R v Meade (Ruling No 3)

Case

[2013] VSC 256

17 May 2013


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

CRIMINAL DIVISION

S CR 2012 0092

THE QUEEN
v
ROBERT ARTHUR MEADE

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JUDGE:

WEINBERG JA

WHERE HELD:

Melbourne

DATE OF HEARING:

29 and 30 April, 2, 6, 7 and 9 May 2013

DATE OF RULING:

17 May 2013

CASE MAY BE CITED AS:

R v Meade (Ruling No 3)

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2013] VSC 256

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CRIMINAL LAW — Trial — Murder — Crown sought to lead evidence of a financial motive on the part of the accused to murder his former wife — Documentary evidence that accused had failed to pay child support for the couple’s three children and had misled his former wife as to his employment status — Evidence capable of presenting accused as callous individual indifferent to the welfare of his children — Evidence of only weak probative force — Evidence excluded — Evidence Act 2008 s 137.

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APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors
For the Crown  Mr R A Elston SC with
Mr N A Hutton
Mr C Hyland, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions
For the Accused Mr P J Morrissey SC with
Mr D Cronin
Turnbull Lawyers

HIS HONOUR:

  1. Mr Morrissey SC, on behalf of the accused, made application, under s 137 of the Evidence Act 2008, for the exclusion of certain evidence which the Crown proposed to lead in order to demonstrate that the accused had a financial motive for killing the deceased.

  1. On 6 May 2013, at the conclusion of argument on Mr Morrissey’s application, I ordered that this evidence be excluded.  I said that I would publish my reasons at a later stage.  These are those reasons. 

  1. In broad terms, the Summary of Crown Opening alleged that, among the matters motivating the accused to want to murder his former wife, was a fear, on his part, of financial embarrassment.  More particularly, it stated that the facts that the deceased had ‘rais[ed] issues about [the accused’s] employment status’, and that she had ‘threatened to make a formal application for child support’, were ‘perceived by [the accused] as [threats] to his own financial stability’.[1]  

    [1]See Summary of Crown Opening, 12 October 2012, [35].

  1. Those propositions relied upon documentary evidence in the form of a number of emails and text messages passing between the accused and the deceased, many of them in the period leading up to her death. 

  1. The salient points of the evidence, as identified by Mr Morrissey, were as follows:

·           The deceased had said to the accused that she would ‘begin proceedings to formalise maintenance from you for the children as my constant requests to get support from you fail’;[2]

[2]Email dated 23 May 2011 from the deceased to the accused at p 1582 of the depositions.

· The deceased had asked the accused for information regarding his employment status,[3] and it would be open to conclude, on the documentary material, that the accused was being at least disingenuous as to his employment and the fact that he had been working for some time;

[3]See SMS text messages dated 9 June 2011, as set out at pp 1594-1600 of the depositions.

·           The accused was in fact earning approximately $800 a day in his position with Uranium Equities Ltd;

·           The accused had failed to pay approximately $900 in child support which had fallen due;[4] and

·           The amount of child support for which the accused was liable had previously been in the order of $430 a month, but had been reassessed in mid-June 2011, based on his taxable income, to $1,259.75 per month.[5] 

[4]T243.

[5]T244.

  1. The ‘sting’ of this evidence, Mr Morrissey submitted, was that the accused would be seen as a man who, despite earning what the jury might very well regard as a large income, was not willing to contribute significantly to his children’s welfare.  Against that, he submitted that the evidence was, at best, only weakly probative in providing a motive to kill.

  1. In reply on the application, the Crown submitted that the accused was aware that he was at risk of further financial scrutiny into his affairs.[6] The evidence indicated that the accused had been lying to his wife about his level of income.  It was submitted that the focus was not on the accused’s attitude towards the welfare of his children, but rather on his treatment of the deceased.  It was submitted that, in any event, any prejudice associated with the evidence could be cured by appropriate direction.

    [6]T254.

  1. In my view, the evidence sought to be excluded was potentially prejudicial.  Its probable effect would have been that the jury would reason from the fact that the accused was earning some $800 a day (yet unwilling to contribute further in the way of child support) that he was a thoroughly mean individual, and should be viewed as disreputable.  The evidence was capable of showing a high degree of indifference and callousness on the accused’s part towards the welfare of his children. 

  1. Against that, the evidence had only very weak probative force.  It is almost impossible to see how the murder of his former wife could have led the accused to have been any better off financially.  In the event of his former wife’s death, he would, in all likelihood, have gained — at least for a time — sole custody of the three children of the relationship, with all the consequent expenses that would entail.  For a man said to have been motivated by financial concerns, as the Crown contends, it would be nonsensical for him to have murdered the deceased in those circumstances. 

  1. In that regard, it should be noted that Mr Elston accepted that, on the Crown case, one of the significant motivating factors in the accused’s decision to kill his former wife, along with his hatred of her, was to keep the children in this country.[7]

    [7]T251.

  1. Having performed the analysis required under s 137 of the Evidence Act 2008, it was plain to me that the probative value of this evidence was ‘outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused’.  It was for that reason that I ordered that it be excluded.

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