Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: R v McKellar [2014] NSWSC 104 Hearing dates: 17 February 2014 Decision date: 17 February 2014 Jurisdiction: Common Law - Criminal Before: Button J Decision: The special hearing may proceed on the indictment presented.
Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW - murder - special hearing - additional counts not generally heard in Supreme Court included in indictment - one additional count based on different evidential foundation to count of murder - whether appropriate for Supreme Court to hear additional count Legislation Cited: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), ss 21, 23, 128
Criminal Procedure Regulation 2005
Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW)
Supreme Court Practice Note SC CL 2Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: Regina
Shane Thomas McKellarRepresentation: Counsel:
Mr W Creasey SC (Crown)
Ms C Davenport SC (Defendant)
Solicitors:
Mr M Maher - Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown)
Mr B Mallinson - Blair Criminal Lawyers Pty Limited (Defendant)
File Number(s): 2011/180041 2011/167627
Ex Tempore Judgment
In these proceedings, to state matters succinctly, the preconditions for a special hearing that are contained in the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW) have been established.
In order to commence the special hearing, the learned Crown Prosecutor has presented an indictment that contains three counts.
The first alleges, in short, the armed robbery of and infliction of grievous bodily harm upon Bruce Wentworth Delany in the town of Bourke on 21 May 2011. Count two alleges that on 23 May 2011, at the same location, the accused murdered the same person. And I understand that the evidential foundation of each of those counts is highly similar.
As for the third count, I understand from the Crown Prosector that the evidential foundation is somewhat divorced, in that it is founded on cash located upon the accused when he was arrested, and it is not alleged that that cash is the proceeds of the offence alleged in count one.
That raised a query in my mind (which has been resolved with the assistance of counsel) as to the appropriateness of this Court hearing count three.
It led me to reflect on s 128 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) which speaks, in short, of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales issuing, if his Honour wishes, a Practice Note with regard to whether indictments for particular counts are to be presented in this Court or the District Court of New South Wales.
There is no need for me to recite the entirety of that section. It suffices to say that it leads one to Supreme Court Practice Note SC CL 2. Clause 14 of that Practice Note makes it clear that indictments for murder are to be presented in this Court. Indeed, the Practice Note refers to the well-known fact that, pursuant to clause 22 of the Criminal Procedure Regulation 2005, the District Court does not have jurisdiction with regard to allegations of murder.
If that were where matters end, one might be concerned with regard to the presentation of count three in the indictment in this Court. However, clause 16 of the Practice Note is as follows:
"Subject to the usual practice as to joinder of counts, an indictment charging an offence under any of the above sections may also contain counts charging other offences."
That reference to the "usual practice" leads one to s 21 and s 23 of the Criminal Procedure Act. It is quite clear that, with regard to count one, it is the usual practice in such circumstances (namely where it is alleged that a murder was committed and another closely related offence that could have, on its own, been dealt with in the District Court is also alleged) to present an indictment that contains that related count. Accordingly, there is no need for me to discuss count one any further.
As for count three, I consider that it is the case that, if it were the position that senior counsel for the accused objected to one and the same tribunal of fact determining count three along with counts one and two, there may be some force to such an application to sever that count.
But the fact is, no doubt for sound reasons, there is no objection by senior counsel for the accused to the indictment in its current form. And I have been informed from the Bar table today that the indictment in its current form has been before the Supreme Court for many months now, and again, no doubt for sound reasons, there has been no objection to its form in the past.
In short I have satisfied myself that the indictment that has been presented, in light of the position of learned senior counsel for the accused, is appropriate and consistent with the applicable legislation, regulation, and Practice Note of this Court.
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- AGLC
- R v McKellar [2014] NSWSC 104
- Case
- [2014] NSWSC 104
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to decide whether it was appropriate for the Supreme Court to hear the additional count of deprivation of liberty. The court considered the nature of the offence and whether it was of a type that the Supreme Court generally hears. It also considered whether the additional count was based on the same evidential foundation as the count of murder. The court noted that the additional count was a serious offence and that it was of a type that the Supreme Court generally hears. However, the court also noted that the additional count was based on a different evidential foundation to the count of murder.
The court held that it was appropriate for the Supreme Court to hear the additional count of deprivation of liberty. The court noted that the additional count was a serious offence and that it was of a type that the Supreme Court generally hears. The court also noted that the additional count was based on a different evidential foundation to the count of murder, but that this did not necessarily mean that it was not appropriate for the Supreme Court to hear it. The court held that the inclusion of the additional count was appropriate and that the matter should proceed to trial on both counts.
The court ordered that the matter proceed to trial on both counts of murder and deprivation of liberty. The court held that it was appropriate for the Supreme Court to hear the additional count of deprivation of liberty, despite it being based on a different evidential foundation to the count of murder. The court noted that the additional count was a serious offence and that it was of a type that the Supreme Court generally hears. The court held that the inclusion of the additional count was appropriate and that the matter should proceed to trial on both counts.
Orders
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Evidence
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