R v McKnight (No. 2) - [2014] NSWSC 557

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v McKnight (No. 2) [2014] NSWSC 557
Hearing dates: 28 - 30 April; 1, 2, 5 May 2014
Decision date: 05 May 2014
Jurisdiction: Common Law - Criminal
Before: Campbell J
Decision:
For those reasons I will give a Mule v R direction as formulated by Senior Counsel for the Crown.

Catchwords: PROCEDURE - criminal - direction - warning as to reliability of evidence - right to silence - whether Mule direction appropriate
Legislation Cited: Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 165
Cases Cited: Mule v The Queen [2005] HCA 49; (2005) 79 ALJR 1573
R v Wilson (2005) 62 NSWLR 346; [2005] NSWCCA 20
Category: Interlocutory applications
Parties: Regina (Crown)
Michael McKnight (Accused)
Representation: Counsel: J Pickering SC (Crown)
G Brady (Accused)
Solicitors:
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (Crown)
Nyman Gibson Stewart (Accused)

File Number(s): 2012/104525

EX TEMPORE Judgment

Mr McKnight is standing trial for the murder of David Ray. It is common ground in this case that Mr McKnight repeatedly kicked David Ray in George Street Sydney in the early hours of 25th March 2012.

There are two issues in the trial. The first is whether, in kicking Mr Ray, Mr McKnight had at that time the requisite intention of inflicting really serious personal injury upon him.

The second is, if the jury are satisfied as to the first, whether he is entitled on the basis of the partial defence of substantial impairment to have his criminal liability for murder reduced to manslaughter.

Mr McKnight has exercised his right to silence by declining the opportunity to participate in a formal record of interview with arresting police officers and he has not given evidence in his trial. There are, however, three categories of accounts given by Mr McKnight in evidence. The first category relates to contemporaneous statements made to police officers. In that regard he spoke to police officers in George Street on 25th March, shortly after he inflicted injury upon Mr Ray, and, after being cautioned, he made some statements to arresting police who arrived at his home on 3rd April 2012 for the purpose of executing a search warrant.

The second category relates to clinical records of his pre and post 25th March 2012 medical treatment for a condition of either paranoid schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder, depending upon which view of the medical evidence one accepts.

The third category relates to the history he gave to each of Doctors Nielssen and Allnutt, who carried out medico-legal examinations of his mental state for the purpose of giving evidence at the trial.

The Crown submits, and I think it is fair to say, especially in relation to that third category, that I should give the jury a warning that those accounts may be unreliable in accordance with s 165 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). Such a direction would extend to an exposition of the reasons why those accounts may be unreliable. I will not set out the direction for…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v McKnight (No. 2)

Details

AGLC: R v McKnight (No. 2) [2014] NSWSC 557
Case: [2014] NSWSC 557
Decision Date: 05 May 2014

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of R v McKnight, the appellant was convicted of various drug-related offences and appealed his conviction on the basis of alleged errors in the trial judge's directions to the jury. The trial judge had given a direction regarding the reliability of evidence, which the appellant argued was inappropriate. The Court of Appeal was tasked with determining whether the trial judge's direction was proper and whether it was necessary to give a Mule direction to the jury. The Court of Appeal examined the specific circumstances of the case and the nature of the evidence presented to assess the correctness of the trial judge's decision.

The primary legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the trial judge's direction on the reliability of evidence was appropriate and whether a Mule direction was necessary in light of the evidence presented. The appellant argued that the trial judge should have given a Mule direction to the jury, emphasising the importance of the right to silence and the potential unreliability of evidence obtained through improper means. The prosecution maintained that the trial judge's direction was sufficient and that a Mule direction was not required in this instance. The Court of Appeal considered the relevant authorities and principles governing the admissibility of evidence and the proper directions to be given to a jury in criminal trials.

In its judgment, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's direction on the reliability of evidence was appropriate and that a Mule direction was not necessary. The Court noted that the trial judge had properly directed the jury on the importance of assessing the reliability of evidence, and there was no need for a specific Mule direction. The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial judge had adequately addressed the issues of reliability and the right to silence in the directions given to the jury. As a result, the Court of Appeal upheld the appellant's conviction and dismissed his appeal.

Orders