R v Martin and Cushman

[1999] NSWSC 1048

CITATION:	R v Martin and Cushman [1999] NSWSC 1048
CURRENT JURISDICTION:	Criminal
FILE NUMBER(S):	70041/97; 70270/97
HEARING DATE(S):	26 August 1999, 14 September 1999
JUDGMENT DATE:	14 September 1999
PARTIES :	Regina v Aaron Lee Martin Regina v Sean Leigh Cushman
JUDGMENT OF:	Simpson J at 1

COUNSEL :	Crown: R Cogswell SC Aaron Lee Martin: P Bodor QC Sean Leigh Cushman: S Hanley
SOLICITORS:	Crown: S E O'Connor Aaron Lee Martin: J B Hajje Sean Leigh Cushman: R J Freeman
CATCHWORDS:	Jury verdict: Martin convicted of the offence of maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm with intent to do so; Cushman convicted on a charge of being an accessory after the fact of Martin's offence.
DECISION:	See paragraphs 65 and 66

THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISION
CRIMINAL

SIMPSON J

Tuesday 14 September 1999

70041/97
70205/97

REGINA v Aaron Lee MARTIN

REGINA v Sean Leigh CUSHMAN

SENTENCE

HER HONOUR :

1    The prisoners, Aaron Lee Martin and Sean Leigh Cushman, appear for sentence following their convictions by a jury on 16 July 1999. Martin was convicted of the offence of maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm on Brian Hagland with intent to do so. Cushman was convicted on a charge of being an accessory after the fact of Martin’s offence.

2    Martin was arraigned on an indictment containing three counts, of which the second and third were alternative to the first, but cumulative upon one another. The principal charge against him was that, on 7 September 1996, he murdered Brian Hagland. The two alternative charges were that he maliciously inflicted grievous bodily harm on Mr Hagland with intent to cause such harm. One of these involved an allegation that Martin engaged in an act of strangling Mr Hagland. The other involved an allegation that he kicked Mr Hagland. Also left to the jury were the further alternatives of manslaughter and maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm but without the specific intent to cause such harm. The jury having convicted of the offence which included the element of specific intent of specific intent, it was unnecessary to proceed to the statutory alternative.

3    At the end of the Crown case in respect of the count of maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm with intent by kicking, I directed the jury to return a verdict of not guilty which the jury duly did. After deliberation the jury found Martin not guilty of murder and not guilty of manslaughter but guilty of the surviving charge of maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm with intent to do so.

4    Cushman was arraigned on a single charge that he was an accessory after Martin’s malicious infliction of grievous bodily harm with intent and was convicted on that count. Although an alternative charge that he was an accessory after the fact of the malicious infliction of grievous bodily harm (but without specific intent) was left to the jury, having regard to its verdict on the principal charge, it was unnecessary for the jury further to consider that alternative or to return a verdict with respect to it.

5    It is now my task for sentencing purposes to determine the facts of the offences, consistent with the jury’s verdicts. The circumstances of the charges, the acquittals, and the verdicts of guilty present a complex fact finding exercise. It is necessary to delineate with some particularity the facts I find as the basis for sentence. At the outset it is necessary to repeat that the offence for which I have to sentence Martin is the single offence on which he was convicted by the jury. It is no part of my sentencing function to punish him because the events which I am about to recount resulted in the death of Mr Hagland. While it is impossible to forget the tragic outcome of these events, it is to be steadily borne in mind that the jury, who heard the whole of the evidence and who deliberated for some days, found him not guilty of the major offences. Nor is it any part of my function - or that of anybody else - to question the jury’s verdict, or to attempt to discern the basis on which they reached that verdict. It may be that different members of the jury arrived at the same verdict by different means. In any event the fact is that the jury were not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Martin was guilty of any offence causing death.

6    It was the Crown case that on the evening of 7 September 1996, Martin, together with some associates including Cushman, was drinking at the North Bondi RSL Club. Martin was intoxicated and became progressively more aggressive as the evening wore on. He engaged in a significant act of vandalism at the Club, breaking the glass pane of a toilet door with his fist, and threatened to throw a stool at the bar. His behaviour led Cushman to take him from the Club, intending to help him into a taxi to take him home, before himself returning to the Club. En route from the Club, Martin engaged in many additional acts of vandalism and aggression. His hand was bleeding from the injury he had suffered in smashing the glass in the door at the Club and he smeared blood on buildings through which he and Cushman passed. He broke the glass door of a restaurant which they passed. He behaved aggressively towards individuals the two encountered. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that for a sustained period he was in a belligerent and antagonistic mood, and that this mood was reflected in his general behaviour.

7    Near Campbell Parade, Cushman and Martin encountered Mr Hagland and his companion, Ms Connie Casey. Martin and Mr Hagland quickly became embroiled in a serious physical fight. At one point Mr Hagland was on the ground, the whites of his eyes showing, with Martin’s hands around his neck, strangling him. This was the act that constituted the offence of maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm with intent, on which the jury convicted. Later, the two men were standing, locked together physically in something like a wrestling position. Mr Hagland was able to bite into Mr Martin’s chest, inflicting a wound of considerable seriousness. Precisely what happened thereafter can only be determined by inference, there being no eye witness who could give an accurate account. What is clear, however, is that Mr Hagland was struck by a bus, and sustained massive multiple injuries that caused his death. The Crown case in support of the charge of murder and the alternative of manslaughter was that Martin deliberately and knowingly threw Mr Hagland into the path of the bus.

8    Cushman remained on the periphery. He played no part in these events. A little while after, he met Martin in a nearby park, hailed a taxi and directed the driver to take Martin home. It was this assistance that constituted the accessorial offence alleged against him and which the jury found to have been proved.

9    It was alleged in the Crown case, and denied by Cushman, that Cushman gave the driver money for the fare. It is unnecessary to resolve this conflict since it makes not the slightest difference for sentencing purposes.

10    The Crown has invited me to find that Martin’s behaviour that night constituted a vicious, sustained and unremitting attack, late at night, in a public place, on a complete stranger, by a drunken man who had a history of being violent after consuming alcohol; and that the assault was committed with intent to cause very serious injury to Mr Hagland; and that such injury was in fact caused. Some of these facts are necessarily implicit in the jury’s verdict.

11    In order to determine whether this series of propositions (and which of them) can be sustained it is necessary to examine, firstly, the evidence concerning the commencement of the encounter between the two men.

12    I am satisfied that Martin was in a very intoxicated state, and his intoxication manifested itself in the aggressive and uncontrolled behaviour I have already described.

13    A significant issue concerns the circumstances in which Mr Hagland and Mr Martin came into physical conflict. The Crown has urged that I should be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Martin was the sole aggressor and that he launched an attack on Mr Hagland that was entirely unprovoked. The nearest eye witness at the confrontation was Ms Casey. As she described the encounter, Martin came towards Mr Hagland, moving aggressively, his eyes staring wildly. She described the movement as like shadow boxing, Martin dancing on the balls of his feet. His behaviour prompted her to tell Mr Hagland not to look at him, and to endeavour to walk past the men without any trouble. She said Mr Hagland said that he did not want any trouble, he was just going home. She said Martin punched out at the top of Mr Hagland’s chest, Mr Hagland tried to push him away, and the two shortly after were lying on the ground with Mr Hagland’s head in the gutter. She said Martin then was pressing down on Mr Hagland who was a very big, healthy, fit man but, who was nonetheless overcome by Martin.

14    In contrast, evidence was given by two other witnesses who observed the commencement of the confrontation. Mr Paul Green saw the two men as they passed each other and saw them turn around. He heard Mr Hagland twice ask Martin to repeat what he had said although Mr Green had not heard any remark from Martin. He gave no evidence of observing the behaviour described by Ms Casey on the part of Martin. Mr Green crossed to the other side of the road and heard a loud thumping sound, turned around and saw the two men lying on the ground.

15    Mr Khufu Amon Ra happened to be looking out of the window of his nearby second floor flat when he saw the two men meet. He did not hear any words but observed what was apparently an exchange of words, with Mr Hagland turning around to say something. Mr Amon Ra moved away for a few minutes and then returned to the window and saw the two men scuffling and fighting. He also heard Ms Casey say something to the effect of “Let’s just go”. He said the fight started by the two men grabbing each other somewhere around their coats or shirts in the chest or lapel area, and both were pushing and shoving. He said that the fight was like wrestling, each man trying to get the advantage of the other. He did not see Martin dancing on the balls of his feet, or shadow boxing.

16    Martin gave a quite different account of the commencement of the encounter. He described walking with Cushman from the Club, and coming across Mr Hagland and Ms Casey. He said he made an offensive remark about Ms Casey which provoked Mr Hagland to ask him to repeat what he had said, followed by an invitation to a fight. Martin claimed that he, that is Martin, said something to the effect of: “Do you want to dance?” or “Let’s have a go”. He said that Mr Hagland then put down the items he was carrying and took a step. Martin was not sure then who grabbed who first, but he thought the two acted almost simultaneously. He denied having moved in front of Mr Hagland with his fists up. He said he was responding to some sort of challenge issued by Mr Hagland.

17    Cushman also gave evidence in this respect and said that he heard Mr Hagland asked Martin to repeat what he had said.

18    It will be seen that there is significant variance between the account given by Ms Casey on the one hand, and the accounts given by the remaining four witnesses on the other. On Ms Casey’s account, no aggression or provocation or, indeed, participation, could be attributed to Mr Hagland before Martin descended upon him in an entirely unprovoked physical assault. The accounts of the other four witnesses do not support that description. These attribute a modest, and I repeat modest, level of involvement at an early stage to Mr Hagland.

19    The Crown invited the jury, as it has invited me, to prefer the description given by Ms Casey to that of the two prisoners and the witnesses, Messrs Green and Amon Ra. It was put that, as Ms Casey was closer to what was happening, and was more intimately involved, she was therefore more likely to be an accurate observer. There is a certain amount of logic in that proposition, but it is not the whole of the story. I do not think it is possible to accept it in its entirety and certainly not to the standard necessary for a finding of fact adverse to Martin for sentencing purposes, which must be a finding beyond reasonable doubt. The accounts given by Martin, Cushman, Messrs Green and Amon Ra interlock in a fashion that excludes a finding beyond reasonable doubt of the contrary proposition. In this respect the evidence of the independent witnesses is most significant. Messrs Green and Amon Ra were uninvolved and may be taken to have an objectivity that cannot be attributed to any of the other three. I accept that Ms Casey was closer to what was happening, but her intimate involvement and her obvious fear at the time tinges her account in a way that makes it necessary to give careful attention to the evidence of the two independent observers. In my opinion, the most likely scenario is that Martin did indeed make the offensive remark of which he gave evidence and that this was a provocative event, inciting a response from Mr Hagland of the kind described, and that the two men thereupon mutually and virtually simultaneously became involved in a physical fight which rapidly escalated and went out of control.

20    It is next necessary to consider the act of maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm. This, as I have said, was constituted by the attempt to strangle Mr Hagland. In this respect the only direct evidence is that of Ms Casey and of Martin. Ms Casey described this event in the following way:

“I could see his back and his arms. Basically it was like he was doing some sort of press-up, he was holding his upper body up on Brian and the hands were going backwards and forwards. Brian was flat out underneath him. The only thing I could see moving of Brian was his feet at that point. Still trying to move his legs off him.”

21    Martin also described this event. He said that the two men grabbed each other, they hit the ground and were rolling around, wrestling. He said that he knew that if he did not do something Mr Hagland would cause him serious injury. He said:

“I think that’s when I put my hands around his neck and tried, sort of tried to get the better of him and then I felt something on me back, I think that was the lady with the handbag…” (T 853)

22    He said that Mr Hagland continued to punch and kick at him during this time. He denied that he was attempting to cause Mr Hagland’s death.

23    I do not think there is any material discrepancy between the two accounts of what Martin did, from an objective point of view. In any event, the jury, by its verdict, found that he did engage in an act of strangling, and that he did so with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm and that he did in fact cause such harm. It is no part of the offence of which he stands convicted that he intended any more serious consequence than that.

24    A relevant consideration, however, is the extent of the injury actually inflicted. This is not easy to determine, having regard to what later happened.

25    Isolating the effect of the strangulation is not easy because of subsequent events, but is necessary because it is for that offence, and that offence only that Martin stands for sentence today. There were bruises to Mr Hagland’s neck and there was substantial medical evidence on this subject.

26    It will be remembered that Ms Casey said that she could see the whites of Mr Hagland’s eyes during the strangulation. Dr Cala, who gave evidence for the Crown, said that this would suggest that Mr Hagland’s level of consciousness was not normal and that he was approaching “a near coma type level of unconsciousness” or a “quite severely diminished level of consciousness”. He thought this description was consistent with the bruising observed to Mr Hagland’s neck , although he added that other explanations may have existed to account for part of the bruising. These explanations included injuries inflicted by the bus at a later point. However, Dr Cala thought that the bulk of the bleeding that caused the bruising could have been due to the attempts at strangulation.

27    Dr Cala’s opinion in this respect was slightly complicated by the fact that he believed that, on the assumption that Mr Hagland had been injured as described, it would be unlikely that he would make a full and rapid recovery to the condition he was in before the strangling. He did not think it likely Mr Hagland would have been able to fight back as hard as the evidence shows that he did. In this respect the fact that he was able to inflict a very serious bite on Martin is of some significance. Moreover, Mr Hagland was, after the strangling incident, in a standing and wrestling position with Martin. Dr Cala considered that this did not necessarily indicate an ability to stand, move, and fight unaided, but may have meant that he gained the strength to do so by clinging to Martin.

28    It is not possible to determine with any degree of accuracy precisely what injury was inflicted on Mr Hagland as a consequence of the strangulation by Martin, but exclude the later events which are not relevant for sentencing purposes. What is clear is that it was a very serious incident during the course of the fight.

29    On behalf of the Crown it was accepted that, for the purpose of this determination, no regard can be paid to the more serious injuries subsequently suffered by Mr Hagland. The enquiry as to the objective circumstances of the offence with which I am dealing stops at the point where Martin’s hands were removed from Mr Hagland’s neck. Thereafter, Mr Hagland was able to rise to his feet, although it may have been with the assistance of Martin in grappling with him.

30    As I have said, it is plain that the offence is a very serious one. One indication of its seriousness is that the legislature has seen fit to prescribe a maximum penalty of penal servitude for twenty-five years.

31    It is necessary to consider some other matters. The Crown argued that Martin’s intoxication ought be seen, for the purpose of sentencing, as an aggravating factor. It is well established that intoxication may, in some circumstances be an aggravating feature, and in others a mitigating factor. What is plain here is that Martin’s level of intoxication contributed to the events which preceded and gave rise to the offence. Moreover, this was not the first time alcohol had played a part in leading him into criminal behaviour, a matter to which I will return.

32    In the present case I accept the submission on the part of the Crown that Martin’s intoxication is a matter of aggravation.

33    Martin was born on 9 January 1974. He was twenty-two years of age at the time of the offence. He is now twenty-five years of age. His criminal history commenced in 1987 when he was but thirteen years of age and he was charged in the Children’s Court with possession of implements capable of entering a conveyance. Thereafter he was back before the Children’s Court on a number of occasions in respect of offences of dishonesty and on one occasion of assault. As an adult he has appeared before the Local Court on a charge of malicious damage, offences associated with the use of motor vehicles, assault and dishonesty.

34    Significantly, in August 1993 he pleaded guilty to and was convicted on a charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. For this offence he was sentenced to a term of penal servitude of fifteen months, made up of a minimum term of six months and an additional term of nine months. He was then nineteen years of age. The Crown urged that considerable weight should be given to that offence as it bears disturbing similarities to the present. The Crown sought to adduce evidence of the offence in the trial. I rejected the evidence for that purpose, but that does not mean that it is not relevant to be taken into account for sentencing purposes.

35    The offence was committed in the early hours of Saturday 26 September 1992. The victim was walking on a suburban road when he was approached by Martin who grabbed the headphones of the radio he was listening to, pulled them off his head, and demanded to know what the victim was laughing at. Martin then punched him in the face causing his nose to bleed and the victim to fall. While the victim was on the ground Martin kicked him in the head with his knees several times, pulled the victim’s jacket over his head and went through his pockets and demanded the victim’s money.

36    Martin was arrested and pleaded guilty to the charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. As I have said, that offence has some disturbing similarities with that of which he now stands convicted.

I have the benefit of a pre-sentence report prepared by an officer of the Probation and Parole Service. It is plain that Martin has had little stability in his life and has not developed the necessary discipline to cope with frustrations of daily life. He is reported to have been perceived from an early age as an angry and frustrated person who would occasionally act aggressively, and who would on occasions harm himself to gain attention; and also as passive and shy and with little self confidence. He was the second youngest of seven siblings who were raised by their mother after their parents separated in 1979, when he was five years of age. His behaviour was such that at thirteen he was sent to live with his father as his mother was unable to control him. There were regular instances of truancy from school, and at one time he was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Disorder. No professional assistance was sought on his behalf.

37    His mother has had her own difficulties apparently with alcohol abuse and psychiatric illness.

38    In addition to the pre-sentence report, there was a comprehensive report from Ms Robilliard, a psychologist. This report was of considerable significance because Ms Robilliard saw Martin in relation to the 1992 offence and reported to the District Court judge who sentenced him on that occasion. In addition to other psychiatric conditions, Ms Robilliard identified symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder related to the events of 7 September 1996.

39    She was able to make a comparison with her assessment in 1992. She thought that now Martin was able to offer much greater insight and understanding than previously and she gave some details of this. She considers that he needs help to control his anger.

40    He is now in a de facto relationship of ten years standing, but this may not be altogether a constructive relationship. Both he and his de facto abuse alcohol and use illegal drugs. This relationship too, has lacked stability and has been marked by periods of separation. There are two children of the relationship, now aged six years and twenty months.

41    There are some positive signs. Martin was, for a period, on bail pending trial. He is said to have improved his behaviour, and to have restricted his alcohol intake and become a regular attender at Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.

42    He has expressed contrition for the offence. I have no reason not to accept this as genuine. He gave that evidence during the trial and while a certain amount of scepticism is justified in those circumstances, there are signs that the expression of regret is genuine.

43    Although he was initially granted bail, it was revoked on 20 August 1998 and he remained in custody thereafter. A report from the Metropolitan Remand and Reception Centre records that he has attended counselling sessions and alcohol and other drug groups whilst in custody. He has also attended educational courses and his literacy has improved. He would formerly have been classified as illiterate and is now able to read and write to an extent.

44    He gave evidence both in the trial and in the sentencing proceedings. Much of his evidence on sentencing was to explain the conduct which resulted in the revocation of bail. However, he reiterated his regret for the events for which he was involved, and for the loss of Mr Hagland’s life. He said he has not consumed alcohol since that evening. He regularly attends Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.

45    He has spent almost fourteen months in custody referable to this offence. Prior to that while on bail he was subject to unusually stringent conditions. On his behalf it was suggested that the conditions were so strict as to amount almost to home detention or house arrest. I agree that the conditions were sufficiently onerous to be taken into account as a factor in mitigation of sentence. On his behalf it was put that he should be given credit, not only for that period of time in actual custody, but also for the period of time on bail when he was subject to significantly restrictive conditions. He was, in effect, largely confined to his home and, indeed, it was for breach of that condition that his bail was ultimately revoked.

46    I accept that he is to be given some recognition for this in the sentence to be imposed and I propose to do so.

47    Another factor to be taken into account in his favour is that, on learning of the death of Mr Hagland, he presented himself to the police and acknowledged his part in the events of that night. The account he then gave was substantially similar to the account he gave to the jury.

48    It is a matter for the utmost regret that it has taken a tragedy of these proportions to bring this still young man to his senses. However, I am satisfied that it is more probable than not that this has happened and that Martin now has reasonable prospects for rehabilitation. He has taken significant steps towards overcoming his alcohol addiction; he has taken significant steps towards improving his literacy and his educational attainments; he has recognised the need for professional help in coping with the legacy of his disturbed and his dysfunctional childhood and adolescence.

49    After argument I admitted into evidence a statement made by Ms Casey. Ms Casey, I understood, was not in Australia at the time of the sentencing proceedings and was not available to be questioned about her statement. Her statement is compelling. It is hardly surprising that she spoke of the continuing emotional effects upon her of the events of 7 September 1996. However, there are a number of reasons why the statement can be given little weight for sentencing purposes. One of these is her unavailability to expand upon or explain what she has said. Another is that, understandably, much of what she wrote was related to Mr Hagland’s death and must, for reasons already given, be excluded from consideration.

50    While I sympathise with Ms Casey, the law does not permit me, in sentencing, to attribute weight to the matters she has raised in her statement.

51    On Martin’s behalf it was urged upon me that, taking into account the two years in which he was subject to the extremely onerous and restrictive bail conditions that I have mentioned, and a little over one year in actual custody, he has effectively served at least the minimum term of any sentence which it would be appropriate to impose. I reiterate that it is necessary to exclude from consideration for sentencing purposes the tragic consequences to Mr Hagland and to Ms Casey.

52    In sentencing Martin I must bear in mind only the events preceding the encounter with Mr Hagland, the physical encounter between the two men up to and including the act of strangling for which he has been convicted, and the effects of that act so far as they can be determined. However, as I have said earlier, that was in itself a very serious offence.

53    For the purpose of sentencing I was referred to a number of authorities. Most, if not all, concerned Crown appeals following inadequate sentences for offences against s 33.

54    Having regard to the contents of the reports to which I have already referred, to Martin’s clear need for a great deal of assistance in relation to his emotional condition and his abuse of alcohol, I find that there are special circumstances within s 5(2) of the Sentencing Act 1959 justifying a longer than usual additional term. In the sentence I am about to impose I take into account the extensive time spent on bail under stringent and restrictive conditions.

55    I have come to the view that the appropriate sentence is one of penal servitude for five years, to date from 20 August 1998. I propose to divide that term into a minimum term of two years and three months and an additional term of two years and nine months.

56    I repeat that that sentence is imposed in respect of the offence for which he was found guilty by the jury. He is not to be sentenced for the death of Mr Hagland. The jury’s verdicts on all charges are to be accorded due respect.

57    I turn now to Sean Lee Cushman. The part played by Cushman has been outlined earlier and was relatively small. Nevertheless, the jury found that he was guilty of the offence of being an accessory, and it is implicit in the verdict that he was aware that Martin had committed the offence of which he was convicted.

58    It was not contested on behalf of the Crown that up until the time Martin encountered Mr Hagland, Cushman was behaving responsibly in seeking to take his intoxicated friend to a taxi so he would go home. I am satisfied in Cushman’s favour that he was in fact acting responsibly until that time. The evidence in the trial, including that given by Cushman, establishes to my satisfaction that Cushman in fact became irritated by Martin’s behaviour, even after leaving the Club, and at one stage sought to abandon him.

59    Sean Cushman was born on 14 July 1973. He was twenty-three years of age at the time of the offence. He is now twenty-six. He has a record for offences of dishonesty and motor vehicle offences. At the time of this offence he was subject to a recognizance to be of good behaviour, imposed on 21 June 1995 and current for the following three years.

60    Cushman did not give evidence in the sentencing proceedings. There was before me a pre-sentence report. He was born in Canada and with his family migrated to Australia as a child.

61    His background had some instability but less than is frequently seen in this court. He has been in a de facto relationship for ten years and has a son aged six. The relationship appears to be stable and supportive. Despite his apparently stable home he experienced difficulties at school and was placed in a psychiatric unit for adolescents. He has abused alcohol and has used marijuana.

62    He has been on relatively stringent bail conditions from the date of his arrest. Like Martin, he presented himself to police and co-operated in the investigation that followed. It was pointed out on his behalf, and I accept, that it was only at a very late stage that the Crown indicated its intention to proceed on a charge of accessory after the fact of maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm with intent, as distinct from the original charge of accessory after the fact of murder. He had been subject to the stress of the original charge for three years.

63    Cushman and his de facto wife and child plan to move to Wyong where a Housing Commission property is available for them, and work is available.

64    In my opinion all these circumstances justify my taking a course that will not subject Cushman to any term of imprisonment. I propose to subject him to a further recognizance subject to conditions.

65    Aaron Lee Martin: you are convicted. You are sentenced to penal servitude for five years, made up of a minimum term of two years and three months commencing on 20 August 1998 and expiring on 19 November 2000, and an additional term of two years and nine months commencing on 20 November 2000 and expiring on 19 August 2003.

66    Sean Leigh Cushman: you are convicted of the offence of being an accessory after the fact of the malicious infliction of grievous bodily harm with intent. I defer passing sentence upon you and order that you be released on recognizance in the sum of $5,000 to be of good behaviour for a period of five years and to appear for sentence if called upon during that time to do so. It is a further condition of the recognizance that you accept the supervision and guidance of the NSW Probation and Parole Service and in particular that you participate in any drug and alcohol intervention program offered or recommended by that Service, and to participate in any other programme of counselling offered or recommended by that Service.

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Last Modified: 04/18/2001