R v Morris
[2017] SADC 132
•1 December 2017
DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal)
R v MORRIS
Criminal Trial by Judge Alone
[2017] SADC 132
Reasons for the Verdict of His Honour Judge Tilmouth
1 December 2017
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - DRUG OFFENCES - POSSESSION
Accused found guilty of one count of trafficking in methylamphetamine.
Controlled Substances Act 1984 (SA) s 32(2), s 32(2)(5)(b); Controlled Substances (General) Regulations 2000 s 6(6); R v Phung (2003) 141 A Crim R 311; R v Frangos (1979) 21 SASR 331; Abbott v Western Australia (2005) 152 A Crim R 186; R v Carr-Briant [1943] KB 607; R v Jeppe [1978] WAR 124; R v Peters [1995] 2 Cr App 7; R v Yalman [1998] 2 Cr App R 269; R v Edwards [1998] Crim LR 207; R v Guney [1998] 2 Cr App R 242; R v Soteriou (2013) 118 SASR 119; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34P(2), s 34P(3); KRM v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 221; Re Van Beelan (1974) 9 SASR 163; R v Brown (1913) 17 CLR 570; R v Copeland (1997) 194 LSJS 1; R v Jenner (2000) 110 A Crim R 512; R v Ciantar (2006) 167 A Crim R 504; Dhanhoa v The Queen (2003) 217 CLR 1; R v Neilan (1991) 52 A Crim R 303, referred to.
He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; R v GNN (2000) 78 SASR 293; Sheppard v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; Chamberlain v The Queen (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521; De Gruchy v The Queen (2002) 211 CLR 85, applied.
R v MORRIS
[2017] SADC 132The issues
Vicky Morris entered a plea not guilty to a single count of trafficking in a controlled drug, found in a car driven by her at the relevant time. Her defence is that she did not possess and had no knowledge of it. The prosecution case is that the combination of the circumstances prove she was in knowing possession and that the offence is therefore proven.
Core facts
Ms Morris is charged with trafficking in methylamphetamine, contrary to s 32(3) of the Controlled Substances Act 1984 (SA). Another Judge of the court made an order for trial by Judge alone some time ago.
On Sunday 12 April 2014 at about 2.16 am, uniformed police travelling North East in a marked police car on Payneham Road Glynde, pulled over a BMW registered to her at her place of residence in Paradise.[1] She was the sole occupant and driver of that vehicle.
[1] Exhibits P7 and P1 respectively.
Police searched the vehicle as well as her handbag and a glasses case. They found and seized what turned out on later chemical examination to be 2.52 g of methylamphetamine of 79 per cent purity, packaged in six separate resealable plastic bags taken from the glasses case. They also found and seized a set of small electronic scales, an ice pipe and two mobile telephones. Later E-crime analysis of the two telephones, revealed SMS messages alleged on the prosecution case, to be from and to Ms Morris referable to earlier transactions in drugs. There are agreed facts that each mobile telephone, a Sony and Samsung, respectively belonged to her or was operated in her name.[2]
Legal principles
[2] Exhibit P9, nos 3 and 4, the SIM of the Samsung was registered to her.
Elements of the offence
The constituent elements of the charge, each requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, are these:
1Methylamphetamine is a controlled drug; this is not disputed and is established by the Controlled Substances (General) Regulations 2000.[3]
2Ms Morris trafficked in that controlled drug. A person traffics if he or she has possession of a drug intending to sell it: s 4(1) Controlled Substances Act.
3Ms Morris knew the substance was methylamphetamine, or at least that it was a controlled substance.
It is elements 2 and 3 that are in dispute. Although it appears the defence put the prosecution to proof so far as the chain of evidence and chemical analysis was concerned, once called it was not challenged.
[3] A ‘controlled drug’ is defined by s 4(1) of the Controlled Substances Act as either ‘a drug of dependence’ or, ‘a substance declared by the regulations to be a controlled drug for the purposes of this Act’. Methylamphetamine is so declared.
In respect of element 2, the prosecution is necessarily required to prove possession of the drug. To be in possession of something is to have possession of whatever is to one’s knowledge, physically in the person’s custody or under his or hers physical control: He Kaw Teh v The Queen.[4] Only if it can be shown beyond reasonable doubt the methylamphetamine (or at least a controlled drug), was to Ms Morris’ own knowledge physically in her custody or control, can she be proven to be in possession of it for this purpose: R v Phung,[5] R v Frangos.[6]
[4] (1985) 157 CLR 523, 600.
[5] (2003) 141 A Crim R 311, [33].
[6] (1979) 21 SASR 331, 337.
That is to say, mere knowledge of the presence of the drugs is insufficient, because it is necessary for the prosecution to go further and to prove physical control with the intention of exercising exclusive control over them: R v GNN.[7] The prosecution must therefore exclude the reasonable possibility that she ‘merely acquiesced’ in taking possession of the drugs: R v GNN.[8]
[7] (2000) 78 SASR 293, [20].
[8] Ibid [25].
Once such proof is established, s 32(5)(b) of the Controlled Substances Act, operates so as to presume Ms Morris was ‘acting for the purpose of the sale of the drug’ and ‘had the relevant intention concerning the sale of the drug necessary to constitute the offence’, if the quantity possessed was a ‘trafficable quantity’. A ‘trafficable quantity’ is defined by s 4 thereof, as
… a quantity of the mixture that equals or exceeds the amount (if any) prescribed as a commercial quantity for any mixture containing the drug.
By regulation 6(6) of the Controlled Substances (General) Regulations 2000 (which applied at the time) it was prescribed that:
For the purposes of the definition of traffickable quantity in s 4(1) of the Act, the quantity of a mixture containing a particular controlled drug prescribed as a traffickable quantity for any mixture containing the controlled drug is the amount (if any) listed in the column headed “Traffickable (Mixed)” of the Tables in Part 1 or 2 of Schedule 1 opposite the entry listing the controlled drug.
The mixed trafficable quantity of methylamphetamine contained in Schedule 1 of the Controlled Substances (General) Regulations is 2 g. Accordingly as the total mixed weight of the contents of the six bags is 2.52 g, the combined effect of the Act and the Regulations is that an onus rests on Ms Morris to establish on the balance of probabilities that she did not hold the intention to traffic in the drug, that it is more likely than not she had no intention of selling the drug: Abbott v Western Australia,[9] R v Carr-Briant.[10]
[9] (2005) 152 A Crim R 186.
[10] [1943] KB 607, 611.
Fundamental principles
Ms Morris comes before the court with the presumption of innocence in her favour, and so she is entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt arising on the evidence in respect of the charge, subject to the above presumption. She is not required to prove her innocence, or required to give evidence, nor to adduce any other evidence: R v Reeves,[11] Pryor v The Queen.[12]
[11] (1992) 29 NSWLR 109, 117.
[12] (1969) 43 ALJR 388, 388.
Evidentiary principles
The evidence adduced in aid of proof that Ms Morris trafficked and formed the intention to sell the packages of methylamphetamine, includes the two phones and the SMS messages contained on them, the deal bags and the electronic scales as well as the manner in which the drugs were individually stored and packaged. These items of evidence are properly admissible as the trappings of trading in illegal drugs: R v Jeppe,[13] R v Peters,[14] R v Yalman,[15] R v Edwards,[16] R v Guney,[17] or as evidence of an ongoing business of selling drugs: R v Soteriou.[18]
[13] [1987] WAR 124.
[14] [1995] 2 Cr App R 77.
[15] [1998] 2 Cr App R 269.
[16] [1998] Crim LR 207.
[17] [1998] 2 Cr App R 242.
[18] (2013) 118 SASR 119, [31]-[38].
For the purposes of s 34P(2) and (3) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA), these items of evidence contain in combination significant probative value for the stated permissible purposes, which substantially outweigh any prejudicial effect, and moreover the permissible and impermissible uses can be kept sufficiently separate, in the manner and for the reasons indicated later. This evidence is not admissible or used on a propensity basis. Importantly, is not evidence in any guise of her bad character, or to suggest she is the type of person likely to commit the charged offence: KRM v The Queen.[19]
[19] (2001) 206 CLR 221, [31].
The material adduced in proof of the charge is substantially circumstantial in nature, so that a conclusion of guilt must not only be a rational inference, but the only rational inference to be drawn from the united force of all the circumstances: Sheppard v The Queen.[20] Correspondingly, the prosecution must exclude any reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence: Chamberlain v The Queen (No 2),[21] Re Van Beelan.[22] Furthermore, an intermediate fact which is an indispensable link in the chain of reasoning towards an inference of guilt, must be found proven beyond reasonable doubt before the ultimate inference of guilt can be drawn from it: Sheppard v The Queen.[23]
[20] (1990) 170 CLR 573, 578.
[21] (1984) 153 CLR 521, 535.
[22] (1974) 9 SASR 163, 370.
[23] (1990) 170 CLR 573, 579.
The case for the prosecution
After the two cars pulled over, Ms Morris alighted from hers holding or carrying her handbag over her shoulder (the differing accounts of this trivial fact are inconsequential), which was on all accounts initially on the passenger front seat. It was soon after placed on the bonnet of the police vehicle which had pulled up behind her, and searched. The evidence of the two police officers involved at this time was that Ms Miller was holding a glasses case which she tucked down the back of her jeans.[24] This case contained a resealable plastic bag holding six identical bags each containing small quantities of methylamphetamine as follows:[25]
[24] T16.11-.18, T33.1-.7, T33.1-.7.
[25] Seen in the photograph Exhibit P2, VM-5.
PLASTIC BAG: QUANTITY OF DRUGS: 1 0.47g 2 0.05g 3 0.50g 4 0.50g 5 0.51g 6 0.49g TOTAL 2.52g
The police evidence was further to the effect that the Samsung mobile phone was in the hand bag as were the scales, whereas the Sony originally came from a pocket in the front of her pants.[26]
[26] T42.8-.23.
The case for the defence
Ms Morris elected to give sworn evidence. Her evidence stands to be judged in just the same way as the evidence of any other witness: R v Brown.[27] It is not to be discounted in any way simply because she is an accused person: R v Copeland,[28] R v Jenner.[29]
[27] (1913) 17 CLR 570, 589.
[28] (1997) 194 LSJS 1, [7].
[29] (2000) 110 A Crim R 512, [31].
Beginning with the BMW, Ms Morris bought the vehicle three or four months before hand for $26,000, plus a trade-in of ‘six-and-a-half’.[30] Soon after she lent it to her friend Steve Sprecher, who in turn lent it to a Chris Clementi, after Sprecher was taken into custody.[31] There are agreed facts that Sprecher was admitted to Yatala Labour Prison on 24 March 2014 and discharged on 24 April 2014.[32] Thereafter she drove another car of hers, a Peugeot, and had not seen Clementi in the meantime.[33]
[30] T133.28-.36, T145.11-.20.
[31] T129.14-.37.
[32] Exhibit P10.
[33] T130.4-131.4.
She deposed that Clementi unexpectedly came to her house that night just before 2.00am and effectively demanded that she go to see a mutual friend, referred to merely as George.[34] In doing so he ‘woke everyone up’ despite the hour and told her:[35]
…one of our friends George wanted me to go see him because he was unaware that Steve had lent the car to Chris and he hadn't been able to contact me or see me’. He wanted me to go in the car to go and see him, not to call him, he said 'No, you have to go and see him' and I didn't want to go. said 'It's the early hours in the morning, I've just woken up'. He said 'It's not a request, you have to go'.
[34] T130.2-.5.
[35] T131.13-.21 and see T148.30-149.2.
It was at this point that she changed, during which time a female resident HD and Clementi were talking, before she departed in the BMW alone.[36] As it happened HD was Sprecher’s ex-partner and both lived at the house of Ms Morris at the time.[37] She described her own relationship with Sprecher as ‘on and off … an up and down relationship.’[38] She told the court that George was a good friend, an accountant who advised her on investing money after she received WorkCover compensation.[39] She added that Clementi demanded ‘It’s not a request I’m telling you to go’ and she asked him if she could ring George but he told her ‘no you have to go see him now’, and that she had to take the BMW.[40]
[36] T131.25-.30.
[37] T125.32-126.2.
[38] T126.6-.8.
[39] T149.3-.8.
[40] T149.12-.27.
Under cross-examination she conceded knowing Clementi for possibly just eight months to a year, of knowing where he lived and of having been to his house ‘maybe once or twice’.[41] She described him as an acquaintance rather than a friend, but was unsure of how old he was or what his job was.[42] When questioned whether she was happy for Sprecher to lend her car to Clementi, she responded ‘yeah, I guess’, even though she was unsure how long he was borrowing it for.[43]
[41] T144.22-.30.
[42] T145.24-.38
[43] T144.35-145.4.
Next taxed with the proposition that ‘you were prepared to lend your car to a man you didn’t really know well’, she responded ‘no, Steve did. I wasn’t prepared to do anything, Steve did it without my knowledge’.[44] She added that after Sprecher was taken into custody she did not try to contact Clementi in order to get her car back, but rather she ‘spoke to Steve and he said he would speak to Chris about getting it back’.[45] She left it at that as she did not want any more ‘dramas from anyone’, whilst asserting ‘it wasn’t for me to contact him’.[46]
[44] T146.1-.6.
[45] T146.7-.12.
[46] T146.16-.18, T148.20-.23.
Pressed by Mr Allen as to why it was that she was required by Clementi to drive the BMW, she repeated:[47]
George hadn’t heard from me and he was concerned for my welfare. He’d seen Chris driving my car and didn’t know whether he had consent to drive it or whether he’d just come and taken it from me or what was going on, so he wanted to see me in the car and make sure I was okay or he was going to call the police and report me missing.
[47] T150.1-.7.
With respect to the events on Payneham Road, her evidence was that the police asked her to get out the vehicle, and that as she did she took her handbag and the two phones and the glasses case from the driver’s door.[48] As she was questioned for driving without glasses as required by a condition of her driver’s licence, she produced the glasses case to demonstrate that she had ‘glasses that prove that I have contacts on.'[49] She claimed ‘I didn’t think that they weren’t my glasses’, because ‘I didn’t have the car, Chris had it.[50] She explained that she normally kept her prescription driving glasses in cases, one in the car, one in her bag and one at home.[51] She denied putting the glasses case down the back of her pants, stating that her jeans were too tight to permit it, and that she in fact handed it to officer Firth on getting out of the BMW.[52]
[48] T134.25-.30.
[49] T134.31-.34, T154.34-155.8.
[50] T134.32-.34.
[51] T151.31-.34.
[52] T156.2-.23.
As for the two mobile phones, she said one was a black Samsung belonging to her and one a white Sony belonging to Sprecher. She recognised it as his, as her photograph was on it as his screen saver.[53] She added:[54]
I don’t know how this phone got here, we thought it had gone missing a while before, so I’m not sure how it got there or why it was there.
She later added that she was using the Sony at the time, although the Samsung originally belonged to her, she later gave it to Sprecher.[55]
[53] This can be seen in the two ‘screen dumps’ marked 3 and 4 in Exhibit PP3a
[54] T135.37-136.1.
[55] T138.1-139.20.
Under cross-examination Ms Morris repeated that both phones were in the console, as she had removed the Sony after it began ringing from under the passenger seat,[56] although she was somewhat confused as to whether it was black or white.[57] (The seized Samsung was in fact black.[58]) She again denied the Samsung was in her handbag and that the Sony phone was in the pocket of her pants.[59]
[56] T154.14-.25.
[57] T159.8-.16.
[58] Exhibit P2, VM-2 (wrongly marked ‘VM-1’ on the Exhibit).
[59] T156.36-157.2.
As for the SMS messages on each mobile phone, she consistently denied sending any of them. Her reason for maintaining this assertion is best condensed in the following passage of her evidence under cross-examination:[60]
As I have said to you and I have said this several times that Steve's ex partner has said that she's sent these messages and these people are her friends and this was all orchestrated by her to try to make it look like I was selling illicit drugs or doing something that I shouldn't be doing because she knew that it would cause Steve and I to separate because he would not tolerate me selling drugs or doing anything like that.
[60] T164.35-165.4.
With respect to the scales in her handbag, she maintained they did not belong to her, that she did not know they were in there and must have somehow come into her possession because Steve’s ex-partner, must have put them in there, possibly when she went to change before leaving.[61] She attributed the motive for this as a desire to split her and Steve, as they were having issues and as his ex wanted to cause a fight between them to make Steve think she had something to do with drugs.[62] She made the same allegation with respect to the plastic bags found in the glasses case, which she did not know to be in there.[63]
[61] T157.3-.20.
[62] T157.21-.27.
[63] T157.31-158.2.
Analysis and resolution
The evidence of Ms Morris begins with the stance that she was told in no uncertain terms in the middle of the night to visit the man George and to take the BMW by a man she barely knew and who turned up completely unannounced. This man also insisted she use a vehicle she had not herself driven for several months, even though she recently purchased it at significant cost. It is not evident at all why she was required to take only that vehicle, despite her exclamation that somehow it would be of some form of reassurance to George. Her evidence that she simply allowed her friend to lend it to a virtual stranger soon after purchase, is self-evidently an unlikely one. Still further, it is an illogical one since it was purchased for the express purpose of her own personal use in contemplation of ‘another knee replacement’.[64] All in all it is a vague, imprecise and unconvincing story.
[64] T145.13-.16
The next step in the inquiry is to weigh the evidence of how and why the glasses case, the scales, the plastic bags and the packets of methylamphetamine came to be in the BMW in the first place. It is to be recalled that Ms Morris did assume the glasses case was hers, which she produced to back her claim that she was not driving in breach of her licence.[65]
[65] T134.25-.34.
Her explanation that this incriminating material was in effect planted, is inherently implausible. It is not apparent how HD might have anticipated the sudden arrival of Clementi or that he would require Ms Morris to take only the BMW. Still further, to accept this evidence is to accept that HD had the presence of mind to act quickly in gathering and then secreting these items in the handbag and the car in a short space of time during which Ms Morris was changing, putting aside the unexplained question of how she acquired the car keys, or how she accessed the handbag without Ms Morris knowing.
This was a woman Ms Morris allowed to remain residing in her own home, despite the apparent difficulties and personal tensions. Just why HD would abuse her largess, still less heavily implicate Ms Morris by placing damning evidence in her possession, is by no means apparent or readily explicable.
Turning next to the issue surrounding the two mobile phones, her explanation ‘I don’t know how this phone got here’, is difficult to follow, given the proven facts that both were hers. It is true enough that the last recorded use of both phones was three days earlier on 11 April, and yet whoever was using them, there is no other apparent alternative explanation other than she was sending messages on them; the reasons for reaching this conclusion are detailed later. The fact that the phones were either in her handbag or on her person, equally suggests they were at hand for use if required.
Coming to the events after she was pulled over, several minor facts in dispute, such as exactly what was said, whether the phones were in the car or on her person, just how and by whom the handbag and glasses case was searched are inconsequential differences attributable to perception and observational flaws as well as the effluxion of time, which for these reasons need no resolution, at least adverse to Ms Morris. The finding of a glass ICE pipe takes the matter no further as it was not examined for the presence of drugs, fingerprints or DNA and Ms Morris did not claim it was for her own personal use in any event.[66]
[66] T167.29-.31.
The conflicting evidence of secreting the glasses case containing the packets of drugs by sliding it down the rear of her pants, is plainly of more consequence. It is however very likely that if she did so, it was the result of panic or fear for any number of reasons, and therefore cannot furnish evidence of guilt: R v Ciantar.[67] It may on the other hand affect her credibility, an issue to be considered later: Dhanhoa v The Queen.[68]
[67] (2006) 167 A Crim R 504, [86].
[68] (2003) 217 CLR 1, [34].
Finally, the question of who is responsible for the text messages, is in part allied to how Ms Morris came into the possession of the phones in the first place. She denies sending any of them. It is simply not feasible that anyone else used the Samsung at this time, for reasons that emerge from an examination of the internal language of the texts themselves. In the first place there are no less than five references to ‘Vicky’ in the incoming messages. Some contain distinctly feminine vernacular or references, such as ‘hey mate I made that up based on perfume and make up…’, ‘can you help me out love’ and ‘Hay love looking for half a game wet. Jamie’.
More significantly, there are exchanges demonstrating the other party is obviously talking to someone other than Steve (‘Steve showed me them … is that right … Oh spoke to Steve and he doesn’t want to see you’, ‘no I meant it Michael he … and Steve is locked up’, ‘can you come to mine please I’m heading … meet Steve sister to get his dog …’ and ‘Right I gave you a chance im not going down for u Steve knows your step dad’), despite her claim Sprecher had the use of it. The reference in the Sony records of 9 April to the user providing ‘my details’ as ‘vicky morris … 5075’ is quite obviously a very telling one.
These records demonstrate conclusively that both mobile phones were recently used by Ms Morris herself. This conclusion is wholly consistent with them remaining under her control on the morning in question, irrespective of where they were precisely found. Her evidence on this topic is not believable and it is squarely contradicted by the objective facts convened by the text messages themselves. In light of this conclusion on such a significant topic, it is not possible to accept her evidence in relation to the other topics detailed above, which in themselves are inherently unlikely and suspect for the reasons identified earlier.
Conclusion from the analysis
On the basis of these conclusions there is no reasonable doubt that Ms Morris was in the possession of and using the two mobile phones. She was in addition in the knowing possession of the drugs in the sunglasses case. It is a short step from there to reason that she was in possession of the packets of drugs intending to sell, because of the way they were packaged in five out of six bags (the smaller quantity in the first bag can be dismissed as a trace sample), the presence of small electronic scales and the number of empty resealable bags.
It was the expert evidence of Detective Sergeant Murphy that in 2014 Methylamphetamine was sold at the lowest or user level in points, that is .1 of a gram. As a general rule the value of a point was between $50 to $100, and that half a gram might fetch between $200 and $400, so that the combined total of 2.52 grams involved here could fetch somewhere between an estimated $1,000 to $4,000. It can be seen that five of the bags contained all but identical quantities of around .5 of a gram, and so were clearly carefully weighed and packaged for the purpose of sale at that level or quantity.
This conclusion can be safely reached because of the strength of the combination of the circumstances, despite the fact that no cash was found on the person of Ms Morris as is so often the case. Likewise the fact that she was not in possession of any ‘tick list’ can equally be dismissed as of no consequence, particularly in light of the content of the text messages on the Samsung phone. Apart from the above singular reference, the material on the Sony takes this aspect of the inquiry no further.
It may be acknowledged that no proven motive for Ms Morris to trade in drugs emerges. As she volunteered during her evidence:[69]
I have no reason to be buying or selling drugs or to have anything to do with the sale of drugs, I've got a career and I have had a WorkCover payout, there was no reason at all for me to have anything to do with this trade. I have never used drugs before. I mean I'm in my late 30s - 40s, sorry.
[69] T166.1-.6.
Assuming this state of affairs to be the case for the present, the fact remains that the prosecution has no obligation to demonstrate a possible motive and the absence of a proven motive cannot as a matter of law be fatal, if its case is otherwise established beyond reasonable doubt: De Gruchy v The Queen,[70] and R v Neilan.[71] The position in this respect is as stated by Gaudron, McHugh and Hayne JJ in De Gruchy v The Queen:[72]
In the present case, there was no evidence of motive, which is not the same thing as proven absence of motive. … However, if, as in the present case, the prosecution does not have to establish motive, it is difficult to say that the absence of evidence in that regard is a matter of “positive significance”, either in the sense that it is a weakness in the prosecution case or a strength in the defence case. It might be otherwise if there were positive evidence that the accused lacked motive. However, that would be a most unusual case. The present is not a case of that kind. It is simply a case where there was no evidence of motive.
[70] (2002) 211 CLR 85, [57(2) and (6)].
[71] (1991) 52 A Crim R 303, 322.
[72] (2002) 211 CLR 85 at [29]–[30] (footnotes omitted).
In light of these findings, it is strictly unnecessary to have resort to the deeming provision contained in s 32(5)(b) of the Controlled Substances Act, for the reason that there is no reasonable possibility other than that Ms Morris was knowingly in possession of methylamphetamine with the intention of selling it. Needless to say, if s 32(5)(b) was engaged, that would serve only to cement a conclusion already independently arrived at. Nor is any inference that she was in the business of trafficking in drugs drawn from the messages contained on the Samsung mobile phone, brought into account in reaching this conclusion. Nonetheless, having concluded the phones were used by her and having regard to the nature of the coded messages as were referred to by Detective Murphy, it would otherwise be a short step to infer that this was the only reasonable inference available in the circumstances.[73]
[73] T95.36-102.33.
Verdict
In view of the above analysis and the conclusions reached therein, the version of Ms Morris as to the circumstances in which she came into the possession of the subject drugs, is innately implausible and untenable. It is refuted by the objective facts. She is therefore found guilty as charged. A verdict is entered accordingly.
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