R v Maurangi No. Sccrm-00-233

[2001] SASC 77

R v MAURANGI
[2001] SASC 77

Court of Criminal Appeal:  Doyle, Nyland and Gray JJ

1................ DOYLE CJ....... This is an application for leave to appeal against conviction.

1. Mr Mourangi was convicted on a verdict of the jury for the offence of manslaughter. The application for leave to appeal came before a judge of this Court. Leave to appeal was granted on grounds one, four (a), four (b) and five, but leave was refused on grounds two and three.

2. By application filed on 9 March 2001, Mr Maurangi applied to have determined by the Full Court his application for leave to appeal against conviction. The application was considered by the court in private, pursuant to rule 15(7) of the Criminal Appeal Rules.

3. For that purpose the court comprised me, Nyland and Gray JJ. The court considered the Notice of Appeal, a written submission submitted by the solicitor for the applicant, a transcript of the hearing before Martin J, a report from the trial Judge and the trial Judge’s summing up.

4. It is convenient to deal first with ground three. That ground complains that the trial Judge should have allowed the applicant to prove the making of an anonymous report to the police, in which another person was identified as a possible suspect in connection with the offence for which the applicant was convicted.

5. It was common ground that an anonymous report was received by Crime Stoppers. It was received by telephone. In our opinion there is no reasonable prospect of this ground succeeding. The suggestion was that the Judge should have exercised powers conferred by s.59J of the Evidence Act to admit the evidence, although it was hearsay.

6. We can see no reason why the Judge should have permitted the introduction of hearsay evidence on a matter like this. It could only have led to confusion in the mind of the jury. It is clear, from the trial Judge’s report, that counsel wanted to use the material if it got before the jury as evidence of the truth of its contents. We would refuse leave on this ground.

7. Ground two is linked. The complaint is that the police failed adequately to follow up the information provided by the anonymous caller, and that the defence were informed of the anonymous call, and of what the police had done, so long after the event that it was deemed too late to make any worthwhile inquiries.

8. It is claimed, in the light of this information, that the judge should have discharged the jury from returning a verdict, and apparently the submission to the trial judge was that that should somehow or other have led to the accused not being proceeded against any further.

9. Our view is that there is no substance in that ground either. The submission seems to be, in effect, that midway through the trial the judge should have terminated the proceedings on the basis of complaints made by counsel for the accused about the conduct of the police investigation.

10. It is one thing to say that inadequacies in the police investigation, if properly put before the jury, might be considered by the jury.  And, in certain circumstances, an application might be made to stay proceedings on the basis that the investigation of the offence had deprived the accused of a fair trial.  But in our opinion, it would not be appropriate for a trial judge to discharge a jury on the basis of rather general and unsubstantiated allegations of inadequate investigation. In our view the judge rightly rejected the application that he should discharge the jury.

11. It is relevant to bear in mind that in any event the same complaint is able to be raised under the ground of appeal which asserts that the verdict is unsafe and unsatisfactory. Our view is if there is any substance in the point, that is the appropriate way to raise it.

12. For those reasons we are unanimously of the opinion that leave to appeal should be refused.  I direct that a copy of the reasons should be provided to the applicant and to the Director of Public Prosecutions.