R v Miller (No 2) - [2000] SASC 152

R v MILLER [No. 2]
[2000] SASC 152

In the Criminal Jurisdiction

Factual Background

MARTIN J. On 1 June 2000 I found that the accused was mentally unfit to stand trial upon a charge of Attempted Rape. I indicated I would subsequently publish my reasons.
The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge of Attempted Rape. He suffers from a mental disorder. Counsel for the accused raised questions as to the accused’s mental fitness to stand trial and mental competence to commit the offence. A previous hearing concerning mental fitness to stand trial had been conducted before a District Court Judge who was not satisfied that the accused was mentally unfit to stand trial. Additional evidence had become available and I determined that the accused’s mental fitness should again be investigated pursuant to Part 8A of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (“the CLCA”). I also decided that if the accused was not mentally unfit to stand trial, I would then proceed to consider the issue of the accused’s mental competence to commit the offence. For practical reasons, therefore, it was agreed that the evidence with respect to both issues would be led during the course of the hearing as to mental fitness to stand trial.
Through counsel who exercised his discretion pursuant to s 269W of the CLCA, the accused elected pursuant to s 269B(1) of the CLCA to have all aspects of the investigation heard and determined by a judge sitting alone.
The evidence concerning the accused’s mental disorder previously given before the District Court Judge had been by way of both reports and oral evidence. By consent I received those reports and a transcript of the oral evidence. I received additional reports and heard oral evidence from a number of expert witnesses. In addition, by consent the Crown tendered statements relevant to the events in question, including interviews with the complainant. It was agreed that, for the purposes of the investigation under Part 8A, I should treat the statements and interviews as accurate.
The objective facts are relatively straightforward. The complainant worked in a shop that is part of a shopping centre at Paralowie. On Wednesday, 2 September 1998 she left the shop at about 7.00 pm. As the complainant walked through a reserve, the accused grabbed her shoulder from behind. She turned to face the accused. He pushed the complainant to the ground and sat on her thigh. He tore her t-shirt and, in the process, the complainant’s brassiere came off. He pulled her trousers off. When she screamed he struck her about the face. During the assault, the accused said he had a gun and told the complainant to listen to him or he would kill her. The accused asked the complainant to take his trousers off. He kissed her on the mouth and about her chest and touched her on the outside of her vagina. The accused removed his penis from his trousers and insisted that the complainant take it in her…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Miller (No 2)

Details

AGLC: R v Miller (No 2) [2000] SASC 152
Case: [2000] SASC 152
Decision Date: 2 June 2000

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Miller (No 2) involved the determination of the accused's mental fitness to stand trial and mental competence to commit the offence of attempted rape. The accused, who suffered from a mental disorder, pleaded not guilty to the charge. The court was required to decide whether the accused's mental processes were so disordered or impaired that he was unable to understand or respond rationally to the charge, exercise procedural rights, or follow the evidence or course of the proceedings. The court considered the evidence of several expert witnesses, including psychologists and psychiatrists, who provided differing opinions on the accused's mental fitness. Ultimately, the court found that the accused was mentally unfit to stand trial due to his inability to understand the charge of attempted rape and the concepts of attempt and lack of consent. The court determined that the accused's mental unfitness to stand trial rendered it unnecessary to consider the issue of his mental competence to commit the offence. Therefore, the court found the accused mentally unfit to stand trial on the charge of attempted rape.

Orders