business Accountants, he established that Aganze Mubake was operating a financial business, investing clients’ funds in shares.[85]
[85] T 61.24-61.29.
DBS McPherson confirmed there was no evidence to suggest that the accused retained any of the monies in this matter because they were all refunded. Of the $200,000 that was not refunded, the evidence does not suggest that it was retained by the accused.[86]
[86] T 61.35-61.38.
DBS McPherson confirmed that some scams might include the hacking of an email, the hacking of someone’s personal information or the hacking of someone’s passwords and bank details.[87]
[87] T 62.10-62.18.
Affidavit of Terence Derek James sworn on 10 August 2022
In his affidavit (Exhibit P3), Mr James stated that around June/July 2021, he began an online relationship with a female calling herself Kellie Ellis (Ellis). Around 21 July 2021, Ellis asked for assistance to help pay her offshore taxes. Between 15 July 2021 and 23 August 2021, Mr James transferred the sum of $6,150 to Ellis’ bank account.
Between 15 July 2021 and 2 August 2021, he transferred the sum of $14,910 to a person named Bermudez Giraldo’s bank account. He believed that he was instructed to transfer the monies to that account by Ellis.
Between 27 September 2021 and 18 October 2021, he transferred the amount of $7,600 in six payments to Andrea Remfrey’s bank account. He was provided Remfrey’s bank accounts by Ellis.
Between 3 and 4 November 2021, he transferred the amount of $15,000 to Juan Martinez. Following reviewing his bank statements which identified the transactions, he had sent $43,660.
On 3 November 2021, he received the amount of $50,000 from a Mugabe Mubake. The funds were transferred to his ANZ account. He said he thought the $50,000 payment was repayment and interest for lending the funds to Ellis. He then received instructions to send the funds to Matinez and Remfrey. He complied with the request, sending $20,000 to Juan Martinez and $30,000 to Andrea Remfrey on the same day.
Mr James stated that he realised he was a victim of a scam but was not aware at the time.
Counsel Addresses
I received written submissions from defence counsel and heard oral submissions from both prosecution and defence counsel. Following the decision in Police v Smith,[88] I heard further submissions from both counsel.
[88] [2025] SASCA 37.
Prosecution Address
The prosecution described the legal arguments concerning particulars and definitions as ‘a secondary and unhelpful distraction’. The key issue in the trial was whether the accused acted dishonestly.
It was submitted that the bank records painted a clear picture in terms of the prosecution case. There was no challenge to Mr Parry being the owner of the funds in the two CBA accounts that he used. At all times Mr Parry was the joint holder of the accounts with his wife and had access or control over the property of the funds in those accounts.
The prosecution argued that it is clear from the evidence that the email sent from Mr Woodhouse’s email address was unauthorised and common ground that someone altered the account name and number. The prosecution did not submit that the accused was the architect of the scam or that he had accessed Mr Woodhouse’s email account or indeed, directed someone else to do so. On this issue, the prosecution accepted that there was a paucity of evidence. However, the evidence viewed in combination, pointed to the accused being part of a scam involving a system or process to defraud Mr Parry of his funds.
It was submitted that there was no other reasonable explanation for the movement of funds into the accused’s primary bank account, his other bank accounts, his CoinSpot account or the accounts of his siblings.
There is no dispute that the $1,214,816.09 ended up in the accused’s primary bank account. The obvious inference given that the accused was the holder of that account, is that he had access and control over the funds in that account.
The accused dealt with Mr Parry’s property by receiving those funds in the knowledge that they did not belong to him and were not his funds to deal with. The Court was urged to infer that the accused had this knowledge and therefore acted dishonestly, because of the number, volume and frequency of transactions over the relevant five-day window.
While it might be a different scenario if there was only one deposit into the accused’s account, which sat in that account for a few days before being reversed, in this instance the accused disposed of the funds by transferring them to various other accounts, which on the prosecution case, provides compelling circumstantial evidence that the accused acted dishonestly when receiving the deposits from Mr Parry.
It was submitted that the total number and frequency of the outgoing transactions from the accused’s primary account which are the subject of the monies laundering charges which rebuts any innocent explanation that might be advanced for the accused receiving Mr Parry’s funds such as a mistaken belief that he had a lawful right to deal with those funds.
Counts 9, 12 and 13 comprise of the $300,000 that was transferred from the accused’s primary bank account to three of his other accounts with the CBA. They occurred within two days of receiving a large portion of Mr Parry’s funds. The sum of $20,000 was deposited on 30 October 2021 to his account ending 4771, and a further $80,000 transferred to his NetBank saver account ending 585. The prosecution argue that the accused then became emboldened, transferring $200,000 on 1 November 2021 to his account ending in 378.
On the prosecution case, those transactions reflect the accused disposing tainted property or stolen property by transferring funds which belonged to Mr Parry from the accused’s primary bank account. The overwhelming inference is that the accused was putting aside his share of the profit from the scams. That is, the prosecution argued, why the ‘funds’ are being moved to the accused’s other personal accounts and points to his knowledge that he was dishonest in receiving the original deposits from Mr Parry.
Similarly, the three transactions to the accused’s CoinSpot account the subject of counts 6, 17 and 21 were for the accused’s personal benefit.
In the prosecution submission, the fact three transactions were made from the accused’s account into cryptocurrency to purportedly maximise the financial benefit to him, illustrates the scope of the accused’s dishonesty in receiving and disposing of those funds, albeit we know that the sum of $70,000 ($20,000 and $50,000) was transferred into an external wallet to someone in West Africa and that there is no further evidence about that person.
The sum of $60,000 was transferred over three instalments of $20,000 each to the ANZ trust account held by the accused’s brother Aganze Mubake. Those transactions are the subject of counts 8, 14 and 18 and refer to the ANZ account ending 046. The prosecution submit it is clear from the banking records, that the $60,000 was quickly dispersed to various other accounts with a significant sum ending up in shares on the IG Markets trading platform.
The prosecution submitted that the evidence is capable of excluding as a reasonable possibility, that Aganze Mubake was the main player who was just using his younger brother without the accused’s knowledge.
The sum of $26,000, over two transactions was sent to the NAB account held by Joelle Mubake and was reflected in counts 15 and 19. Those transactions are referred to as ‘return’ and ‘payback of loan’. The record shows that on the same day, that is 2 November 2021, $20,000 was transferred into Joelle Mubake’s other account with NAB.
The prosecution submits that the transfer of funds from the accused’s account to his siblings further demonstrates that his conduct was dishonest in receiving the funds from Mr Parry, and that he was sharing his profit obtained from playing his part in the scam.
Those transactions themselves constitute offences of money laundering. That is, the accused was disposing of the funds by transferring them to other accounts in circumstances where he reasonably ought to have known that the funds were tainted.
With respect to the single transfer to Mr James’ ANZ account. reflected in count 20, Mr James was a victim of a romance scam. His funds were sent to accounts in the names of Ellis, Geraldo, Martinez and Remfrey prior to receiving $50,000 from the accused’s account. Mr James then sent the $50,000 to Martinez and Remfrey. There is an absence of evidence to establish who those people were and what role, if any, they had to play in any scam. The prosecution does not say that the accused was the mastermind behind this particular romance scam. He was, however, part of the system or process in which he received funds dishonestly that were then disposed of and in this instance, by transferring them to an account held by Mr James.
The remaining transfers out of the accused’s primary account are the two transfers on 31 October 2021 of $1,000 each, which are the subject of counts 10 and 11. There are no banking records or any evidence relating to those individuals.
There were previous transfers to a Mr Mohamad Koroma on 27 October 2021 totalling $280. However, the relevant transactions on 31 October 2021 were made following three deposits by Mr Parry totalling $500,000 and immediately following a $50,000 deposit. The prosecution argues that notwithstanding that there was a deposit of $3,780 from GS Projects about which there is no further evidence, I can find that those two transfers of $1,000 were part and parcel of the tainted property which the accused received from Mr Parry in the preceding day. There was a remaining $602,000 from the original deposits that was reversed from the accused’s primary account on 7 November 2021.
Whilst I must not speculate about what might have happened to those funds, given the speed with which the CBA was able to recover the funds, the accused simply may not have gotten around to disposing of those funds because they were recovered within such a short timeframe.
Ultimately, when assessing the 14 outgoing transactions, the subject of the money laundering charges, it is clear, the prosecution argues, that those transactions involved tainted property, that is, funds belonging to Mr Parry and that the transactions were made in circumstances where the accused ought reasonably to have known the property was tainted. Those circumstances are the deposit of over $1,200,000 into his account for the seven transactions which did not belong to him, revealing his involvement in the scam. In other words, the charges of theft (counts 1-7), can be used as circumstantial evidence to infer that the accused ought to reasonably have known that the funds he was transferring out of his account was tainted property. Those 14 outgoing transactions are also cross‑admissible against each other so when they are viewed together, the frequency of the transactions and the nature of their destinations being to the accused’s other personal accounts and to his siblings’ accounts, leads to the only available inference that he ought to have reasonably known he was disposing of funds that were tainted.
The prosecution also submitted that those 14 outgoing transactions and the post offending transactions can be used as circumstantial evidence to find that the accused was knowingly dishonest when he received $1,200,000 from Mr Parry. It is the volume and the nature of those transactions which point to the accused’s dishonest conduct according to the standards of ordinary people and that he knew his conduct was dishonest.
The prosecution submitted that it has adequately particularised its case and that there has been no mystery about the property that is alleged to have been dealt with by the accused. The prosecution argued that it has always been clear that with respect to counts 1-7, it is theft by receiving those funds into the accused’s primary bank account, particularised on the Information as property to the value of whatever the amount in the particular transaction.
The term ‘funds’ was used deliberately as synonymous with property to encompass both money sitting in a bank account and an intangible chose in action. Section 132 of the CLCA includes both of those things within the definition of ‘property’.[89] Accordingly, on the prosecution case there is no vagueness or confusion from how the prosecution has pitched its case.
[89] S 132 CLCA.
It was submitted that at all times the prosecution has said it is the act of receiving dishonestly the funds that ended up in the accused’s primary bank account. It is quite clear that Mr Parry did not consent to his funds being transferred.
Pursuant to s 130(3) of the CLCA, a transaction includes disposing of property, which is the particular alleged with respect to counts 8-21.[90] That is, that the accused disposed of funds belonging to Mr Parry by transferring them to various other accounts. The prosecution argued that it has proved that those funds were disposed of when they arrived in either the accused’s primary bank account or other bank accounts. The prosecution says it matters not whether those funds are labelled as money or a chose in action, as they are talking about the same thing. It is money sitting in a bank account which then entitles the creditor, the rightful owner, to take legal action against the bank for recovery.
[90] S 130(3) CLCA.

The relevant definitions in the CLCA are, it is submitted, deliberately broad to encapsulate the different ways someone can commit theft and money laundering and are sufficiently broad and flexible to encapsulate the conduct that has occurred here. The prosecution say there has not been any ambiguity or confusion in how the prosecution have run their case.
The contemporary application of Part 5 of the CLCA recognises how money or funds, which is the neutral term deployed in the trial, are dealt with in contemporary society. That is, the use of hard currency, cash and coins is less frequent and it is now more common to see electronic transfers and PayID transactions.
It was suggested that I might some comfort in the High Court authority of Hocking v Director General of the National Archives of Australia,[91] where it was observed that property is not a term of art with a precise meaning but is better understood as a bundle of rights which can be enforced by the rightful owner against others.
[91] (2020) 271 CLR 1.
Defence Submissions
The defence case was that the prosecution has failed to prove the case both as a matter of a law in the way the charges had been particularised, and in the manner with which the evidence was presented.
The defence argued that once Mr Parry affected the electronic fund transfers, his property did not transfer to the accused. Instead, the accused’s chose in action with the CBA increased, potentially as a theft as against the CBA. At no point has the accused taken any property of Mr Parry, unless of course he is somehow involved in the deception, or the manipulation of the trust details. Here, it is conceded, by the prosecution that there is no evidence that the accused was involved in that IT breach.
The prosecution argues that the theft offences relate to the accused ‘receiving the funds transferred by Mr Parry’, while the money laundering charges reflect the ‘transfer of funds from the accused’s account to various other accounts. This, the defence argued, appears to suggest the property involved in each of the categories of charges are various ‘funds’ which the defence says, is unclear terminology as a matter of law. The prosecution repeatedly stated that the term ‘funds’ was used to avoid ambiguity, as it could be money sitting in the bank or it could be a chose in action. Defence counsel submits this raises a level of ambiguity and also mistakes High Court authority that there is no money in the bank sitting there ready to be stolen in the old fashion sense.
In Russell v Scott a ‘bank account’ was described as nothing more or less than a chose in action, consisting ‘in the contractual right against the bank, i.e., in a debt, but a debt fluctuating in amount as monies might be deposited and withdrawn.[92]
[92] (1936) 55 CLR 440.
In Parsons v The Queen the High Court said:[93]
But, though in a popular sense it may be said that a depositor with a bank has ‘money in the bank’, in law he has but a chose in action, a right to recover from the bank the balance standing to his credit in account with the bank at the date of his demand, or the commencement of action… the money deposited becomes an asset of the bank which may use it as it pleases.
[93] (1999) 195 CLR 619.
It is, defence argued, a mistake in law to suggest that in the context of electronic funds transfers (EFT), that ‘money’ is exchanged, or to confuse the intangible rights of a bank account holder with some physical asset capable of receipt or asportation.
Even if the property involved in each charge is an intangible chose in action, it is important to understand what occurs regarding that property in the specific instance of an EFT. The majority in Lordianto v Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police; Kalimuthu v Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police (Lordianto) said: [94]
In a typical transaction for the payment of a debt or the transfer of money, there is no delivery of a physical asset in the form of notes and coins but a transfer through the electronic clearing and settlement systems used by the banking industry.
The originator's title to "money" is not transferred. The transfer operates by adjusting the total amount of the debts owed by the participants, the banks, to each other by a process which the banks commercially describe as "netting". It is a process whereby a series of obligations between two participants is replaced with a single obligation which is calculated by adding all of the obligations owed by each participant to the other and deducting the smaller from the larger. On any one day, the netting involves multiple participants in the industry, often using clearing houses, which operate as multilateral contracts. The process of netting determines the net sum which each bank owes to each other in the clearing system, which is then settled.
There are a number of consequences. First, when an originator instructs a bank to make a transfer from their account, the chose in action representing that credit balance is extinguished or reduced by the amount of the transfer. Second, a fresh chose in action is created, or the value of an existing chose in action is increased, for the beneficiary which entitles them to withdraw an equivalent amount from their bank, subject always to the terms of their contract with their bank. Third, the property the beneficiary acquires is wholly distinct from the property which the originator had before the transfer.
[94] [2019] HCA 39.
While the defence accepts that a chose in action is ‘property’ for the purposes of the definition in s 130 of the CLCA, it is unclear, defence argued, whether the prosecution asserts that the term ‘funds’ refers to this.
In the event the prosecution may seek to disavow itself of the constraint it has placed by way of the particulars of the Information and submit it must only prove a transaction has been engaged in regardless of the type or species, the defence argued, in line with Gleeson CJ in EPA v Sydney Water Corporation Ltd, that whilst usually the prosecution is only required to establish the elements of an offence, there may be circumstances arising out of the manner in which the case is conducted which will make it unfair or oppressive to an accused person to permit the prosecution to depart from its particulars.[95]
[95] (1997) 98 A Crim R 481 at [484].
According to the prosecution, the thefts relate to the seven EFT’s by Mr Parry, pursuant to the altered trust details. Understanding that an EFT involves the account holder dealing with their intangible legal right to recover from the bank, consequently, the defence argues, impacts the consideration of whether the elements of the charged offence have been proved beyond reasonable doubt. If the prosecution alleges what has been dealt with are ‘funds’, there arises an issue as to what species of ‘property’ this term relates. No physical notes or coins have been exchanged in the offending period.
It is submitted that even if the prosecution articulates that the property the subject of the thefts was a chose in action, to prove the thefts, the prosecution must establish that the accused dishonestly dealt with the property of Mr Parry without his consent. It cannot be said that the accused ever ‘dealt’ with Mr Parry’s property. Mr Parry himself instructed the bank to adjust the total debt owed to him by the various amounts specified on each occasion, which necessarily reduced the value of the chose in action held by Mr Parry.
The consequence of that demand was only to increase the value of the accused’s existing right against the CBA. The accused did not acquire any new property in the sense of now possessing something Mr Parry previously had (as would be the case in a physical taking of property). The property Mr Parry dealt with originally was wholly distinct from the property which the accused had, either before or after the transfers were demanded.
It would, the defence argued, be different altogether if there was evidence that the accused himself purported to exercise the rights of Mr Parry to instruct a transfer involving his account. Here the accused was simply the beneficiary of the dealings with property undertaken by Mr Parry himself. The accused did not have to deal with any property or moreover do anything for the value of his chose in action against the CBA to increase in value. The defence argued that there is no evidence that the accused dealt with the property and importantly, DBS McPherson conceded that there was no evidence to suggest the accused was responsible for the IT breach which led Mr Parry to conduct his EFT’s.
Accordingly, it cannot be proved that the accused ever dealt with, let alone dishonestly or without consent, the particular property of Mr Parry that is involved in a transaction of this type. The prosecution case fails to prove that element of the offence charged as a matter of law.
With respect to the money laundering charges, each of the offences allege that the accused engaged in a transaction by disposing of property he ought reasonably to know was tainted property. It is, the defence argued, of interest to note that the prosecution sought to prove that the accused acted dishonestly as it relates to the thefts but have determined not to charge him pursuant to s 138(1) of the CLCA, perhaps reflecting their own concerns about the paucity of evidence as it relates to the thefts.[96]
[96] S 138(i) CLCA.
The prosecution alleged the accused engaged in the disposal of tainted property. Disposing of property is defined as a transaction for the purposes of the CLCA.[97] The defence submitted that while the Information did not particularise the property alleged to be involved in the transaction undertaken by the accused, the prosecution has particularised the transactions as involving ‘the transfer of funds’. This phrase, the defence argues, envisages a physical transfer of tangible assets, like the handing over of money or the delivery of a bag of coins, which is not the case here.
[97] S 138(3) CLCA.
The Information in this matter has been subject to scrutiny and amendment by the Crown. It would be wrong to conclude that the decision to specify the particular transaction type ‘by disposing of that property’ is not the result of a considered and deliberate forensic decision. Indeed, as much was conceded by the trial prosecutor in his opening.
It would be wrong in those circumstances to broaden the scope of the prosecution case and the one that the accused has come to trial to meet.
The defence argued that if the property asserted by the prosecution in each instance where the accused effected a transfer is the accused’s chose in action, there arises an issue whether his actions can be proved to amount to disposing of the property he ought reasonably to know was tainted.
This, the defence argued, was because a bank account is nothing more or less than a chose in action, consisting ‘in the contractual right against the bank, i.e., in a debt, but a debt fluctuating in amount as monies might be deposited and withdrawn’.[98]
[98] (1936) 55 CLR 440.
Defence argued that their argument is somewhat simple, and boils down to that a chose in action is only increased or decreased as a transfer occurs. The chose in action is only extinguished if the entirety of the funds are withdrawn.
The result of the ‘operator’ of the bank account actioning the EFT was that the chose in action representing the credit balance of the accused’s primary bank account, was reduced by the amount of the transfer each time. However, at no time did the operator of the accused’s primary bank account dispose of or extinguish the chose in action the accused held in relation to the accused’s primary bank account. If the result of the transfers was a reduction in value of the accused’s property rather than an extinguishment of the right altogether, it follows that at no point did the accused dispose of the property, he ought reasonably to have known it was tainted property. As Duggan J stated in Hayes v Kenning, if a material averment in the complaint itself has not been proved, then a prosecution must fail.[99]
[99] [1992] SASC 3616.
The defence argued that at no point did the accused dispose of his chose in action against the CBA because it is simply increasing and decreasing. No tangible asset is going in or out. As a matter of law, the prosecution has not met the particulars that they have come to address or to prove.
Defence counsel submitted that the prosecution have asked me to infer that the accused ought reasonably to have known and rely on the size of the transfers and the frequency, however, the prosecution has not provided evidence about the accused’s employment or income. While there is a reference in the bank records to a sum of nearly $600 with a reference to payroll, whether that was the accused’s only job is unknown. While accepting that if the accounts investigated by police are the only bank accounts, and the amounts are very large for someone who appears to be of limited means, we do not know how many bank accounts the accused has, or the dates those accounts were opened, other than the accused’s primary bank account. There is no evidence as to the daily limit, which the defence says the accused plainly did not reach.
Ultimately, defence submit that prosecution is inviting me to make inferences in what is an inadequate police investigation and inadequate prosecution. The police failed to follow up one of the people the subject of the transfer of $1,000 and we do not know the daily limits of these accounts. Defence counsel submits that the accounts were set up in the accused’s name, which does not point to someone trying to avoid detection. To the contrary, the accused’s behaviour over the five days points to someone that is acting completely honestly, with no trickery, or deceit. If it were truly dishonest, why not transfer all the funds out of the account or withdraw cash where it could not be clawed back by the bank.
While inferentially there is some scam, there is evidence that scammers were routinely using innocent victims just as they did with Mr James and two people named Martinez and Remfrey. The prosecution has not proved that the accused was not another innocent victim caught up in the whole scam.
The types of transactions and values that occurred in those accounts prior to the dates presented are unknown. Furthermore, the evidence does not reveal whether the accused had accounts with other financial institutions, save a CoinSpot account. Other than his youth, the prosecution has led very little evidence about the personal circumstances of the accused.
The defence argues that there are significant shortcomings in the investigation of this matter and the evidence before the court. Police failed to make any follow ups with a person identified as Koroma nor did they choose to follow the IP address from the intrusion to GM Woodhouse.
Transferring larger funds into savings type accounts that generally have larger return on interest rates, is, defence submitted, exactly the type of thing honest people might be expected to do when they have sufficient funds. Equally, transferring funds to family members who, on the evidence, ran a financial business to potentially invest, is also the exact thing an honest person would do. One might equally loan money to family members either for safekeeping or for their honest use.
As to any inference that it was the accused’s bank account that was used for the EFT’s from Mr Parry, such that he must have known about the scam, the defence submitted that is simply neutral when the evidence reveals that ‘scammers’ use innocent victims bank accounts regularly and routinely.
While it might be said that the transactions relating to the money laundering charges are large, as at 7 November 2021 when the scam reversal occurs, there was still in excess of $600,000 in the accused’s primary bank account and the accused had not touched the last three transfers by Mr Perry occurring on 2 and 3 November 2021. Importantly, there are no cash withdrawals from the accused’s four CBA accounts during the relevant period of 30 October 2021 until 7 November 2021.
It is submitted that the behaviour of the accused is unsophisticated and indeed allowed for much of the money to be returned to Mr Parry. His bank accounts and CoinSpot account were set up using his own details and identity documents. There is no evidence to suggest the accused retained any of the profit of the scam.
With respect to counts 10 and 11, it is submitted that there is ample evidence in the statement of the accused’s primary bank account that these charges are not made out. From the first transactions that appear in the accused’s primary bank account from 24 September 2021 it appears the accused’s primary bank account is being used to organise some sort of event. The defence invite an inference from the various transactions that the ‘event’ is some sort of fashion gala.
It is apparent that a total of $6,000 is pooled into the accused’s account ending ‘771’ from his accounts ending ‘585’ and ‘378’ on 24 September 2020. That is then in turn transferred into the accused’s primary bank account on the same day. There then appears to be transfers consistent with organising an event. There are apparent transfers to Olympic Party Hire of which the description is somewhat self-evident and numerous references to ‘Fashion Gala’, ‘Gala Ticket’ and ‘sponsorship’. Equally, there are references to ‘bartenders’ and ‘lights’. These are all references that are consistent with organising an event. Furthermore, there are seven $50 payments with the description ‘model’ as well as two payments of $200 referencing ‘performer’ and transactions described as ‘Facebook Ads’, ‘Promo videos’ and ‘Promotors’.
Importantly there are two transfers of $1,000 on 20 October 2020 for ‘Best Dressed Prize’. These are all transactions one might expect if someone were involved in organising a fashion gala event. The defence submit that tracking through the statement as a whole it might be inferred that the event is an annual event noting that the two transfers occurring on 31 October 2021 being the subject of counts 10 and 11, purport to be prizes for the male and female best dressed are almost exactly a year later. Importantly, and inferring that the transactions are plainly legitimate. It is also noted that as of 31 October 2021 (immediately prior to the transfers the subject of counts 10 and 11), there is a credit to the account of $3,780 from GS Projects Pty Ltd referencing ‘Astral tiling inv215’.[100] The prosecution have not alleged anything improper about this transaction. The defence submit that the transfers the subject of counts 10 and 11 could have come from this increase of the value of the accused’s chose in action with the bank such that the prosecution must fail on those two counts.
[100] Exhibit P1, page 18.
While it is always the prosecution that bears the onus, the defence submitted that a number of reasonably innocent hypotheses arise on the evidence on the prosecution case.
While not to speculate, the evidence does reveal that scams are widespread and occur frequently in Australia.
Another reasonable hypothesis suggested by defence was that Aganze Mubake was part of the scam without the accused’s knowledge. Plainly the accused’s brother was the elder of the two (by 7 years) and had knowledge in finance. Scammers are increasingly targeting young people[101] and the accused was aged just 20 years of age at the time of the alleged offending. It would appear that other than the money that was transferred to Mr James and into Bitcoin, the only other monies that weren’t retrieved ended up in Aganze Mubake’s control. Indeed, that included the monies that were transferred to Joelle Mubake that were not returned to her by the bank. Aganze Mubake’s had numerous bank accounts and financial sophistication. There was some evidence to link him to Canberra to make police believe he may have resided there and the bank accounts of Bernie Lux Pty Ltd operated by him demonstrate a likely presence in Canberra.
[101] T 53.13-53.15.

The very IP intrusion of GM Woodhouse originated in Canberra. It is, the defence argued, a reasonable possibility that the accused unwittingly and innocently assisted his brother or any another person.
While the prosecution submitted that they do not allege that the accused was the sole operator responsible for designing and executing the fraud, and may have been part of a joint enterprise directed by others to provide his bank account as part of wider scam, if that is open on the prosecution case, then it is equally consistent on the evidence that the accused was directed to do things whilst having no knowledge of the scam, thinking he was doing the right thing honestly and reasonably. There is simply insufficient evidence to determine that the accused ought reasonably to have known his transfers were tainted based on the size of the transfers alone.
In the defence submission, the subjective personal circumstances of the accused must have some part to play on that objective test. Clearly all we have here is the accused’s age and very little else.
With respect to the submission that the accused might not have got around to disposing of the $600,000, this was not a matter of hours but rather a couple of days. If this was truly dishonest, the defence question, why the accused sitting on this money for so long.
On 1 November 2021, there is a total more than $300,000 that moves between various accounts. On 2 November 2021, there is much less, that is $90,000. It is speculative, the defence argue, to say that the only reasonable explanation for the sums involved to say that it is dishonest and the prosecution case must fail.
Discussion
Property/Funds
The prosecution had, following a defence request, particularised the ‘property’ the subject of the alleged offences as ‘funds’ on the Information.
With respect to the theft charges, the prosecution asserts that the accused received the ‘funds’ transferred by Mr Parry, and in relation to the money laundering charges, the ‘funds’ were transferred from the accused’s account to his own and other accounts.
The prosecution says the term ‘funds’ is a general term, not restricted by the definition of ‘money’, being physical currency. The term has been used in reference to the property, to encompass both money sitting in a bank account, and to an intangible right or thing, that is, ‘a chose in action’.
Section 130 of the CLCA includes both of those things within the definition of ‘property’.[102] Accordingly, the prosecution argues, it does not matter whether the funds are labelled as money or a chose in action, as they are the same thing, that is, money sitting in a bank account which then entitles the creditor, the rightful owner to take legal action against the bank for recovery.
[102] S 130 CLCA.
In support of the use of the term ‘funds’, the prosecution has noted that the CLCA was amended to bring dishonesty cases within a contemporary setting, and that the definitions that are provided are deliberately broad to encapsulate the different ways someone can commit theft and money laundering.
The defence argues that it is a mistake in law to suggest that in the context of EFT’s, ‘money’ is exchanged, as this confuses the intangible rights of a bank account holder with some physical asset, capable of receipt or asportation.
Furthermore, while usually the prosecution is only required to establish the elements of an offence, the defence submits that there may be circumstances arising out of the way the case is conducted which will make it unfair or oppressive to an accused to permit the prosecution to depart from its particulars.
As to the species of ‘property’ in this case, it is well understood that the balance standing to the credit of a customer is a debt that is a chose in action due to the customer, with the bank undertaking to repay the debt or any part of it on demand.[103]
[103] Joachimson v Swiss Bank Corporation (1921) 3 KB 110 see Atkin LJ at [127].
The relationship between banker and customer is contractual, that is, a contractual right of the customer to recover from the bank, money or funds deposited in the customer’s account. In Croton v R, Barwick CJ said: [104]
But though in a popular sense it may be said that a depositor with a bank has “money in the bank”, in law he has but a chose in action, a right to recover from the bank the balance standing to his credit in account with the bank at the date of his demand, or the commencement of action. That recovery will be effected by an action for debt. But the money deposited becomes an asset of the bank which may use it as it pleases: see generally Nussbaum, Money in the Law: s. 8, p. 103. Neither the balance standing to the credit of the joint account in this case, nor any part of it, as it constituted no more than a chose in action in contradistinction to a chose in possession, was susceptible of larceny, though it might be the subject of misappropriation: see also on this point the judgment of Lord Goddard in Reg. v. Davenport1 with which I respectfully agree.
[104] Croton v The Queen (1967) 117 CLR 326 at [330].
Importantly, I note that the definition of ‘property’ in s 130 of the CLCA includes money and intangible property including ‘things in action’. In Police v Smith,[105] the Court agreed that the application of an inapt label to the property, (in that case ‘money’), did not result in the property not coming within the definition of ‘property’ within the meaning of Part 5 of the CLCA.
[105] [2025] SASCA 37 at [79].
With respect to any argument that there had been unfairness to the defence in the particularisation of the charges, particulars are not elements of an offence. Rather, their role is to allow an accused to understand the nature of a charge and the prosecution case. As Wells J held in R v Pfitzner, the rule governing the particulars of a charge:[106]
…is founded, generally speaking, upon the propositions that a miscarriage of justice occurs if an accused person is not made sufficiently aware of the case he has to meet; but that no such miscarriage occurs if the accused is sufficiently made aware of the case he is to meet, even though there is a technical flaw in the formalities of the charge.
…Particulars in an information tend to belie their own name. They are an aid, but can never be more than an aid, to determining what exactly the defence is called on to answer.
[106] R v Pfitzner (1976) 15 SASR 171.
In Johnson v Miller, Dixon J, in discussing the purpose of particulars in a criminal trial said:[107]
[A] defendant is entitled to be apprised not only of the legal nature of the offence with which he is charged but also of the particular act, matter or thing alleged as the foundation of the charge. The court hearing a complaint or information for an offence must have before it a means of identifying with the matter or transaction alleged in the document the matter or transaction appearing in evidence.
[107] (1937) 59 CLR 467 at [489].
I have concluded that a chose in action comes within the definition of ‘property’. As discussed in Police v Smith,[108] the question whether or not a particular is a material particular depends on the significance to be attached to it in the circumstances of the case. It requires close consideration of the terms of any statutory provision and the issues in dispute at trial. It also requires consideration of not only the terms of the information but also the way in which the parties conducted the case at trial. This in turn, includes consideration of not only the way in which the prosecution presented its case, but also any forensic decisions made by the defence. The manner in which the case is conducted may give rise to circumstances which make it unfair to an accused to permit the prosecution to depart from its particulars. Put another way, a particular which is not inherently material to proof of a charge may become material as a result of the way in which the case is conducted. In my view here, the additional particularisation of the property as ‘funds’ only makes plainer the case with which the accused was required to meet, and there could be no basis to find that the accused was not afforded procedural fairness. The accused had been informed on the information of the transactions and their nature, forming the basis of the charges. There was no dispute between the parties that the ‘funds’ or the ‘property’ was deposited into the accused’s primary bank account and that there were transfers of particular property out of that account to others, with the central issue being whether the elements of the offences had been established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
[108] Ibid at [73].
With respect to the money laundering charges, there is no dispute that the accused transferred the property charged in each offence to various other accounts and that the property was tainted.[109] The real issue is whether the accused ought reasonably to have known that the property the subject of each transaction was tainted and whether the transactions were a ‘disposal’ of the property.
[109] Other than the transfers concerned in Counts 10 and 11, referred to later in these reasons.
Disposal of property
While conceding that it would be different if I were to conclude that ‘disposal’ was not a material particular of the offence, which would only necessitate proof that the accused had engaged in a ‘transaction’ involving property, the defence maintained that the result of the accused actioning the various EFT’s was that the chose in action representing the credit balance of the accused’s primary bank account was reduced by the amount of the transfer each time. At no time did the accused dispose of or extinguish the chose in action the accused held in respect of the accused’s primary bank account. If the result of the transfers was a reduction in value of the accused’s property, rather than an extinguishment of the right altogether, it followed the defence argued, that at no time did the accuse ‘dispose’ of the property he ought reasonably to have known was tainted.
The defence relied on the analysis in Lordianto[110] by Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Gordon JJ concerning the nature of bank transfers which operate by adjusting the total amount of the debts owed by the banks to each other by a process which the banks commercially describe as ‘netting’, and the consequences said to flow from that process, including that when the account holder instructs a bank to make a transfer from their account, ‘the chose in action representing the credit balance is extinguished or reduced by the amount of the transfer.’
[110] Lordianto v Commissioner for Australian Federal Police (2019) CLR 216.
While I accept that the accused’s chose in action was not extinguished by the transactions he effected, it does not follow that the accused did not dispose of the property. As discussed earlier, the issue in Police v Smith concerned the particularisation of property alleged to have been the subject of bank transfers as ‘money’ with respect to the offence of money laundering. Although any argument as to whether the respondent in that case had ‘disposed’ of property in having transferred property from his account to other accounts amounted to ‘disposing’ did not appear to have arisen, the Court’s discussion with respect to the approach to be taken with respect to definitional provisions in legislation is of relevance here.
In discussing the approach to be taken to the construction of the term ‘money’, it was noted that support for the appellant’s contention that the ‘manifest purpose of Part 5 was to address the failure of the existing regime of offences to cope with the current social and legal environment in which the law is intended to operate was found in the relevant Second Reading speech,[111] and that by adopting the approach to definitional provisions referred to by McHugh J in Kelly v The Queen[112] and the High Court in SkyCity Adelaide Pty Ltd v Treasurer of South Australia,[113] the approach to s 138 of the CLCA is to read into it the words of the definition, and bearing in mind the purpose and mischief to which Part 5 was directed.
[111] South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 29 May 2002, 362.
[112] Kelly v The Queen (2004) 218 CLR 216.
[113] SkyCity Adelaide Pty Ltd v Treasurer of South Australia [2024] HCA 37.
The mischief to which Part 5 was aimed was dishonest behaviour involving property. As discussed earlier in these reasons, the property the subject of the money laundering charges is intangible property, that is, a chose in action and the principles enunciated in Lordianto, in the legislative context in which they were made, are not in dispute.
In Police v Smith, it was observed that definitions within legislation provide an aid in construction of the legislation rather than enacting substantive law and that: [114]
Where a definition applies, the words of the definition are read into the substantive enactment which is then construed into its context, bearing in mind its purpose and the mischief it was designed to overcome.
[114] Ibid at [22].
While the accused has not extinguished any chose in action altogether, in my view, the observations made in Lordianto, do not provide support for the defence argument or when considering the relevant principles of statutory interpretation. In engaging in a transaction as alleged in counts 8-21, the accused has disposed of the chose in action in relation to his primary bank account by the sums that have been alleged in the charges, which has increased the chose in action of the account holder of the accounts to which the money was transferred.
While I do not accept the defence argument with respect to the disposal of property in the circumstances here, I have found that ‘disposal’ is a material particular in this case.
Pursuant to s 138(3) of the CLCA ‘transaction’ is defined to include ‘disposing’ of property, and the charges against the accused have specifically been pleaded as alleging that the accused engaged in a transaction by disposing of property.[115] The issue of whether there had been disposal of property was a focus in the defence case at the outset and no doubt there were decisions made as to how the defence case was conducted, based on that focus. It would, in my view, have been unfair to the defence had I concluded that the accused had not disposed of property as alleged, to conclude that all that was required here was a finding that the accused had engaged in a transaction.
[115] S 138(3) CLCA.
The Charges
The accused is charged with dishonestly dealing with Mr Parry’s property (counts 1-7) and having disposed of property/funds which he ought reasonably to have known were tainted (counts 8-21).
As there is no direct evidence of the accused’s involvement in the hacking of Mr Woodhouse’s computer, the prosecution case is based on circumstantial evidence and founded in inferences that I am asked to draw from the evidence before me. As such, a verdict of guilty of any of the charged offences can only be given if the evidence excludes any reasonable explanation consistent with innocence. I must be satisfied, not only that the accused’s guilt is a rational inference, but that it is the only rational inference that the circumstances I find proven enable me to draw.
In considering the circumstantial evidence upon which the prosecution relies, I must decide which facts I accept are established by that evidence and then consider what inference or inferences I am prepared to draw from those facts. I must consider the combined strength of the established facts and I cannot return a verdict of guilty unless the facts exclude any reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence.
I accept that the evidence in relation to counts 1-7 are cross-admissible in proof of each other for a non-propensity use. The money laundering charges are also cross-admissible.
As observed in R v Tran[116] where the appellant was charged with multiple counts of money laundering, and separate counts of dishonestly dealing with documents and drug trafficking, ‘a comprehensive assessment of an accused’s activities may be instructive in interpreting particular actions, regardless of whether the issue in relation to a specific act was the source of funds, knowledge, dishonest intent, or knowing involvement in trafficking’.
[116] R v Tran [2017] SASCFC 99 at [26].
I have not reasoned that if I were to find the accused guilty of one of the counts, he is more likely to have committed any other count. The charges have been considered separately and I have not engaged in bad person reasoning.
I find the following facts established:
·Mr Parry received an email directing him to deposit settlement monies into an account, the details of which related to the accused’s primary bank account.
·The accused received property into his primary bank account from Mr Parry over a period of 5 days from 30 October 2021 to 3 November 2021.
·There is no evidence connecting the accused with the fraudulent email forwarded to Mr Parry instructing him to transfer his property to the accused’s primary bank account.
·Prior to the transfers by Mr Parry, the balance in the accused’s primary bank account was $1,450.64.
·The bank statement for the accused’s primary bank account identified that each of the deposits into his account were from ‘Stephen Parry’.
·On 30 October 2021, through to 3 November 2021, property were transferred on 14 occasions from the accused’s primary bank account to his other CBA accounts, accounts in the control of his siblings, his CoinSpot account, and to Terence James, Mohamed Koroma and Badjoko Bunyoma.
·Further transfer of the property received from the accused’s primary bank account, the subject of counts 8-21 were made by the recipients of the funds.
·As at 4 November 2021, none of the property received by the accused from ‘Stephen Parry’, remained in any of the accused’s bank accounts.
·The sum of $1,008,150.95 of the property transferred by Mr Parry were recovered by the CBA and returned to Mr Parry, with none of the property/funds transferred into the accused’s primary bank account remaining in the accused’s bank accounts.
Counts 8-21: Money Laundering
As set out above, I am satisfied that the accused, in conducting the transfers the subject of the money laundering charges, was disposing of property. In my view, any reasonable person in the accused’s position, ought reasonably to have known that his transfers were tainted based on the size of the transfers to him and where it was that he directed the transfers. While it may be the case that scammers use innocent victim’s bank accounts regularly and routinely, the evidence in this case, showing that the accused distributed the property in the manner in which he did at the times and to whom he did, provides compelling evidence that the accused was alive to the nature of the property that had appeared in his primary bank account and identified as having been received from Mr Parry.
While I accept that there are scams that involve innocent people being used as ‘mules’ or being directed to disburse funds, that does not in the circumstances here, weigh against what I consider to be the overwhelming evidence that the accused was aware that the property he transferred was tainted.
I do not accept that the accused was being directed to do things with no knowledge of the property having been obtained from unlawful activity or that he could reasonably have thought he was acting honestly and reasonably. His behaviour in transferring property to his own accounts and to those controlled by his siblings is not, contrary to the defence submissions, indicative of honesty on the accused’s part. That he did not have access to his siblings’ accounts does not in my view alter my assessment.
That not all the property had been transferred before the CBA effected the reversals back to Mr Parry does not in my view assist in determining the issues here.

While Aganze Mubake may well have been the person who was directing the accused as to where and how property was to be distributed, to accept the hypothesis that Aganze Mubake was part of the scam without the accused’s knowledge is in my view, fanciful. Even allowing for Aganze Mubake to be an older person of some financial sophistication, who had some connection to Canberra, does not provide any reasonable basis to conclude that it is a reasonable possibility that the accused was unaware of the nature of the property that he was, on the defence case at least, being directed by someone else to distribute. While it may be, as the defence have submitted, the accused was unsophisticated and it could be characterised as a deception that was not well-rehearsed or planned in trying to avoid detection, that does not weigh against the overwhelming evidence which when considered as a whole, rebuts any innocent explanation. I do not speculate, but there were any number of reasons why that could have been so.
There is no evidence of any other accounts held by the accused, other than those held with the CBA. Nonetheless, in my view, receipt into a bank account of sums of funds the size of the deposits here would be of considerable moment to any bank account holder.
There is of course, no obligation on the defence to prove anything, and having rejected any reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence, does not mean that I find the accused guilty of any offence. I must return to the prosecution case.
With respect to counts 10 and 11, I find that I cannot be satisfied that the sums of $1,000 each transferred to Badjoko Bunyoma and Mohamed Koroma, described as female and male ‘best dressed prize money’ respectively, given the deposit of $3,780 into the accused’s primary bank account from another source on 31 October 2021, and the evidence showing previous payments of a similar kind, are tainted property. In those circumstances, I find the accused not guilty of counts 10 and 11.
Counts 1-7: Theft
As to the theft charges, with respect to the first element that the accused dealt with property, the prosecution alleges that the accused dealt with the property by receiving the funds in the knowledge that they did not belong to him and were not his property to deal with.
The defence rejects this and says it cannot be proved that the accused ever dealt with Mr Parry’s property, supported by DBS McPherson, who gave evidence that there was no evidence to suggest the accused was responsible for the IT breach, which led Mr Parry to conduct the EFT’s. Mr Parry himself, pursuant to his legal right to do so, instructed the bank to adjust the total debt owed to him by the various amounts specified on each occasion. The accused was simply the beneficiary of the dealings with property undertaken by Mr Parry himself. The accused did not have to deal with any property or moreover do anything for the value of his chose in action against CBA to increase in value.
Pursuant to the definition of ‘deal’ in s 130 of the CLCA, a person can ‘deal’ with property by way of receiving property.[117] In this instance, there is no dispute that the accused received the property in his account and I am satisfied that the prosecution has proved this element of each theft offence (counts 1-7) beyond reasonable doubt.
[117] S 130 CLCA.
The second element is that the accused dealt with the property ‘dishonestly’ and the prosecution must establish that the accused’s dealing in the property was ‘dishonest’. A person’s conduct is dishonest if the person acts dishonestly according to the standards of ordinary people and knows that he is so acting.
The prosecution relies on the number of transfers and the significant sums of money involved (namely seven separate transactions totalling over $1,200,000 over the course of five days), as circumstantial evidence from which it can be inferred that the accused was acting dishonestly.
In my view, the accused disposing of tainted property he reasonably ought to have known was tainted, as I have found with respect to the counts of money laundering, save counts 10 and 11, leads to an overwhelming inference that the accused was putting aside his share of the profit from the scam and points to his knowledge that he was dishonest in receiving the original transfers into his primary bank account. Furthermore, the disposal of property from the accused’s primary bank account to his siblings and cryptocurrency demonstrates that his conduct was dishonest in receiving the funds into that account.
I am satisfied in relation to each of counts 1-7 that the accused dealt with, that is, he received, the property dishonestly.
The third element is that the accused dealt with the property without the owner’s consent. That is, the prosecution must prove that the property owner did not agree to the accused dealing with the property. It is clear on the evidence that Mr Parry did not consent to his property being transferred to the accused’s account. Mr Parry’s unchallenged evidence was that the funds were meant to go to the conveyancing account. I am satisfied in relation to each of counts 1-7 that the accused dealt with Mr Parry’s property without his consent.
The fourth element looks at the accused’s state of mind. The prosecution must prove that the accused either intended to permanently deprive the owner of the property or he intended to seriously encroach on the owner’s rights in the property. A person intends to permanently deprive someone of property if they intend that the person will not get it back. The law recognises three ways a person can intend to seriously encroach on the owner’s rights in the property. The first is if the accused intends to treat the property as his own to dispose of, regardless of the owner’s rights. The second is if the accused intends to deal with the property in a way that creates a substantial risk that the owner will not get it back, and the accused is aware of that substantial risk. The third is if the accused intends to deal with the property in a way that creates a substantial risk that, when the owner gets the property back, its value will be substantially impaired, and the accused is aware of that substantial risk.
The prosecution has argued that the accused intended to dispose of the funds from the accused’s primary bank account by making separate transfers to other financial accounts, that is, he intended serious encroachment. The defence disputes this and says that the prosecution have not established this element as transferring large funds into some saving-type accounts that generally have larger return on interest rates, is exactly the type of thing honest people might be expected to do when they have sufficient funds.
Furthermore, transferring funds to family members, and to Aganze Mubake, who on the evidence ran a financial business, to potentially invest is the exact thing an honest person would do. One might equally loan money to family members either for safekeeping or for their use, honestly.
Plainly in my view, the accused intended to permanently deprive Mr Parry of his property. The way the accused dealt with the property by distributing it to his other personal accounts, including to a cryptocurrency platform and to accounts held by close family members, in my view rebuts any hypothesis that he innocently came across the funds and then disposed of them honestly. The accused made a serious encroachment on Mr Parry’s proprietary rights by treating the property as his own to dispose of, regardless of Mr Parry’s rights.
Conclusion
The totality of the evidence allows me to make a proper assessment of the accused’s potential involvement in the offences alleged against him. The way the accused dealt with the property by disposing property to his other personal accounts, including to a cryptocurrency platform and to accounts held by his close family members, rebuts any hypothesis that he innocently came across the property and then disposed of them honestly.
I am satisfied in relation to each of counts 1-7 that the accused intended to treat the property as his own and to make a serious encroachment on Mr Parry’s rights.
I find the accused guilty of counts 1-9 and 12-21.
I find the accused not guilty of counts 10 and 11.