R v Mills - [2000] QCA 357

[2000] QCA 357

COURT OF APPEAL

PINCUS JA
McPHERSON JA

ATKINSON J

CA No 162 of 2000

THE QUEEN

ANDREW PETER MILLS	Applicant
BRISBANE ..DATE 01/09/2000
01092999 T11-12/JB27 M/T COA221/2000

McPHERSON JA: The applicant pleaded guilty in the District Court at Southport to three counts of the offence under s.321A(2) of the Code of making a statement to another, knowing it to be false, with intent to induce a belief that there was an explosive in a place; in other words, he carried out a bomb hoax. The maximum penalty for that offence is imprisonment for five years. The applicant was sentenced on all three counts to a total term of imprisonment of three months followed by probation for two years, with a special condition that he receive psychiatric treatment or counselling. He now applies for leave to appeal against the sentence on the ground that it is excessive.

The circumstances are that on 8 May 1999 three telephone calls
were received on the 000 number at the Broadbeach Police
Station. The calls were logged and recorded at
8.51 p.m., 8.55 p.m. and 9.12 p.m. In the first of the calls,
the caller said there was a bomb at the Coombabah High School
and that it would detonate in five minutes. The caller was
asked where the bomb was and, at that point, the telephone call
was terminated.

In the second of the two telephone calls, it was said that the bomb was at the Coombabah Primary School and that it would detonate in 45 minutes. When asked for details, the caller said, "You will have to find out." The third call, which as I said, occurred at 9.12 p.m., involved a lengthier conversation in which the caller said that a Sergeant Bennett was responsible for what had happened. He said he was a crooked

01092999 T11-12/JB27 M/T COA221/2000

cop.

The call was traced to a public telephone booth and the
applicant was located in the area shortly afterwards. He was
interviewed by police. He admitted that he had made the calls
and had done so because he was annoyed and frustrated. He had
been found guilty in October 1998 of what the Code describes as
serious assault, to which the Sergeant Bennett referred to in
the telephone conversation had been the principal witness.
There was an appeal pending in the District Court against his
conviction or sentence in respect of that matter when he
committed the offences now before us. Apparently this
experience rankled with the applicant and motivated him to

commit the bomb hoax offence.

So far as his personal circumstances are concerned, he was born
on October 25 1965 and so was 33 years old at the time of the
offence. He has a record of a few comparatively minor
offences, but including the serious assault to which I have
referred. There are factors in his history that go in his
favour.

He has a de facto relationship with a woman who has an 11 year…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Mills

Details

AGLC: R v Mills [2000] QCA 357
Case: [2000] QCA 357
Decision Date: 1/09/2000

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of The Queen v. Mills, the applicant was convicted in the District Court at Southport for making bomb hoaxes and subsequently applied for leave to appeal against his sentence. The applicant pleaded guilty to three counts of making a statement to another, knowing it to be false, with intent to induce a belief that there was an explosive in a place, under s.321A(2) of the Code. The maximum penalty for this offence is imprisonment for five years. The District Court sentenced the applicant to a total term of imprisonment of three months followed by probation for two years, with a special condition that he receive psychiatric treatment or counselling. The applicant argued that the sentence was excessive.

The legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the sentence imposed by the District Court was within the range of a proper sentencing discretion and whether the deterrent element in sentencing had a weight that could operate against the mitigating consequences of the applicant's mental disturbance. The Court of Appeal considered the nature of the offence and the potential harm that could have been caused by the applicant's actions. The Court also took into account the applicant's personal circumstances, including his de facto relationship and work history, as well as his plea of guilty and expression of remorse.

The Court of Appeal held that the District Court was within its discretion in imposing a brief period of imprisonment, together with an order for probation involving psychiatric counselling. The Court emphasised the deterrent element in sentencing in cases of this kind and the importance of ensuring that the sentence is sufficient to prevent reoffending. The Court also noted that the applicant's psychiatric status was unclear, as there were differences in opinion between the two psychiatrists who examined him. However, the Court found that the deterrent element in the sentencing process had a weight that could operate against the mitigating consequences of the applicant's mental disturbance.

The Court of Appeal therefore refused the applicant's application for leave to appeal against his sentence, and the decision of the District Court was upheld. The Court found that the District Court was acting within the limits of a proper discretion when it imposed the sentence it did. The Court also noted that the applicant was fortunate that he was arrested soon after the threat was made, and that if he had not been located and caught, it is likely that much more serious consequences would have ensued.

Orders