R v Manolakis - [2007] SASC 438

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Court of Criminal Appeal)
R v MANOLAKIS
[2007] SASC 438
Judgment of The Court of Criminal Appeal
(The Honourable Justice Bleby, The Honourable Justice Anderson and The Honourable Justice White)
14 December 2007
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL AND INQUIRY AFTER CONVICTION - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PARTICULAR GROUNDS - CONDUCT OF TRIAL JUDGE
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL AND INQUIRY AFTER CONVICTION - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE - GENERALLY
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL AND INQUIRY AFTER CONVICTION - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PARTICULAR GROUNDS - UNREASONABLE OR INSUPPORTABLE VERDICT - OTHER CASES
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - MISCELLANEOUS OFFENCES AND MATTERS - OTHER OFFENCES
Appeal against conviction - applicant convicted of threatening to cause harm to a Commonwealth public official contrary to s 147.2(2) of the Schedule to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (the Code), causing harm to a Commonwealth public official contrary to s 147.1(1) of the Code, and two counts of obstructing a Commonwealth public official in the performance of his or her functions contrary to s 149.1(1) of the Code - whether there were errors and discrepancies in witness testimony - whether the witnesses were credible - whether the judge improperly rejected and admitted certain evidence - whether the trial judge was biased against the applicant - whether the target of the threat was a Commonwealth public official - whether the evidence, if accepted, could have been regarded as constituting a "threat" for the purposes of the offence - whether the convictions for these offences were unreasonable, or constituted a miscarriage of justice.
Held: issues as to the reliability of prosecution evidence were put by the applicant to the jury and addressed in the summing-up of the judge - it was for the jury to consider the evidence in light of the criticisms by the applicant - it was open to the jury to accept and act on their evidence - application for permission to appeal refused.
Sufficient evidence presented at trial to establish that the target of the threat was at the time a Commonwealth public official - the words of the applicant in combination with his surrounding behaviour and demeanour were capable of satisfying the requirements of a "threat" for the purposes of the offence - appeal dismissed.
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (Schedule) s 147.1(1), s 147.2(2), s 149.1(1), Dictionary; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 352(1)(a)(i); Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 45B, referred to.

R v MANOLAKIS
[2007] SASC 438
Court of Criminal Appeal: Bleby, Anderson and White JJ

BLEBY J: I agree with the orders proposed by White J for the reasons that he gives.
ANDERSON J: I also agree with the orders proposed by White J for the reasons that he gives.
WHITE J: The applicant was convicted by a jury of four offences. Permission to appeal against those convictions was refused by a single judge. The applicant renewed the application for permission before this Court. He represented himself before this Court, as he had at trial.
The applicant was convicted of the offences of threatening to cause harm to a public official;[1] causing harm to a public official;[2] and two counts of obstructing a public official in the performance of his or her functions.[3]
The Circumstances of the Offences
[1] s 147.2(2) of the Schedule to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (the Code).
[2] s 147.1(1) of the Code.
[3] s 149.1(1) of the Code.
Incident of 17 November 2005
The prosecution allegation concerning the first offence was that shortly after 8.30 am on 17 November 2005, the applicant approached Ms Browne-Baldock, an employee in the electoral office of Senator Minchin. That office is located at the intersection of Grenfell Street and Fullarton Road, Kent Town. Ms Browne-Baldock was reversing her vehicle into Grenfell Street when the applicant approached her on foot and caught her attention.
Ms Browne-Baldock said that the applicant shouted at her through the open driver’s side window in a loud angry manner, whilst pointing to the Senator’s office. He said: “tell him he’s gone, he’s a fucking paedophile, tell him I’m going to get him”. There was some dispute as to whether the applicant said “paedophile” or “paedophile lover” and also whether he said “I’m going to get him” more than once.
A number of emails had previously been sent to the office of Senator Minchin in October and November 2005 by a person identifying himself as “Tom Manolakis”. These emails made unsubstantiated paedophilia allegations against several members of Parliament and public officials. One email accused the Senator of being a “paedophile lover”. There was also evidence that on 29 October 2005 a man had confronted Senator Minchin while in his car outside the office, making allegations of a similar kind concerning paedophilia. There was a subsequent email on 31 October from “Tom Manolakis” about this “in person discussion”. Other evidence indicated that the applicant used the name “Tom Manolakis” to describe himself.
Ms Browne-Baldock was aware of these emails and of the incident involving Senator Minchin on 29 October 2005. Ms Browne-Baldock assumed that the man outside her vehicle on 17 November 2005 was the same person who had sent the emails and who had confronted the Senator. Her evidence was that she was scared and concerned that the man would do some physical harm to the Senator.
After the applicant left, Ms Browne-Baldock observed him yelling at a tradesman in the street. When Ms Browne-Baldock returned to the office a short while later she saw that the glass panel next to the front door had been broken from the outside.
There was supporting evidence from two other witnesses: Ms Ross and Mr Jensen. Ms Ross was approached by the applicant in the street adjacent to Senator Minchin’s office at about 8.30 am on 17 November 2005. He asked her if she worked in the Senator’s office. She replied that she did not, and he said “well, you’re a lucky girl then. The man that works in here is a paedophile. Well, he’s a paedophile lover”. Ms Ross said that the applicant appeared agitated and emotional. Following this, she heard a loud banging sound and saw the applicant reaching to the glass panel next to the door to the office of Senator Minchin.
Mr Jensen said that at about 8.00 am on that same day, he was standing at the rear of his vehicle on the opposite side of the road from the Senator’s office. He noticed a male person walking towards a parked car and calling out in an upset voice “fucking bastards”. The man then noticed Mr Jensen and told him to turn away and not to look at him. He then entered his car and drove away. As there was a half hour difference between the respective incidents to which Ms Browne-Baldock and Mr Jensen deposed, the prosecution put to the jury that either Mr Jensen was wrong as to the time of the incident, or that he was correct and the applicant initially arrived at 8.00 am but returned at 8.30 am when he confronted Ms Browne-Baldock.
All three witnesses testified that the man appeared to be agitated, angry and upset. Ms Browne-Baldock and Ms Ross both identified the applicant as the man they had seen that morning.
Later that same morning the South Australian Police received an email from a person identifying himself as “Tom Manolakis”. Amongst other things, he acknowledged in this email that he had accidentally broken a glass panel at Senator Minchin’s office that morning. Shortly after, Senator Minchin’s office also received an email from “Tom Manolakis” which included the following:
Hiding from me Nick.
I apologize to your staff for scaring them this morning I accidentally broke the glass panel next to your front door, but to to (sic) you paedophile lover.
Take it out of the $100 Billion Dollars that I am owed by Australia, it is no more than $300. Peanuts for me.
The applicant did not dispute at trial that he was present at the Senator’s office at the time in question, or that he had written all of the emails to the Senator. He did, however, dispute the accuracy of the witnesses’ recollections of the events of that day.
Incident of 14 February 2006
The applicant was arrested after the incident of 17 November 2005 and granted bail. In breach of his bail agreement, he failed to attend the Magistrate’s Court on 10 February 2006. A warrant for his arrest was issued. The three offences committed on 14 February 2006 occurred during the execution of that warrant by two officers of the Australian Federal Police.
The officers, Mr Beshara and Mr Mills, were driving along Payneham Road at Glynde in search of the applicant. They saw him riding a bicycle on the footpath. They stopped the vehicle and walked to the foot path, about 15 metres in front of the applicant. Mr Beshara displayed his police identification and shouted to the applicant “Stop, Police”. The officers gave evidence that the applicant then increased his speed and veered towards Mr Beshara, who then repeated his instruction of “Stop, Police”. The applicant did not stop. He raised his left arm and hand as he moved towards Mr Beshara and struck him on the shoulder. The bicycle itself collided with Mr Beshara’s leg and groin area. Mr Beshara was knocked to the ground and suffered some injuries.
This incident comprised the offence in Count 2 of causing harm to a Commonwealth public official contrary to s 147.1 of the Code.
The applicant resisted the attempts of Mr Mills to restrain him. First, Mr Mills attempted to restrain the applicant by holding his shoulders. The applicant, still astride his bicycle, aggressively swung about his arms and upper body. Mr Beshara stood up to assist Mr Mills. The applicant resisted both of their efforts. They wrestled the applicant to the ground, and against his resistance, arrested him. His resistance led to Counts 3 and 4 of obstructing a Commonwealth public official contrary to s 149.1 of the Code.
A short written statement from an elderly bystander, Mr Jarrett, was tendered at trial. This statement was generally consistent with the evidence of the two police officers.
The applicant did not give evidence at trial.
Preliminary Matters
At the commencement of the appeal hearing, the applicant submitted that this Court should disqualify itself from hearing the matter on the grounds of apprehended bias. He contended that every member of the Supreme Court was similarly biased. The applicant submitted further that his application for permission to appeal should be referred to another court. Those applications were refused. The reasons appear in the transcript at pp 3-7.
The applicant then sought an adjournment of the hearing so that he could make an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court against this Court’s refusal to disqualify itself. He also said that he was not ready to make submissions on the substantive application. This was despite the fact that he had previously made submissions to support his application for permission to appeal before Kelly J, as the single judge hearing his application. The application to adjourn was also refused. The reasons appear in the transcript at p 10.
In his written and oral submissions, and in written communications tendered in evidence at trial, the applicant makes a number of serious allegations about a large number of ministers of the Crown; members of the Australian and South Australian Parliaments; judicial officers; and other public officers. They are generally of a scandalous nature. No factual basis has been provided to support the allegations. The applicant appears to have a fixation, to the point of an obsession, about paedophilia. This appears to colour his view of anyone who he perceives to be not responding favourably to some claim, application or contention of fact made by him. The applicant alleges that a number of public identities are either paedophiles or paedophile lovers and then asserts that, because those allegations have not previously been denied, the doctrine of estoppel operates so that his allegations ought to be regarded as established. The applicant’s understanding of the doctrine of estoppel in this respect is erroneous.
As I have said, a number of the applicant’s allegations are scandalous. They are repeated in these reasons only to the extent that they are necessary to understand the evidence or the applicant’s submissions.
The applicant made wide-ranging complaints concerning the conduct of the trial and the evidence which had been presented. His written submissions indicate 46 separate grounds of complaint. Although not articulated in this way, the applicant’s submissions were, in effect, that the jury verdicts were unreasonable in that they could not be supported by the evidence. In other respects the submission was that the verdicts constituted a miscarriage of justice.
Two of the applicant’s complaints involve a question of law. He does not require the permission of this Court to appeal on those grounds.[4]
[4] Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 352(1)(a)(i).
The test applied by this Court on an application for permission to appeal is whether the grounds of appeal are reasonably arguable. I propose to consider the applicant’s principal complaints only. In my opinion, the balance of his complaints are not arguable at all and do not require individual consideration.
It is convenient to consider the applicant’s principal complaints under the sub-headings which follow. This involves some grouping of the complaints.
The Grounds of Appeal
The Evidence of Ms Browne-Baldock
Ms Browne-Baldock was the principal prosecution witness for the incident of 17 November 2005.
The applicant drew attention to claimed discrepancies between the account given by Ms Browne-Baldock to the Australian Federal Police on 17 November 2005 and her oral evidence at trial. Ms Browne-Baldock told the police that the applicant said to her, through the open car window, “Tell him he’s gone. He’s a fucking paedophile. I’m gonna get him. You tell him.” In her evidence in chief, Ms Browne-Baldock described the incident as follows:
A.Okay. I put down my window, I turned to speak and this gentleman put his face right in the window and said “Tell him he’s gone” and pointing at the building, “He’s a fucking paedophile, tell him I’m gonna get him”, words similar to that. Pretty much those words, actually.
Q.What was his demeanour as he was saying that to you?
A.He was very red-faced, very very angry, pointing wildly and screaming at me with his face only inches from mine.
Later in her evidence-in-chief, Ms Browne-Baldock said that the phrase “I’m gonna get him” may have been said twice, but the rest had only been said once. In cross-examination, Ms Browne-Baldock said that “Tell him” had been repeated, but she was less certain that “I’m gonna get him” had been repeated.
Ms Browne-Baldock did not mention anything in her evidence-in-chief or in her statement to the police on 17 November 2005 about the applicant spitting on her during the incident. In cross-examination, the applicant elicited the following evidence:
Q. Were you spat on as I talked to you?
A.Yes, actually. There was a spray on me. I was most offended by that and I did comment about it to other staff but it was just when people talk sometimes that happens.
It is clear that Ms Browne-Baldock was referring to the unintentional spray of saliva which sometimes occurs while a person is speaking, not to an action of deliberate spitting. The applicant submitted that the omission of Ms Browne-Baldock to mention the saliva spray to the police at the time of her written statement undermined her credibility.
The applicant also submitted that the evidence of Ms Browne-Baldock should be regarded as a complete fabrication.
The applicant made submissions to the jury about all of those matters. In summing-up, the judge also reminded the jury of those submissions of the applicant. The judge also reminded the jury of the applicant’s submission that as an employee of Senator Minchin, Ms Browne-Baldock was partisan and inclined for that reason to exaggerate her account.
The jury saw and heard Ms Browne-Baldock give evidence. It was for the jury to assess her honesty and reliability. In my opinion, the particular discrepancies (if properly called discrepancies) mentioned by the applicant were quite minor. It cannot be said that the jury’s verdicts are consequently unreasonable. I note that although there were no witnesses to the actual incident with Ms Browne-Baldock, her account of the applicant’s behaviour on the morning of 17 November did receive some support from the evidence of Mr Jensen and Ms Ross, and from the damage caused by the applicant to the glass panel. The email communications, including those received on 17 November, indicated the applicant’s resentment towards Senator Minchin and his increasing agitation about the lack of acknowledgement by the Senator of his correspondence.
In my opinion, this group of complaints is not reasonably arguable.
The Conduct of the Trial
The applicant made a number of complaints about the conduct of the trial by the trial judge.
Before addressing those complaints, it is appropriate to say something about events which occurred before the trial. At a number of directions hearings, the applicant told judges of the District Court that he did not intend to seek legal representation and would represent himself. More than once, he was urged to consider obtaining legal representation but chose, as was his right, to represent himself.
At a directions hearing six weeks before the trial, the trial judge provided extensive information to the applicant about the conduct of a criminal trial before a jury. He explained trial processes including arraignment; jury empanelment (including the defendant’s right of objection and how to exercise that right); the taking of evidence (including evidence-in-chief, cross-examination and re-examination); the necessity to take all evidence from each witness at the one time; the right of the applicant to elect whether to give evidence (and considerations relevant to the exercise of that right); summing-up to the jury at the end of the case; and the ability of the judge to provide assistance during the trial and the limitations upon that ability. In other words, the judge went to some lengths before trial to ensure that the applicant had an adequate understanding of the trial process.
The applicant submitted that the judge had erred before and during the trial in ruling certain evidence as irrelevant and hence inadmissible. The judge refused to allow the applicant to pursue an allegation of misappropriation of public monies by a Minister of the Crown; to cross-examine Ms Browne-Baldock about issues the applicant had raised with Senator Minchin which had received no response; to cross-examine Ms Browne-Baldock as to her knowledge of certain Liberal Party identities; to cross-examine Ms Browne-Baldock about aspects of her personal circumstances and history (for example about the years in which she had not worked while having children); and a range of other matters. The applicant submitted that these errors resulted in an unfair trial. He also submitted that these rulings indicated bias towards him by the judge. There is no substance to any of these complaints. The judge was clearly correct in his rulings about the irrelevance of these particular issues. The judge allowed the applicant a considerable degree of latitude in the cross-examination. Despite the relatively narrow compass of the issues concerning Ms Browne-Baldock, her cross-examination lasted for more than one day.

The applicant submitted that the judge had erred in allowing emails written by the applicant and addressed to Senator Minchin and others to be admitted into evidence. In my opinion, the judge did not err in this respect. The emails written prior to 17 November 2007 were relevant to the increasing level of frustration and irritation felt by the applicant towards Senator Minchin. The email of 17 November 2005 to Senator Minchin included an admission by the applicant of breaking a glass panel at the Senator’s office that morning and an apology for “scaring” the staff. This was capable of being regarded as an admission of his conduct involving Ms Browne-Baldock.
The applicant complained of bias by the judge. There is nothing in this complaint. A review of the trial transcript shows that the judge was at pains throughout the trial to ensure that the applicant had a fair trial. He intervened on several occasions to provide assistance to the applicant by, for example, reminding him of the need to put his own case to the prosecution witnesses; pointing out his entitlement to test on the voir dire the request of prosecution witnesses to refresh their memory from notes; mentioning the basis upon which evidence adverse to the applicant could be excluded; excluding evidence which was adverse to the applicant; allowing, over prosecution objections, the applicant to cross-examine on a number of issues; directing that two prosecution witnesses be recalled for further cross-examination because the applicant had not, despite earlier cautions from the judge, properly put his case to them; and, in the final stages, allowing the applicant an adjournment in which to consider whether to call any evidence in his own defence. A review of the trial transcript belies altogether the applicant’s assertion of bias by the trial judge. The mere fact that some of the judge’s rulings were adverse to the applicant does not indicate bias.
In my opinion, this group of complaints is not reasonably arguable.
The Evidence Concerning the Incidents of 14 February 2006
Mr Beshara and Mr Mills gave evidence that on 14 February 2006 they were looking for the applicant in order to apprehend him. He had not, in compliance with his bail, attended in the Adelaide Magistrates Court on 10 February 2006. These same two officers had arrested the applicant on 17 November 2005, and Mr Beshara had dealt with the applicant on two previous occasions. Both officers were familiar with the applicant’s appearance and it would have been reasonable for the jury to infer that the applicant was familiar with them.
The applicant was critical of the evidence of Mr Beshara and Mr Mills. He suggested to the jury, and on appeal, that they could not have seen him from their car when they said they had. Even if they had, he said that they would not have been able to identify him as the cyclist, taking into account the distance, his movement and his helmet. The applicant contended that the footpath width was insufficient for him to have diverted towards Mr Beshara. He submitted that the prosecution had not excluded the possibility of unavoidable accident.
At trial, the applicant tendered a number of photographs of the location where the incident with Mr Beshara and Mr Mills took place. The applicant drew attention to some undulation in the road and to several stobie poles and verandah posts which, he submitted, would have interrupted the view of the police officers from their vehicle. In his final address to the jury, the applicant submitted that Counts 2, 3 and 4 had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. In particular, he submitted that it had not been proven that he knew at the time that Mr Beshara and Mr Mills were police officers or that he had intended to cause harm.
The applicant submitted to the jury that the evidence disclosed that Mr Beshara and Mr Mills had colluded to present adverse evidence to him. This was evident, he submitted to the jury, because both had made an identical mistake in the recording in their notes of the time at which they had attended Senator Minchin’s office on 17 November 2005. He claimed that their evidence was a fabrication.
The judge reminded the jury, in his summing-up, of the various criticisms made by the applicant.
I have reviewed the entire trial transcript. I have done so having particular regard to the criticisms made by the applicant. The various matters that the applicant relied upon were put by him to the jury. It was for the jury to assess the honesty and reliability of Mr Beshara and Mr Mills, taking into account the criticisms made by the applicant. It was open to the jury to accept their evidence as honest and reliable and to act accordingly. The features of their evidence which the applicant criticised did not mean that their evidence could not be regarded by the jury as reliable.
On my review of the evidence, I do not consider that it is reasonably arguable that the jury verdicts did not have a reasonable basis in the evidence. Nor is it reasonably arguable that a miscarriage of justice has occurred.
The Status of Senator Minchin as a Commonwealth Public Official
To make out the first count, the prosecution had to prove (amongst other things) that on 17 November 2005 Senator Minchin was a “Commonwealth public official”. That expression includes a member of either House of the Australian Parliament.[5] To prove that Senator Minchin was a Senator, the prosecution tendered a copy of a letter dated 2 November 2004 from the Governor of South Australia to the Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia. That letter attached a copy of the Writ for the Election of Senators for the State of South Australia issued by the Governor on 31 August 2004, together with the Certificate of Election of Senators for the State of South Australia dated 2 November 2004, issued by the Australian Electoral Officer for South Australia, Mr Drury. By that Certificate, Mr Drury certified that Senator Minchin had been duly elected as a Senator for the State of South Australia.[6] Similarly, Her Excellency the Governor certified in her letter of 2 November 2007 that Senator Minchin had been duly elected as a senator. This material was clearly admissible pursuant to s 45B of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA).
[5] See the Dictionary of the Code.
[6] See Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) s 283.
Strictly speaking, this evidence did not prove that Senator Minchin was still a senator as at 17 November 2005. However, there was also the evidence of Ms Browne-Baldock concerning her employment in the electorate office of Senator Minchin. The jury was entitled to conclude from the whole of this evidence that Senator Minchin was a Commonwealth public official as at 17 November 2005. It was not necessary, as the applicant contended, for the prosecution to have called the Usher of the Black Rod in the Senate.
This complaint about the adequacy of the prosecution proof of the status of Senator Minchin involves a question of law only, and is a ground of appeal which does not require the permission of this Court. In my opinion, the ground is not made out.
Finally, it was not necessary, as the applicant contended, for the prosecution to have called witnesses so that he could explore issues concerning the validity of Senator Minchin’s candidacy or election.
Was a Relevant Threat to Cause Harm Proven?
One submission of the applicant may be construed as a complaint that the evidence of his conduct on 17 November 2005 could not, even if accepted by the jury, have been regarded as amounting to a threat to cause harm for the purposes of s 147.2(2) of the Code. Such a submission raises a question of law, and thus permission to appeal is not required.
Count 1 in the Information was that Anastasios Manolakis:
On the 17^th day of November 2005 at Kent Town in the state of South Australia, made to another person, namely Beverley Browne-Baldock, a threat to cause harm to Senator Nick Minchin, a Commonwealth public official because of the status of the said Senator Nick Minchin as a public official, being reckless as to causing the said Beverley Browne-Baldock to fear that the threat would be carried out; contrary to s 147.2(2) of the Criminal Code (Cth).
Particulars of Offence
The defendant approached Senator Minchin’s electorate officer, Ms Browne-Baldock, and made threats against the Senator. The defendant appeared to be upset and agitated.
The judge instructed the jury that they had to be satisfied of the following six elements to find that Count 1 had been proven:
1.that on 17^th November, 2005, Senator Nick Minchin was a Commonwealth public official;
2.that there was a threat by the accused to cause harm to Senator Nick Minchin;
3.that the threat was made to Ms Browne-Baldock;
4.that the threat by the accused was made intentionally, that is, he meant to threaten Senator Nick Minchin;
5.that the threat to Senator Nick Minchin was because of his status as a public official; and
6.that, in making the threat, the accused was reckless as to whether the threat would cause Ms Browne-Baldock to fear that harm would be caused to Senator Minchin.
The submission of the applicant may be construed to be that the words and conduct attributed to the applicant by Ms Browne-Baldock could not reasonably be understood as a threat to cause harm to Senator Minchin and that the evidence did not justify a conclusion that he had intended to threaten Senator Minchin. In other words, even if the prosecution evidence was accepted at face value, that the second and fourth elements had not been made out.
For the applicant’s conduct to constitute a relevant threat, it had to be a threat to cause Senator Minchin physical harm or harm to his mental health.[7] The prosecution case was that the applicant’s conduct constituted a threat to carry out physical harm to Senator Minchin. The judge explained to the jury that such physical harm did not include the type of force or impact that falls within what is acceptable as incidental to social interaction or to life in the community.[8] The judge instructed the jury that they had to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant had made a threat to cause the kind of harm to Senator Minchin outlined above.
[7] See the definition of “harm” in the Dictionary of the Code.
[8] Ibid.
On one view, the words of the applicant could be understood as not involving any threat to cause physical harm. The words could instead be understood as a statement of intent to expose publicly the conduct which the applicant alleged against Senator Minchin, or to cause some other detriment to him, perhaps of a political kind. If the applicant’s conduct comprised only the words spoken, there may be some force in this submission. However, Ms Browne-Baldock’s evidence was that the applicant’s conduct comprised more than his spoken words. Ms Browne-Baldock described the applicant as very angry and appearing to be out of control. The words were screamed at her at very short range while the applicant was pointing wildly. The applicant’s whole presentation, as described by Ms Browne-Baldock, had a tenor of violence. The applicant’s conduct in breaking the glass panel that morning was also relevant to the jury’s characterisation of his conduct. It too suggested that the applicant was willing to resort to a form of violence.
It was for the jury to consider whether the conduct of the applicant amounted to a threat to cause harm to Senator Minchin. In my opinion, when viewed as a whole, it was reasonably open to the jury to characterise the applicant’s conduct as a threat to cause Senator Minchin physical harm. In other words, I am satisfied that this ground of appeal has not been made out.
Conclusion
I do not propose to address separately the remaining complaints of the applicant. They comprise matters which were of little moment in the trial. It is sufficient to say that, in my view, they do not constitute reasonably arguable grounds of appeal.
I would refuse the applicant permission to appeal. In relation to the two complaints which involve questions of law and in respect of which an appeal lies as of right, I would dismiss the appeal