R v Massey - [1996] QCA 230

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL	[1996] QCA 230
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

C.A. No. 72 of 1996

Brisbane

Before	McPherson J.A. Davies J.A. Demack J.
[R. v. M]

T H E Q U E E N

v.
M
(Appellant)
McPherson J.A.
Davies J.A.
Demack J.

Judgment delivered 12/07/96

Joint reasons for judgment by McPherson J.A. and Demack J.; separate reasons by

Davies J.A. concurring as to the orders.

APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION DISMISSED. APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO

APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE REFUSED.

CATCHWORDS	CRIMINAL LAW - CORROBORATION - Whether corroboration evidence of an act of sexual misconduct on a later occasion is capable also of corroborating evidence of the complainant about similar acts on an earlier occasion or occasions. R. v. McCann [1972] Tas. S.R. (N.C.) 3 followed; R. v. Sakail [1993] 1 Qd.R. 312 followed.
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - Primitive and barbaric sexual conduct by stepfather towards stepdaughter
Counsel:	G. McGuire for the appellant D. Meredith for the respondent
Solicitors:	Nicholsons for the appellant Director of Public Prosecutions for the respondent
Hearing Date:	12 June 1996

JOINT REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - McPHERSON J.A. & DEMACK J.

Judgment delivered the 12th day of July 1996

The applicant was convicted after a trial in the District Court at Toowoomba of one count of indecent dealing (count 1), three of indecent assault (counts 4, 6 and 7) and two of rape (counts 2 and 5). Count 3 was abandoned in the course of the trial. The sentences imposed were imprisonment for 2 years for the indecent dealing; imprisonment for 11 and 10 years respectively for the two rapes; and 7 years for the three indecent assaults. All sentences were to be served concurrently, so that the effective sentence was one of imprisonment for 11 years.

The appellant now appeals against his conviction and seeks leave to appeal

against sentence.

The offences were committed between July 1973 and July 1980 at various places in south eastern Queensland. The complainant, who was the appellant's stepdaughter, was born on 26 July 1961. She was 13½ years old at the time of the first offence (count 1), and some 19 years of age at the time of the last offence charged. The appellant was born in 1940, and was 55 at the time of the trial.

When she gave evidence at the trial the complainant was 34 years old and had been married. There is material in the record suggesting that she is of less than average intelligence, and as a child she attended a special school; but she was described by the judge as an impressive witness, and the jury obviously believed her testimony. The appellant himself, who was said to have a speech impediment, did not give evidence. Her evidence on the incidents giving rise to the charges was therefore uncontradicted, although three witnesses gave evidence for the defence on matters going essentially to the complainant's credit.

The jury were, on the material before them, plainly entitled to accept the complainant's evidence as they did,…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading R v Massey

Details

AGLC: R v Massey [1996] QCA 230
Case: [1996] QCA 230
Decision Date: 12/07/1996

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v Massey was heard in a court where the accused faced allegations of sexual misconduct. The dispute centred around the sufficiency of corroboration evidence presented by the prosecution to support the complainant's allegations. The case was heard and decided in a superior court, providing a binding precedent for similar future cases.

The primary legal issue the court needed to address was whether evidence of sexual misconduct on a later occasion could also serve to corroborate the complainant's account of similar acts that occurred earlier. The court had to examine relevant case law to determine the applicability of this principle. Specifically, the court considered whether the decisions in R v McCann and R v Sakail, which held that evidence of subsequent misconduct could corroborate earlier allegations, should be applied to the current case.

The court held that the evidence of subsequent misconduct was indeed capable of corroborating the complainant's earlier allegations, following the precedent set in R v McCann and R v Sakail. The court found that the prosecution had provided sufficient corroboration to support the complainant's account, thereby affirming the reliability of the earlier allegations. Consequently, the court ruled in favour of the prosecution, upholding the conviction.

No additional orders were made beyond the affirmation of the conviction. The court's decision reinforces the established legal principle that corroboration of subsequent misconduct can support earlier allegations, provided the circumstances align with the precedent set by the cited cases.

Orders