R v Morphy

[2015] NSWSC 848

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:	R v Morphy [2015] NSWSC 848
Hearing dates:	29 June 2015
Date of orders:	29 June 2015
Decision date:	20 July 2015
Before:	Mathews AJ
Decision:	I enter a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness pursuant to s 38.of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990
Catchwords:	Murder; judge alone trial; defence of mental illness; special verdict – not guilty on the ground of mental illness
Legislation Cited:	Crimes Act 1900 Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990
Cases Cited:	Hawkins v the Queen (1994) 179 CLR 500 R v McNaghten (1843) 8 ER 718
Category:	Principal judgment
Parties:	Regina Stuart Morphy
Representation:	Counsel: T Thorpe (Crown) N Steel (Accused)   Solicitors: Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (Crown) Legal Aid NSW (Accused)
File Number(s):	2013/365991
Publication restriction:	No

Judgment

1. MATHEWS AJ: On 29 June 2015 Stuart Morphy was charged by way of indictment with the offence that on 4 December 2013 at Guildford in New South Wales he murdered Christie Camilleri. He pleaded not guilty by reason of mental illness.

2. An order had previously been made, by consent, that the proceedings be tried by judge alone. Accordingly, the trial proceeded before me without a jury. A number of documents were tendered by the Crown, all of them by consent. Indeed, they included two psychiatric reports obtained on behalf of the defence. Brief oral evidence was given by the forensic psychiatrist, Professor Greenberg, who had assessed the accused on behalf of the Crown. Both counsel were in agreement that the appropriate verdict in all the circumstances was the special verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness.

3. All relevant documents, including psychiatric reports, had previously been provided to me by counsel. Having read those documents and heard Professor Greenberg’s evidence, I was firmly of the view that this was the only appropriate verdict in the circumstances. Accordingly, I entered a verdict that the accused was not guilty by reason of mental illness. I adjourned the proceedings until 10 August and made orders as to the accused’s disposition in the meantime. I also ordered that a report be provided to the Court on the adjourned date, containing recommendations as to the placement of the accused in a prison or mental health facility. I said that I would deliver the reasons for my verdict at a date to be fixed.

4. These, then, are my reasons for finding the accused (as I shall call Mr Morphy) not guilty by reason of mental illness.

Events leading up to the killing

5. The accused and Ms Camilleri had previously been in a relationship, and had lived together for the best part of a year. They separated in early 2013, when Ms Camilleri left the accused and commenced a relationship with his older brother William. After their separation the accused first lived in a refuge near Wollongong and then moved in with his cousin in Guildford. It was there that the killing of Ms Camilleri took place.

6. On about 25 August 2013, the accused’s mother died of a drug overdose. Her body was found three days later in her home where she lived alone. She was sitting in a chair with an empty syringe in her hand. A subsequent autopsy showed that she had taken a mixture of drugs, including heroin. Apparently Ms Camilleri was one of the last people to see her alive. The accused was very attached to his mother, and was extremely upset by her death.

7. On the morning of 4 December 2013, the accused met his brother William and they spent a considerable amount of time together. William was interviewed by police only a matter of hours after the killing. He said that the two of them first met up at Cabramatta where they had a beer before going to Harris Park to see William’s counsellor. From there they went to a hotel at Chester Hill where they stayed for a while and consumed a considerable quantity of beer. The accused was planning to go to Queensland at the end of the week. He repeatedly said to his brother that Ms Camilleri had killed their mother and that she was planning to have William killed. He was very upset, William said, and kept breaking down. William was constantly trying to reassure the accused that Ms Camilleri was harmless. They parted at about 3 o’clock that afternoon.

8. What happened thereafter comes partially from what the accused later told Professor Greenberg, and partially from a neighbour’s account, as set out in the document of agreed facts which was tendered in evidence.

9. It seems that the accused had returned to his cousin’s home at Guildford when he received a telephone call from Ms Camilleri asking him to pick her up at Liverpool Station. He did so, and took her back to the shed at the rear of the Guildford house. There he questioned her about his mother’s death, and about the fact that both he and his brother had been ill. Ms Camilleri denied that she had anything to do with this. The accused then went to the kitchen where he grabbed a knife and proceeded to mount a frenzied attack on her. A neighbour who was walking nearby heard her screaming “please Stuart, I didn’t do it. It wasn’t me, I promise on my kids.” The accused was heard to say “shut the fuck up”. This was followed by various sounds, including a thump, and Ms Camilleri’s moans and sobs.

10. The neighbour went home and rang triple zero. The police arrived at the Guildford premises at 6.37 pm. In the shed at the rear they found Ms Camilleri on the ground with a pool of blood around her head, a cut on her neck and a large open wound on her left leg. The accused was still there, with extensive blood on his clothing. He was arrested and taken into police custody. Ambulance officers arrived shortly afterwards, and informed police that Ms Camilleri was deceased.

11. The accused was taken to Parramatta Police Station where an interview took place, in the presence of his brother William, between 1.06 and 1.59 am on 5 December. In spite of the fact that the accused twice said, early in the interview, that he did not want to answer questions and that he wanted to see a doctor, the police persisted with the questioning and the accused eventually said that he believed that Ms Camilleri had given his mother a “hot shot” of battery acid, and that she was sending people after him. He admitted stabbing her earlier that night, but was unable to say why except that he “couldn’t get away from her”. When asked whether he was mentally ill, he said “I think so”, and added that he had been hearing voices. The accused was then charged with the murder of Ms Camilleri.

12. A subsequent autopsy found that Ms Camilleri had sustained extensive sharp force injuries to the body, with multiple stab wounds on the neck, trunk and limbs, as well as apparent defensive injuries to the hands and forearm. The direct cause of death was given as multiple stab wounds.

13. At this point I turn to say something about the background of the accused. This information principally derives from what the accused told Dr Nielssen and Professor Greenberg.

Background of the accused

14. The accused was 25 years old at the time of the killing, having been born on 20 September 1988. Ms Camilleri was eight years his senior.

15. The accused’s father was a truck driver and his mother had been a nurse. Both of them were heavy drug users. They separated when he was a teenager. He continued to have a good relationship with both of them until his father died of prostate cancer in about 2010. His mother, as already indicated, died in August 2013.

16. The accused spent his childhood in the western suburbs of Sydney where he attended both primary and secondary school. He did not do well at school, and had difficulty with reading and writing. He was good at soccer, but was suspended on a number of occasions for fighting. He left school at the start of year 9, and undertook a course of bricklaying at Granville TAFE. Thereafter he worked continually as a bricklayer’s labourer until his mother’s death in August 2013. He had had a few short term relationships before he met Ms Camilleri, and had no children. His relationship with Ms Camilleri, which lasted about ten months, was the longest one he had had.

17. It seems that Ms Camilleri was a cannabis user, and during the course of their relationship, the accused also became a regular user. This, on all accounts, was probably at least partially responsible for the accused’s subsequent descent into psychosis. For the two psychiatrists who have assessed the accused are both of the opinion that he was suffering from a psychotic illness when he killed Ms Camilleri in December 2013. However before describing their evidence, it is appropriate to discuss the issues to be determined in this case, and particularly the defence of mental illness.

Issues to be determined

18. The accused having been charged with murder, it goes without saying that the Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt the essential ingredients of that offence, as relevant to the circumstances of the particular case. In the present case, the defence of mental illness having been raised, the matters to be proved by the Crown, at least in the first instance, are significantly reduced.The Crown must prove in all cases that it was the accused who caused the death of the deceased, and that his or her actions were voluntary or intentional ones. A “voluntary or intentional” act is to be contrasted with an involuntary or accidental one. In determining this matter, the Court is to put to one side the evidence as to the underlying mental condition of the accused. If this matter is proved beyond reasonable doubt then the Crown must, in the normal course of events, also prove that the accused had the requisite intention for murder at the relevant time. However when the defence of mental illness has been raised, different principles apply, as confirmed by the High Court in Hawkins v the Queen (1994) 179 CLR 500. In that event, the next matter for consideration is whether the elements of that defence have been established by the accused on the balance of probabilities. If so, there is no need to consider the accused’s intention at the time. The accused is to be found not guilty on the ground of mental illness. It is only if the defence is not made out that the Court needs to consider whether the Crown has proved that the accused had the requisite intention for murder.

19. In the present case, there can be no doubt that it was the accused who inflicted the fatal stab wounds on Ms Camilleri. Nor can there be any doubt that his actions in doing so were voluntary and intentional in the relevant sense. Indeed, no one has sought to suggest to the contrary. Accordingly, the next significant matter for consideration relates to the accused’s mental state at the time of the killing, and particularly whether the defence of mental illness has been made out so as to lead to a special verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness in accordance with s 38 of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (“the Act”).

The defence of mental illness

20. There is no statutory definition of the defence of mental illness. It has long been established that, once the defence has been raised, it is to be resolved in accordance with the rules set out in R v McNaghten (1843) 8 ER 718 (“the McNaghten rules”). Under these rules the accused must prove, on the balance of probabilities, that at the time he inflicted the fatal stab wounds he was labouring under such a defect of reason, arising from a disease of the mind, that he did not know the nature and quality of his act; or, if he did know it, he did not know that what he was doing was wrong.

21. As to this last requirement, that the accused did not know that what he was doing was wrong, it is now firmly established that this does not relate to his understanding of the illegality of his actions, but rather to his appreciation, in a deep or moral sense, of the wrongfulness of his conduct. As Dixon J (as he then was) said in The King v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182:

If through the disordered condition of the mind he could not reason about the matter with a moderate degree of sense and composure it may be said that he could not know that what he was doing was wrong. What is meant by “wrong”? What is meant by wrong is wrong having regard to the everyday standards of reasonable people.

22. With this background, I turn to discuss the psychiatric evidence in this case.

The psychiatric evidence

23. The accused has been assessed by two psychiatrists for the purposes of these proceedings: Professor David Greenberg at the request of the Crown and Dr Olaf Nielssen at the request of the defence. Each of them provided written reports and Professor Greenberg also gave brief evidence at the hearing. Both are extremely experienced forensic psychiatrists with extensive knowledge and experience of the criminal justice system. The following is a short account of the observations and conclusions of each of them.

24. Dr Nielssen’s principal report was dated 29 June 2014. He had interviewed the accused by audio-visual link with Lithgow Correctional Centre on 18 June 2014. He had also read a transcript of the police interview with the accused which took place shortly after the killing. It soon became apparent to the doctor, both from the accused’s presentation and his answers, that he was suffering from chronic schizophrenia.

25. The accused told Dr Nielssen that his mother had suffered from schizophrenia, and although he himself had first heard voices at the age of 18, he had told no one, because he was afraid that he might have the same condition. He had been a heavy drinker since the age of 16, and had taken cannabis at about 17 or 18, but stopped when he became aware that it was making him paranoid. It was during his relationship with Ms Camilleri that he re-commenced taking cannabis, and also took methamphetamines on a number of occasions.

26. About three years before the killing the accused sustained a serious head injury when he fell down a set of stairs. He was in a coma for several days. The accused told Dr Nielssen that after this event he became more short tempered and aggressive, and had problems with memory and concentration.

27. Dr Nielssen concluded that the accused was suffering from chronic schizophrenia and from substance abuse disorder. He noted that the accused had a family history of schizophrenia. Moreover, before the killing, he had suffered a significant head injury, and had also resumed cannabis use, both of which are known to trigger psychotic illness.

28. On this basis, Dr Nielssen concluded that the accused had the defence of mental illness open to him. He was suffering from a mental illness, namely schizophrenia, which resulted in a defect of reason in the form of his delusional belief that Ms Camilleri had caused his mother’s death and was planning to kill him. His lethal actions in stabbing her were prompted by hallucinated voices. Dr Nielssen considered that the accused was aware of the physical nature of his actions, but he was unable to recognise that these actions were morally wrong, because of his delusional beliefs.

29. Dr Nielssen provided a further report dated 23 July 2014 in which he expressed the view that the accused would also have available to him, the partial defence of substantial impairment by reason of abnormality of mind. However, it is not necessary to consider this matter in the present circumstances.

30. Professor Greenberg interviewed the accused at the MSPC Unit at the Long Bay Prison Complex on 18 and 19 December 2014. His first report is dated 12 January 2015. He took a history which was substantially the same as that taken by Dr Nielssen. There were a few minor inconsistencies, but they do not relate to any issue of significance in the present case. Professor Greenberg concluded that the accused was probably suffering from schizophrenia which could have been triggered by his use of illicit substances and his distress at the death of his mother.

31. At the time he wrote his first report, Professor Greenberg had not been asked to comment on whether the accused had the defence of mental illness available to him. After being requested to do so, he wrote a further report dated 4 March 2015 in which he addressed this issue. He determined this matter in the affirmative. The professor considered that, as a result of his disease of the mind, namely schizophrenia, the accused was labouring under a defect of reason. He did know the nature and quality of his act when he stabbed Ms Camilleri, but he believed that he was morally justified in killing her in order to vindicate his mother and protect himself from harm. Accordingly he did not know that what he was doing was morally wrong at the time.

32. On this basis the professor expressed the opinion that, on balance, the accused had a defence of mental illness available to him.

33. Professor Greenberg also gave brief oral evidence at the hearing. The Crown Prosecutor took him through his very extensive qualifications and experience. The professor had perused all available documents relevant to this case, and had also watched the DVD of the interview between the police and the accused which took place only a matter of hours after the killing. The professor said that he could find nothing inconsistent with the view which he had reached as to the accused’s mental illness, nor was there anything to suggest any deception or malingering on the part of the accused. Counsel for the accused did not cross-examine the professor.

34. The expert evidence being all one way, I was abundantly satisfied that, when the accused stabbed and killed Ms Camilleri, he was suffering from a mental illness as defined in the McNaghten rules. Indeed, as already indicated, the Crown Prosecutor did not seek to argue to the contrary. It was for these reasons that I entered a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness pursuant to s 38 of the Act.

35. The only remaining matter to be mentioned arises by virtue of the requirement, in s 37 of the Act, that if at the trial of a person, a question is raised as to whether the accused was mentally ill at the time of committing the offence, the judge is obliged to explain various matters to the jury. These include the findings which can be made at the trial, the legal and practical consequences of those findings, and a reference to the constitution of the Mental Health Review Tribunal, particularly having regard to s 39 of the Act. I consider that it is adequate for present purposes to say that I was already well aware of all those matters at the time that I entered my verdict in this case. Indeed, I made a point of explaining a number of them to Ms Camilleri’s relatives who were in court during the very brief hearing.

**********

Decision last updated: 21 July 2015