R v MC (No 2)
[2019] ACTSC 61
•15 March 2019
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: | R v MC (No 2) |
Citation: | [2019] ACTSC 61 |
Hearing Dates: | 21 November 2018 |
DecisionDate: | 15 March 2019 |
Before: | Loukas-Karlsson J |
Decision: | See [77]. |
Catchwords: | CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Judgment and Punishment – Sentence – historic sexual offences – offender found guilty by a jury - indecent assault on a person under the age of 16 – carnal knowledge of a person under the age of 10 – delay |
Legislation Cited: | Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) ss 67, 76 |
Cases Cited: | Cheung v The Queen [2001] HCA 67; 209 CLR 1 CX v The Queen [2017] ACTCA 37 Zdravkovic v The Queen [2016] ACTCA 53 |
Parties: | The Queen (Crown) MC (Offender) |
Representation: | Counsel Ms S Beaumont (Crown) Ms B Morrisroe (Offender) |
| Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown) Legal Aid ACT (Offender) | |
File Numbers: | SCC 134/16; SCC 28/17 |
LOUKAS-KARLSSON J
Introduction
MC (the offender) was found guilty after a trial of the following offences:
(a)CC17/1475 - That on a day unknown between 2 January 1979 and 3 January 1981, he committed an indecent assault on LT, she being a person under the age of 16 years, contrary to s 76 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) (Count 1);
(b)CC17/1478 - That on a day unknown between 2 January 1982 and 3 January 1985, he committed an indecent assault on LT, she being a person under the age of 16 years, contrary to s 76 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) (Count 3);
(c)CC16/25 - That on a day unknown between 30 June 1980 and 1 September 1980, he committed an indecent assault on NT, she being a person under the age of 16 years, contrary to s 76 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) (Count 4);
(d)CC16/604 - That on a day unknown between 7 October 1981 and 20 October 1983, he committed an offence of carnal knowledge on NT, she being a person under the age of 10 years, contrary to s 67 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) (Count 5);
(e)CC16/27 - That on a day unknown between 3 November 1980 and 30 January 1983, he committed an offence of indecent assault on ND, she being a person under the age of 16 years, contrary to s 76 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) (Count 7); and
(f)XO2017/31037 - That on a day unknown between 20 October 1983 and 3 November 1985, he committed an offence of indecent assault on ND, she being a person under the age of 16 years, contrary to s 76 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) (Count 9).
In R v XH (No 2) [2016] ACTSC 350 (XH (No 2)) at [37]-[39], Justice Penfold considered that as a result of s 25(2) of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT), the relevant maximum penalty for the offence of carnal knowledge should be 17 years of imprisonment. This is a result of the replacement of the offence of carnal knowledge with the offence of sexual intercourse with a child under 10, which carries a maximum penalty of 17 years of imprisonment. I adopt this position on the maximum penalty in relation to the offences before me.
The maximum penalty for the offence of indecent assault is five years of imprisonment. The maximum penalty for the offence of carnal knowledge is 17 years of imprisonment.
Facts
The High Court in Cheung v The Queen [2001] HCA 67; 209 CLR 1 (Cheung) endorsed the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal’s approach in R v Isaacs (1997) 41 NSWLR 374 (Isaacs) in relation to the Court’s role in sentencing and interpreting a jury’s verdict of guilty following a trial. The Court in Cheung at [14] quoted the summarised principles from Isaacs (at pages 377-378) as follows:
1.Where, following a trial by jury, a person has been convicted of a criminal offence, the power and responsibility of determining the punishment to be inflicted upon the offender rest with the judge, and not with the jury …
2. Subject to certain constraints, it is the duty of the judge to determine the facts relevant to sentencing. Some of these facts will have emerged in evidence at the trial; others may only emerge in the course of the sentencing proceedings. …
3. The primary constraint upon the power and duty of decision-making referred to above is that the view of the facts adopted by the judge for purposes of sentencing must be consistent with the verdict of the jury.
4. A second constraint is that findings of fact made against an offender by a sentencing judge must be arrived at beyond reasonable doubt.
5. There is no general requirement that a sentencing judge must sentence an offender upon the basis of the view of the facts, consistent with the verdict, which is most favourable to the offender. … However, the practical effect of 4 above, in a given case, may be that, because the judge is required to resolve any reasonable doubt in favour of the accused, then the judge will be obliged, for that reason, to sentence upon a view of the facts which is most favourable to the offender. …
Taking into account these principles, I make the following factual findings.
The offender is the uncle of the three victims. During their childhood years, the offender and the victim’s grandmother would on occasion care for each of the victims. The victims would be cared for either at their grandmother’s house in Lyons, or at a property in Weston, where the offender lived for a time with his father.
The Victim LT
On one occasion between 1979 and 1981, whilst the offender was babysitting LT at a property in Lyons, the offender had put LT to bed. While the offender was saying goodnight to LT, the offender put his hands down her pants and fingered her genitalia. The victim was aged between 3 and 6 years old during the commission of this offence. This makes up Count 1.
On another occasion, between 1982 and 1985, the victim LT was at the property in Weston. The victim was playing with other relatives in the backyard. The offender had some chairs in the backyard set up against a wall in the shade. The offender placed the victim on his lap, and “rocked the victim” on his lap. The offender placed the victim’s hand down his pants and onto his penis. The victim was aged between 6 and 10 years old during the commission of this offence. This makes up Count 3.
The Victim NT
On another occasion, at the property in Lyons sometime in 1980, the offender had put NT to bed. In bed, the accused fingered the victim’s genitalia. The victim was aged 3 years old during the commission of this offence. This makes up Count 4.
On another occasion, between 1981 and 1983, the offender took NT into a room at the property in Lyons during the day, and inserted his penis into her genitalia. The victim was aged between 5 and 7 years old during the commission of this offence. This makes up Count 5.
The Victim ND
On another occasion, at the property in Lyons sometime between 1980 and 1983, the accused fingered ND’s genitalia whilst the victim was falling asleep. The victim was aged between 3 and 5 years old during the commission of this offence. This makes up Count 7.
On another occasion, at the property in Lyons sometime between 1983 and 1985, the victim awoke, due to discomfort and pain, to find the accused penetrating her vagina with his fingers. The victim was aged between 5 and 8 years old during the commission of this offence. This makes up Count 9.
Objective Seriousness
The prosecution submitted that the offences took place while the girls were in the care of their grandmother and the offender, where they were entitled to feel they would be safe. It was further submitted that the offences formed part of a course of conduct between 1979 and 1985.
In relation to the victims, the prosecution submitted that they were vulnerable girls, being aged between 3 and 8 years old during the commission of the offences, and that the offender was in a position of trust and authority over them when the offences were committed. The prosecution referred to Sheller JA’s comments in R v BJW [2000] NSWCCA 60; 112 A Crim R 1 (BJW) at [21] in this regard:
…a child aged 13 or younger is virtually helpless in the family unit when sexually abused by a step-parent. All too often the child is afraid to inform upon the step-parent; see generally R v Bamford (unreported) CCA, 23 July 1991 per Lee CJ at CL at 5. The younger the victim the more serious is the criminality; see R v PWH (unreported) CCA, 20 February 1992.
The prosecution further submitted that the only inference is that the offender committed the offences for his own sexual gratification.
In relation to the counts of indecent assault, the prosecution submitted that in Ivimy v R [2008] NSWCCA 25, the Court considered that touching of genitalia was “close to a worst case” for offences of this kind.
Ultimately, the prosecution submitted that the indecent assault offending was of a relatively high range, given the age of the victims and the conduct involved. The prosecution further submitted that the offence of carnal knowledge of a girl under 10 is “inherently serious”. I accept this submission as it accords with my view.
Counsel for the offender did not make specific submissions in relation to range.
It must be stated that references to low range, middle range and high range objective seriousness are unlikely to be helpful in this jurisdiction. As has previously been expressed in this jurisdiction, it is preferable for a sentencing judge to confine themselves to identifying features of the case that inform the objective seriousness of the case: see R v Toumo’ua [2017] ACTCA 9; 12 ACTLR 103 (Toumo’ua).
The indecent assaults are objectively very serious offences on their individual facts, as is the offence of carnal knowledge. The three victims were all very young at the time of the offences. The offender was in a position of trust that he abused.
Victim Impact Statements
At the hearing on 21 November 2018, the prosecution read out three Victim Impact Statements on behalf of each of the three victims respectively.
The extent of the impact upon the victims was made clear by the Victim Impact Statements. The reading of the Victim Impact Statements is important for the Court as the offender heard what the victims had to say. Courts know of the extremely serious effects of such offences as these. It is valuable for the Court to hear the words of the victims.
The Court acknowledges the significant impact that the offences have had, and continue to have, on the victims. The Victim Impact Statements were eloquent statements of the serious, profound and long lasting personal harm suffered by all three victims.
Subjective Circumstances
I have before me a Pre-Sentence Report (PSR) prepared for these proceedings. I also heard evidence from Mr Geoffrey Knox, a solicitor who holds power of attorney for the offender, and who provided a reference.
The offender was born in Sweden in 1948, and is now aged 70 years old. He was aged between approximately 30 and 37 years during the commission of the offences. The offender’s family migrated from Sweden to Melbourne in 1963. His parents separated in 1967. The offender relocated to Canberra in 1975, where his father lived with him until 1982. The offender’s father passed away in 1990, and his mother passed away in 2003.
The offender has had no children, and described two significant intimate relationships: the first whilst the offender was participating in active service with the Australian Army in Vietnam during 1969, and the second between 1979 and 1982.
The offender left mainstream education at age 16, where he then held a civilian position within the Department of Defence, prior to entering national service with the Australian Army from 1968 to 1970. In evidence before me is a statement of the offender’s army service which confirms his national service record, and indicates that the offender received medals for his service.
He then worked as a constable in the Commonwealth Police Force from 1970 until 1977, when he departed as a result of workplace stress and symptoms of a mental health condition. The offender reported that the Department of Veterans Affairs had provided interventions for that condition, which he believes is now stable.
He has since repaired cars and built house extensions for work, and received a pension from the Department of Veterans Affairs.
The offender prior to being remanded into custody assisted with the care of his sister, who has some cognitive impairment. The evidence of Mr Knox was to the effect that since the offender was remanded, Mr Knox has been assisting the offender’s sister. It was conceded by the prosecution that the offender’s sister was emotionally attached to the offender.
The offender reported no history of problematic consumption of alcohol, and denied consumption of any illicit substances. The offender does not have a criminal history.
The PSR concludes that the offender reported that he received strong support from one of his siblings, and that he seems to have led a pro-social life characterised by friendships in the community and a history of no prior contact with the criminal justice system. The PSR notes that further investigation of his mental health could be of benefit to determine whether the reported symptoms referred to above at [28] contributed to his offence pathway. The PSR notes that it is of significance that the offender does not accept responsibility for the current offences and believes he is the victim of “vexatious” claims.
The PSR assessed the offender as low risk with regard to general offending, and that his risk of similar sexual offending is also low.
I take the subjective matters into account on sentence.
Criminal History
The offender has no criminal history, and was of otherwise good character. The prosecution submitted that the offender’s prior good character should be given little weight.
Prior good character has limited weight with respect to child sexual offences. In Dousha v R [2008] NSWCCA 263, the Court at [49] stated the following:
While an offender’s previous good character must be taken into account on sentence its weight as a matter in mitigation of sentence will vary depending on the circumstances of the offending (Ryan v R [2001] HCA 21; 206 CLR 267 per McHugh J at 275). In the context of offending constituted by a course of repeated sexual offending against young children a claim for good character does not entitle an offender to the leniency that might otherwise be available (see R v PGM [2008] NSWCCA 172 at [43] and [44]).
It is clear on the authorities that the offender’s prior good character should be given only limited weight on the facts of this case.
References
In evidence before me are two letters of reference. The first reference is under the hand of Mr Knox. It includes the following:
I can confirm that [the offender] has been, in effect, a carer for his sister…and he has requested that we assist [her] with various matters, including payment of her rent and purchase of a mobility scooter for her.
…
I can confirm also that I find the offences of which he has been convicted to be out of character to the person that I know and it certainly came as a shock to me when I became aware of his conviction.
Mr Knox was cross-examined by the prosecution at the sentence hearing.
The second reference is under the hand of one of the offender’s siblings. It includes the following:
I know that he has been charged with indecent assault which is a [shock] to me and my family. [The offender] is a man that is totally unselfish [and] he has extremely high morals. [He] has served in Vietnam. He then worked in various positions.
…
I have only good things to say about my brother and so do many, many people with me.
Ultimately the prosecution submitted that the references should be given little weight.
I have taken into account the offender’s care responsibilities for his sister in the subjective matters. This was not submitted to be case of exceptional hardship and I do not take this into account as exceptional hardship for a dependent. As indicated above, consistent with the authorities, I give the references in support of the offender’s otherwise good character only limited weight in this case.
Time in Custody
The offender’s bail was revoked on 16 June 2018, at the conclusion of the trial. I will backdate the sentence to commence on 16 June 2018 as a result.
Delay
Counsel for the offender submitted that there was a delay in the prosecution in the matter, given that the offending ceased in 1985, and that the offender became aware of the allegations in the 1990’s. Counsel for the offender submitted that the delay was relevant, as the offender now confronts full-time imprisonment as a man “undoubtedly in his declining years”. Counsel for the offender submitted that the delay should inform the manner in which a sentence should be served.
The prosecution conceded that there had been a significant delay in this case, and referred to the comments of the Court in PR v The Queen [2014] ACTCA 40 (PR) at [33] in that regard:
It is now much better known that victims of sexual abuse, especially young victims, can take some time, even years, before they are ready or emotionally strong enough to disclose such abuse or to face the further trauma that comes with a prosecution of such offences.
Nevertheless, the prosecution conceded that the delay of some 32 to 38 years should be taken into account. The prosecution referred to the judgment of Wood CJ at CL (with whom Bell J and Smart AJ agreed) in R v Blanco [1999] NSWCCA 121; 106 A Crim R 303, where his Honour at [16] stated that:
The reason why delay is to be taken into account when sentencing an offender relates first to the fact of the uncertain suspense in which a person may be left; secondly to any demonstrated progress of the offender towards rehabilitation during the intervening period; and thirdly, to the fact that a sentence for a stale crime does call for a measure of understanding and flexibility of approach: See, in addition to Todd and Mill, the decisions in Harrison (1990) 48 A Crim R 197 at 198-199 and King (Court of Criminal Appeal NSW, 24 February 1998).
The prosecution submitted that in this case, the offender was confronted by family sometime in the 1990’s, a police investigation began in mid-2010 and by November 2014, the offender was notified of the allegations being formally investigated by police. The prosecution submitted that there is no evidence that he suffered suspense or uncertainty as to whether the authorities were going to take action. The prosecution submitted that from the letters he wrote to the victims in the 1990’s, “it appears that he is at peace with his offending resulting from forgiveness from God”.
Ultimately, the prosecution submitted that while the Court should take into account delay, it is not an error to not identify mathematically the amount of the reduction in sentence given for delay: PR at [46].
In this case, I have taken into account the relevant delay as part of the process of instinctive synthesis on sentence.
Cases
I was referred to the cases of CX v The Queen [2017] ACTCA 37 (CX); R v TC (unreported, ACT Supreme Court, Penfold J, 28 March 2011) (TC), R v CC [2016] ACTSC 43 (CC) and R v DL [2018] ACTSC 142 (DL) by the prosecution.
In CX, the offender had been sentenced by the primary judge for 12 child sex offences committed between 1973 and 1993. The victims were the offender’s daughters, and two sisters who received childcare in the offender’s home, and who were aged between five and twelve years old. At the time of sentencing, the offender was elderly, and had a life expectancy of 4.19 years. The primary judge imposed a total sentence of 10 years of imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 5 years. The Court of Appeal considered the sentence to be well within range for these types of offences.
In TC, the offender pleaded guilty to three charges of incest and three charges of an act of indecency. The offences were representative, and were committed over a period of about 10 years. The victims were the offender’s two daughters. The offender expressed remorse and had been of prior good character. The total sentence was 11 years of imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 6 and a half years.
In CC, the offender pleaded guilty to five counts of incest and one count of an act of indecency with a young person between the ages of 10 and 16 years. The offences were committed on the offender’s stepdaughter, who was 13 years old at the time of the offences. The offender was found to be remorseful for the offences, and did not have a prior history of sexual offending. The offender received a total sentence of five years and nine months of imprisonment, with a non-parole period set at two years and 11 months.
In DL, the offender was found guilty by a jury of three offences of an act of indecency with a person under the age of 10, one count of an act of indecency with a person under the age of 16, and four counts of incest. The offending related to two victims, who were the offender’s granddaughters. The offender had no criminal history, and did not accept his guilt. The total sentence was eight years of imprisonment, with a non-parole period of four years and eight months.
I was referred to the cases of XH No 2; R v Djenadija [2015] ACTSC 207 (Djenadija); R v HI [2015] ACTSC 373 (HI); R v Trezise [2018] ACTSC 135 (Trezise); R v KS [2018] ACTSC 220 (KS) and R v Scheeren [2014] ACTSC 272 (Scheeren) by counsel for the offender.
In XH (No 2), the offender was found guilty by a jury of one offence of indecent assault of a female under the age of 16 years, and one offence of carnal knowledge of a girl under the age of 10. The offences took place in 1982, when the offender was seventeen or eighteen years old, and the victim, the offender’s half-sister, was six or seven years old. The offender did not accept his guilt, and the offender had no prior convictions for sexual offending. The offender was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of three years and ten months, to be served by way of intensive corrections order.
In Djenadija, the offender was found guilty of four offences of an act of indecency on a person under 16 years of age which occurred between the period of 1983 and 1985. The victims of the offences were two sisters, who were friends with the offender’s daughter. At the time of sentencing, the offender had no relevant prior convictions, was seventy-five years of age, in poor health and maintained his denial that he had committed the offences. The offender was sentenced to a total period of one year and eleven months, to be served as four months in custody, following which the sentence was to be suspended and the offender enter into a good behaviour order for the full term of the sentence.
In HI, the offender was found guilty of three counts of committing an act of indecency with a young person under the age of 10 years, seven counts of committing an act of indecency with a young person between the ages of 10 and 16 years and one count of incest. The offences were committed against the offender’s stepdaughter and her cousin in the period between 1988 and 1991. The offender had no criminal history and maintained his denial that he had committed the offences. The offender received a total sentence of six years and nine months of imprisonment, and, so as to reflect the offender’s rehabilitation, lack of criminal history and the staleness of the offences, Burns J imposed a comparably shorter non-parole period of two years and three months.
In Trezise, the offender pleaded guilty to nine counts of indecent assault. The offences were committed against three children, two of whom brothers, between 1974 and 1977 when the offender held the position a youth group leader at the Wesley Uniting Church. At the time of sentencing, the offender was 79 years of age, in declining health and had demonstrated remorse for the offending, but had a criminal history of related offences. The offender received a sentence of three years, two months and six days of imprisonment, to be suspended after a period of six months upon which the offender was to enter into an undertaking to be of good behaviour for a period of three years.
In KS, the offender pleaded guilty to a single count of indecently assaulting a child under the age of 16 years. The offending occurred between the period of 8 January 1982 and 20 June 1983 against the offender’s daughter, although the offender was unaware that the victim was his daughter at the relevant time. The offender had no relevant criminal history, was of otherwise good character and exhibited remorse, shame and guilt in respect of the offending. The offender was sentenced to a period of 12 months of imprisonment to be suspended after a period of 3 months, following which a good behaviour order was to be entered into for a period of 12 months.
In Scheeren, the offender pleaded guilty to one count of buggery and eleven counts of indecent assault on a male; Murrell CJ noting that fellatio, like all sexual assaults against a male at the time (apart from buggery) were prosecuted as indecent assault. The offending occurred against a single victim, a family friend of the offender, who was between the ages of eleven and twelve when the offending occurred between 1 December 1979 and 31 December 1980. In arriving at the total sentence Murrell CJ noted the offender had taken steps towards rehabilitation, exhibited remorse, had no criminal record, was otherwise of good character and that the offences were stale in nature. By reference to sentencing patterns applicable at the time of the offending, the offender was sentenced to eight years imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years and eight months.
Consonant with the authorities, it must be underlined that each case is different and must be approached on its own facts. Nevertheless, I have been referred to and considered these comparable cases as “yardsticks” as referred to by the High Court in Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45; 242 CLR 520 (Hili) at [53]-[54]. I also take into account, to the extent that I can, the sentencing practice applicable for crimes of this nature at the time they were committed: see Trezise at [29]; see also R v Kilic [2016] HCA 48; 259 CLR 256.
Statutory and Other Considerations
In sentencing the offender, the Court is required to take into account those matters under s 33 of the Crimes(Sentencing) Act 2005 (the Sentencing Act) that are known and relevant. I have referred to the relevant matters above.
The Court sentences in the context of the objects of the Sentencing Act in s 6 and the sentencing purposes in s 7 of the Sentencing Act. The sentencing purposes of punishment, general and specific deterrence, the protection of the community, rehabilitation, accountability, denunciation, and recognition of harm to the victims are important sentencing considerations.
The sentencing process also requires an examination of s 10 of the Sentencing Act and alternatives to prison. In this case, an alternative to full-time imprisonment is not appropriate. Full-time imprisonment reflects the gravity of the offences committed by the offender.
As with every sentencing exercise, careful attention must be paid to the maximum penalty, which provides a yardstick: Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; 228 CLR 357.
When sentencing for multiple offences, I must fix an appropriate sentence for each offence and then consider questions of accumulation or concurrence, as well as totality: Zdravkovic v The Queen [2016] ACTCA 53 at [64] (Zdravkovic). The real question is whether the total sentence is “just and appropriate” to reflect the total criminality: Mill v The Queen (1988) 166 CLR 59; R v Meyboom [2012] ACTCA 48 at [66]; Zdravkovic at [71].
Counsel for the offender submitted that the delay in prosecuting the offender was relevant, and submitted that some concurrency would be appropriate for the purposes of totality. I have taken these matters into account.
In R v Eisenach [2011] ACTCA 2, the Court at [86] referred with approval to the following statement in R v Dent (unreported, NSWCCA, 14 March 1991):
One begins with the proposition ... that our community views with great concern the sexual molestation of children by adults... That acknowledgement has been in our legislation over a long period of time. Little children are entitled to grow up free from defilement by sexual predators and free from risk of psychological upset, confusion and difficulties in later life, caused by such conduct.
In R v TW [2011] ACTCA 25; 6 ACTLR 18, the Court at [21] stated the following:
Those offences are ones which the courts view very seriously. As Maxwell J said in Fisher v The Queen (1989) 40 A Crim R 442 (at 446):
... the community looks to the courts to deal with persons convicted of serious sexual assaults, or abuses upon young children, in such a way as to provide some measure of protection for young persons, and some measure of deterrence to those persons who contemplate similar activities.
In BJW, Sheller JA (with whom James and Dowd JJ agreed) at [20] stated the following:
The maximum penalties the legislature has set for such offences reflect community abhorrence of and concern about adult sexual abuse of children. General deterrence is of great importance in sentencing such offenders and especially so when the offender is in a position of trust to the victim. See the remarks of Kirby ACJ in R v Skinner (1994) 72 A Crim R 151 at 154.
The courts have made it clear that general deterrence is of great importance in sentencing adults who abuse children.
I take into account these authorities and sentencing principles.
Sentence
It must be recognised by the Court that the offences committed against the victims have had a serious and significant impact upon them all. Both the short and long-term consequences of being the victim of these offences must be acknowledged. It must also be recognised that no sentence that the Court imposes will rectify the consequences of what has occurred to the victims in the commission of these offences by the offender.
In my view, the offender must receive a sentence of imprisonment to be served by way of full-time imprisonment.
In coming to a sentence by way of instinctive synthesis, I have taken into account all the matters discussed above, including the objective seriousness of the offences, subjective matters, delay and totality.
Order
I make the following orders in respect of MC:
(a)I record convictions in relation to the offences;
(b)For Count 1 (CC17/1475), indecent assault, the offender is sentenced to 18 months of imprisonment, commencing on 16 June 2018 and ending on 15 December 2019;
(c)For Count 3 (CC17/1478), indecent assault, the offender is sentenced to 2 years of imprisonment, commencing on 16 June 2019 and ending on 15 June 2021;
(d)For Count 4 (CC16/25), indecent assault, the offender is sentenced to 2 years of imprisonment, commencing on 16 December 2020 and ending on 15 December 2022;
(e)For Count 5 (CC16/604), an offence of carnal knowledge, the offender is sentenced to 4 years of imprisonment, commencing on 16 January 2022 and ending on 15 January 2026;
(f)For Count 7 (CC16/27), indecent assault, the offender is sentenced to 18 months of imprisonment, commencing on 16 September 2025 and ending on 15 March 2027;
(g)For Count 9 (XO2017/31037), indecent assault, the offender is sentenced to 2 years of imprisonment, commencing on 16 June 2026 and ending on 15 June 2028;
(h)I set a non-parole period of 6 years, commencing 16 June 2018 and ending on 15 June 2024;
(i)Overall, for the offender there will be a sentence of 10 years with a non-parole period of 6 years.
| I certify that the preceding seventy-seven [77] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of her Honour Justice Loukas-Karlsson. Associate: Date: 15 March 2019 |
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