R v MICHELS - [2006] SASC 226

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Court of Criminal Appeal)
R v MICHELS
[2006] SASC 226
Judgment of The Court of Criminal Appeal
(The Honourable Justice Perry, The Honourable Justice Vanstone and The Honourable Justice White)
3 August 2006
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL AND INQUIRY AFTER CONVICTION - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PARTICULAR GROUNDS - UNREASONABLE OR INSUPPORTABLE VERDICT
Appeal against conviction - appellant convicted of four counts of causing bodily harm by dangerous driving contrary to s 19A(3) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act - all four counts arose from a single collision between the appellant's vehicle and another vehicle at an intersection of country roads - prosecution case that the dangerous driving lay in appellant's failure to "register" advisory road signs and the presence of the other vehicle - whether the evidence excluded as a reasonable possibility momentary inattention or mere misjudgment by the appellant in crossing the intersection - whether evidence proved any more than driving without due care and attention.
Held: sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant's conduct constituted dangerous driving within the meaning of s 19A - appeal dismissed.
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), s 19A, referred to.
Bliss v The Queen (1993) 173 LSJS 255, distinguished.
Kroon v The Queen (1991) 55 SASR 476; R v Mayne (1975) 11 SASR 583; Morris v The Queen (1987) 163 CLR 454, considered.

R v MICHELS
[2006] SASC 226
Court of Criminal Appeal: Perry, Vanstone and White JJ

PERRY J. In my view, the appeal should be dismissed. I agree with the reasons of White J.
VANSTONE J: In my opinion this appeal should be dismissed.
I have had the advantage of reading the reasons for decision of White J. I agree in general terms with them.
In particular I consider that it was open to the jury to be satisfied that when the appellant entered the intersection, at a time and in a manner which would inevitably compromise the safe passage of Mr Brooks’ vehicle, having either not taken in or not appropriately responded to the ample road warning signs alongside and in her path, she was driving dangerously.
WHITE J: On 7 March 2004 a collision occurred near Port Vincent on the Yorke Peninsula at the intersection of the Main Coast Road with the Port Vincent-Minlaton Road. The appellant was driving a white sedan, with two passengers, in a westerly direction on the Port Vincent-Minlaton Road. Her car collided with a yellow utility driven by one Brooks in a northerly direction along the Main Coast Road. The two passengers in the appellant’s vehicle and the two passengers in Mr Brooks’ vehicle were injured.
The appellant was charged with four counts of causing bodily harm by dangerous driving contrary to s 19A(3) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (“CLCA”), each count relating to one of the injured passengers.
By majority verdicts a jury found the appellant guilty of…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v MICHELS

Details

AGLC: R v MICHELS [2006] SASC 226
Case: [2006] SASC 226
Decision Date: 3 August 2006

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Michels, appealed against her conviction on four counts of causing bodily harm by dangerous driving under section 19A(3) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act. The convictions stemmed from a single collision at an intersection involving the appellant’s vehicle and another vehicle. The prosecution argued that the dangerous driving was evidenced by the appellant’s failure to notice advisory road signs and the presence of the other vehicle. The primary issue before the court was whether the evidence supported a finding of dangerous driving, as opposed to mere inattention or misjudgment.

The court examined the distinction between driving dangerously and driving without due care and attention. It referenced Bliss to highlight that not every collision resulting in injury constitutes dangerous driving. The court noted that the circumstances in this case differed significantly from Bliss, as the appellant had a longer distance and more time to observe the approaching vehicle. The jury was entitled to consider that the appellant had ample opportunity to notice the other vehicle, which was visible for approximately five seconds over a distance of 179 metres. The court concluded that the failure to see the approaching vehicle could not reasonably be attributed to momentary inattention or inadvertence.

Based on the evidence and the reasoning applied, the court dismissed the appeal. Although there were valid points regarding the appellant’s failure to register the advisory signs, the court found that these did not sufficiently undermine the jury's verdict. The court emphasised that the failure to observe the approaching vehicle over a substantial distance and time frame negated the possibility of mere inattention or misjudgment. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and the convictions were upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

PERRY J

Bliss illustrates clearly the distinction which is to be drawn between driving in a manner dangerous on the one hand, and driving without due care on the other. It reflects the legislative intention that it is not every case of driving which results in a collision in which someone is injured which is to be characterised as driving in a manner dangerous. But I do not think that this case can be characterised as being on “all fours” with it. The appellant in Bliss had only the time taken by a vehicle travelling at 100 kph to cover 80 metres in which to see it. The possibility of momentary inattention or inadvertence in those circumstances is obvious. But for the reasons already noted, the jury in this case was entitled to consider that the appellant had the opportunity of observing the approach of Mr Brooks’ vehicle over a distance of 179 metres, and while she herself travelled a longer distance than had the appellant in Bliss. I repeat my conclusion that, in the circumstances of this case, the failure to see an approaching vehicle which was visible for some 5 seconds cannot reasonably be attributed to momentary inattention or inadvertence. I do not consider that Bliss requires any contrary conclusion.Conclusion For these reasons, although I consider that there is force in the appellant’s submissions concerning her alleged failure to “register” the advisory signs, I do not consider that the appellant has made out her second ground of appeal. As stated earlier, it is not necessary in these circumstances to consider the first ground of appeal. I would dismiss the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: PERRY J

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